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A b s t r a c t
In investigating the adoption process of a crop called “citrus siam ” in a South 
Sum atran rubber-smallholding village, Belatung, the im portance of externality of other 
villagers in a villager’s decision making was noticed. Neo-classical economics generally 
uses a model in which individuals are trea ted  as atom istic, self-interested and independent 
beings, and a ttem pts have rarely been made to incorporate an individual’s relative socio­
economic position into a utility function framework. Previous a ttem pts, which may be 
placed under the broad haeding of ” interdependence approach” , are so far simplistic, and 
still in their infancy.
On the other hand, the sociological and anthropological literature has paid greater 
a tten tion  to these aspects. Approaches developed for analysis of a person’s socio-economic 
position can provide useful concepts for economists to develop realistic economic models 
of human behaviour. Techniques of sociological network analysis appear to be particularly 
useful for economists to utilise in their work.
In this thesis, firstly, the interdependence approach literature and basic literature of 
adoption process are reviewed. Secondly, villagers’ interactions with each other are 
carefully described with sociological network analysis techniques. On this basis, thirdly, a 
model of expected utility which explicitly incorporates both a person’s absolute and 
relative income levels is developed for the analysis of the “Cancian Dip” or “upper-middle 
class conservatism ” hypothesis. Finally, with d a ta  collected from the village, Belatung, 
hypotheses and propositions of the model are statistically tested.
The interdependence approach, though theoretically a little more complicated, is 
empirically proved to  be significantly more powerful in explaining the citrus siam 
adoption process in Belatung.
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G lo ssa r y  o f  I n d o n e s ia n  T e r m s
bagi tiga
BAPPED A
bedeng
BIMAS
bupati
cam at
cengkeh
adat System of traditional custom of Malay, Indonesia
bagi dua Sharecropping where harvest is divided into two halves, same as
paruhan
Sharecropping where harvest is divided into one third for landowner 
and two thirds for sharecropper
Badan Perencanaan Pem bangunan Daerah (Regional Development 
Program m e Body)
literally railway em bankm ent, but actually a  house divided into four 
sections each of which is for one family of a National Railway worker. 
Bimbingan Massal
literally regent who governs subdistrict in province, presently 
appointed Governor of province, 
head of a district in kabupaten. 
cloves
depo (depe, depa) about 170 cm, which is the length of two arms stretched out.
Indigenous unit of measurement, 
desa smallest adm inistrative unit, village
Dinas Perdagangan _ __
Trade Agency of M inistry of Trade and Commerce 
Dinas Perkebunan Estate Crop Agency of M inistry of Agriculture 
Dinas Pertanian dan Tanam an Pangan
Agency for Agriculture and Food Crops of Ministry of Agriculture 
(Food Crops Agency) 
duku Nephelium lappaceum
dukun traditional medical healer
dusun literally hamlet, bu t in South Sum atra corresponds to desa, smallest
adm inistrative unit, 
haji pilgrim to Mecca,
jeruk siam (jeruk siem)
citrus siam (C itrus Nobilis M icrocarpa Hoslk) 
sweet oranges (C itrus aurantium  or C itrus sinensis Osbeck.) 
subdistrict of province, regency, where bupati governs 
cotton
subdistrict of kabupaten, where cam at governs 
coffee shop, grocery shop in Malay 
village head, 
w ater buffalo.
head of a natural village, dusun, in South Sum atra, which now 
corresponds to an adm inistrative village, desa. 
preacher, mosque official, religious teacher 
pepper
upland, a plot of land. See also padi ladang.
lower land along rivers, floodbed. More than  once a year, these plots 
are flooded. It is divided into three levels, from higher levels, lebak 
tinggi (lebak pem atang), lebak tengah (lebak tengahan) and lebak 
rendah (lebak dalam ). For detailed discussion of geographical terms, 
see Takaya (1980).
jeruk manis 
kabupaten 
kapak 
kecam atan 
kedai kopi 
kepala desa 
kerbau 
kerio
khotib (khatib)
lada
ladang
lebak
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Lebaran 
Lebaran haji
religious feast celebrated a t  th e  end of the fast
religious feast celebrated on th e  10th day of D u ’lhijjah (an islamic 
calendar m onth) for haji.
LIPI
m arga
nakok
num pang
Lembaga Ilmu Penelitian Indonesia (Indonesian Insti tu te  of Sciences), 
adm inis tra tive  un it under kecam atan  
rubber tapper  (sharecropper)
a type of land lease system  where a  lessee, penum pang, is not required 
to pay any charges.
padi ladang Brush and grass on ladang are cu t with parang  (large knife) during the 
dry season. Dried brush and  grass are b u rn t  in November, and 
immediately after this, holes are punched out with a  six-foot long 
tugal, and 10 to  20 grains of rice seed are dibbled in each hole. Harvest 
is between April and June.
pangeran
parang
paruhan
prince in the S u ltan a te  system 
large jungle knife
sharecropping where harvest is divided into two halves, same as bagi 
dua
pasirah a village head during the  colonial period. The adm inistrative village 
then covered a  w’ider area, which now correspond with a  marga. After 
the independence, a  head of m arga.
pem atang  
pemborong 
P .J .K .A . 
ram b u tan  
Rupiah (Rp.)
raised area  along a  river, literally small dike in rice field or raised path , 
contractor,  builder and trad e r  of harvests  who organise hired labourers. 
Perusahan J a b a ta n  K ereta  Api (National Railway)
Lansium dom esticum
US$l =  R p .l000 , A $ l= R p .8 0 0  (1982-3)
sawah irrigated rice field
sekolah rak y a t  (SR)
primary school before 1945 
sekolah dasar (SD)
primary school after independence 
sekolah menengah p er tam a (SM P)
junior high school 
sekolah menengah a ta s  (SMA)
senior high school
sekolah menengah ekonomi p e r tam a  (SM EP) 
junior economic high school 
sekolah menengah ekonomi a ta s  (SMEA)
senior economic high school
ta lang (1) remote ham let of a  village (2) peneplain and terrace area, its soil is 
red and classified as red yellow podsol, very poor soil, deficient in 
nu trien ts ,  considered as having no potential for agricultural use.
tan jung  
toko kopi 
tugal 
ume
cape, tongue of land along a  river 
coffee shop in Indonesian 
long wooden stick
In to d ay ’s Malay culture , ume or u m a s tands  for upland fields where 
slash and burn  cu lt ivation  is practiced, is an an tonym  of sawah. In this 
area, however, ume m eans a  garden or a  plot of land in general due to 
the lack of sawah. T hus  um e and kebun(kebon) seem to be used 
in terchangeably by villagers.
U .P .P .P .K .K .R . Unit P eraksana  Proyek, P u sa t  Koagulasi K aret R akyat (Project 
Executive Unit,  Smallholder R ubber Coagulation Centre)
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1C H A P T E R  1
I n tr o d u c t io n
Independence is for the very few; 
it is a privilege of the  strong.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886
Independence?
T h a t ’s middle class blasphemy.
We are all dependent on one another, 
every soul of us on earth .
George Bernard Shaw, Pygm alion , 1913
All envy is p ropor tiona te  to  desire;
we are uneasy a t  the  a t ta in m en t  of another ,
according as we th ink  our own happiness would be advanced
by the addition  of th a t  which he withholds from us.
Samuel Johnson , The R am bler, 1750-52
1.1  R e se a rch  O b je c t iv e s
No m an is, in practice, a purely economic m an who is independent of other men, 
though a  m an tends to  claim proudly th a t  he is in principle an independent man who is 
not influenced by o thers .  M odern economics has been established on the  foundation of 
th is  principle ra ther than  on actual practice, but with th is  foundation it has well 
approx im ated  various economic s ituations so far. M odern economics has even 
endeavoured on occasion to explain various sociological s i tua tions  and other situations, 
which had been generally tho u g h t  in the a rea  of o ther disciplines. Thus, the term  
“Economic Imperia lism ” has been ironically co ined .1
^ ad n i tz k y  and Bernholz 1985, and Hirshleifer 1985.
2However, as the world economic situation has become more complex and modern 
economics has failed to  advance suitable practical remedies, a number of criticisms 
against its foundations have been voiced by outside groups. A t the same time, as modern 
economists have looked into more micro-level economic situations, they have started  to 
realise the inappropriateness of the foundation themselves. Modern economists, however, 
have not been unaware of such difficulties, and the pioneers of modern economics always 
m entioned these in their classic works. They were ju st “assum ed-away” for the sake of 
simplifying theories, or worse for protecting established theories in the knowledge th a t the 
incorporation of the concept of “interdependence” vitiated  these.
At present, the movement towards incorporating the concept of “interdependence” 
into modern economics is gaining momentum , although it lacks a common integrated 
approach.
These problems have been well understood by economists and economic 
anthropologists dealing with non-western economies who have engaged in field research. 
For example, the adoption of agricultural innovations in developing agriculture has been 
tackled by economists with various ad-hoc frameworks until recently. This phenomenon 
has been often better explained by rural sociologists than economists. It is only recently 
th a t a solid theoretical framework for the economic analysis of the agricultural adoption 
process has been proposed.
This study has two objectives.
Its first and major objective is the presentation of a theoretical framework for 
economic studies of adoption process of new technologies in agriculture, which is based on 
the concept of interdependence.
Its second objective is to  test the interdependence approach model with empirical 
data. It is useful to focus on a situation where many of the “external” factors in the 
environm ent facing potential adopters are similar. It was decided to study the adoption 
process in the village of Belatung in South Sum atra, Indonesia, for this purpose. This 
village has traditionally been a rubber-smallholding village; however, in recent years, 
many villagers have adopted a  new crop, locally known as “citrus siam ” .
31.2 B ack grou n d  o f the C ase S tudy
W ith the realisation th a t the “oil boom” may be nearing its end, the Indonesian 
governm ent’s national priorities have shifted to non-oil and non-natural gas industries. 
Indonesia’s rubber industry, in particular, has been regarded by the government as a most 
im portan t industry with good potential for growth. However, the lack of effective 
estate/sm allhold ing  cash crop extension services and problems with research have delayed 
the execution of any swift change of the national priorities to  supporting these industries 
as opposed to  the traditionally im portant agricultural food crop sector. In recent years, 
many rubber smallholders have switched from rubber to  other cash crops whose gestation 
periods are much shorter than rubber, or whose profitability is much better than rubber 
in the short term . Depending on regional conditions, rubber smallholders have been trying 
coffee, cloves and many other tree crops or fruit crops.
In South Sum atra where rubber smallholdings dom inate rubber production, and 
which is one of the major rubber producing areas of Indonesia, this change of rubber 
sm allholders has been widely observed. Especially, citrus siam has been widely tried by 
rubber smallholders as an alternative crop, and has been very successful.
C itrus production has long been adopted by Indonesian farmers from Bali to 
Sum atra, but has not been widely commercialised due to insufficient domestic 
consum ption. In these days, although relevant national sta tistics are lacking, a significant 
increase in demand for citrus can be seen due to the Indonesian people’s changing dietary 
pa tte rn . In city areas, citrus fruits are consumed by a large proportion of people directly 
or indirectly in the forms of fresh juice, tinned juice, granules or powder. The reaction on 
the supply side has been so rapid th a t the M inistry of Agriculture has warned th a t rice
o
farm ers should not intercrop rice and citrus for the purpose of mere short term p ro f i t /  
Rice farm ers in Java have started  producing citrus on mounds between rice, and getting 
significant profits out of this.
C itrus production is thus becoming very popular, but is vulnerable to disease. The 
export of saplings/grafts of citrus to outer islands is prohibited for fear of transferring
^See the article of Kom pas on 15 August 1983 (Kompas 1983c).
4diseases experienced in Java. Nevertheless, farmers of ou ter  islands or Javanese 
t ran sm ig ran ts  have still been trying to  t ran sp o r t  them  from Java .  However, farmers in
o
the  dow n-stream  areas0 of South S u m a tra  have also been producing a  kind of citrus, 
c i trus siam, since the 1950’s, and during the federal period and before the 1965 coup, it 
seems they even exported it to Singapore th rough Palem bang. Because of the 
cen tralisation  under the New Order regime, its export from Palem bang to  Singapore was 
banned, and due to the wide-spread citrus virus disease in the  area, production decreased 
greatly.
The revival of its production in South S u m a tra  s ta r ted  in the early 1970’s, bu t  in 
the  mid- and up-stream  areas in the province to  avoid disease. Farm ers in the new areas 
seem to have acquired the techniques to produce citrus siam by observation or by learning 
from their fellow farmers or relatives who produced citrus siam during the previous boom. 
During the previous boom, these new areas were m arginal production areas mainly 
because of high t ranspor ta t ion  costs.
Thus, rubber smallholders in the new areas, formerly the  marginal areas for citrus, 
have gradually switched to citrus siam production from rubber production which has been 
suffering from decreasing profitability due both  to decreasing productivity  of the old 
rubber s tands and to relatively poor prices in the area.
This growing popularity  of citrus siam was not in te rrup ted  by the sudden increase 
of profitability of coffee in 1976. Although it was grown widely in the up-s tream  areas, 
coffee was not suitable in the lower region. During the surge of coffee prices, farmers in 
the mid- and down-stream  areas have actually adopted  c itrus siam. The surge of coffee 
prices did not last for long, bu t by the early 1980’s the popularity  of citrus siam had 
gained more m om entum .
In these circumstances, extension services for citrus siam production have been 
strongly dem anded by farmers. The Food Crop Agency (Dinas Pertan ian  dan T anam an  
P a n g a n ) is in charge of this crop and has the great  potential to  diffuse the  information
9
The province of South Sum atra has traditionally been divided into three in relation to its rivers. 
From the east, down-stream areas, mid-stream areas, and up-stream areas.
5effectively through the agency’s Kontak Tani (contact farmer) system ,4 which has been 
operating in sawah rice growing areas.
However, as mentioned above, the up- and m id-stream  areas in South Sum atra have 
traditionally  been under rubber smallholdings, and the Agency’s contact farm er system is 
not yet established there although this is intended.
For the establishm ent of the contact farmer system , the selection of the contact 
farm er in a village is naturally a  key aspect. Usually, the agency asks a  village head to 
recommend one farm er for the job. The village head seems to select himself or a powerful 
farm er next to him in his own group. The selection may be viewed as very political one, 
and tends to  end up in the “top-down” approach. This “top-down” approach has 
sometimes been found to have a disturbing effect on diffusing information.^ The contact 
farm er selected may monopolise information from the authority  or he may not convey 
villagers’ opinion to the authority  for his own benefit. He may be isolated in term s of 
inform ation flows in the village. Although he may be an im portant person in the village, 
he may be too “different” from other villagers for them  to receive his influence from. In 
this case, the inform ation from the authority  may diffuse, but the authority  is unlikely to 
obtain feedback about farm ers’ reactions or problems through him. Much depends on the 
village structu re , and on individual characteristics of the person selected.
Economics has little to say about the characteristics of individuals as agents of 
technology diffusion. It can suggest tha t a rich farmer is generally quick to adopt, but has 
nothing to contribute about information flows, or about whether the richest farmer can 
effectively influence others. This is because conventional analysis assumes atom istic, 
as tructu ral, discrete, individual and independent roles for farmers. The nature of 
com parative statics analysis provides for only a monotonic relationship, for example, 
between a farm er’s wealth and his adoption behaviour, saying th a t non-monotonic 
relations can ultim ately be reduced to a set of monotonic relations if they are identifiable. 
However, in actuality , there may be some explanatory variables which influence the 
dependent variable in opposite ways depending on its range, and cannot be decomposed.
4For a discussion of the contact farmer system, see Benor and Harrison (1977). 
^Agarwal (1983)
6In sociological studies of adoption /d iffusion  processes, Cancian  (1967, 1979) .has 
strongly argued for a  curvilinear or ra ther  non-monotonic rela tionship  between socio­
economic s ta tu s  measured in term s of w ealth  or income levels and farm ers’ 
innovativeness. Rogers, in his distinguished works on adoption /d iffusion  (Rogers 1983), 
trea ted  C an c ia n ’s findings ( “Cancian Dip” ) as a  warning against a  blind usage of 
monotonic assum ptions.
The “top-dow n” approach backed by the findings of economic studies based on 
m onotonicity has been pointed ou t as not being conducive to  or satisfactory for the 
explanation of the process of adoption/diffusion. A t the o ther extrem e, the “grass-root 
pa r tic ipa tion” approach seems also to have problems. The selection of change agents 
within a village such as con tac t  farmers, should be carefully conducted paying great 
a t ten t ion  to th e  relationship between adoption behaviour and characteristics of people 
who are likely to  become the source of information.^
In the recent economics l i terature , a framework useful for the analysis of social 
s truc tu re  and information has gradually been developed, namely, the interdependence 
approach (interdependence utili ty  function approach).^  However, in many respects, this 
approach is as yet a t  an early stage of development.
In this s tudy , an a t tem p t  is m ade to develop an empirically tes tab le  model based on 
this interdependence approach and drawing on the network analysis developed in the 
sociology of social s tructure . Some hypotheses which relate the citrus siam adoption 
process in a rubber-smallholding village in South S u m a tra  to  the villagers’ individual and 
s truc tu ra l  characteristics will be derived and statis tica lly  tested. Non-monotonic 
relationships between adoption behaviour and its explanatory  variables will be carefully 
explored.
^Agarwal 1983, Rogers 1983, and Benor and Harrison 1977.
^Hirsch 1977, Hayakawa and Venieris 1977, Boskin and Sheshinski 1978, Becker 1974, Layard 
1980 and Scitovsky 1976.
71 .3  T h e s is  S tr u c tu r e
This study is presented in the following way.
In the rest of Chapter 1, the literature of theoretical adoption/diffusion process 
models is first reviewed. Economic and sociological studies of contextual effects on 
individual behaviour for the purpose of integrating these two disciplines and the 
adoption/diffusion process models are further discussed. Dynamic aspects associated with 
the integration are also reviewed. Research m ethods adopted for this study are then set 
up according to  the results in literature reviews.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the description of the village, Belatung, in South Sum atra, 
Indonesia, in term s of basic general characteristics and its economy, especially 
agricultural economy.
In C hapter 3, the village’s socio-economic structure captured by network analysis is 
described, and villagers’ reference groups are derived and related to the structure of 
interdependence among villagers.
In C hapter 4, the citrus siam adoption processes in South Sum atra and in a village, 
Belatung, are described in detail in relation to other m ajor crops. Villagers’ times of 
adoption are then related to the structure of interdependence.
In Chapter 5, the interdependence utility function is form ulated and a measure of a 
villager’s a ttitude  towards risk is derived from the interdependence utility function. This 
measure is related to adoption behaviour, i.e., the scale and time of adoption. Relations 
between the adoption behaviour and variables associated with the interdependence utility 
function are derived and hypothesised.
Chapter 6 supplies empirical statistical exam inations of hypotheses derived in 
Chapter 5.
Finally, in Chapter 7, the process and results in this study are summarised, and the 
advantages of the interdependence approach are discussed subject to  the limitations 
imposed by the facts (1) th a t contextual effects were measured with particular methods 
which are likely to have influenced the results, and (2) th a t the adoption process of citrus 
siam was studied in only one village. Some research and policy recommendations are also
discussed.
81.4 R ev iew  o f  L iterature
Several existing models of the intra-farm  diffusion process, economic and 
sociological studies of the contextual effects, and dynamic aspects of the 
adoption/diffusion process associated with the contextual effects studies, are reviewed 
here.
1.4 .1  T h eoretica l M odels o f the Intra-farm  D iffu sion  P ro cess
A study of the diffusion process of an agricultural innovation in a  certain area can
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be decomposed to three components. The first com ponent is a farm er’s time of adoption 
of the innovation concerned, and the second is the farm er’s scale of adoption over time. 
The intra-farm  diffusion process can be described with these two components. Further, if 
an agricultural innovation in a small village is studied, the adoption process in term s of 
the extent of the innovation adopted in the whole village can be derived from these two 
components, provided th a t a survey is properly conducted.^ This is the third component 
of the diffusion process and called the inter-farm diffusion process.
Few models have been formulated until now for analysis of the intra-farm  process.
1.4 .1 .1  M ansfie ld  M odel
Mansfield (1961, 1968) developed im itation models for both inter-firm  and intra- 
firm diffusion processes.
Mansfield (1968) made the following assum ptions. Firstly, the proportion of-new 
adopters to non-adopters is a function of the profitability of the new technology (assumed 
constant) and the level of uncertainty associated with the new technology. Secondly, the 
level of uncertainty is a function of the initial level of uncertainty and the ratio of total 
adopters to all potential adopters in a system. Thirdly, the level of uncertainty is, 
further, linearly related to the ratio of total adopters to all potential adopters. Finally, 
the ratio  of the level of uncertainty to the initial level of uncertainty is inversely related
^Lindner, Pardey and Jarrett (1982) called this the adoption lag (A.L.) and separated it into (1) 
the discovery stage lag (D.S.L.) and (2) the evaluation stage lag (E .S.L .). The D .S.L. is the period 
from availability to awareness and the E.S.L. refers to the period from awareness to first use of the 
innovation.
well constructed random survey can approximately capture the adoption process of the whole 
village, while a census survey is, of course, the m ost accurate method despite various associated  
costs.
9to  the ra tio  of adopters  to  all potential adopters .  These assum ptions  reflect the decision 
m akers’ im ita t iv e  a t t i tu d e ,  and are very intuitive..
Mansfield fitted logistic curves to  d a ta  of intra-firm  diffusion processes of diesel 
locomotives in United S ta tes between 1925 and 1959. He explained abou t 70 percent of 
the  variance of the  derived speed of adoption by some charac teris tics  of f irm s.10
1 .4 .1 .2  S to n em a n  M odel
Stonem an  (1981) showed th a t  Mansfield’s model canno t explain the stylised fact of 
the  sigmoidal curve of the diffusion process, when Bayesian learn ing11 is applied to  the  
revision of the  level of uncertain ty  associated with the new technology. He developed an 
adap tive  portfolio model involving Bayesian learning. In this model, the Freundian utility  
function, which consists of the mean and variance of to ta l  re tu rn  from two technologies 
and ad ju s tm en t  costs, is maximised to  derive the optimal allocation ra te  of the new
t o
technology as a  function of means and variances of two technologies. The optim al 
allocation ra te  is adaptively revised according to means and variances of two technologies, 
which are revised in the Bayesian manner. He showed (1) the more profitable the  
technology, the  higher the level of usage and (2) the more risk averse the firm, the lower 
the  level of usage.
10The speed of adoption is defined as a coefficient of tim e in the logistic function. 
C haracteristics used to explain the variance are (1) profitability of a diesel locom otive, (2) tim e lag 
from the first diesel locom otive adopter, (3) operation size, and (4) liquidity (Mansfield 1968, 
p. 185).
11See Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) for the concept of the “Bayesian learning” and its 
application to agricultural decision analysis.
12 The Freundian utility function has the following form:
u(Xi ) = a E ( X i ) - 1-bVar ( Xi ) - C
where X- is the i-th individual’s income and E(*) and Var(*) are respectively an expectation  
operator and variance operator. C is the disutility of adjustm ent costs.
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1.4 .1 .3  F ed er  M odel
Feder (1980) and Feder and O’M ara (1981) developed an expected utility 
m aximisation portfolio model. They assumed that: instead of Bayesian learning, the 
change of variance of yield of the new crop (technology) depends negatively on time and 
on the to ta l acreage of the new crop. Here, time captures the exogenous im provem ent of 
information about the innovation, such as th a t derived from a more efficient distribution 
system of information from outside sources, and the to ta l acreage represents farm ers’ 
cum ulative experience with the innovation, the communal “learning by doing” .
Simulations with this model produced sigmoidal curves and some implications 
concerning the income distributive effects of innovations. In the sim ulation, the lower
i  o
limit of landholding size of adopters gradually diminishes as the variance of yield of a 
new technology decreases. This decrease is assumed to be a function of two independent 
variables, time, and the total area of new technology. They related this lower limit 
landholding size to the land-holding distribution of the study area. Consequently this 
model can generate a sigmoidal curve of the number of adopters over tim e. It should be 
noted th a t the economic structure of an area, for example a village, can be described not 
only by landholding distribution, but also by many other economic factors, such as 
distributions of income and items of human capital (e.g. educational a tta inm en t).
1 .4 .1 .4  L indner M odel
Lindner, Fischer and Pardey (1979) constructed a simple model based on Bayes 
Theorem to derive a farm er’s time of adoption, assuming th a t the am ount of information 
a farmer collects each unit of time is constant. The model suggests tha t; ( l)  the time of 
adoption is earlier when the innovation is more profitable, (2) the tim e of adoption is 
related to  a farm er’s initial degree of pessimism about relative profitability of the 
innovation (farmer’s initial expected difference between average yields from the new and 
old technologies), (3) the tim e of adoption is earlier if the initial degree of conviction is 
stronger, i.e., the inverse of variance of difference between yields from the new and old
1 o
10“Critical landholding size”. Farmers with landholdings smaller than this will not adopt the 
innovation, while larger farmers will adopt it at least on a portion of their land.
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technologies initially expected by a farmer is greater, and finally (4) the tim e of adoption 
is inversely related to the farm er’s degree of confidence about the quality of information, 
which is represented by a ratio of the number of observations to the real variance of 
difference in yields from two technologies.
Lindner and Fischer (1982) improved portfolio models by introducing the concept of 
“quality of inform ation” . This concept represents the quality of information collected for 
revisions of decision m akers’ belief of new technology, i.e., the distribution of returns from 
the new technology. Information about the new technology from adopters to  a  potential 
adopter is classified as “indirect information” , while information from farm ers’ own 
experiences with the new technology is classified as “direct inform ation” . They explained 
the possibility of “rational rejection” of a profitable new technology by a potential 
adopter. A farm er’s rational rejection can happen if he is restricted to  sources of 
information which he greatly discounts. Even though he collects unlimited quantities of 
information from them, its quality does not reach the level required to  adopt the 
innovation.
1.4 .1 .5  G ladw in  M odel
Gladwin (1976a, b, 1979, 1980) developed a completely different model of a farm er’s 
adoption behaviour. Her model’s distinct feature is th a t she regards the decision of 
adoption vs. non-adoption (rejection) as a product of a hierarchical decision process in 
which a series of decision criteria is used in Yes-No judgm ents. This hierarchical theory 
of choice, initially developed by Tversky (1972), states th a t people generally do not make 
complicated calculations of the overall utility changes associated with alternatives. It is 
argued th a t an individual’s decision process is represented by a hierarchical decision-tree, 
with decision criteria a t each node (branching point) of the tree.
Her model’s advantage, according to Ongkili (1985), lies in ’the scope generated for 
comparing and testing the influence of additional or alternative factors th a t are perceived 
to lim it adoption’. Ongkili states also th a t this point is im portant in the light of the 
tendency among economists to  focus on only a limited num ber of adoption constraints 
when investigating the problem of low adoption levels of new technology. For instance, 
empirical studies which have concentrated attention on the risk factor as an inhibitor of
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adoption (Moscardi 1979, Dillon and Scandizzo 1978) fail to test the relative importance 
of risk compared to  other lim iting factors such as non-profitability, lack of knowledge, 
lack of capital or credit (Ongkili 1985). Hence, her model is helpful to locate decision 
criteria in a particu lar adoption process in a particular area.
Another advantageous feature of Gladwin’s model is th a t it avoids the cumbersome 
process of eliciting decision-makers’ utility functions for tests of risk a ttitudes, or even the 
use of socio-economic da ta  for the same purpose.
Her model also has problems, however. Firstly, for the construction of a 
hierarchical decision tree, researchers have to have very close interaction with decision­
makers especially for identifying which criterion is superior to  others. This is a most 
demanding requirem ent for researchers. Secondly, her model does not allow (1) any trade­
off among decision criteria and (2) any feed-back process. Her model rejects one of the 
major principles of neo-classical production and consumption theory, and fails to consider 
dynamics of the adoption-diffusion process. The lack of consideration of feed-back, in 
which a potential adopter may loosen his decision criteria according to his last decision­
making itinerary represented by the decision tree is the major demerit of her model. 
Accumulation of the feed-back process naturally leads to consideration of the trade-off 
among decision criteria. Hence, Gladwin’s model with the feed-back process incorporated 
can be regarded as an equilibrium model, and it may converge onto the same analytical 
results tha t neo-classical models produce.
These models reviewed here are regarded as the most im portant ones dealing with 
the core of the adoption/diffusion process. The necessity of modelling the farm ers’ 
collection and evaluation of information available to them  from others as well as from 
their own experiences, has emerged.
The Lindner model has utilised the concepts of quality of “direct information” and 
“indirect inform ation” . These concepts now turn  out to be crucial for the development of 
a theoretical model of the adoption/diffusion process. If a simple aggregation by tim e, 
total products, or number of adopters is not allowed, information flows m ust be directly
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considered, and by some means the relationships between information sources *and 
recipients have to be conceptualised. In other words, one person’s effect on another 
person’s decision making, in term s of information quality or information evaluations has 
to  be considered. A structure of these relationships or effects among all potential sources 
and recipients of information about agricultural innovation has to be elicited by some 
means.
Studies of the effect of the structure of the relationships of components of a system 
on behaviour of these components have been called studies of “contextual effects” . They 
have been developed mainly in sociology, but implicitly in economics, too. The 
development in economics has been more formal (m athem atical) and rigid, but the 
assistance of the sociological studies is required for its operationalisation in economics.
1 .4 .2  C o n te x t u a l  E ffects  a n d  In d iv id u a l  E ffects
The basic assumption of the neo-classical economics th a t a decision-maker is 
completely independent of other decision-makers’ characteristics and behaviour in his 
decision-making is a paradigm at the present stage of the development of economics. 
There is another paradigm atic assumption, in the sociological literature th a t the impact 
of the decision-maker’s society on his decision-making cannot be ignored. This paradigm 
is a more general one than the former in the sense th a t the former paradigm  is a special 
case of this paradigm . This has rarely been treated in economic literature although itjhas 
long been recognised but “assumed-away” by neo-classical economists. In other words, the 
effects of his social context can in itself be as significant as the effects of his individual 
characteristics in the determination of his individual behaviour. These effects of social 
context have been called “contextual effects” in sociological literature, and the 
assessments of contextual effects have been represented by a linear model in which 
measures of individual behaviour are regressed on combinations of individual 
characteristics and their group-level averages or dummy variables which indicate 
memberships of certain groups (Boyd and Iversen 1979, Blalock 1984).
Erbring and Young (1979) argued:
If social context is to  affect individual behavior, such effects must be 
transm itted  through processes that are somehow contingent upon the social 
structure  in which the individual is embedded. Thus a specification of group-
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level effects on individual outcom es requires, first of all, a  careful exam ination  of * 
possible linkage m echanism s through which the  hypothesized “con tex tua l 
effects” m ight operate. In particu la r, it shall be argued th a t  con tex tua l effects 
m ust be conceptualised as a  consequence of processes of in teractions am ong 
ind iv iduals in a social netw ork.
Such in teractions are  generally classified in to  tw o categories: (1) face-to-face 
con tac ts  between pairs of individual decision-m akers and (2) sym bolic categorical 
re la tions shared am ong all individual decision-m akers in a given g r o u p . I n  netw ork 
analysis, an approach based on the first type of in teraction  is called the  rela tional 
approach , and one based on the  second type is called the s tru c tu ra l approach . The 
re la tional approach focuses on social processes of contagion underlying s u c h 'g ro u p  
phenom ena as assim ilation and  co n trast. The s tru c tu ra l approach , on the  o ther hand , 
focuses on socio-psychological processes of com parison underlying such “reference group” 
phenom ena as com petition , em ulation , iden tification , facilita tion  and inhib ition . W ithou t 
reference to in teractions in e ith er form, the notion of con tex tua l effects tends to  become 
theoretically  vacuous.
In economic studies, con tex tua l effects are increasingly recognised as the basic 
concept for various subjects as indicated below. W hichever type of in teraction  may be of 
in terest in relation to  these contex tual effects, it has to  be recognised th a t individual 
decision-m akers belong to the  contex t of a social system  as well as to  d istinc t personal 
categories. Decision-m akers are  related to o ther decision-m akers in the  social system . 
They receive inform ation from  others, and eva lua te  it according to  their own positions in 
the social system  as well as to  their own personal characteristics. Decision-m akers m ust 
thus be regarded as “c o n te x tu a l” ^  instead of as “ind ividuals” .
In the next sub-section, economic stud ies in which the con tex tua l effects are 
incorporated  either explicitly or im plicitly are reviewed in the search of an in tegrated  
fram ework to  tre a t the co n tex tu a l effects which explain the adop tion /d iffusion  of 
innovations.
^ S ym b olic  categorical relations include ( l)  sym bolic interactions based on the equivalence of 
two persons’ patterns of interactions with all others (structural equivalence) and (2) relations based 
on the equivalence of two persons’ individual socio-economic characteristics with no respect to their 
actual interactions (categorical equivalence).
^H am aguchi (1982)
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The trea tm en t of contextual effects and social interactions in sociological studies, 
especially in network analysis are also reviewed.
1.4.3 E co n o m ic  Studies o f  C on tex tu a l E ffects
In this section, firstly, the existing adoption/diffusion m odels’ implicit trea tm en t of 
social in teraction which involve contextual effects is reviewed. Secondly, Becker’s explicit 
treatm ent of social interactions is evaluated. Thirdly, utility function models which 
include relative income levels in the utility function are examined. Finally, interdependent 
preference models are inspected.
1 .4 .3 .1  S oc ia l In teraction s in  E conom ic M od els o f  the D iffu sion  P rocess
Since Griliches and certain sociologists debated the effects of social interactions in 
reference to  studies of hybrid corn diffusion in the United S ta tes ,1  ^ the concept of such 
interactions has been implicitly included in diffusion models of innovations. However, the 
concept has often been included in term s of the “to tal area” 1 or “total product” 10 of the 
innovation in the surrounding region of the farms under study, and sometimes simply in 
term s of “tim e” . ^
The underlying assum ption of this social interaction concept is th a t the quality of 
information about an innovation improves over tim e through the various search activities 
of decision-makers, and is proportionate to the number of their chances to observe the 
innovation. This assumption is plausible for an overall regional scale study of a diffusion 
process, bu t hardly appropriate for a small scale detailed study such as th a t of the 
diffusion of a new agricultural technology in one village. This is because the quality and 
quantity  of the information a farmer collects cannot be increased and improved in an 
exogenously determined way, but rather through socio-economic interactions among 
villagers. It may be true, of course, th a t socio-economic interactions increase with time, 
total area, etc, so that the use of these proxies captures social interactions in a stochastic 
and not determ inistic sense. In a small scale study, the stochastic representation of socio-
^Griliches (1957, 1960, 1962), Brandner and Straus (1959) and Havens and Rogers (1961). 
^Feder and O’Mara (1981).
18Mansfield (1961, 1968).
^Davies (1979), Feder and O’Mara (1981).
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economic interactions by their proxies may thus be very erratic, and it may well be better 
to investigate directly the socio-economic interactions themselves.
1 .4 .3 .2  B eck er ’s Social In teraction  M odel
Becker studied social aspects of the household, such as fertility, m arriage, divorce
opi
and education of children, and further studied social organisations / 0  In one basic study, 
he treated  social interactions ^ 1 in a utility  function model which includes the 
characteristics of other persons that affect a person’s output of consumables. In Becker’s 
study, for example, a person’s utility function consists of his “distinction” in his 
occupation, and some m arket goods or services. His distinction involves the opinions 
about him (as he perceives it) held by other persons in the same occupation, and is 
determined by both his “social environment” and his effort to change. The “social 
environm ent” is the aggregated situation of the opinions about him before he makes an 
effort to change them. As the result of the inclusion of the “social environm ent” variable 
into a person’s utility function as an endogenous variable, and the assum ption th a t his 
expenditure on consumables and his effort to change his environment are perfect 
substitu tes in his utility function, socio-economic transactions, i.e., “social interactions” 
in Becker’s term s, have to occur immediately between him and other persons in his 
occupation.
Such immediate socio-economic transactions involving other persons’ income lexels 
in a person’s utility function mean that an envious person has to immediately force others 
to transfer parts of their incomes to him. Criminal activities can therefore be explained in 
this framework. With such a model, envy cannot simply be interpreted as incentive 
to make an effort to increase a person’s utility through an increase of his own controllable
20Becker (1981, 1983).
21Becker (1974, 1976a).
22Becker (1976b).
O O
°Being “envious” is defined differently in various studies. Varian (1974) states that if an agent 
prefers another agent’s bundle to his own at a given allocation, the first agent “envies” the second. 
Rawls (1971) defines “envy” as “the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others, 
even though their being more fortunate than we are does not detract from our advantage” (p.532). 
Becker states that “an envious or malicious person presumably would feel better off if some other 
persons become worse off in certain respects” (1974, p.1088). The definition used here follows 
Becker’s.
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consumables in a way th a t does not harm others. Becker’s straightforw ard inclusion of 
other persons’ characteristics as endogenous variables into the utility function leads to a 
narrow interpretation of the effect of a person’s envy on others, i.e., th a t envy always 
harm s others.
Becker’s model thus explains how social interaction between two persons takes 
place, on the assumption th a t the degree of a person’s evaluation of o thers’ opinion about 
him can be measured in some form. In order for this model to be operational in 
explaining the difference of interactions with many other persons, the degree of evaluation 
of information from each other person should be measured and compared, and be directly 
incorporated into a utility function by some means.
Becker’s utility function approach towards social interactions can easily 
accom modate a finite number of decision-makers. However, Becker does not internalise 
the “social environm ent” in his model. The formation of this social environm ent is not 
endogenous in the model. For example, how, and by w hat means his “distinction” in his 
occupation is determined is not investigated. This problem seems to be treated as a 
totally  sociological concern. But at least it can be argued th a t the “social environm ent” in 
term s of the decision-maker’s distinction is determined by his socio-economic 
characteristics relative to others’ corresponding ones. A simplistic example of this 
mechanism is his relative income or wealth level(s) to others, or his rank of wealth level 
in the relative income utility function models which are reviewed in the following section.
1 .4 .3 .3  R e la tive  Incom e U tility  M odels
Pigou (1962) noted th a t “ ... the satisfaction which a man derives from the 
possession of a given income depends not only on the absolute am ount of income, but also 
on the relation subsisting between it and the incomes of other people” . Duesenberry 
(1949) stated th a t “Our theory ... depends upon the validity of a single hypothesis, viz.: 
th a t the utility index is a function of relative rather than absolute consumption 
expenditure” , and developed his relative income hypothesis. And G albraith  (1958) more 
dram atically argued th a t “people are poverty stricken when their income ... falls 
markedly behind th a t of the community” . Recently, Hirsch (1976) introduced the 
concept of the “positional goods” . Thus, economists have known the existence and
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im portance  of the contextual effects on individuals, bu t rarely constructed  a  formal model 
of the  con tex tua l effects following such sta tem ents .
Only recently, formal models of contextual effects in the above framework have 
s ta r ted  emerging. Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) considered the optim al redistributive 
tax a t io n  system  using a utility function which includes a  person’s relative income level as 
well as his absolute  income level, and solved Mirrlees’ problem of the regressivity of 
m arginal tax -ra tes  (Ng 1983).^
Layard (1980), w ithout referring to the Boskin-Sheshinski model, developed a utility 
function model which includes the relative income level as well as the absolute income 
level. This model was s t im ulated  by the study of relative deprivation by Runciman 
(1966). T he concept of “relative deprivation” indicates th a t  a person’s satisfaction 
decreases if o th e rs ’ satisfaction, or characteristics from which satisfaction is derived, 
increases or is expected to increase. In L ayard’s s tudy, two features of hum an  nature  are 
considered: (1) the desire for social s ta tus  and (2) the expectation of income and social 
s ta tu s .  These features, together with the present income level, are incorporated into a 
utili ty  function for the analysis of public policy, such as th a t  involving taxation  and 
education , especially examination systems.
In his formulation of the utility function which incorporate the relative income 
level, Layard noted with interest th a t  Runcim an’s s tudy indicated the following:
For the  evidence is th a t  people are mainly bothered about the income of 
people close to them in the income distribution and do not suffer greatly from 
the riches of the rich (or the poor), unless they happen to be nearly rich (or 
poor) themselves. Thus one cannot really assume th a t  s ta tu s  is determined by a 
person’s income relative to  mean income.
In place of the relative income level, Layard introduced a  person’s percentile rank- 
order in the earnings distribution into the utility function as a  continuous variable, and 
conducted his analysis. This presents a  major problem. Although he had recognised a 
person’s differentiated suffering on account of different persons’ income levels, he did not
o i
^Mirrlees (1971) derived an optimal tax scheme which has a progressive tax-rate but a 
regressive marginal tax-rate. Various forms of utility functions and social welfare functions are 
used in later studies (Atkinson 1973, Helpman 1974), but still the regressive marginal tax-rate is 
present.
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account for th is by merely transferring the relative income into a rank order. Thus it 
seems th a t Layard misunderstood what Runciman m eant. W hat Runciman really implied 
in his book is the importance of the reference group to  which a person belongs. A person’s 
relative income level should be derived in reference to the income levels of members of his 
reference group. The concept of social rank does not represent this a t all. For example, if 
Person B whose social rank is just one rank above Person A swaps his social rank with 
Person C whose social rank is two ranks above Person A, Person A is not affected at all, 
because his social rank is unchanged. If Person B belongs to Person A’s reference group 
and Person C does not, a change in Person A’s utility can be expected. In order to 
introduce th is aspect, a person’s reference group should have been first identified, and 
then the person’s relative, rather, subjectively relative, income level should have been 
calculated by, for example, corresponding different weights to the reference group’s 
m em bers’ income levels as well as non-members’ income levels.
Katz (1983) also incorporated a person’s social rank in term s of ascending order of 
wealth ranks, and analysed the person’s risk a ttitu d e  assuming th a t he is risk-averse with
o r
respect to both absolute wealth level and social r a n k / 0 He found th a t a utility function 
incorporating social rank corresponds with the Friedman-Savage utility function 
(Friedm an and Savage 1948), in which one’s a ttitu d e  towards risk changes from risk- 
averse to risk-taking or vice versa as one’s absolute wealth level increases, depending on 
the wealth distribution within the system. This result immediately encounters the
°Let Uj be Person i ’s utility function which consists of his absolute wealth level, X-, and his 
social rank, Rj. K atz’s assumptions are:
in
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problem  of a  rich person’s insurance behaviour and a poor person’s gam bling .(the 
gam bling-insurance paradox), as well as the problem  discussed above w ith respect to 
L a y a rd ’s u tility  function. T here is no room in th is  model for the  ad ju s tm en t over tim e 
which has been in troduced to  overcome the gam bling-insurance paradox .
1 .4 .3 .4  I n te r d e p e n d e n t  P re feren ces  M o d e ls
If, in th e  relative incom e u tility  model, d ifferent w eights are given to  different 
persons’ incom e levels to derive a person’s re la tive income level, the u tility  function with 
th is  defin ition  of the relative income level can be regarded as a u tility  function which 
rep resen ts  in terdependen t preferences. A person’s preference is regarded as dependent on 
o th e r persons’ socio-economic characteristics. T he degree of a  person’s dependence varies 
am ong his co u n te rp a rt persons. Therefore, relative incom e u tility  models are 
accom m odated  as special cases am ongst in terdependen t preference u tility  models.
In terd ep en d en t preferences have been studied by few scholars. D uesenberry (1949) 
applied  in te rdependen t preferences to an analysis of the choice between consum ption and 
sav ing , and to  an analysis of dem and grow th. Leibenstein (1950) in troduced the  concepts 
of “bandw agon effect” , “snob effect” , and “Veblen effect” . Johnson (1952) used 
in te rd ep en d en t preferences in an analysis of th e  effects of income d istribu tion  on 
aggregate  consum ption . Poliak (1976) incorporated  in terdependen t preferences into 
dem and analysis w ith a linear dem and system . H ayakaw a and Venieris (1977) jin d  
K ap teyn  e t al. (1978, 1980) and Van P raag  et al. (1979) in troduced a  sociological concept 
of “reference groups (space)” into their study of consum er interdependence.
However, only D uesenberry’s study is directly  suggestive for the analysis of the 
innovation  diffusion process. He assum ed th a t the  d istribu tion  of income was rectangular, 
i.e., th a t  incom e receivers were evenly d istribu ted  over a range of incom es from  zero to 
th e  m axim um  incom e level, and derived a curve which m onotonically converges to  a 
ceiling level. T h is  curve resem bles the upper p a r t of a  sigmoid which generally describes
■^Markowitz (1952), Zeckhauser and Keeler (1970), and Binswanger (1980). The Friedman- 
Savage utility function can explain the coexistence of insurance against the remote possibility of 
large loss, with gambling for the remote possibility of a large gain. However, this can imply quite 
unreasonable behaviour at other levels of wealth, such as a rich man in the convex area of the 
function not insuring himself against possibilities of the major loss.
21
diffusion processes. If it is assumed that the income distribution is a form of normal 
d istribution, it is intuitively suggested that the curve derived may well become a sigmoid. 
But Duesenberry did not do this, and no one else has done so until now.
In order for these interdependent preference models to be operative, measures which 
can indicate a  person’s effect on another person’s utility should be determ ined, and 
incorporated into the first person’s utility function or demand function. Poliak used 
constant interdependence coefficients to indicate and represent this effect, and 
incorporated them  in a linear demand system.
Even though Leontiefs input-output analysis, a widely used tool in economics, 
appears to be capable of providing a method for such measurement of these coefficients, it 
has rarely been conducted in economic studies.
K apteyn et al. (1978, 1980) and Van Praag et al. (1979) introduced “reference 
weights” , and measured them  according to persons’ similarities or difference in six socio­
economic characteristics, i.e, education, working-environment, job-type, degree of 
urbanisation, age and geography. These reference weights may represent persons’ 
symbolic categorical relations, but there is no assurance th a t they actually imply tha t 
the persons in teract with each other and pass information to and from each o t h e r . T h i s  
method seems to be the easiest way to argue if or how strongly any two persons are 
related. But w ithout assurance of their actual interactions, this approach may produce 
misleading results.
Leontiefs input-output analysis is a widely accepted tool so far to measure 
m onetary interdependence among economic agents in a system on the basis of their actual 
interactions.
S tructural path analysis of input-output matrices or social accounting m atrices 
(SAM) has been developed by Lantner (1974) and Gazon (1976, 1979). These authors 
form ulated the concepts of economic influence and structural path analysis to capture the 
transmission of influence within a structure. More specifically, whereas the reduced
27Refer to two categories of interactions in Section 1.4.2 on page 14.
28Refer Rogers and Bhowmick 1971.
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fo rm ‘d  provides the solution of a model by expressing endogenous variables as functions 
of exogenous variables, s tructura l  path  analysis a t tem p ts ,  in addition , to clarify and 
explain this solution through the  study of the  transm ission of influence within the matrix 
of economic transac tions ,  s ta rt ing  with changes in exogenous variables and proceeding to 
their u l t im a te  effects on endogenous variables (Defourny and Thorbecke 1984, p.119). 
These la t te r  au tho rs  in terpreted  an average expenditure propensity  and a  multiplier as 
the  respective intensities of direct and global influence.
By using an in p u t-o u tp u t  matrix of m onetary  transac tions  among decision-makers, 
their  m onetary  interdependence can thus be investigated (Michaely 1983). However, the 
m onetary  transac t ions  do not necessarily t ran sm it  inform ation to  and from decision­
makers. For the  detection of informational interdependence, and more general 
in terdependence, more general interactions am ong decision-makers in the input-output 
m atr ix  have to  be examined. Sociologists have realised the usefulness of the input-output 
analysis to  cap tu re  interdependence among decision-makers in a system, and developed 
network analysis. Network analysis methodologies are reviewed in Section 1.4.4.
1 .4 .3 .5  I n fo r m a t io n  Q u a l i ty  and  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e
T he concept of “information quality” was introduced by Lindner and Fischer 
(1982), as reviewed in Section 1.4.1.4, where information abou t  an innovation is classified 
into tw o categories, (1) “direct information” from a decision-maker’s own experience with 
the  innovation  and (2) “indirect information” from other adopters  of the innovation. 
These au th o rs  argue th a t  the “indirect in form ation” is less im portan t  than  “direct 
in fo rm ation” .
29 . .An input-output matrix model is usually set up as follows:
X  = A X  Y
where X is a vector of gross products of sectors (i=l,2,...,n), Y is a vector of final products 
(demands) of goods (i=l,2,...,n), and A is a matrix of input-output coefficients. The reduced form 
of this model is:
X = { I -  A) - 1 Y
where I is the identity matrix.
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It is also apparen t th a t  some clear differences exist between the levels of importance 
of sets of indirect information from two d is tan tly  located adopters . T he concept of 
“d istance” is thus introduced in some empirical diffusion process studies. Lindner, Pardey 
and J a r r e t t  (1982) studied the adoption process of trace element fertiliser in South 
Austra lia , and Ongkili and Quilkey (1983) studied rice farmers in Sabah, East 
Malaysia. u In these studies, a set of variables which represent the “dis tance” between an 
adop ter  and various sources of information abou t  innovations was found to  be very 
significant in explaining the time of adoption. The overall explanatory  power of the 
regression remained low, however.
In these empirical studies, formal institu tional sources such as extension service 
sta tions  and geographically closest adopters  are utilised as sources of inform ation about 
innovations. This is a  restriction which does not seem appropria te  for a small village 
level s tudy. Lindner, Pardey and J a r r e t t ’s study trea ted  an area  where farm ers were 
widely spread geographically, so th a t  the distance could be measured in kilometers. On 
the o ther hand, Ongkili and Quilkey’s study trea ted  rice farmers located very closely to 
one ano ther in Sabah villages. The distance variables were more significant in the former 
than  in the la tte r  study.
This disparity between the two studies is thought to be due to the restrictive 
selection of the information sources. More broadly, sources of indirect inform ation about 
an innovation can be classified into two categories:
1. System-external sources,
2. System-internal sources.
The “system ” comprises all potential adopters  in the study area. The system-external 
sources are not com ponents of the system, bu t are closely related to the potential 
adopters  as sources of information about the  innovation concerned. They comprise, for 
example, extension services working through local offices and farm visits, experiment 
s ta tions , agricultural radio programmes, agricultural magazines, and so on. T he system-
O 0
uOngkili and Quilkey (1983) introduced “psychic distance” variables and “institutional” 
variables as well as physical distances to information sources.
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in terna l sources are the com ponents  of the system. T hus  all the potential adopters- are 
sources of inform ation abou t  the  innovation by directly talking to  each other, or by 
allowing the ir  farms to be observed.
In a s tudy  of a geographically sparsely spread system covering a  wide area, the 
sys tem -in terna l sources of information may well be much less im p o rtan t  than  the system- 
ex terna l sources, unless there is an efficient com m unication system between potential 
adop ters .  In a  large sample study , the system-internal sources are often aggregated or 
represented  by a  particu lar  source for the purpose of operationability . Hence the 
aggregated  or represented system -internal sources lose their accountability .
In smaller area  studies, on the o ther hand, the com ponents of the system are closely 
located and very regularly exchange information abou t innovations as well as about other 
ac tiv ities .  System-external sources for each com ponent of the system may often be 
identical. T he  system -internal sources may therefore be much more im portan t.  Thus in a 
small village, all farmers are by and large information sources for all farmers, and they 
can be located somewhere in the “information flow m ap ” .
However, the m anner of an individual fa rm er’s evaluation of the quality of 
in form ation  varies widely am ong farmers, depending on coun terpart  farmers. The 
inform ational s truc tu re  is hence defined as a set of all connected potential adopters in 
accordance with how they evaluate each other. The simplest example is th a t  of an 
inform ation  flow map, where decision-makers are connected if information flows between 
them . T h is  concept of the village informational s truc tu re  is justified if a  decision-maker 
does no t differentially eva lua te  the information he receives, i.e., if he accepts received 
inform ation  as it is, regardless of the person from whom he receives it. More plausible 
types  of informational s tru c tu re  can be imagined, however, and they are reviewed in
Section 1.4.4.
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1 .4 .3 .6  Risk and A tt itu d es  tow ards  Risk
After a  decision-maker receives information from others and evaluates it in 
accordance w ith  his relationships with others, he then revises his allocation of resources 
using the information received, tak ing  into account his a t t i tu d e  tow ards risk. This process 
m ay be simultaneous. If the decision-maker is more risk-averse, he needs more narrowly 
d is tr ibu ted  yield d a ta  a n d /o r  a  higher average yield. Lindner and Fischer (1982) clearly 
showed, in their Bayesian model, th a t  the necessary am oun t of yield d a ta  for a  decision­
m aker to adopt a  new technology increases as he becomes more risk-averse. Feder (1980) 
also showed this property in his expected utility maximising portfolio model.
In empirical studies of the adoption process, a t t i tu d e  tow ards risk has been used as 
a prim ary explanatory  variable for adoption behaviour, a lthough this is also assumed to  
be determ ined by various socio-economic characteristics.
In the li terature , it has been generally agreed th a t  risk-aversion is an im portan t 
d e te rm in an t  of adoption behaviour. Lack of adoption or slow adoption is expected if 
uncerta in ty  associated with the innovation is high, a n d /o r  if a  fa rm er’s risk aversion is 
high.
Because of the difficulty in directly measuring risk or risk-a tt i tude, there have been 
several indirect m ethods in which these variables are incorporated as determ inants  of 
adoption  behaviour. Feder et al. (1981) reviewed these indirect methods as well as direct 
m ethods, and pointed out their merits  and demerits.
The presence of a crop which is reasonably stable in risky situation  was regarded as 
a  de te rm inan t  of adoption of ano ther  crop (new crop) (G erhart  1975). This approach is 
potentially  misleading, because the adoption of the former crop is also to  be explained. 
T he adoption of multiple crops of villagers should be considered in a  simultaneous 
equation system, or the whole cropping p a t te rn  should be explained in a  single equation, 
where the cropping pa t te rn  is considered as a single crop. Thus, it is considered th a t  
crops o ther than  one whose adoption  is to  be explained or the cropping p a t te rn  of farmers 
should not be included as an explanatory  variable of the  crop being adopted , although it 
may show a  significant correlation with the adoption of the innovative crop.
The incorporation of location-specific dum m y variables thought to  represent risk or
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risk a t t i tu d e  has been used in a number of s tudies, b u t  these location-specific dum m y 
variables may also represent other factors such as soil fertility and rainfall. The 
m agnitude of risks associated with the environm ent can be directly derived by collecting 
relevant d a ta  in the field. If the study aims to  explain a  village-level adoption process, 
however, these environmental risks can be neglected on the basis th a t  they are alm ost 
identical am ong all villagers in the village. Of course, there may be a  variation in such 
environm ental risk between areas of the village, and  it will then be im p o rtan t  to  take  this 
into account.
There is another argum ent for the inclusion of risk as a de te rm inan t  of adoption  
behaviour from the information viewpoint. F arm ers’ ability to collect and evaluate 
information relevant to agricultural innovations influences their perception of risk. D a ta  
have been collected concerning contacts with extension services, dem onstrations, and 
other media services. However, the explanatory power of these factors depends on the 
performance of the extension services etc. As Feder et al. (1981, p p .16-17) pointed out: uIf 
the extension services has failed in the past,  the  m ost dom inan t factor may be the 
information gained by observing the procedures and performance of neighbours, friends, 
and relatives who have experimented with the innovation.” F arm ers’ information 
channels should thus not be limited to official sources.
It is considered more fruitful, however, to shift the focus to villagers’ a t t i tu d es  
tow ards risk from studying these environmental risks. A tti tudes  tow ards risk may be 
obtained through gambling experiments or other types of experiments (Binswanger 1980, 
Young 1979). However, such experiments tend to use the hypothetical conditions which 
may be totally  irrelevant to agricultural decisions, or the risk a t t i tu d e  measure is 
determ ined in the manner in which the measure may absorb all the variations from the 
predictions of the specified models. Their s ta tis tica l significance levels as determ inants  of 
adoption  behaviour were found to be mixed.
Thus, effort to  consider risks and risk a t t i tu d es  should be retained in the study with 
careful consideration of fa rm ers’ environmental conditions and informal channels of 
inform ation. T he context in which all potential adopters  are embedded should hence be 
carefully considered in a model of adoption behaviour.
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If the  village’s socio-economic s tructu re  is viewed as having an informational 
s t ru c tu re  where all the villagers are connected by information flows, the interdependence 
u ti li ty  function approach (which has already been recognised as a  good approach  to 
analysis  of socio-economic institutional aspects) may be able to combine the 
considerations on risk a t t i tu d e  and the village’s socio-economic s tructure . A m ethod 
which relates a person’s a t t i tu d e  towards risk with the form of his utility function has 
been established.*^ For analysis of economic factors in adoption/diffusion processes, 
however, a  workable model of this type has not yet emerged.
1 .4 .4  S ocio log ica l S tud ies o f C on textual E ffects
Network analysis has been recognised as a  good conceptual framework for studies of
o o
social s truc tu re  based on structural-functionalism  as opposed to  categorical analysis. L
In network analysis, a decision-maker’s norm may be derived from his relations with 
o thers  and his s tructu ra l  location in the system, as opposed to the given, cross-sectionally 
identical utility function of decision-makers in the neo-classical framework. The decision­
m aker may thus be seen as belonging to a system of o ther decision-makers whose relations 
or in teractions are captured through the use of networks, as well as to categories based on 
his socio-economic characteristics. Again, m em bership in certain categories can be 
in terp re ted  from the viewpoint of his s truc tu ra l  location and relationship with o ther 
m em bers of the system. Any interaction which t ran sm its  information about innovations 
between any two members of the system may then be viewed from these two m em bers’ 
charac teris tics  and their relationships in the specific system. A particular decision- 
m a k e r’s evaluation of information from a system -internal source, i.e., from ano ther  
m em ber, is affected by his relationship with th a t  source, and interpreted according to  
their  s truc tu ra l  relationship in the system.
T he network analysis of contextual effects on an individual’s behaviour can be
31 Although there are various better measures of risk attitude, the starting point is the Arrow- 
P ratt risk aversion index. The benefit of various new measures seems to be marginal. See for 
exam ple R o ss(l9 8 l)  and Zeckhauser and Keeler (1970).
32 The relationship between network analysis and structural-functionalism  was only recently 
discussed by McCord (1980) and Wellman (1983) although network analysis itself has been utilised  
by sociologists, anthropologists and others since as early as 1949 (Festinger 1949).
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classified into two approaches: (1) the relational approach and (2) the structural
0 9
approach, depending on the type of socio-economic interactions focussed. In this sub­
section, innovation diffusion studies in these two approaches are reviewed, and further, in 
relation to  a  person’s a ttitu d e  towards risk discussed in Section 1.4.3.6, Cancian’s study 
of “upper-m iddle class conservatism” is reviewed.
1 .4 .4 .1  R e la tio n a l A pproach
Sociological research on the diffusion of innovations has advanced significantly since 
the medical innovation study of Coleman et al. (1957) involving the relational approach
O  i
of network analysis, and its most notable recent contribution is the study of the  family 
planning diffusion process in Korean villages by Rogers and Kincaid (1981). The 
relational approach of network analysis has been developed in order to elicit the 
inform ational structure of social systems by emphasising face-to-face interactions which 
directly transm it information, and the approach has produced numerous concepts 
describing a social structure and the position and characteristics of individuals and groups 
in this structure . Some of these concepts are discussed below.
o r
Sociological research has shown th a t “social integration” 00 is positively associated 
with the earlier adoption of innovations which accord with social norms. It has also shown 
th a t social integration imposes “innovation homogeneity” 0® within subgroups of the 
social system , ju st as it forces prominent persons to adopt innovations consistent wjth 
social norms. Potential adopters who are socially integrated into a system of other 
potential adopters are (1) likely to be early adopters of an innovation which is in accord 
with the social norms and (2) likely to adopt an innovation a t a time when other 
potential adopters directly connected to them by relations or interactions which are
33 Refer also Section 1.4.2 on page 14.
^ R o g e r s  (1983), Chapter 8.
O C
°°A n g e ll (1968) classified social integration into three categories: ( l)  norm ative, (2) functional 
and (3) com m unicative integration. In the framework of relational approach of network analysis of 
social system , the term “social integration” means the degree of interactions among elements of the 
system  or the degree of interactions which are initiated by an elem ent or directed to the element. 
The form er can be regarded as representing the system ’s degree of social integration and the latter 
as representing the elem ent’s degree of social integration within the system . In this sense, the term  
“social in tegration” here corresponds with the com m unicative integration.
Pressure to adopt the innovation from adopters to non-adopters w ithin the same group.36
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relevant to  the innovation adopt the innovation. In addition, those who are on-the  
periphery of the system are (1) likely to be late adopters of an innovation which conforms 
with the social norm s,3  ^ while being early adopters of an innovation which does not 
conform with the social norms, and (2) likely to adopt innovations a t a time predicted by 
their personal preferences rather than by their relations with other potential adopters.
This conception of the relationship between social structure and the adoption of
oo
innovation00 has been operationalised through the use of two similar network variables 
which have slightly different meanings.39 The concept of “centrality ’’ refers to the extent 
th a t a decision-maker is involved in all relations among all decision-makers in the system, 
representing the dimension of the function of social integration in term s of his ability to 
com m unicate with other potential adopters. The concept of “prestige” refers to the 
extent th a t the decision-maker is the object of interaction initiated by other decision­
makers who are themselves the object of interaction, representing the dimension of the 
function of social integration in terms of influence over other potential adopters. For 
example, in a network, a person with whom more persons in teract has more prestige, and 
is more influential over others. As Coleman et al. (1957, 1966) pointed out and Knoke 
and B urt (1982) later elaborated, neither one of these two concepts can account for the 
apparent dissemination of medical innovations.
In empirical studies, the two variables are usually more or less highly correlated 
with each other depending on the social context concerned, and neither one can be singled 
out as the most appropriate index of social integration.
37
The innovation’s economic profitability may be considered depending on whether the social 
norm includes considerations on economic profitability.
o  o
°T his has been called the “centre-periphery” conception.
There are numerous statistics which measure the degrees of these two concepts. For detailed 
definitions, see Knoke and Burt (1982), Knoke and Kuklinski (1982), Freeman (1979), and 
Freeman et al. (1979).
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1 .4 .4 .2  S tru ctu ra l A p proach
Considering the difficulty of in terpre ting  the  function of social in tegration  in the 
framework of the relational approach, Burt  (1980a, b) proposed a concept of “structura l 
equivalence” ,4** and fu r ther a  s tructura l  approach (s truc tu ra l  equivalence approach, 
positional approach) in which symbolic in teractions am ong persons are focussed. He 
assum ed th a t  there are various statuses in a  system , replacing the two sta tuses  of the 
“centre-periphery” conception, centre and periphery, and related the concepts of 
“prestige” and “cen tra li ty” . These various s ta tuses  are shared by several persons, to the 
ex ten t  of the closeness of these persons in term s of “social d is tance” .
T he  social d istance between any two persons is m easured as the degree to which 
they m utually  do and do not in teract with th ird  persons. In other words, it is the 
difference between two persons’ patterns  of in teractions and non-interactions. While the 
relational approach only focuses on their actual in teractions, the s truc tu ra l  approach 
simultaneously and equivalently considers both in teractions and non-interactions.'**
“Social distance” is a concept similar to the one used by economists Blin and Cohen 
(1977) in tackling the aggregation problem of industries in an inpu t-ou tpu t  m atr ix .4  ^ In 
an in p u t-o u tp u t  m atrix , if two industries have an equivalent pa tte rn  of inputs and an
4**For detailed discussion of the concept of “structural equivalence” , see Lorrain and White 
(1971) and Burt (1980c).
4 *Social distance between tw o persons, i and j, is defined as follows: 
n
si j =  (zi k ~ zjk )2 +  (zk i ~ zkj)2
k = i
where Zj  ^ indicates the existence of interactions between i and k initiated by i.
A O
z This concept is also sim ilar to the concept of “sim ilarity index” in numerical taxonom y 
(Sneath and Sokal 1973, Dunn and Everitt 1982). For economic aggregation problems, see Fisher 
1969.
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eq u iv a len t o u tp u t p a t t e r n , t h e y  can be aggregated in to  one industry . As the  degree of 
th e  equivalence of in p u t/o u tp u t p a tte rn s  decreases, the  possibility of the  aggregation  of 
these  tw o industries decreases. R ather th an  m erely suggesting the  possibility of 
ag g reg atio n , how ever, B urt (1982, 1983) also proposed, on the basis of stud ies of 
“invisible colleges” and “interlocking d irec to ra tes” , th a t  the equivalence of in p u t/o u tp u t 
p a tte rn s  ind icates the degree of influence between tw o decision-m akers. In order to 
d irec tly  exam ine the  equivalence of tw o persons in the con tex t of the social system  they 
belong to , their social d istance is standard ised . T his standard ised  m easure is called a 
s tru c tu ra l  equivalence proxim ity .
B u rt, fu rther, construc ted  a person’s u tility  function w ith s tru c tu ra l equivalence 
p rox im ities as interdependence coefficients. T his u tility  function com prises tw o p arts . 
T h e  first p a r t is an ordinary u tility  function which evaluates a  person’s u tility  level 
accord ing  to  his level of adoption  of an innovation regardless of o ther persons’ conditions.
^Let Z-j be the am ount of inputs to the i-th industry from the j-th industry, then X-j be the 
ratio o f Z-j to the total amount of inputs to the i-th industry, j Ziy  ^jj be the ratio of Z-j to
the tota l am ount of outputs from the j-th, j Z--. The input pattern of tne i-th industry can be
represented by either a vector of
z i.  =  ( z , v  % . • • • .  z in) x { =  ( X u ,  ) .
Sim ilarly the output pattern of the j-th industry can be represented by either a vector of
* . / =  ( z i r  z 2 r  -> z n j )  <”■ Yr  1 Yir y2r V -
T he equivalence of the i-th and j-th  industries is measured by the same index as Burt used.
n
Si j = L  (Zik ~ Zjk )2 + (Zki ~ Zk;)2
k= 1
or
k=  1
^Burt’s interdependence utility function is:
lkiX iO' O' V- - >  fc l lu, = nxt L i t )-a  +  1 j g .  Xk
where 1- is i’s structural equivalence proximity to himself, i.e., independence coefficient, l^j is k’s 
structural equivalence proximity to i, i.e., interdependence coefficient of i on k, and Xj and X^ are i 
and k ’s adoption levels (dichotomous).
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T h e  second p a r t  “discounts” th e  person’s utili ty  according to  o thers’ adoption levels of 
the  innovation. In this discounting function, s truc tu ra l  equivalence proximities are 
incorporated  as interdependence coefficients. T he  degree of interdependence in terms of 
d iscounting the  person’s own utility  is p roportionate  to the ratios of his adoption level of 
the  innovation to o thers ’ levels of adoption. These ratios are weighted by corresponding 
interdependence coefficients and  summed up. Hence, the person’s utility is decreased when 
an o th e r  person’s level of adop tion  increases, w ith yet o ther persons’ adoptions remaining 
equal. Also, if the  person’s interdependence w ith  Person B is greater than  th a t  with 
Person C, the  m agnitude  of change in his utility when Person B ’s adoption level changes 
is g reater  than  when Person C ’s adoption level changes, provided th a t  these two persons 
have the identical initial adop tion  levels. In o ther words, the ra tio  of his marginal utility 
w ith  respect to Person B’s adoption  level, and also th a t  with respect to  Person C ’s level is 
determ ined by his in terdependence (coefficient) with these o thers .45
Burt derived some propositions which conform to the findings of the relational 
approach  to  diffusion detailed above. The main propositions are as follows: (1) a person 
will adop t  an innovation after persons whom he perceives to  be s tructura lly  equivalent to 
h im 46 have adop ted  it, in relation to his s truc tu ra l  equivalent proximity to these persons, 
(2) a person will adop t  an innovation for more personal, ra the r  than  social, reasons to the 
ex ten t  th a t  he does not have o th er  persons to whom he is close in term s of the structural 
equivalence proxim ity . This means th a t  he will ad o p t  according to his interdependence 
coefficient, regardless of w hether he is a t  the centre or periphery of a social system. '
While B u rt  used networks of various kinds of socio-economic interactions to derive 
the  m agnitude of symbolic in teractions between any two persons in the form of both
’More precisely, this ratio:
is also dependent on their adoption levels.
^Structurally equivalent persons who share the same status in terms of flows of information 
w ithin the network system .
A T
'In B urt’s term inology, they are structurally unique.
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social d is tances  and s truc tu ra l  equivalence indices, such symbolic interaction  may also be 
derived by “categorical analysis” . Here the focus is on the similarity  or difference of 
individual socio-economic characteristics between two persons (categorical equivalence, 
for example , Kapteyn et al. 1978, 1980, Van P raag  et al. 1979).48 If two persons are 
found to  have an identical range of socio-economic characteristics, they are assumed to 
have strong  symbolic interaction  of a certain kind. If they are found to  have a  different 
range of socio-economic characteristics, they are assumed to have strong symbolic 
in teraction  of another kind.
Categorical analysis cannot elicit the system of symbolic interactions which 
t ran sm its  information ab o u t  innovations. This  is because it t re a ts  each individual 
m em ber of the  system as an as truc tura l ,  independent and atom istic  unit,  concentrating on 
the  socio-economic characteristics of discrete individual members. Individual members are 
classified in to  categories, and expected to  behave similarly if they belong to the same 
category. T he  overall contex t of the system is ignored. Influence of one member on 
ano ther  in the  context is ignored. If Person B and Person C are the only persons who are 
in the sam e category in a system, and in ano ther system, Person D and Person E are in 
the  sam e category together with many other persons, it is easily imagined th a t  the 
symbolic in teraction  between the former two persons and th a t  between the la tter  two 
persons are quite different. Also only influences from outside the category are evaluated, 
on the  basis th a t  all villagers are located around an “average” villager within this 
category. Difference from the average villager is trea ted  as a randomly distributed  
deviation , which is eventually a t tr ibu ted  to some kind of “error” .
A nother reason is th a t :  as Rogers and Bhowmick (1971) s ta ted ,  neither the 
homophily (similarity) nor heterophily (difference) between socio-economic characteristics 
determ ines w hether or not information flows between two villagers.* 4^
T he adoption  of innovation in a village may thus  be studied through the use of
48See also Sections 1.4.2, p.14, and 1.4.3.4, p.21.
4^For more detailed discussion, See Rogers and Shoemaker (1971), Chapter 6, pp.210-215.
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network analysis, in which the village informational s truc tu re  is captured by using 
networks. T h e  “centre-periphery” and “s truc tu ra l  equivalence” conceptions may thus be 
used to  re la te  this s truc tu re  to the adoption of the innovation. Such an approach to  
s tudying  adop tion  would suggest th a t  some limitation is perceived to the applicability of 
conventional neo-classical economic methods. Indeed, according to the framework ju s t  
suggested, only villagers a t  the periphery of the system, or s tructura lly  unique villagers 
^  in B u r t ’s term , adop t  innovations according to their own independent economic 
preferences. The applicability of conventional economic studies would seem to  be 
restr icted to  these villagers.
1.4 .4 .3  C an cian  Dip
In rela tion  to the discussion of a person’s risk a t t i tu d e  in the economics l i terature, 
C anc ian ’s no tab le  hypotheses about the relationship between a  person’s innovativeness 
and his risk a t t i tu d e  is discussed here.
T he previously assumed monotonic relationship between villagers’ socio-economic 
s ta tu s  and  their  innovativeness has been questioned by Cancian (1967, 1976, 1979, 1980 
and 1 9 8 1 ) . If villagers are classified into quartiles according to their income levels, 
villagers of the lower-middle quartile are, Cancian argues, more innovative than those of 
the upper-m iddle quartile, while those of the top quartile  are most innovative and those 
of the b o t to m  quartile least innovative. This phenomenon has been called “Cancian Dip” 
or “upper-m iddle class conservatism” by diffusion researchers. Cancian Dip is also, 
Cancian argues, more d is tinc t a t the earlier stages of the diffusion process. As the process 
proceeds, it d isappears, because the upper-middle quartile  villagers catch up and pass the 
lower-middle quartile villagers.
C ancian  proposes th a t  when uncertainty is high in the early stages of diffusion, 
lower-middle quartile villagers will be more innovative than  upper-middle quartile 
villagers in a  social system, because they have less to lose. Later, when the innovation has
^ V illa g e rs  who are com pletely independent in their decision m aking.
^ S ocio -econ om ic status is generally represented by two variables in Cancian’s study (1979), 
incom e level and farm size. The innovativeness is represented by various variables such as tim e of 
adoption of an innovation, number of applicable innovations used, and percentage of an innovative 
crop.
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diffused m ore widely and is perceived as less uncertain , the g reater  socio-economic 
resources of the  upper-middle quartile villagers enable them  to  adop t  a t  a  faster ra te  than  
the lower-middle quartile  villagers, and th u s  to catch  them  up and surpass them  in term s 
of innovativeness.
T hus, the  Cancian Dip hypothesis corresponds to A r ro w -P ra t t ’s decreasing absolute
r n
risk-aversion hypothesis, bu t  goes fu r ther in postu la ting  th a t  there is a dip which 
disappears over time.
T he “Cancian Dip” hypothesis is difficult to  test s tatistically  with empirical da ta .  
Cancian (1979) tested it in 49 d a ta  sets, each of which represented a farming system  a t  an 
approxim ate ly  25 percent adoption level of some new technology. 23 of these sets 
supported  the existence of the dip (the first pa r t  of the hypothesis) while 26 did not. The 
second p a r t  of the hypothesis was supported  by 25 sets. If these d a ta  sets are divided into 
developing countries and developed countries, it can be found th a t  the hypothesis is 
supported  more in developing countries th a n  developed countries. Fu rther ,  it can be found 
th a t  the hypothesis is supported  more in areas where subsistence or staple crops are
r  o
mainly produced than  in areas of m arket-oriented agricu ltu re .00
T he empirical findings of the decreasing absolute risk-aversion hypothesis can be 
applied in a s tra igh tforw ard  m anner in developed countries or m arket-oriented 
agriculture. It can thus still be taken th a t  there is a m onotonic relationship between 
socio-economic s ta tu s  (measured in te rm s of income levels or farm size) and 
innovativeness. It should be noted, however, th a t  the  existing empirical support  for the 
decreasing absolute  risk-aversion hypothesis does not imply the rejection of the Cancian 
Dip hypothesis; the decreasing absolute risk-aversion hypothesis is actually a  necessary 
condition for the Cancian Dip hypothesis. It would be useful to  test rigorously for the
r  o
^Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) first proposed this hypothesis. As a person’s wealth level 
increases, his absolute risk-aversion decreases, and hence he becomes more innovative. Empirical 
studies are provided by Officer and Halter (1968), Bond and W onder (1980) in Australia, Dillon  
and Scandizzo (1978) in Brazil, Binswanger (1980) in India, O ’Mara (1971) in Mexico, Herath 
(1980) in Sri Lanka, and Hamal and Anderson (1982) in Nepal.
r  o
°Rogers (1983) divided these data sets into developing and developed countries. The criterion 
of his classification is not clear, and the numbers of the data sets which support the hypothesis in 
each classification could not be reproduced. However, a classification according to a com m on-sense 
criterion based on the descriptions of data sets in Cancian (1979) could produce almost identical 
numbers.
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presence of the Cancian  Dip in the d a ta  sets which have been used to tes t the hypothesis 
of decreasing absolute  risk aversion.
Although overwhelming evidence for the Cancian Dip has not been found, the 
a u to m a t ic  assum ption of monotonicity between socio-economic s ta tu s  and innovativeness 
in subsistence agriculture or in developing countries, especially a t  earlier stages of the 
adop tion /d iffusion  process is no longer w arran ted .
In conclusion, it may be said th a t  a synthesis of the insights gained from economic 
stud ies  of in terdependent preferences, and sociological studies of s truc tu ra l  equivalence 
m ay provide a promising approach to the study of the adoption/diffusion process of an 
innovation . It seems possible th a t  the incorporation of s truc tu ra l  equivalence into a 
person ’s utility function in term s of interdependence coefficients could provide a rigorous 
theore tica l  framework for the analysis of such processes. It may be a better  framework to 
view th e  s truc tu ra l  aspect of a  system and its relationship with the adoption/diffusion 
process.
1 .4 .5  D y n a m ic  A sp e c ts  o f  D iffu s io n  P r o c e s s  M o d e ls  
1 .4 .5 .1  L ea rn in g  P r o c e ss
In a transit ional society whose trad it ion  is being replaced by new developments, 
people are “cautious in ad ap ting  to a changing environm ent because tradition  and 
experience suggest th a t  caution is often a wise tactic  in the gam e of economic survival” .'’4 
M em bers  make a  series of short- term  plans with cautiousness, responding to feedbacks 
from m arkets  and the behaviour of others, because the task of completely estimating 
o th e rs ’ behaviour far exceeds any individual’s com putational capability.
Theoretical tools for such an adaptive strategy are developed in Day and Groves 
(1975). Day and Singh (1977) used the concept of “cautious optim isation” in a regional 
agricu ltura l  diffusion study. These au thors  showed th a t  the increasing diffusion of an 
innovation  is caused by the relaxation of self-imposed constra in ts , due to
54 Day and Singh (1977), p.10
37
“learning-by-doing” effects, and to the relaxation of financial constraints owing to 
surpluses generated by the previous adoption of the innovation. The concepts of learning- 
by-doing and “learning-by-looking” 55 are basic concepts within the framework of such an 
adaptive strategy.
In non-Bayesian models such as the Mansfield and Feder models, uncertainty 
associated with an innovation5  ^ is regarded as a decreasing function of the total area or 
to tal product of the innovation in the surrounding area of a potential adopter, and 
sometimes as a function of time in the simplest form. On the other hand, in Bayesian 
models such as the Stoneman and Lindner models, uncertainty associated with an 
innovation perceived by a potential adopter is regularly revised according to Bayes 
Theorem .57 A potential adopter is assumed to collect a fixed am ount of da ta  about the 
innovation’s performances in terms of yields, and to use this for the revision of the prior 
d istribution of yields. According to the posterior distribution of yields, he decides 
whether to adopt the innovation. If he does not adopt it a t this point, the revision 
process of the yield distribution continues. This appears to  be a more behaviouristic and 
more acceptable way of capturing the persons’ learning processes than the assumption 
th a t uncertainty associated with an innovation is simply dependent upon time and the 
to tal area of the innovation adopted.
In actuality , the am ount of yield data  collected by a person of an innovation 
depends on how much effort he makes in searching for it, on what sort of environment he 
is in in term s of gathering these data , and on how the overall adoption process in the 
surrounding area proceeds. A t earlier stages, the am ount of da ta  is small however much 
effort he makes, and it is natural to assume th a t a t later stages it becomes much greater, 
simply because of the sigmoidally accum ulating number of adopters and products of the 
innovation.
It may be argued, however, th a t in a  small village the am ount of da ta  a villager
55Lindner and Fischer (1982)
^Uncertainty associated with an innovation is represented by expected or actual variance of 
yields of the innovation in all existing models.
r  7
°'See Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977) for its application to agricultural decision analysis.
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collects does no t m a t te r  much. All villagers are , by and large, sources for all o ther 
villagers, as discussed in Section 1.4.3.5. Inform ation continuously flows in through the 
daily in teractions. W h a t really m a t te rs  w ith respect to the revision of a villager’s 
subjective d is tr ibu tion  of yields is the quality  of the inform ation he collects, and the way 
in which he eva lua tes  the inform ation. The evaluation of information can be included in 
a  theore tica l  model by introducing the concept of “interdependence coefficients” already 
discussed. A villager is assumed to  ad a p t  his resource allocation period by period 
according to  the  changes in his environm ent,  in te rm s of the economic conditions as well 
as the  s i tu a t io n  of o ther  decision makers.
1.4 .5 .2  N e tw o r k  S tab ili ty
T h e  incorporation  of network analysis into diffusion process studies presents 
difficulties, even though it may be considered a be tte r  approach than  categorical
r q
analysis .0 T he length of a diffusion process varies from very short, as for example, with 
the  17 m on ths  in the an tib io tics  prescription s tudy  by Coleman et al. (1957, 1966), to 
very long, as for example, with the 34 years of the locomotive study by Mansfield (1968). 
If the length of the process is reasonably short ,  the  s truc tu re  of the system of potential 
adop te rs  may no t change much. B ut if the length is long, the system s truc tu re  may well 
change so substan tia l ly  th a t  it is clearly necessary to incorporate the mechanism of 
s t ru c tu ra l  change in to  the network analysis model. If there is to  be some predictive value 
in network analysis, the com plete  instability  of networks cannot be adm itted .  On the 
o ther h an d ,  the ir  complete s tab ility  cannot be imagined. T hus, networks are assumed to 
be changing, w ith  some stable and  some unstab le bu t  predictable or observable elements. 
Similar difficulties of course apply to categorical analysis such as studies by Kapteyn et 
al. (1978, 1980) and Van P raag  et al. (1979).
Rogers and  Kincaid (1981) summarised a  variety of research results about network 
s tab il ity  in to  four propositions:-
^ R e fe r  Sections 1.4.2, p.14, 1.4.3.4, p.21, and 1.4.4.2, p.33.
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1. Spatially proxim ate l in k s^  are more stable.
2. Links representing ascribed, rather than achieved, interpersonal relationship
are more stable.®®
3. Homophilous links are more stable than heterophilous links.®* 1
4. Reciprocated links are more stable.
In many tropical developing countries such as Indonesia, villagers live very close 
together. Even though there may be some residential quarters in a village significantly 
different from others in certain aspects, the dispersion of these quarters is very stable over 
time because of kinship relationships and the lack of a housing m arket. The kinship 
structure (ascribed relationships) of a small village is usually a very dom inant factor in 
the general social structure, and continues to remain very stable unless considerable 
m igration takes place. In general, heterophily among villagers, causing instability of the 
network system , is generated by the adoption of technological or ideological innovations. 
Similarly, the flows of information about innovations can be regarded as non-reciprocal 
links. They may be initiated by adopters of the innovation to others, and the first two 
kinds of links can be regarded as the basis for considering the stability and the second two 
kinds of links may be produced and changed by the accum ulation of changes in the first 
two kinds of links as adoption/diffusion process develops.
However, if one accepts the generality of sigmoidal diffusion curves, the effect of 
innovation adoption on network stability is more m oderate a t early and later stages of 
diffusion, than  a t middle stages. Hence, if the network system a t the earlier stages is 
studied, it can be assumed th a t  the network system  has not yet changed much as result of 
adoption.
For these reasons, the network approach based on a single tem poral network can
°®Link m eans interactions or relationships between tw o persons in a system .
®®Ascribed relationships are, like kinship relationships, determined by persons’ births, and 
achieved relationships are, like membership in the sam e com pany, determined by persons’ statuses
achieved by their own effort.
1
OAH om ophilous links are links between two persons with sim ilar socio-econom ic characteristics, 
and heterophilous links are those between two persons with different socio-econom ic characteristics.
n c )
o z Links which are initiated by tw o persons concerned at the same time.
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still be meaningful, in a small village study of agricu ltura l innovations. If the network 
which cap tu res  relations and interactions originated from the diffusion of the innovation 
is add it ionally  considered, the approach will be fu r ther reinforced.
T h e  network stability  question is usefully regarded from the  point of view of the 
concept of “change of ta s te ” in utility function analysis. This  “change of ta s te” problem 
has been a critical point for the utility function analysis to  be applied to dynamic 
processes, and  has confined it within the range of com para tive  s t a t i c s . A s  seen in the 
in terdependence u tility  function model, a person’s tas te  can be represented by 
in terdependence coefficients in his interdependence u tility  function, and these are 
de te rm ined  by the network system to which he belongs. In o ther words, his utility 
depends on his environm ent as well as on his own individual characteristics. Therefore, if 
the  s tab il ity  of the network can be assumed, this problem of “change of ta s te ” can also be 
avoided in the  in terdependent preference approach.
1 .4 .5 .3  D y n a m ic  E x te r n a l  E c o n o m ic  C o n d it io n s
Economic changes induce the diffusion of existing as well as new technologies. 
N um erous supply-response studies are based on the effects of economic changes on the 
diffusion of existing technologies .^4 However, a supply-response type approach is not 
entirely suitab le  for studies of the adoption process. This especially applies to intra-farm  
diffusion, unless a threshold which determines a villager’s time of adoption^ is 
endogenously trea ted  in term s of the profitability of the relevant technologies. The 
supply-response type approach may be suitable for diffusion studies if many villagers have 
a lready adopted  the technology on a large scale, and if the expected or actual 
p rofitab ilit ies  of the relevant technologies are changing considerably over-time. A t the 
earlier s tages  of diffusion these conditions are not satisfied, however, and the supply- 
response ty p e  approach cannot appropriately explain these stages.
In existing theoretical models of diffusion process of an innovation, the profitability
^ R e fe r  Stigler and Becker 1977, and Rosenberg 1985.
D^Behrman (1968) provides a detailed exam ple of an agricultural supply-response study. 
Y otopoulos and Nugent (1976) presents general dem erits of supply-response models. Ghatak and 
Ingersent (1984) presents some recent development of the models.
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of the innovation is always assumed to be fixed over time. If a model deals with a very 
short period, this assum ption is quite plausible. But usually diffusion processes of 
innovations are quite long enough for their profitabilities to vary significantly.
In fixed profitability models, a potential adopter may be assumed to collect only 
physical yield d a ta  to revise his subjective d istribution of the innovation’s profitability. 
However, in variable profitability models, a potential adopter m ust also be assumed to 
collect price d a ta  of inputs and outputs as well as physical yields, so th a t he can calculate 
his net income from all sources, i.e., his to ta l profit.
In the la tte r case, all necessary inform ation about innovations, which will involve 
studying other farm ers’ performances is represented by the to ta l profit level. One model 
thus takes into account both the characteristics of innovations, on which existing 
theoretical intra-farm  diffusion models have focussed, and the profitability factors which 
supply-response studies have treated .
1 .4 .6  T o w a r d s  th e  In te r d e p e n d e n c e  A p p r o a c h  - D is c u s s io n
The development of theoretical models of the intra-farm  diffusion process and 
studies of contextual effects in both economics and sociology have been reviewed, and the 
au thor has endeavoured to seek the useful convergence of models for studies of the 
agricultural innovation adoption process. Following this review, it is suggested tha t the 
incorporation of the structural approach of network analysis into an economic model, 
using the interdependence u tility  function, is an appealing way to tackle the 
adoption/diffusion process. The problems associated with such incorporation are now 
discussed.
The particular specification of a utility function by Burt (1980a,b)^° has certain 
problems.
F irstly , the only endogenous variable is a person’s gain from adoption, 
dichotomously given. In order for the function to be integrated as either a relative 
income or interdependent preferences utility  function, a person’s income level should be 
the endogenous variable.
65See Footnote on page 31.
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Secondly, even if a person’s income level is incorporated into his utility function, 
B u rt’s u tility  function cannot be interpreted as a  relative income utility function in its 
sim plest form. The following form of the subjectively perceived average income level, X-, 
(harm onic average) is used for the comparison of the person’s absolute income level with 
th a t of o thers’:
n / ,
k = i x *
where lj^ is the interdependence coefficient of i with respect to k and is k ’s income 
level. This form ulation of the average income level evaluates a unit change in income of a 
higher income person as being of less significance than a unit change in income of a lower 
income person. It partly corresponds with Runcim an’s statem ent as noted by Layard 
(1 9 8 0 ).^  The above form involves a complicated in terpretation of the interdependence 
coefficients, however. It is therefore useful to use the sim plest form of a weighted average 
such as:
1
kiX k
giving the simplest in terpreta tion  to the interdependence coefficients.
Thirdly , B urt’s form of a utility function has a characteristic which is intuitively 
unacceptable. The marginal utility  with respect to a person’s income level is:
d &  a - i  X i
V
--------------  =  O l u X  • ~
d X . * X-
so th a t if the person’s relative income level, X-/X-, increases, his marginal utility of a unit 
increase in income is also increased. This contradicts the decreasing marginal utility 
theory, th a t  a poor m an’s dollar is more valuable than a rich m an’s dollar, and what is 
felt to  be the actual situation th a t a  dollar for a  man who perceives himself as poor in his 
society is much more valuable than  when he becomes richer in th society. In other words, 
an objectively or subjectively poor m an’s dollar is more valuable than an objectively or
®^See Section 1.4.3.3.
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subjectively rich man’s dollar. Burt’s form of utility function must therefore be rectified 
to conform to this recognition.
Fourthly, comparing Burt’s form of a utility function with that of Becker, the 
treatm ent of other persons’ income levels appears to be a problem. Burt did not assume 
other persons’ income levels to be either exogenous or endogenous in a particular person’s 
utility function. He just demonstrated how one’s utility changes when others change their 
income levels in an adoption process. Becker treated these income levels as endogenous, 
controllable by giving or taking certain amounts of income to or from other persons as a 
means for reaching an equilibrium. Becker’s treatm ent may be plausible for relationships 
within a household, but causes problems if applied to situations where relationships 
between households are considered. It is of course true that in a general context, 
monetary and non-monetary transactions which involve various sums of money or 
valuables are frequently observed among households. However, in many villages in 
developing countries, such monetary or non-monetary transactions among households 
within villages are often rigidly regulated by religious and traditional custom s.67
Further, and in relation to this fourth aspect, the problem can be looked at from a 
different point of view. The primary concern of this study is the explanation of a person’s 
adoption behaviour, rather than his initiation of interactions with other persons. If the 
latter are also included as endogenous variables these have to be considered on the basis 
of the similarity or difference between the person and his counterpart’s socio-economic 
characteristics. The actual external interactions which transmit contextual effects in the 
im portant manner already discussed (Section 1.4.4.2) are thus neglected. Therefore, such 
interactions or, more specifically, others’ income levels are better treated as exogenous 
variables. It is probably more appropriate to assume that a person is “harmlessly 
envious” to others, because he does not try to control others’ income levels.
Fifthly, the treatment of others’ income levels as exogenous variables leads to 
another problem which is related to a person’s attitude towards risk, and its measure. If a
67For example, in Islamic areas, one tenth of one’s income should be donated to mosques for 
saving poor people in the areas.
66For the definition of “envy” or “being envious”, see Footnote on page 16.
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person’s a t t i tu d e  tow ards risk is related to  the u tility  or d isutility  from changes in his 
own income level together with changes in o thers ’ income levels, then a  measure suitable 
for this purpose m ust be formulated. This is done in the  theoretical model in Chapter 5.
It m ust be also recognised th a t  the choice of a  su itable interdependence coefficient 
poses ano ther  m ajor problem in formulating the in terdependence utility function in a way 
th a t  is useful for analytical purposes.
In existing relative income utility function models, the  concept of “reference groups” 
is missing, although its im portance has been noticed (Section 1.4.3.3). The problem now 
is how such reference groups may be identified. In reviewing the network analysis of 
contextual effects, it was found th a t  the concept of “s truc tu ra l  equivalence” in the 
s truc tu ra l  approach  appears to be superior both  to  the relational approach and to the 
“categorical equivalence” concept in the s truc tu ra l  approach (categorical analysis). 
However, it m ust be adm itted  th a t  none of these concepts have been rigorously examined 
empirically in sociology and other relevant disciplines.®® It is therefore in this study 
refrained from concluding th a t  particular interdependence coefficients are superior to 
other possible measures. Hence, the enhanced definition of “s truc tu ra l  equivalence” 
developed by B urt  (1980c), in which indirect in teractions of the second-order^® are 
included, is accordingly used. By including indirect in teractions, information flows which 
are t ran sm it ted  through such indirect interactions are more emphasised.
/» Q
^Exceptions are Burt’s studies of “invisible colleges” and “interlocking directorates” (1982, 
1983).
Interactions between two persons which involve a third person as a mediator. This adjustm ent 
was also used by Rogers and Kincaid (1981) in their relational approach study of family planning 
diffusion processes in Korean villages. It seems that proponents of these two approaches have 
realised dem erits in using only direct interactions.
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C H A P T E R  2
B e la tu n g  V illa g e  S cen e
2.1 In tro d u ctio n
The rubber smallholding village of Belatung in South Sum atra, Indonesia, was 
selected as a case study of villagers’ adoption behaviour. South Sum atra is a province 
producing both o il/na tu ra l gas and rubber, and is affected by the Indonesian 
G overnm ent’s current effort to give more emphasis to agricultural industries including 
rubber. Recently a branch of Research Institu te of E state Crops (Balai Penelitian 
Perkebunan Sembawa) was opened on the outskirts of Palem bang to conduct research on 
new technologies and effective methods of diffusing them , cooperating in the latter with 
the Extension Agency of Estate Crops (Dinas Perkebunan) of the M inistry of Agriculture. 
Despite the official emphasis on rubber, however, the smallholders of Belatung are 
shifting their interest towards other more profitable crops such as the perennial tree crop, 
citrus siam.
In this chapter, the socio-economy of Belatung is described, to help to understand 
the background to the citrus siam  adoption behaviour of villagers.
2 .2  G eneral In form ation
2 .2 .1  P h y s ic a l E n v iron m en t
2 .2 .1 .1  A rea
Belatung is one of the villages in M arga Lebuk Batang, Kecam atan Peninjauan, 
K abupaten Ogan Komering Ulu of South Sum atra Province (Figures 2-1 and 2-2). This 
village is located about 20 kilometers from B aturaja, the capital of Kabupaten Ogan 
Komering Ulu, and 195 kilometers from Palem bang, the capital of South Sum atra 
Province. B atu ra ja  is located in an im portant position in term s of transportation of both
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goods and people. The railway from Palem bang  to  T an jung  Karang (capital of Lam pung 
province) passes through it, as does the S u m a tra  Highway. Belatung is also on the 
railway line from B atu ra ja  to Palem bang, being the  second s ta tion  after Baturaja . The 
early m orning tra in  from B a tu ra ja  to Palem bang, mid-day express from T anjung  Karang 
to  Palem bang, mid-day train  from Palem bang to  B a tu ra ja ,  and two m id-night expresses, 
one from T an jung  Karang and ano ther from Palem bang, pass through Belatung each day. 
There are also some irregular freight trains from a cement factory in B a tu ra ja  to its main 
processing factory in Palem bang (P T  Semen B a tu ra ja ).
Belatung officially covers 1325 ha, and is bounded by Bandar Agung to the North , 
K a r ta  M ulya to  the East, T ransm igra tion  Sungai Gilas to the South and Lebuk B atang  
L am a to  the W est (Figure 2-2). The village residential area  is s i tuated  along the Ogan 
river (Figure 2-3).
W ithin  its to ta l  area, Belatung has 100 ha of saw ah , 530 ha of “dry land” , and 610 
ha  of smallholding estate  crop area  (T anah  P erkebunan  R ak y a t ). The sawah area has 
long been abandoned , however. According to the village head, a government survey team  
estim ated  the costs of im provem ent of the sawah area  in early 1970s. Since the costs of 
building w ater gates and em bankm ent were es tim ated  as being too high, the village’s 
proposal th a t  this area should be improved seems to have been rejected.^ Nowadays the 
official area  of sawah only seems to be quoted as a  means of obtaining fertiliser from the 
BIMAS project.
The official category of dry land (T anah  kering p e r ta n ian ) seems to include the land 
classes of ladang , peinatang and lebak. These are quite different in term s of 
geomorphology and agricultural utilisation. Ladang covers the peneplain and terrace 
areas, while pem atang  indicates the land along bu t  not flooded by the river. Lebak covers 
areas seasonally flooded by the  river.
Lebak is usually further classified into three levels, from low to high, namely lebak 
dalam  (lebak ren d ah ), lebak tengah  (lebak ten g ah a n ) and lebak tinggi (lebak pem atang). 
However, because of the speed of river w ater flow in this area, the river edges are quite
^There has been no official answer from the governm ent.
Figure 2-1: Map of South Sum atra, Indonesia
Source: Barlow and Muharminto (1980)
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Figure 2 -2 : M aps o f B e la tung
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F ig u re  2-3: Schematic Cross-section of Village Landscape
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Source: Fieldwork
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sharp  and  no area  corresponds exactly to lebak dalam  and lebak ten g ah . The Belatung 
villagers accordingly distinguish only lebak and lad an g . T he  saw ah land may correspond 
to the lower levels of lebak lands, bu t the charac teris tics  of this a rea  were no t be 
examined because of the difficulties of reaching it.
T ak ay a  (1980) studied the agricultural landscape along the Komering river, which 
is the neighbouring main s tream  to the Ogan. People there classify their lands in to  the 
six categories, going from higher to lower levels. These are ta lan g , p em a ta n g , lebak 
p em atan g , lebak ten g ah an , lebak dalam  and raw a-raw a . T a lang  is upland away from the 
main river, bu t not necessarily suffering from lack of w ater. This  term  is sometimes used 
by villagers to characterise a hamlet located away from the  village’s m ain residential 
area, even though there are only one or two houses there. P em atan g  is land along the 
river bu t not submerged by floods. The three categories of lebak land are seasonally 
flooded. Raw a-raw a is a  perennially inundated p a r t  of the backswamp.
2 .2 .1 .2  M e te o r o lo g ic a l  C o n d it io n s
Tropical forest climate prevails in South Sum atra . B a tu ra ja  is located a t  an a lt i tude  
of 49 m and more than  200 km away from the coast. It is cooler and less humid th an  the 
area around Palem bang. The m axim um  tem pera tu re  is abou t  32 degrees C, and the 
m inimum 20 degrees C, with only small fluctuations in this tem pera tu re  range. The 
annual to tal rainfall, in B atu ra ja ,  is on average 2693 mm, with a s tandard  deviation of 
480 m m  between 1970 and 1982. During the last 13 years, there have been three years, 
1972, 1975 and 1977, when the annual rainfall was less than  2213 mm (the average minus 
one s tandard  deviation). The local people divide a  year into two seasons, musim hujan 
(rainy season, November to  mid-May) and musim kering (dry season, mid-May to 
October). More than  250 mm of rain falls in a m onth  of an average rainy season, bu t 
m onthly rainfall drops to 100 to  150 mm in dry seasons. As shown in Figure 2-4, there is 
a fairly high probability of no rain in August.
IN
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Figure 2-4: Monthly Rainfall Pattern 1970-1982, Baturaja
L e g e n d
Mean
Mean 4- 1 S.D. 
Mean — 1 S.D.
S o u r c e : D in a s  P e r t a n i a n  dan  Tanaman P an g an  B a t u r a j a  (1 9 7 0 -8 3 )
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2 .2 .2  H is to r ic a l B ackground
In th is sub-section, the agricultural situation  around B aturaja  is historically 
described according to some official documents of the history of South Sum atra (M a’moen 
Abdullah 1978, 1979, 1980), and village elders’ stories.
2 .2 .2 .1  D u tc h  O ccup ation  P eriod  (1920 - 1941)
The N etherland’s colonial adm inistration was established in the so called 
“up-stream  area” (daerah ulu) in the 1920’s. Previous to th a t Dutch control extended to 
the “low-stream  areas” (daerah ilir) only. The present province of South Sum atra was 
divided into three Afdelings governed by Asisten Residens and these were divided into 
some O nderafdelings governed by Kontroleurs.
At the Onderafdeling level, the local indigenous adm inistrative structure was used 
to support the colonial adm inistration. An Onderafdeling was divided into several 
D istriks governed by a Demang, which corresponded locally to a M arga governed by a 
pasirah and supported by kerios, (heads of dusuns). Pasirahs were usually elected from 
the pangeran family of the region. However, the titles of the pangeran, gelar depati and 
raden, which had been used for the positions of the old Sultanate, were officially 
abolished.
The railway between Palembang and Lampung was opened in about 1930. 
According to the village elders’ story, Belatung had been the residence of the pasirah_&nd 
pangeran in the area before the opening of the railway, but after the opening the capital 
of the K abupaten moved to Baturaja, and the capital of the m arga moved to  the 
neighbouring Lebuk Batang Baru (See Figure 2-2-b).
Rubber estates in this area seem to have been started  in the 1920’s. In 1923, the 
price of rubber peaked at 120 gulden per pikul, and Erfpachtsperceel lands (long term  
lease lands) were opened as rubber estates. An esta te  called Erfpachtsperceel M aria 
Louisa was opened in Belatung and its surrounding area. Presumably the rubber 
smallholdings sta rted  spreading from this estate. The villagers’ estim ate of the age of 
their old rubber trees is around 50 to  60 years old as W hitford (1931) indicates th a t the 
initial establishm ent of rubber estates took place during the 1920’s.
Rice production for subsistence seems to have been supervised by the Dutch colonial
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adm inistration . According to the village elders, the presently abandoned sawah land "was 
often inspected by the Kontroleur of the Onderafdeling based in B aturaja.
2 .2 .2 .2  Jap an ese  O ccupation  P eriod  (1941 - 1945)
The Japanese occupation military adm inistration forced villagers to produce food 
crops such as rice and cassava. This emphasis on food crops was completely different from 
the Dutch colonial adm inistration’s emphasis on cash crops. According to village elders, 
their rubber smallholdings close to the residential area were cut down and burnt so th a t 
cassava could be cultivated. They were also forced to produce rice on sawah lands. 
Certain proportions of harvests had to be given to the government through the 
reorganised village adm inistration. Daily household goods were only available through 
“distribution shops” (toko gabungan). Lamp oil was totally banned, and villagers used 
rubber sap for lamps. The only non-food crop which villagers were forced to plant was 
cotton. It seems to have been planted on ladang lands, and to have been unsuccessful in 
the area.
This change of emphasis damaged the village economy and its effects persisted even 
after Independence in 1945. The rubber lands close to the village, which were burnt down, 
had been the villagers’ prime sources of cash. It took them  a long time to replant such 
areas and resume the rubber production.
2 .2 .2 .3  F ederal P eriod  to  1969 (1945 - 1969)
Recollections of the villagers are the sole source of information about the economic 
situation in the village from Independence until 1969. No official record is available. 
According to the au thor’s interviews with village elders, this period was freer than the 
present in term s of regulations on economic activities. There was no restriction on what 
crops could be grown. Although the villagers suffered from lack of cash during the earlier 
part of the period, they soon resumed rubber production and with the interm ediation of 
Chinese rubber dealers started  exporting their harvest to Singapore through Palembang. 
Palem bang was the centre of the South Sum atran economy, which had closer links with 
Singapore than Jakarta .
The period was also freer in terms of the movement of population, and the number 
of persons in the village seems to have decreased considerably during the la tte r half. The
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Lampung and Ranau areas (Figure 2-1) were gradually planted to coffee as* the 
production of th a t crop became increasingly more profitable over other cash crops, 
especially rubber.
Between 1965 and 1969, the village economy seems to have been in turmoil. Village 
elders were very reluctant to discuss the events of th a t period. Transportation to 
Palem bang was cut because of the bad m aintenance of the road and railway, and some 
parts of the route appear to have been impassable due to rebel activities. Labour was also 
scarce during this period.
As the Orde Baru (New Order) regime became established, however, conditions 
improved. In 1969, the Belatung village elected a  new head, who was a member of the 
traditional village ruling family. He was a very strong leader, and has remained in this 
position until the present.
2 .2 .2 .4  P o s t - 1 9 6 9  P e r io d
Since the present village head was elected in 1969, the village has been stable. In 
general, South Sum atra has been enriched by the revenue from oil and natural gas 
production, and temporarily by the coffee boom between 1976 and 1980. Investment on 
infrastructure, especially on roads and schools, took place. Better infrastructure and 
socio-political stability enabled villagers in South Sum atra to have more and better 
opportunities to prosper in their agricultural production. __
During the first part of this period (1969 - 1976), rubber prices gradually declined 
and villagers seem to have started to think about alternatives to rubber smallholdings. 
The coffee boom, which started  in 1976, influenced these villagers’ decisions. In non-coffee 
producing areas, villagers started  growing alternative tree crops such as cloves, cinnamon, 
pepper and citrus siam. This process will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Although 
rubber price started  to improve from 1976 onwards until 1980, prices of alternative crops 
increased far more rapidly and the move from rubber to alternative crops seems to have 
been unchanged or even accelerated.
Villagers in Belatung started growing citrus siam in 1969. Especially after the 
coffee boom started  in 1976, the switch from rubber to  citrus siam gathered momentum. 
This process was facilitated by the completion and improvement of roads to larger cities,
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particularly  the Sum atran Highway, as the m arket for agricultural products began to 
expand rapidly.
2 .2 .3  E conom ic B ackgroun d
Belatung is located in the middle of the largest rubber producing area in South 
Sum atra  (Figure 2-1). Rubber products from this area are transported to M uara Enim, 
B atu ra ja  or Prabum ulih. Since Belatung is less than 20 km away from B aturaja, it is 
very dependent on B atura ja’s economy.
B aturaja  is the centre for handling agricultural products from the south-western 
part of South Sum atra. Coffee produced in the high-altitude regions (Ranau, Lahat, etc.) 
is transported  to B aturaja, and then diverted towards either Palembang or Tanjung 
K arang in Lampung Province. Rubber, both from individual smallholdings and from 
transm igration project areas (such as th a t of B atum arta  30 to 40 km from B aturaja), is 
taken to  Baturaja, and then transported by truck to Palem bang through M uara Enim, 
via the Sum atran Highway.
Various kinds of transportation are available for bringing goods into and out of 
B aturaja. The Ogan river is used to transport bamboo from M uara Dua and upper-stream 
areas to Baturaja. The railway from Palembang to Tanjung Karang passes through 
B aturaja, as already indicated.
The most recent improvement in transportation system comes from the Sum atran 
Highway, which sta rts  from Aceh and term inates at Tanjung Karang (Figure 2-1). When 
the southern part of the highway was completed in 1983, it much enhanced the 
im portance of B aturaja as a centre for agricultural products and tourism. The highway 
further altered the previous heavy dependency of B aturaja on Palembang and improved 
direct access through Tanjung Karang to Jakarta . The mass transportation ferries 
between Tanjung Karang and Jakarta  have improved dram atically. These changes have 
not only affected trade, but have also enabled villagers to travel much more easily.
Further changes affecting Baturaja as a market have also occurred. Considerable 
am ounts of vegetables are now produced from the vast previously unpopulated areas 
successively opened as transm igration projects. These are all transported to B aturaja and 
m arketed there. The city adm inistration of B aturaja is re-organising the m arket system in
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B a tu ra ja  by opening a th ird  official m arket place, as well as a new bus term inal for buses 
going tow ards T an jung  Karang.
2 .3  H o u s e h o ld  C h a ra c ter is t ic s
2 .3 .1  D e m o g r a p h y
In many economic studies, the term  “household” has been interchangeably used 
with “domestic group” . A “domestic group” , which is a  term used mainly in 
an thropology , may be defined as a group of people who habitually  share a  common 
dwelling and a common food supply. Domestic groups may be made up of individuals 
between whom no kinship ties exist.
For the purpose of this study in Belatung, the above definition of “household =  
dom estic group” m ust be slightly modified. There are some groups of villagers who live in 
the  sam e house but do not share food, cooking facilities and income. They actually live 
separately  in upstairs  and downstairs sections with different kitchens, though they have 
relatively close kinship ties. These would be understood as two separate  households.
2 .3 .1 .1  A g e -S e x  S tru c tu r e
In December 1982, B elatung’s population consisted of 670 persons, 354 males and 
316 females, in 118 households. The num ber of households was abou t a half of the average 
for the  28 villages in Kecamatan Peninjauan. Because of the wide variance about this 
m ean, however, the Belatung figures are still within the range of the K ecam atan  average 
plus-minus one s tandard  deviation.
The village’s age-sex s tructure  and its comparison with th a t  of South Sum atra  in 
1979 are shown in Figure 2-5. Some observed differences are th a t  the num ber of younger 
males aged between 20 and 39 years was relatively lower in the village. This was also the 
case w ith  females upto 4 years and between 15 and 19 years.
In South Sum atra , young rural males tend to go to the cities so as to gain 
experience in non-agricultural occupations. They come back after a  num ber of years, 
som etim es am ounting  to ten or more years, to inherit their lands. Villagers often claim 
th a t  they have close relatives in Palem bang, J a k a r ta  or o ther m ajor cities.
F igu re 2-5: Belatung Village Population Pyram id
Age
Group
MALE
354 p e r so n s  
52.8%
3.0 p e r s o n s / h h
1 0%
70 * 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4
FEMALE 
316 per sons  
47.2%
2.68 p e r s o n s /h h
7o%
indicates average proportion 
in South Sumatra 1979 
Source BAPPEDA (1979)
TOTAL 
670 persons 
5.68 per sons/hh
Source:
(a) : Fieldwork
(b) : BAPPEDA (1979)
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2 .3 .1 .2  H ou seh o ld  S tructure
F igure 2-6: Household-size D istribution
Household No. of 
Size households
1 1 0.8 7,
2 7 5.9
3 12 10.2
4 20 16.9
5 18 15.3
6 20 16.9
7 18 15.3
8 9 7.6
9 4 3.4
10 5 4.2
11 3 2.5
12 1 0.8
*
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
******************
************* ***** **
******************
*********
* * * *
*****
*  *  *
*
Total 118 99.8
Average 5.68 persons/household
S.D. 2.29
Source: Fieldwork
The average size of a household is 5.68 persons and households with 4 to 7 members 
are dom inant in the village (Figure 2-6). The usual pattern  is a husband, a wife and two 
or three children for two-generation households. In three-generation households, typically 
there are, in addition to the household head and his wife, two parents of the household 
head, and two or three children. Some households also include unm arried siblings of 
either the husband or the wife.
2 .3 .2  Incom e  
2 .3 .2 .1  A gricu ltu re
During 1982-83, annual incomes from agricultural products ranged up to Ftp. 5.75 
million reflecting the wide variety of cropping patterns. The few with the higher incomes 
usually had coffee plots in Kota Bumi, Lampung province, and were still earning good 
retu rns despite the recent fall in coffee prices. When such person were excluded annual 
agricultural incomes ranged up to Rp. 1.75 million. The average annual agricultural 
income for farmers is about Rp. 1 million (Figure 2-7).
25 O
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Figure 2-7: Distribution of Annual Agricultural Income
Range Households
(million Rp.)No. *J%
•A.(a;) 5 4.2 *****
i 24 20.3 ************************
-0.25 9 7.6 *********
-0.50 16 13.6 ****************
-0.75 17 14.4 *****************
-1.00 11 9.3 ***********
-1.25 15 12.7 ***************
-1.50 5 4.2 *****
-1.75 8 6.8 ***** ***
-2.00 1 0.8 *
-2.25 1 0.8 *
-2.50 0 0.0
-2.75 0 0.0
-3.00 1 0.8 *
-3.25 1 0.8 *
-3.50 1 0.8 *
-3.75 0 0.0
-4.00 1 0.8 *
-4.25 0 0.0
-4.50 0 0.0
-4.75 0 0.0
-5.00 0 0.0
-5.25 1 0.8 *
-5.50 0 0.0
-5.75 1 0.8 ★
Total 118 99.5
All Villagers
Average = Rp. 771,117
S.D. 945,048
n = 118
Farmers only (except n .a. and those without
agricultural income)
Average = Rp.1,022,380 
S.D. = 963,136 
n = 89
Note:
(a) N.A. denotes a household which did not state its income. 
Some of these households appeared to belong to the high 
income group.
Source: Fieldwork
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2 .3 .2 .2  N on -a g r icu ltu ra l O ccupations
T a b le  2-1: M ajor N on-agricu ltural Income Sources
Source
of
Number
Households
Average
(Rp.)
(SD)
*
Range
(Minimum - Maximum)
Fishery 19 334474 (287474) lOOOO - 1200000
Shop 5 712400 (411544) 162000 - 1200000
Remittance 13 82308 (134855) 5000 - 500000
Salary 27 654341 (162258) 312000 - 984000
Others 45 422320 (515220) 5000 - 3000000
Total 74 644035 (477556) 5000 - 3000000
Note: * Only for villagers who have incomes from these sources. 
Source: Fieldwork
V illagers’ non-agricu ltural income sources were classified in to  five categories: (1)
fisheries (2) grocery shops (3) rem ittances (4) salaries and (5) o thers. T he to tal num ber 
of villagers w ith non-agricu ltural income sources was 74 (T able 2-1).
D uring  the dry season, when the  Ogan riv e r’s w ater level is down, villagers set trap s  
and nets in the  river and catch  fresh w ater fish. N ineteen villagers were identified in th is 
class w ith  annual incomes from  fisheries ranging from Rp. 10,000 to  R p .l ,200,000. These 
villagers sold fish to  itin e ran t fishm ongers from  o ther villages, who come in the early 
m orning by m otor bike and take fish to the B a tu ra ja  m arkets. Some villagers sold fish in 
the B a tu ra ja  m arkets them selves.
T here were six small grocery shops in the village, and incomes from these shops 
were availab le  for five cases, excepting the sm allest un it. T his shop had only two shelves 
and was not open regularly . The annual incom es from the  five shops ranged from  
Rp. 162,000 to  R p .l ,200,000.
T here  were 13 villagers who received rem ittances from th e ir sons outside the village, 
the  annua l am o u n t ranging from  R p.5,000 to  R p .500,000.
T here were 27 salary-earners who included four school teachers, one civil m ilitary  
officer, and  22 N ational Railway workers.
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O ther sources of income included lumbering, carpenters, pemborong rumah (house 
con tracto rs), boat-m aking, etc, where 45 villagers were involved.
Figure 2-8 shows the distribution of the proportions of agricultural income in to tal 
annual income. 24 villagers were identified as having no source of agricultural income. 
But they were not necessarily non-farmers. They included farmers who did not sell but 
only consumed their agricultural products. They can be considered as non-commercial 
farm ers. On the other hand, there were 39 full-time farmers who had only agricultural 
income sources. Of the remaining 50 villagers, 32 were part-tim e farmers of “Class-1” 
whose agricultural incomes were more than 50 percent of their total annual incomes, and 
18 villagers were part-tim e farmers of “Class-2” whose agricultural incomes were less than 
50 percent of their total annual incomes.
The distribution of villagers’ total annual incomes is shown in Figure 2-9. The 
average is about Rp. 1.2 million. Although it has a wide deviation (standard deviation is 
Rp. 1.0 million), the Gini coefficient (0.3789) does not indicate a strongly unequal 
income distribution. Farm  size was more unequally distributed (Gini coefficient =  
0.5533, Section 2.4.2.1).
2 .3 .3  E x p e n d i tu r e
The villagers’ household expenditure and consumption levels are investigated here 
from the viewpoint tha t these can indicate the relative living standards of households.
Figure 2-10 shows the distribution of to tal annual household expenditure. The 
average to ta l expenditure was about Rp. 1 million, which is about 17% less than the 
average income level, and with a much narrower deviation (standard deviation is Rp. 0.6 
million).
Since village households produced some subsistence foods such as rice, fish and
o
vegetables, their home-production for consumption and subsistence expenditures were 
also investigated. Nineteen major items were selected for examination:
2The value of subsistence items both produced by the villagers and purchased.
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Figure 2-8: Proportion of Agricultural Income
Proportion No. of Households
%
0 24 ************************ Non-commercial
farmers
1 - 4 1 *
5 - 9 0
10 - 14 0
15 - 19 3 * * *
20 - 24 4 * * * * Paxt-time farmers
25 - 29 2 * * Class-2
30 - 34 0
35 - 39 5 ***** (n=18)
40 - 44 1 *
45 - 49 2 * *
50 - 54 4 * * * *
55 - 59 3 * * *
60 - 64 0
65 - 69 4 * * * *
70 - 74 3 * * * Paxt-time faxmers
75 - 79 2 * * Class-1
80 - 84 5 *****
85 - 89 3 * * * (n=32)
90 - 94 4 * * * *
95 - 99 4 * * * *
100 39 *************************************** Full-time farmers
Total 118
Average Proportion of Agricultural Income 60.94% (S.D.=40.72)
Source: Fieldwork
F ig u r e  2-9: Distribution of Total Annual Income
Amount
6
(x Rp 10 ) No. of Households
- 0.25 2 1.7 * *
- 0.50 13 11.0 *************
- 0.75 26 22.0 **************************
- 1.00 19 16.1 *******************
- 1.25 15 12.7 ***************
- 1.50 8 6.8 ********
- 1.75 13 11.0 *************
- 2.00 5 4.2 *****
- 2.25 2 1.7 * *
- 2.50 1 0.8 *
- 2.75 1 0.8 *
- 3.00 1 0.8 *
- 3.25 1 0.8 *
- 3.50 2 1.7 * *
- 3.75 0 0.0
- 4.00 1 0.8 *
- 4.25 0 0.0
- 4.50 0 0.0
- 4.75 1 0.8 *
- 5.00 0 0.0
5.00 - 2 1.7 * *
N.A. 5 4.2 *****
Total 118 99.6%
Average Rp 1,,226,995
S.D . 1,032,168
Gini Index 0 .3789
Note: N.A. not available. 
Source: Fieldwork.
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Figure 2-10: D istribution of Total Expenditure
(million Rp.) No. of Households
o 0.25 3 * * *
0.25 - 0.5 18 ******************
0.5 - 0.75 24 ************************
0.75 - 1.0 23 ***********************
1.0 - 1.25 11 ***********
1.25 - 1.5 13
1.5 - 1.75 6 ******
1.75 - 2.0 7 *******
2.0 - 2.25 4 * * * *
2.25 - 2.5 1 *
2.5 - 2.75 1 *
2.75 - 3.0 2 **
N. A. 
Total
5
118
afc £ afc afc
Average 1..023
S.D. 0..578
Source: Fieldwork
1 . Rice 11. Kerosene
2. Fish 12. Flour
3. Salted Fish 13. Milk
4. Coffee 14. Eggs
5. Tea 15. Onion
6. Sugax 16. Potato
7. Salt 17. Meat
8. Cooking Oil 18. Cassava
9.
io.
Cigarette
Soap
19. Fruits
The quantities of these items purchased and home-produced were determined from 
household heads and their wives, and evaluated a t prevailing market prices. The value of 
aggregated m onthly consumption was then compared with the household’s estimated 
m onthly expenditure for these items. The two values were found to be alm ost identical, 
indicating th a t the selected items and the estim ates of expenditure were probably quite 
realistic.
On average, a household in Belatung purchased Rp.59,000 a month of subsistence
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Table 2-2: Subsistence Consumption of Major Items
Items Quantity Value (Rp.) Proportion (%)
Purchased Average (S.D.) Average (S.D.) Average
(a) (b)
Rice(kg) 66.65(32.97) 19995 (9890) 34.9 27.2
Fish(kg) 11.24(13.37) 3295 (3482) 5.0 4.5
(Rp) 447.8(1857.)
Salted Fish(kg) 1.235(1.873) 1566 (2058) 2.7 2.1
(Rp) 331.0(1245.)
Coffee (kg) 2.349(2.621) 5872 (6553) 9.8 8.0
Tea(box) 1.473(2.661) 308 ( 543) 0.5 0.4
(Rp) 13.27(141.1)
Sugar(kg) 7.597(4.988) 4558 (2993) 7.8 6.2
Salt(kg) 2.382(2.317) 238 ( 232) 0.4 0.3
Cooking Oil(l) 3.656(2.856) 2193 (1713) 3.8 3.0
Cigarette(Rp) 8219 (7137) 12.8 11.2
Soap(No.) 6.416(3.605) 802 ( 451) 1.5 1.1
Kerosene(1) 17.61(12.65) 2641 (1897) 4.7 3.6
Flour(kg) 4.450(4.336) 1558 (1518) 2.7 2.1
Milk(tin) 2.522(3.003) 1261 (1502) 2.1 1.7
Eggs(No.) 12.89(12.23) 1289 (1223) 2.4 1.8
Onion(kg) 1.331(1.356) 666 ( 678) 1.1 0.9
Potato(kg) 0.653(1.306) 392 ( 783) 0.6 0.5
Meat(kg) 0.659(1.317) 1648 (3291) 2.5 2.2
Cassava(kg) 12.45(22.75) 622 (1138) 1.1 0.8
Fruits(Rp) 2293 (3413) 3.5 3.1
Sub-total 59381(27833) 99.9% 80.7%
Home-production Quantity Monetary Value (Rp)
Rice(kg) 18.46(26.87) 5536 (8061) 39.3 7.5
Fish(kg) 7.969(13.37) 1992 (3343) 14.2 2.7
Coffee(kg) 2.313(2.619) 5783 (6547) 41.1 7.9
Eggs(No.) 3.283(11.86) 328 (1186) 2.3 0.4
Cassava(kg) 8.597(22.97) 430 (1148) 3.1 0.6
Sub-total 14070(12666) 100.0% 19.1%
Total 73451(36614) 99.8%
Notes: (a) Average proportions in purchased items and in home-produced
items.
(b) Average proportions in total subsistence consumption. 
Source: Fieldwork
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items, notably rice, coffee, sugar and cigarettes (Table 2-2). Evaluating home production 
a t prevailing m arket prices, the total value of home-production was Rp. 14,000. Adding 
the aggregated value of monthly home-production to the to tal m onetary expenditure (or 
purchases), the total value of annual subsistence consumptions was calculated for each 
household. Thus the average village household used cash for 80 percent of its total 
subsistence consumption of Rp.73,000 in a month.
2 .3 .4  E d u c a t io n
Education in the village was provided in two forms: (1) formal schooling and (2) 
informal education. The former required attendance a t government or private schools, 
and the la tte r was obtained by attendance a t informal village religious class given by a 
khotib of the village or by on-the-job training on farms or elsewhere.
The village had one primary school situated in the middle of the village. Six years 
of prim ary education is required for every child. The villagers paid for textbooks, 
stationery and uniforms. Uniforms were by far the most expensive items, and according 
to recent legislation all the primary school pupils should wear uniforms. This caused 
problems, since villagers were reluctant to incur such expenditure, and in some cases 
could not afford this additional cost.
For secondary education, villagers had to send children to B aturaja or Palembang. 
In addition to the costs listed above for primary schooling, they had to pay 
transporta tion  costs to and from Baturaja (Rp.500 return fare per day), and give some 
pocket money. Only richer villagers could afford these expenses. A few villagers sent 
children to stay in their relatives’ places in Palem bang and attend school from there.
T ertiary  education was only available in provincial capitals. Only the wealthiest 
villagers could send their children to Palembang or other major cities in Java, no villager 
did so. Only one villager was a graduate of a university, and he was a teacher a t the 
Belatung prim ary school. He belonged to the village’s ruling family, and was sent to 
Lampung by his father who was a pasirah before World W ar II.
To discuss the formal educational a tta inm ent of household heads, some historical 
backgrounds is needed. During the colonial period, the sole education available for 
villagers was primary school, or Sekolah Rakyat (SR), for four years. The quality of this
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Table 2-3: Educational Attainment
School Grade
Number of villagers
Age Group
H.H. ALL
(proxy)| (a)| (b) (c)| 0-5 6-11 12-14 15-17 18-30 31-
1 1 M F 1 M t F M F M F M F M F M F
None 0 (0)| 17 | 128 m l 140 14 8 0 1 4 0 9 8 18 37
Primary 1 (1)| 2 1 15 17 | 13 16 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
School 2 (2)| 7 1 23 20 | 15 14 0 1 1 2 2 3 5 0
3 (3)| 5 1 18 211 10 11 3 1 0 1 4 4 1 4
4 (4)| 3 I 12 19 1 3 8 5 2 1 0 2 3 1 6
5 (5)| 8 | 22 17 j 5 4 7 4 3 1 1 7 6 1
6 (6)1 3 1 12 17 j 1 2 8 9 0 1 2 4 1 1
graduate (7)| 54 | 79 86 | 5 4 3 6 31 46 40 30
Junior 1 (8)| o I 4 0| 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0
High School 2 (9)1 1 1 10 1 j 4 0 3 1 2 0 1 0
3(10)| o 1 5 2) 0 0 4 2 1 0 0 0
graduate(11)| 12 1 15 31 1 0 6 3 8 0
Senior 1(12) | o I 0 0| 0 0 0 0
High School 2(13)| o 1 0 0| 0 0 0 0
3(14)| o 1 0 0| 0 0 0 0
graduate(15)( 5 I 10 2 | 5 2 5 0
University (20)| 1 | 1 0| 0 0 1 0
graduate 1 1
Total | 118) 354 316 | 140 61 63 32 22 23 14 67 80 88 80
Average | 6.1 | 4.0 3 .4 | 0 1.9 2.2 5.7 5.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 5.9 6.0 3.2
S.D. 3.9 j 4.0 3.2 0 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 3.7 2.6 4.0 2.9 4.3 3.2
Note:
(a) Household heads
(b) Male villagers
(c) Female villagers 
Source: Fieldwork
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schooling seem s to  have varied between villages and cities. A few of the  older villagers 
w ent to  B a tu ra ja , P alem bang  and even to  J a k a r ta  for th is  level of education.
Som e years afte r Independence, the  prim ary  school was renam ed and re-organised as 
th e  Sekolah D asa r, and com pulsory education was extended to  six years.
Secondary education  in B a tu ra ja  s ta rted  in the early 1970’s and was available for 
general s tu d ies (three years in the jun io r high school, Sekolah M enengah P e rtam a , and 
th ree  years in the senior high school, Sekolah M enengah A ta s ), economic studies (three 
years in Sekolah M enengah Ekonomi P e rta m a , th ree  years in Sekolah M enengah Ekonomi 
A ta s), technical stud ies (th ree years in Sekolah Teknik M enengah P e rtam a  and three 
years in Sekolah Teknik M enengah A tas) and o ther categories. As the  arm y has its 
hosp ital in B a tu ra ja , a  higher secondary school for nursing has also become available.
U nder the  O rde B aru regime, the drive for education has been considerable, and the 
co n stru c tio n  of new village prim ary schools and secondary schools a t kabupaten  level has 
been boom ing. In the a rea  surrounding B elatung, alm ost all villages w ith m ore than  100 
households and  located along m ajor roads have their own prim ary  schools, and B elatung’s 
own p rim ary  school was bu ilt in the mid 1970’s. Previously the  children com m uted to the 
neighbouring  village.
T he educational a tta in m e n t proxy used in th is  study  was defined w ith an em phasis 
on w he ther a  person has finished the prescribed length of schooling. T hus, if a person had 
finished p rim ary  school education , he was given seven as his educational a tta in m en t 
adding  one to  six years in a  prim ary school (C haudhri 1979). This clearly distinguishes 
the p rim ary  school g rad u ate  from a person who has spen t six years in a prim ary school, 
b u t did not g raduate . S im ilar ad justm en ts were conducted for jun io r and senior high 
school g rad u a tes  and university  g raduates, who were given proxies of 11, 15 and 20 
respectively.
T he average educational a tta in m en t of household heads was 6.1 in term s of the 
educational a tta in m en t proxy (Table 2-3), which corresponds to  Year 6 of prim ary school 
education , while the average for all m ales was 4.0, and th a t  of all females, 3.4. The 
average educational a tta in m e n t levels of the various age-sex groups indicate low 
educational a tta in m en t of persons, especially females, over 31 years old.
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Villagers’ informal education atta inm en t was difficult to measure. Their attendance 
a t the village religious class was the most easily quantifiable measure, but as the 
attendance a t the class was a m atter of religious faith, it was quite difficult to obtain 
reliable da ta .
In general, farming experience and other types of experience can be quantified by 
asking villagers the length of time spent on a particular occupation a t a particular place, 
but it is very hard to integrate these da ta  into a reasonably reliable measure. In the 
literature , farm ing experience is often used to  represent all of these factors. This is 
usually simply taken to be the number of years in farming, and is found to be highly 
correlated w ith age, since farmers are characteristically immobile. Since the young 
villagers of South Sum atra, however, tend to go out of their native villages for non- 
agricultural occupations, years of farming experience may not be so strongly related to 
age.
F ig u re  2-11: Distribution of Farming Experience
Range (years) No. of Households
0
1 - 5  
-  10
- 15
-  20
- 25
- 30
- 35
- 40
- 45
- 50 
51 -
4 * * * *
18 ****************** —
23 ***********************
18 ******************
11 ***********
10 **********
8 ********
13 *************
7 *******
1 *
3 * * *
2 * *
Total 118
Average 18.27 (years)
S.D. 13.40 (years)
Source: Fieldwork
Figure 2-11 shows the distribution of the farming experience of household heads, 
measured in term s of years. On average, villagers had 18.27 years of farming experience.
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2 .3 .5  M e d ia  E x p o su r e
M edia exposure has been regarded as an im p o r tan t  factor influencing villagers’ 
adoption  behaviour.  While villagers’ educational a t ta in m e n t  levels can be regarded as a 
proxy for the ir  ability to  evaluate information abou t an innovation from external sources, 
the m agn itude  of their media exposure can be regarded as a measure of their 
opportun it ies  to  receive external information abou t  innovations.
T o  m easure  villagers’ magnitudes of m edia exposure, the factors (1) radio 
possession, (2) frequency of listening to  agricultural program mes on radio, (3) 
subscrip tions to newspapers and (4) subscriptions to agricultural or general magazines 
were selected. However, neither newspapers nor magazines were available to  the villagers, 
and in any case, would have been of little use due to  the low level of literacy. Therefore, 
only the first tw o measures were used.
Villagers who had a  radio could listen to agricultural program mes which are 
broadcast  early in the morning and evening. T he information these program m es provide 
was generally considered useful, especially for sawah rice-producers, as the  programmes 
are coordinated  by the Food Crop Agency (Dinas Pertan ian  dan T an am an  Pangan). 
Inform ation ab o u t  citrus siam production was broadcas t  sometimes, as this crop, too, is 
under the control of this agency. There was a commercial radio station  in B a tu ra ja  bu t it 
rarely broadcas t  agricultural information.
Forty  nine of the 118 villagers possessed a radio in their homes (Table 2-4). 
However, no t all villagers who had a radio listened to  agricultural program mes regularly. 
Four villagers with a radio did not listen to  the program m e a t  all, and only 19 villagers 
listened every day.
To m easure the ex ten t of villagers’ exposure to  the outside world, questions were 
asked ab o u t  the frequency of their visits to B a tu ra ja ,  Prabum ulih , Palem bang, Lampung 
and J a k a r ta .  B a tu ra ja  is the nearest commercial centre  and the capital of the Kabupaten 
Ogan Komering Ulu. It was about thirty  m inutes to an hour away by bus. Prabum ulih  
was the second closest city and the capital of the  neighbouring K abupaten  Ogan 
Komering Ilir (F igure 2-1). The railway to Palem bang passed through this city, and was 
abou t  one to  one and a  half hours away by train . Palem bang, the capital of South
Table 2-4: Media and Outside Exposure
Radio Possession
Yes 49 ( 41.5^)
No 69 ( 58.57,)
Total 118 (100.02)
Agricultural Programme on Radio
times/week
0 73 ( 61.92) 
1-2 4 ( 3.42) 
3-4 17 ( 14.42) 
5-6 5 ( 4.22) 
7 19 ( 16.12)
Total 118 (100.02)
Visits to Cities
Times/
Year
Baturaj a Prabumulih Palembang Lampung Jakarta
0 16 111 65 74 106
1 2 20 16 7
2 2 8 9 2
3 3 4 2
4 3 1 6 3 1
5 1 1 2 3
6 1
10 1 2
12 37 1 11 4
15 3
20 3
24 9 2
30 1
36 5
40 1
48 4
52 18 1
60 3
90 1
104 4
156 3
260 1
365 1
Total 118 118 118 118 118
Average 48.1 0.2 2.3 2.4 0.2
S.D. 82.7 1.3 4.6 9.7 0.6
Source: Fieldwork
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S u m a tra  prov ince, was abou t five hours aw ay by tra in  (several villagers sent children to  
high schools th e re ). Lam pung represents Lam pung province, located to  the south  of South 
S u m a tra  province. In the K o ta  Bumi area, some villagers of B elatung  had coffee 
sm allho ld ings and  w ent there tw ice a year to look a fte r them . A fter th e  com pletion of the 
S u m atran  H ighw ay m ade it easy to go there , m ost c itru s  siam  products  w ent through this 
region and  across the  s tra it  to  Jav a . A part from its role as the national cap ita l, J a k a r ta  is 
a t  p resen t th e  largest m arket for citrus siam , and also a source of better-quality  saplings. 
A lthough tra n s p o r t  of citrus siam  saplings from Ja v a  to  the O uter Islands is prohibited  
due to  concerns w ith virus disease, villagers often tried  to  sm uggle these saplings into 
their villages.
B a tu ra ja  w as visited alm ost once a week (48 tim es a year on average) while visits to 
o ther cities are  much less (T able 2-4). P rabum ulih  and J a k a r ta  were only visited 0.2 
tim es a year on average, and m ore th an  100 villagers never w ent there. Palem bang and 
L am pung w ere visited 2.3-2.4 tim es a year on average, while ab o u t 50 villagers had been 
there a t  least once a year.
2 .4  A g r ic u ltu r a l  E co n o m y  
2 .4 .1  C r o p p in g  P a tte r n s
M ajor crops in the village were rice (padi lebak, padi lad an g ), rubber, coffee, citrus 
siam , d uku , d u rian , ram b u tan , cloves, and pineapples. Rice (padi lebak , padi ladang), 
rubber, d u rian  and  duku could be classified as old or trad itio n a l crops, while coffee, citrus 
siam , clove, ram b u tan  and pineapple were new. O ther th an  these m ajor crops, crops such 
as pepper, coconu t, sugar cane, and sweet citrus (jeruk  m anis) were also grown. These 
crops were grow n for both cash and subsistence by a sm all num ber of villagers (less than  
10 percen t). B an an a  and vegetables were grown by alm ost all villagers bu t on a  very 
sm all scale and  m ainly for subsistence. C assava was also grown by the Javanese N ational 
Railway w orkers on their allo ted  tiny plots, again for subsistence.
F a rm ers  tended to  grow some m ajor crops together; hence there were significantly 
positive co rre la tio n s am ong these m ajor crops, b u t no significantly negative correlations
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T ab le 2-5: Correlations among Major Crops
1 c 1 D 1 c I R 1 R 1 P 1 R 1 C | D 1
1 o 1 u | I 1 i  1 A 1 I 1 u  1 L j u  1
C r o p s 1 F 1 K 1 T 1 c  1 M 1 N 1 B 1 o  1 R 1
1 F 1 U 1 R i E  j B 1 E 1 B 1 V | I  j
1 E 1 1 U 1 1 U 1 A j E j E  1 A  1
1 E 1 1 S 1 1 T 1 P 1 R 1 1 N j
1 1 1 1 A 1 P 1 1 1 1
1 1 S . 1 1 N 1 L 1 1 1 1
I 1 1 1 1 E 1 1 1 1
C O F F E E 1 - - | . 2 0 1 1 - 2 1  | 1 1 * 2 5 1 . 3 5  | . 29 j
DUKU 1 - - 1 1 * 2 8 1 | . 2 0 1 * 2 7 1 1 . 4 5  1
C I T R U S  S I A M | 1 1 -- 1 1 . 3 4 | 1 1 1 1
R I C E 1 1 1 1 . 1 6 | 1 - 2 3 1 1 . 4 9  1
RAMBUTAN 1 1 1 1 - - | . 2 9 | | • I 7 1 1
P I N E A P P L E 1 1 1 1 1 -- 1 1 1 1
R U B B E R 1 1 1 1 1 | - -  | . 2 3  1 . 2 7  1
C LO VE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - -  1 1
D U R I A N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -- j
Note :
Only significantly non-zero Pearson correlation coefficients 
axe shown.
Source: Fieldwork
(Table 2-5).'' This suggests tha t  there were no crops seriously competing with each other. 
The crops which had strongly positive correlations were (1) durian and duku, (2) durian 
and padi, and (3) coffee and cloves. Durian and duku are fruits which grew almost 
naturally together in the village. Duku especially was a crop unique to this area, and was 
known in the markets as “duku Belatung” . Durian and padi were another commonly 
found combination, and this was related to the land usage type often found in the farm 
(See Figure 2-3). The combination of coffee and clove was thought to be due to the fact
o
C o rre la tio n s are calcu lated  w ith  a Pearson co rre la tion  coefficient on the  basis of existence of 
crops concerned.
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th a t  both  crops were new. Coffee was very profitable in the late 1970’s, but w hen.the 
prices declined in the early 1980’s, cloves were introduced as a  replacement in some cases.
Villagers are classified into 12 cropping pattern  groups, using W ard’s hierarchical 
clustering m ethod.4 Figure 2-12 shows the hierarchical process of the cluster analysis. 
Basically, villagers with identical cropping patterns are grouped into one, and the groups 
of the identical cropping patterns are re-grouped according to their similarity until all 
villagers are put into one. There is no absolute criterion to determine the level of 
sim ilarity  to  draw out a certain number of cropping pattern  groups. Groups are selected, 
in this study, so th a t each group has one or two common crops grown by all of its 
member-villagers. Table 2-6 shows the results of this classification.
The members of each Cropping Pattern  Group except No. 11 share some common 
crops, and the way in which this is done characterises the Groups. The Cropping Pattern  
G roups which share only old or traditional crops are Nos. 1 (duku, rice), 2 (rice, durian), 
6 (rice), and 7 (rubber). On the other hand, members of No. 10 share pineapples, and 
those of No. 12 share coffee. The other groups have some old and some new crops in 
common.
2 .4 .2  L a n d  
2 .4 .2 .1  F a r m  Size
Farm  size was often difficult to measure. Villagers were asked to quantify their farm 
sizes plot by plot in term s of both hectares and their conventional units of measurement. 
While large landholders had their land registration documents using hectares as units, 
small landholders often did not have them. In the latter cases, the villagers’ conventional 
units of length were converted into hectares.
Some villagers had coffee and other plots in Kota Bumi, and their farm size included 
the area of these plots outside Belatung.
Figure 2-13 shows the distribution of farm sizes in hectare. The distribution centres 
around 4.5 ha., with a  standard deviation of 5.7 ha. Its Gini coefficient is 0.5533, which
4Wishart (1975) argued the superiority of Ward’s method (Ward 1963), but there is no criterion 
to judge its absolute superiority. Other numerical taxonomic methods were also used for confirming 
these results.
Figure 2-12: Clustering of Cropping Pattern Groups
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Source: Fieldwork
Table 2-6: Cropping Pattern Groups
Crops
Cropping
Pattern
c 1 D 1 c 1 & 1 R 1 P 1 B 1 c 1 D
0 1 U 1 I | I 1 A | I 1 u 1 L 1 U
F 1 K 1 T 1 C 1 M 1 N 1 B 1 o 1 R
F 1 U 1 R 1 E | B 1 E 1 B 1 v 1 I
E 1 1 u 1 u 1 A 1 E 1 E 1 A
E 1 1 s 1 T 1 P 1 R 1 N
1 1 A 1 P 1
Group 1 1 1 1 1 E 1 (a) (b) (c)
1 1 12 | 15* | o I 15* | o I 2 10 | 3 13 II | |
15 1 4.67 | 4.95
2 1 7 | o I 4 | 10* | 2 I 0 7 | 0 10*
I 1
II1 I 10 1 4.00 |11.44
3 1 io* | 10* | 10* | 10* | o I 0 10* | 0 5
1 1 
III I
10 1 5.50 | 8.15
4 1 5 | 8 1 9* | 9* | o I 1 o I 1 9*
1 1 
II 9 1 4.67 | 2.69
5 1 5 1 10* | 7 I 10* | 10* | 3 10* | 4 10*
1 1 
II 1 | 10 1 6.40 | 9.03
6 1 3 | 2 I o i 13* | o I 0 o I 0 0
I 1
II1 I 13 1
1.85 | 3.50
7 1 o | 6 | 7 | 8 | 0 1 0 11* | 0 0
1 1 
II1 I 11 1 2.64 | 2.73
8 1 6* 1 2 I 2 I 2 I 1 | 1 6* | 6* 0
1 1 
II1 I 6 1 4.33 | 5.83
9 1 3 | o I 10* | 10* | 7 I 0 1 | 2 0
1 1 
III I 10 1 3.50 | 2.43
10 1 o | 4 | 3 I 3 I 3 I 6* o I 0 0
1 1 
III I 6 1 3.17 | 0.62
11 1 o | o I 3 I o I 1 | 0 o I 0 0
1 1 
III 1 12 1 0.33 | 0.21
12 1 o* | 1 | 4 | o I o I 0 o I 0 0
1 1 
II 6 1 1.83 | 3.25
Total 1 39 | 58 | 59 | 87 | 24 | 13 61 | 16 47 ||118 1 3.59 | 4.52
Notes:
Numbers of villagers who grow a certain crop within 
each Cropping Pattern Group are shown in cells.
Asterisks denote common crops shared by all member-villagers 
of the Cropping Pattern Group.
(a) No. of member-villagers of the Cropping Pattern Group.
(b) Average number of crops per member-villager of the Cropping 
Pattern Group.
(c) Average Farm Size (ha.)
Source: Fieldwork
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F ig u r e  2-13: D istribu tion  of F arm  Size
Area (ha.) No. %
0 6 5.1 afc 3(C
1 15 12.7 ***************
2 18 15.3 ******************
3 15 12.7 ***************
4 17 14.4 *****************
5 10 8.5 **********
6 7 5.9 ******
7 9 7.6 *********
8 3 2.5 * * *
9 1 0.8 *
10 3 2.5 * * *
11 4 3.4 * * * *
12 1 0.8 *
13 2 1.7 **
15 1 0.8 *
16 1 0.8 *
20- 5 4.2 *****
Total 118 99.7
Average 4.52 Median 3.10
S.D. 5.71
Gini Index 0. 5533
Source: Fieldwork
ind icated  a  relatively unequal d istribu tion . M any villagers had several parcels of land 
which were spatially  sca tte red  w ithin the village.
2 .4 .2 .2  L a n d  T e n u r e  S y s te m s
M ost villagers, except the  N ational Railway w orkers, were ow ner-operators. The 
N ational Railway w orkers were given small-sized p lo ts by their em ployer to  grow 
subsistence food crops such as cassava and banana, as well as some cash crops.
T ab le 2-7 shows the  villagers’ tenure s ta tu s . 94 villagers were ow ner-operators, 
while the  13 w orkers for the  N ational Railway had plots given to  them . Six villagers were 
landless, bu t tw o of them  were retired, one was a widow, one was a  shop owner and the  
o ther tw o were officials of the N ational Railway. Such landless villagers had no incentive 
to  work for o thers and were no t sources of hired labour. T he rem aining five villagers were 
m ix tu res of ow ner-operators and lessees.
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T a b le  2-7: Number of F arm ers  by tenure
Tenure Status No. of Households
Landless 6
Owner-operator 94
National Railway’s Land 13
Numpang 1
Owner-operator + Leaseholder 1
Owner-operator + Numpang 1
Sharecropper + Leaseholder 1
Sharecropper + Numpang 1
Total 118
Source: Fieldwork
Land lease systems in the  village had three  categories: leaseholdings (fixed-rent),
sharecropping and the “num pang” system. The first two categories need no explanation. 
The “n u m p an g ” system was an interesting indigenous land tenure  system, where a 
landless fa rm er looked after the plot as a temporary  care-taker and could later move to 
ano ther tenu re  s ta tus .  As indicated by the descriptive te rm  used,"* he resembles a 
passenger on a  train  who rides to a certain location where he changes to  a  further train.
In the  num pang  system, there is no obvious short- term  transaction  between the 
landowner and  his lessee. T he lessee may later purchase the plot, a lthough there is no 
assurance. In s ituations where hired labour is expensive, land is ab u n d a n t  in relation to 
household labour, and potential lessees are usually Javanese m igrants  who do not have 
resources to  purchase land, th is  arrangem ent seems suitable.
While the  direct gain for a landowner from this a rrangem ent is relatively small, he
^T he word “n u m p a n g ” originates from the word-root “tu m p a n g ” and a person who “tu m p a n g ” 
(as a verb) is called “p en u m p an g ” which means a passenger in B ahasa  Indonesia and Malay.
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also benefits from the control of undergrowth and the prevention of the  establishm ent of 
“jungle” trees which would occur if the areas were not farmed.
In the  village there are only three villagers who num pang  plots, and  only one of 
them  is a  pure penum pang .
2 .4 .2 .3  S a le s /P u r c h a s e  o f  L and and  M ig r a t io n
There had been no recent sales and purchases of plots of land.6 Such transactions 
appear to be related to the wealth of the villagers concerned and to  migration. Thus, 
immediately after the 1965 incidents and right up until 1972, the living s tandards  of some 
villagers deter iora ted . In some cases this was due to their associations w ith  the previous 
adm inis tra tions . But, the regional level economic turm oils  has a more general effect. A 
num ber of o ther villagers seem to have left the village during th a t  period because of the 
greater profitability  of coffee production a t  K ota Bumi in Lam pung and R anau in Ogan 
Komering Ulu. Many land sales occurred during th a t  period. P lots of rubber land were 
sold to villagers who stayed, although some better  quality plots, especially along the 
Ogan river, were not sold. For example, one villager who owned a grocery shop a t th a t  
t ime appeared to  have bought a considerable num ber of rubber plots. O ther  departing 
villagers sold their plots to close relatives, with the intention of redeeming the plots when 
they come back w ithout great  difficulty and high cost.
2 .4 .3  L a b o u r
2 .4 .3 .1  F a m ily  L abou r
Household members who are 15 to 60 years old, and who are presently not going to 
school, are trea ted  as the family labour force.
Of the 670 persons in the 118 households, 323 persons belonged to this category. 
Assuming th a t  all those in the specified age range are productive, and  the others 
consumer-members of the households, the ratio between these two categories is 1.07 : 
1. 00 .
In the labour force, there  were 161 males and 162 females, with an average of 1.363 
male labourers and 1.373 female labourers per household. M ost households had one male
6Past transactions of land are recorded in Section 3.5.3.
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and one female working age (45.8%). Details are given in Figure 2-14 and Tables 2-8 .and 
2-9.
2 .4 .3 .2  E x c h a n g e  L ab ou r
Exchange labour in trad it ional societies functions as a  means of coping with periodic 
or irregular concentrations of labour demand. In agriculture, the p lanting and harvest of 
rice, especially of saw ah , require considerably more labour th an  a family can provide over 
this very short  period concerned. In social life, trad i t ion  com m ands villagers to organise 
feasts a t  the times of births, circumcisions, weddings, construction  of houses, and 
funerals. These, too, require substan tia l  labour, and exchange labour becomes im portan t.
In M alay-Indonesian culture, such exchange labour is called “gotong-royong” and is 
emphasised as a  m ajor principle of social life. “Gotong-royong” in Sawah production in 
the M alay-Indonesian culture also parallels similar arrangem ents  in wet-land rice 
production elsewhere in Asia.
Actually “gotong-royong” is less prevalent in South S um atra ,  especially in rubber 
producing areas, compared with o ther parts  of Indonesia. South Sum atran  culture has 
historically been characterised by stronger individuality and a simpler social s truc tu re  
than  the  hierarchical social system in Java. Certainly, the introduction of cash-cropping 
involving perennials has reduced the number of opportunities  for “gotong-royong” in 
agriculture. In estates, the villagers are hired workers, and in smallholding areas, family 
labour is usually adequate  for its own cash-crop production.
In Belatung, with its history of smallholding rubber production, “gotong-royong”
was seen only in social life. During the festivities a t tend ing  births, circumcisions,
weddings, construction of houses, and funerals, a  villager asks his relatives and neighbours
to par tic ipa te  in various tasks, such as the delivery of invita tions, p reparation  of food,
7night watches and narrations.
These exchange arrangem ents  are reciprocal in the long term , since alm ost all 
villagers partic ipa te  in a  very similar set of ceremonies on their  own account.
7
During the author’s fieldwork, he was present at three weddings, three funerals and one big- 
scale feast for three babies. There were also several other such occasions where he was not able to 
attend.
Figure 2-14: Family Labour Force Distribution by Sex
Male Households 
No. 7.
0 12 10.2 ******
1 69 58.5 ***********************************
2 23 19.5 ************
3 10 8.5 *****
4 4 3.4 **
Total 118 100.1(a)
Average 1.364 male labour per household
S.D. 0. 903
Female Households 
No. 7.
0 5 4.2 ***
1 78 66.1 * **************************************
2 22 18.6 ***********
3 12 10.1 ******
4 1 O 00 *
Total 118 99.8 (a)
Average 1.373 female labour per household
S.D. 0 .760
Total Households
No 7
0 1 0.8 *
1 12 10.2 ******
2 55 46.6 ****************************
3 18 15.3 *********
4 20 16.9 **********
5 6 5.1 * * *
6 5 4.2 * * *
7 1 0.8 *
Total 118 99.9(a)
Average 2. 737 labour per household
S.D. 1.336
Note: (a) rounding errors
Source: Fieldwork
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Table 2-8: Labour vs. Non-Labour Household Members
Non-Labour Force Household members 
0| 1| 2 1 31 4 1 5. I 6. I 7. I 8. I Total(%)
0 . 0 I 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0.0 1 0.0 1 0.8 j 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 ( 0.8)
1. 1 1 3 1 4 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 12
0.8 1 2.5 1 3.4 1 1-7 1 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 (10.2)
2. 3 1 7 1 8 1 1 4 1 8 1 11 1 2 1 1 1 1 | 55
2.5 1 5.9 1 6.8 j 11.9 1 6.8 1 9.3 1 1.7 1 0.8 1 0.8 1 (46.6)
3. 1 1 6 1 1 1 4 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 18
0.8 1 5.1 1 0.8 1 3.4 1 2.5 1 0.8 1 1.7 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 (15.3)
4. 4 1 1 1 6 1 2 1 3 1 0 1 2 i 2 1 0 | 20
3.4 1 0.8 1 5.1 1 1-7 1 2.5 1 0.0 1 1.7 1 1.7 1 0.0 1 (16.9)
5. 1 1 1 1 2 1 o 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 I 0 1 6
0.8 1 0.8 1 1.7 i 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.0 1 0.8 1 0.0 1 ( 5.1)
6. 0 ! 0 1 2 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 5
0.0 1 0.0 1 1.7 j 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.8 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 ( 4-2)
7. O 1 1 1 O 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 O 1 O 1 o | 1
0.0 1 0.8 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 ( 0.8)
TAL i o 1 19 1 24 | 23 1 16 1 15 1 6 1 4 1 1 | 118
% 8.5 116.1 120.3 j 19.5 113.6 112.7 1 5.1 1 3.4 1 0.8 j100.0
0
U
R
I
F
0
R
C
E
H
0
U
S
E
H
0
L
D
Notes:
A figure of a upper column in a cell represents the number of 
households which have certain numbers of labour-force household 
members and non-labour-force members. A figure of a lower column 
in a cell represents a percentage in all households.
Source:
Fieldwork
83
T a b le  2-9 : Male vs. Female Labour
F E M A L E
0-1 l . |
L A B O U R  
2. I 3. I 4.I Total
M
A
L
E
O.
1.
L
A
B
0
U
R
2 .
3.
4.
Total
1 I 9
7 | 0.8 I 7.6
3 I 54
7. I 2.5 I 45.8
1 I 8 
7 | 0.8 I 6.8
O I 7
7 |  0.0 I 5.9
O I O
7 I 0.0 I 0.0
5 I 78 
7 I 4.2 I 66.1
0
0.0
8
6.8
9
7.6
2
1.7
3
2.5
22
18.6
2
1.7
4
3.4
4
3.4
1
0.8
1
0.8
12
10.2
O
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.8
O
0.0
O
0.0
1
0.8
12
10.2
69
58.5
23
19.5
10
8.5
4
3.4
118
100.0
Notes:
A figure of a upper column in a cell represents the number of 
households which have certain numbers of male and female 
labour-force members. A figure of a lower column in a cell 
represents a percentage in all households.
Source:
Fieldwork
The use of exchange labour during ceremonial occasions was investigated by the 
au th o r  during Field work in the village in 1982-83 and inform ation was obtained on its use 
in previous periods. However, it was not possible to  identify social groupings which 
differed in their partic ipation  or non-participation in exchange labour. It can only be 
s ta ted  th a t  such ceremonial exchange labour in its frequent use followed A dat,  and any 
obvious segregation or discrimination within the village was strongly avoided.
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2 .4 .3 .3  H ired  Labour
As discussed in Section 2.4.2.2, most villagers were owner-operators. They managed 
their agricultural activities using family labour from the household, and rarely hire labour 
from outside, especially from beyond the village. Hiring-in of labour for agricultural 
purpose was not observed. Two main factors are thought to explain this.
F irstly , the cropping patterns of the villagers, as discussed in Section 2.4.1, were 
dom inated by perennial cash crops with few peak labour demand periods, in contrast to 
subsistence food crops which have more marked peaks. Although a considerable am ount 
of labour is required for rubber re-planting, no replanting has been taken place in 
Belatung. When the villagers planted new rubber stands, they cleared the jungle by 
burning and planted conventional (unimproved) seedlings. Usually land was cleared in 
the dry season, and farmers worked on it for about three m onths with family labour 
including the wife and children, and occasionally with the help of relatives. Rice was 
planted w ith minimal labour a t the end of this period. The harvesting of rubber was a 
regular activ ity , undertaken by household members, and which was sometimes 
in terrup ted  during rice harvesting.
Secondly, sources of hired labour were limited. It is often stated th a t South 
Sum atran  people are very proud of being owner-operators, and very reluctant to work for 
others. While precise figures were unavailable, the wage for South Sum atran labour was 
much higher than  th a t for Javanese transm igrants who received R p.1000-1500 per day for 
unskilled labour during 1982-83. The wage rate has been traditionally determined in 
accordance with the m arket price of three kg of rice plus one meal. The m arket price of 
rice in 1982-83 was Rp.300-350. At the time, the nearest source of Javanese labour was 
the transm igration  project a t B atum arta which was 50-60 km away from Belatung and 
Javanese transm igrants were unwilling to work in such villages a t the prevailing wage 
rates. This was likely to change because a new transm igration project was opened near 
the village on the old long-term lease land called Erfpachtsperceel M aria Louisa. It is 
expected th a t the Javanese transm igrants would be willing to work outside the project for 
additional cash income during the period of seven to eight years th a t elapses before their 
rubber trees can be tapped.
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2 .4 .4  T ech n o logy
As already discussed, the crops produced in the  village were mainly rice (padi 
lad an g , padi lebak) for subsistence, rubber and o ther cash-crops.
T he padi ladang was grown in the following way®:
1. Brush grass and old rubber trees on pem atang  or ladang were cut with parang 
or kapak  a t  the end of the dry season (Septem ber and October). Dried brush, 
grass and  dead rubber trees were b u rn t  in November ju s t  before the rainy 
season. Rem nants  of logs were not usually removed. Immediately after 
burn ing , small and shallow holes were punched ou t with a long tugal and 10 
to 20 gra ins of rice seed were dibbled in to  each hole.
2. W eeding was rarely executed. The harvest took place between April and June, 
depending on the growth of rice.
3. A ladang  plot was usually used successively for three years, with rice being 
followed by other crops, and then it was left for a t  least further three years to 
recover before it was used again. By 1982-83, however, a  ladang plot was 
rarely left idle after three years of rice production.
T he production of padi lebak is distinguished from padi ladang (T akaya  1980). But 
in Belatung and surrounding villages along the Ogan river (Figure 2-2-b), there was no 
clear d istinction  between the two. There were some differences, however; more frequent 
weeding was necessary for padi lebak production because of its closeness to water, and the 
three year ro ta t ion  could not take place on lebak plots because of annual flooding.
T he production technology of rubber was very primitive. The husband and wife 
s ta r ted  w orking early in the morning, usually ab o u t  six or seven o ’clock. They tapped the 
rubber trees, and  subsequently collected the latex in coconut bowls. This job usually 
occupied the ir  t ime until noon. A couple could manage to tap  and collect latex from 
abou t two hectares of rubber trees a day, gaining ab o u t  one or two 10 litre plastic buckets 
of latex. Depending on w eather conditions, they usually worked for four to five days a 
week and produced 60 kg to 150 kg of rubber slab.
To coagula te  the latex, the farmers used alum  or ta w a s , which was available from 
grocery shops in local villages and weekly m arkets. The latex was sieved into a wooden 
box, and mixed with alum by hand. Sometimes, a hole dug in the ground was used 
instead of a  box. The quality of slab produced under such conditions was poor.
8Based on the author’s observations in Belatung and T akaya’s (1980) observations in Komering 
Ulu.
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Stands of rubber trees were usually quite overgrown due to lack of weeding. They 
were called hutan karet (rubber jungle). Because of this, it was difficult to  move through 
the trees to tap  and collect latex.
2.4.5 Credit
The most approachable sources of general purpose credit for the villagers were close 
rich relatives. They could borrow money with no interest from such people if they were in 
a household crisis. However, they did not borrow money from such people for agricultural 
purposes, which were not regarded as emergency needs. For these purposes, they chose 
other richer villagers who are not close relations. While a certain interest rate  may be 
charged, due to Islamic faith , this may not be observed by outsiders. No credit 
transactions could be found during fieldwork, although some past transactions were 
identified. These were all for non-agricultural purposes, such as buying furniture or a 
second-hand mini bus.
There were several official sources of credit for agricultural purposes. Credit may be 
obtained from the BIMAS scheme in the form of rice-seeds, fertilisers and insecticides, if 
there are saw ah plots in a village. Amazingly, and even though the sawah plots in 
Belatung had long been unexploited owing to the water-course and dam  problems 
mentioned in Section 2.2.1.1, the village head had once gathered some ten villagers and 
claimed BIMAS credits. The Dinas Pertanian (Food Crop Agency) gave these to villagers 
w ithout actually investigating their claimed sawah plots. The rice-seeds were then sown 
on the ladang or lebak plots, and completely failed. After this incident, the villagers 
ironically lost confidence in the BIMAS scheme.
Because there is no obligation to repay BIMAS credits if production is unsuccessful, 
the village head was a ttem pting  during the time of the fieldwork to obtain further “free” 
fertilisers and insecticides, whose use would be indicated for saw ah, but which would be 
actually employed for other crops such as citrus siam. While this was illegal, it was 
either undetected or simply ignored by the authorities, including the Dinas Pertanian dan 
Tanam an Pangan extension officers. The Dinas Pertanian dan Tanam an Pangan had 
already started  a credit scheme specifically for citrus siam production, but this scheme 
had not yet covered Belatung or its surrounding areas.
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2 .4 .6  O u tp u t  M a r k e ts
The marketing of agricultural products was relatively easy for the villagers of 
Belatung. They could attend a weekly market, which was held every Tuesday in the 
adjacent village of Lebuk Batang Lama and served all the residents of Marga Lebuk 
Batang (Figure 2-2). It took the Belatung people about 20 minutes to walk to this 
village. The market opened early in the morning and closed by noon. Rubber merchants, 
who were mainly from Baturaja and other towns, gathered there and bought rubber slabs. 
Some merchants even sent their trucks to villages in the vicinity, and bought slabs 
directly from the farmers who had only to carry the slabs from their rubber plots to the 
roadside in their village.
In the weekly market, there were many merchants who sold various household 
goods. Occasionally, there were merchants who sold agricultural chemicals and fertilisers, 
as well as small agricultural machinery like sprayers.
Villagers went to Baturaja on average once a week mainly to buy household goods 
but also to sell their products (Section 2.3.5). During the dry season, they caught fish 
from the Ogan river and took them to Baturaja to sell. In Baturaja, there were two 
official agricultural products market places where individuals could become vendors on 
paying a certain tax for a small block of ground or stall. There were also three unofficial 
market places which operated without any tax payments. These were subsequently 
brought under the control of the city administration, but further unofficial market places 
appeared likely to emerge in an attempt to avoid official regulations.
With cash crops other than rubber, villagers had their own links with specific 
merchants, which might have developed over a long period. Villagers called these 
merchants pemborong buah-buahan (fruit contractors). They usually visited the 
villagers’ fruit plots one or two months before harvest time and made contracts, 
sometimes with advance payments according to their estimation of the likely harvests. At 
harvest time, they visited the plots with a group of hired-labourers, usually from within 
the contractor’s native village or a transmigration project. In Belatung, there was one 
regular fruit contractor. The village head was also a fruit contractor before he assumed 
his official position, and subsequently his youngest brother often organised this activity.
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There were also two villagers who acted as fruit contractors for their relatives in-the 
village. All these fruit contractors hired trucks and carried the fruit harvests to Jak arta  
and other big cities in Java including Bandung or Surabaya.
There were also some itinerant fishmongers who were active during the dry season. 
On the way from their native villages to B aturaja, they bought the m orning’s catch of 
fish directly from the Belatung villagers.
The following means of transporting the agricultural products from Belatung were 
available to  villagers: (1) railway (2) mini-buses and (3) hired-trucks. In the early 1970’s, 
the villagers primarily used the railway to carry their products to Palem bang or Tanjung 
Karang, sometimes with only a railway lorry which they pushed themselves. In 1977, the 
road to Palem bang was opened through the old long-term lease land Erfpachtsperceel 
M aria Louisa, and another road to Palem bang via Peninjauan was widened (Figure 2-1). 
The most recent improvement of roads was the southern portion of the Sum atran 
Highway which passes through the centre of B aturaja, and makes very easy access to both 
Tanjung Karang and Jakarta . Following this im provem ent, and prior to the study 
reported here, the villagers started  self-organised truck loads of fruit crops to Java. The 
m arkets for fruits from this area were therefore further expanded.
2 .4 .7  E x te n s io n  S erv ice  A c t iv i t ie s  
2 .4 .7 .1  D in a s  P e r k e b u n a n
The Dinas Perkebunan is the Estate Crop Agency of the M inistry of Agriculture, 
and is responsible for estate crops such as rubber, coffee, clove, cinnamon and pepper. Its 
B aturaja branch has been concentrating its efforts on the K abupaten’s major perennial 
crops, rubber and coffee, and had set up smallholder rubber dem onstration schemes in 
three blocks in Kecamatan Peninjauan. The control office for these three demonstration 
blocks was built in Belatung in 1981, next to the village head’s house. This office was 
called the Unit Peraksana Proyek, Pusat Koagulasi Karet Rakyat (U .P.P.K .K .R ., Project 
Executive Unit, Smallholder Rubber Coagulation Centre) and had about th irty  personnel. 
The head of the Unit and three officers lived in Belatung, while the other personnel lived 
a t the dem onstration blocks or in B aturaja. The office actively administered the three 
dem onstration blocks and was planning for future plots in Kecam atan Peninjauan.
89
However, the  dem onstration  block in Belatung itself seemed to  be poorly m ain ta ined . The 
rubber smallholder scheme group, Sebimbing Sekundang , was nominally established a t  
the block in Belatung with an ex-village official as cha irm an, bu t had a t t ra c te d  only a 
retired N ational Railway worker and a landless villager who had re tu rned  from Kota 
Bumi. To join this group a member had to abandon any activities on his own plots of 
land, b u t  since most villagers were owner-operators, th is  regulation was a  m ajor obstacle 
to  partic ipa tion .
The villagers also did not appear to  t ru s t  the Dinas Perkebunan personnel, whose 
performance was considered to be poor as dem onstra ted  when the bushfire, said to  have 
been s ta r ted  by a cigarette b u t t  dropped from a  tra in ,  dam aged quite a large area  of the 
Belatung dem onstra tion  block in August 1983. A t the regular inspection by the 
Pa lem bang  provincial headquarters  staff immediately after the fire, it was also revealed 
th a t  m ost seedlings grown in the Belatung dem onstra tion  block had either died or been 
dam aged reportedly by the long d rough t in 1982.
2 .4 .7 .2  D in a s  P e r ta n ia n  dan  T a n a m a n  P a n g a n
The Dinas P ertan ian  dan T an am an  Pangan  is the Food Crop Agency of the 
M inistry of Agriculture, and is responsible for food crops like rice, maize and  cassava, and 
some horticu ltura l  crops, such as citrus siam. In 1982 it opened an extension office in 
Belatung, which was then used on Tuesdays for the meetings of extension workers in 
K ecam atan  Peninjauan. The extension officer based a t  these premises was a young 
g rad u a te  of a high school for agricultural studies. At the time of this fieldwork he had 
not mixed with the villagers or won their t ru s t  in any way.
A part  from its extension service, the Dinas P ertan ian  dan T an am an  Pangan  had 
also set up a credit scheme for citrus siam production, bu t had not extended its coverage 
to K ecam atan  Peninjauan. Few villagers showed any interest in the credit scheme, 
however, as it only offered finance for sap ling /graf ts ,  fertilisers and agro-chemicals while 
hedging and other costs associated with citrus siam production were not covered.
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C H A P T E R  3
B e la t u n g  S o c io - E c o n o m ic  S t r u c t u r e
3.1  I n tr o d u c t io n
In this chapter ,  the socio-economic structure of Belatung is described and illustrated 
by the use of networks of several im portan t socio-economic in teractions am ong villagers. 
G roups of villagers are identified. A group is composed of villagers who can be considered 
as sharing  inform ation and playing similar roles in dissem inating agricultural information 
in the village.
F irs tly ,  in Section 3.2, several methods for identification of groups of villagers in a 
network system are briefly investigated. These m ethods have been developed by network 
sociologists and social anthropologists , although they were originally based on economic 
in p u t-o u tp u t  analysis. One particu la r  set of m ethods is chosen for use according to  
cr ite ria  considered appropria te  to this study.
Secondly, in Section 3.3, some im portant types of socio-economic interactions 
am ong villagers are selected and discussed from the point of view of their ability to 
t ran sm it  agricultural information.
T hird ly , network systems of selected socio-economic interactions am ong villagers 
are then examined in Sections 3.4 to 3.7. Distinct groups of villagers within these 
network systems are identified.
Finally, in Section 3.8, these network systems are in tegrated  into one network 
system, the  village socio-economic structure , and then associations of villagers who share 
alm ost identical agricultural information and, a t  the  same time, play similar roles in 
d issem inating agricultural information are identified. Average socio-economic and 
agricu ltura l characteristics of m em bers of these associations are then examined.
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3.2 G roup Id en tifica tion  M ethod
G roup  identification methods in network analysis correspond to industrial 
classification or aggregation methods in an inpu t-ou tpu t  m atrix  of industries. Basically 
these m ethods  are perm uta tion  or decomposition problems in m atrix  algebra.
Individuals in a network m atrix  or an inpu t-ou tpu t  m atrix  are classified in to  one 
group if they are similar in a certain respect. The similarity of two individuals has been 
measured in many ways.
In in p u t-o u tp u t  analysis, Blin and Cohen (1977) used the “dissimilarity scale” 
which m easures “quasi-input-heterogeneity (homogeneity)” on the input coefficient 
m atrix  and  on the Leontief inverse multiplier m atrix  of the in p u t-o u tp u t  table. According 
to  this scale, industries were classified into groups by a method of hierarchical cluster 
analysis.
In economic inpu t-ou tpu t analysis, transactions between any two industries or 
sectors are measured in exact monetary terms, but the entries in a network analysis 
m atrix  are different. Since the la tte r  analysis has been developed as a  tool for quali ta t ive  
exam ination  of social s tructure , the entries in a m atrix  often merely indicate the existence 
of in teractions of interest in the study. Entries are often d ichotomous 0-1 variables.
F u r th e r ,  because of the emphasis on the s tructu re  of the system under study , the 
external environm ent of the system is not considered a t  all, or is assumed away as an 
u n im p o rtan t  factor. Generally, a large system is chosen, so th a t  effects from the external 
environm ent may be assumed to be almost identical to m em bers of the  system or 
negligible.
Because of the simplistic dichotomous choices of network matrices, and the 
exclusion of the  external environment,* network researchers had to  develop new m ethods 
to  identify groups of individuals in a system. G roup identification m ethods in network
o
analysis can be placed in two categories. One is the relational approach, a  group of 
clique-detection methods based on various definitions of the concept of “clique” . T he
*This exclusion causes the problem of non-existent Leontief inverse multiplier matrix in input- 
output analysis.
2 • .See also reviews of the sociological contextual analysis in Section 1.4.4.
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other ca tegory  is the s tructura l approach (s truc tu ra l  equivalence approach) ,  which, 
though based on interactions in a  network m atr ix ,  somehow derives similarity indices 
between any two persons and relies on methodology of numerical taxonom y (Lorraine and 
W hite 1971, Sneath and Sokal 1973).
3.2 .1  R e la tio n a l A pproach
T he concept of the “clique” has been central in small group research in sociology. 
The m ost s tr ingent graph theoretical definition is th a t  a  clique is a set of completely 
linked poin ts  (individuals) not contained within a larger, completely linked set (of 
ind iv iduals) .3 This definition is too s tr ingent for operational purposes, and has
encouraged researchers to produce less restrictive definitions. Seidman and Foster (1978) 
developed the  k-plex definition of “clique” . A k-plex clique is a  set of n individual points, 
in which each individual point is connected directly to a t  least n-k of the o ther individual 
points. This  definition is consistent with the concept of a  “social circle” , a set of actors 
(individuals) with shared interests having direct or minimally indirect linkage with each 
o ther (A lba and Kadushin 1976), and includes the most s tr ingen t definition of “clique” as 
a special case, the 1-plex.
E v ere t t  (1982a, b, 1983a, b) developed a  graph-theoretic  clique detection procedure 
based on the k-plex definition, and published a F O R T R A N  program m e for it. This 
m ethod requires a  large am ount of com puter memory, however, and is not suitable for the 
analysis of a  large network system.
Definitions of “clique” based on graph theory are very s tr ingen t,  and require 
considerable time and memory for computer analysis. To avoid this, some ad hoc and less 
restrictive definitions have been proposed.
Hubbell (1965) developed a method based on raising the original sociometric m atrix  
to successively higher powers. In this m ethod, the criterion for clique identification rests 
on a  linkage distance measure of proximity; individuals are classified info a  clique if they 
have a high degree of direct an d /o r  one-step interactions with o ther members of the 
clique.
o
°The meaning of “completely linked” is that each component of the clique has reciprocal 
interaction with every other component.
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Hierarchical clustering has been utilised to identify cliques since Johnson (1967) 
used both the nearest neighbour, the farthest neighbour, and W ard’s methods. Peay 
(1974) developed a hierarchical clustering programme tha t  allows clusters (cliques) to 
overlap.
Numerous other clique identification methods exist, details of some of which have 
been published. Various clique-identification methods are reviewed in Lankford (1974), 
Rogers and Kincaid (1981), and Knoke and Kuklinski (1983).
Rogers and Kincaid (1981) classified the methods from a technical perspective as 
suitable for various purposes, and chose the NEGOPY method of Richards (1975) for 
their own study of the diffusion of family planning information in South Korean villages.
The NEGOPY method is a clique detection method based on the following very 
simple definition of “clique” :
1. It is a subsystem whose components interact with each other relatively more 
frequently than with other members of the system.
2. Each one must have a minimum of three members.
3. A member must have at least 50 percent of his/her links within the clique.
4. All members must be directly or indirectly connected by a continuous chain of 
dyadic links4 lying directly within the clique.
Theoretically, Richards’ NEGOPY method is an iterative approximation method to 
identify an eigen-vector which corresponds to a maximum eigen value of a row-stochastic 
matrix derived from an original sociometric matrix (Higuchi 1983a). The merits of this 
method are as follows:
1. Various types of similarity or distance measures can be used.
2. It does not require a great amount of computer memory and computing time.
3. The algorithm is easily interpretable.
4interactions between two members
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On the  basis of the similarity of results produced by several methods,^ Rogers^and 
Kincaid chose the N E G O PY  method as being superior for an analysis of a  large-sized 
netw ork  system.
Although these various clique identification methods are different from the technical 
po in t of view, they all imply the common proposition th a t  m embers of a  par ticu la r  clique 
in te rac t  more strongly and share more similar information with each other than  with non- 
m em bers.
3 .2 .2  S tr u c tu r a l  A p p ro a ch
In the  s tructura l  approach, individuals are aggregated into a jo in tly  occupied 
position to  the ex tent th a t  they have a  common set of linkages to  o ther individuals in the 
system.® This s tructura l  approach is identical to  the approach used in an aggregation of 
Am erican industries by Blin and  Cohen (1977). Their concept of 
“quasi- input-he terogeneity” is a special case of the measure of s truc tu ra l  equivalence Burt 
(1976) used. Hierarchical cluster analysis is then employed to identify groups of 
s tru c tu ra l ly  equivalent individuals. Individuals of a par ticu lar  group identified are then 
assum ed to  have similar roles in the system because they have a similar pa t te rn  of 
in te rac tions  with others. Thus, they are regarded to have similar pa tte rns  of preferences, 
and fu r ther to behave similarly if they have similar am oun ts  of resources and similar 
in form ation .
T he structura l  approach to identifying groups in a network system has often been 
preferred to  clique detection methods (B urt  1978) because groups identified by structura l  
approach:
1. include a broader range of types of subgroups,
^Rogers and Kincaid (1981) used ( l)  Direct Factor Analysis, (2) N EG O PY  (3) CONCOR  
blockm odeling (4) Smallest Space Analysis.
^Form ally and most stringently, the concept of “structural equivalence” is defined as follows: 
tw o individuals a and b of a set C are structurally equivalent if, for any given relation R and any 
individuals x of C, aRx if and only if bRx, and xRa if and only if xRb. In other words, a is 
structurally equivalent to b if a relates to every object x of C in exactly the same way as b does. 
From the point o f view of the logic of the structure, then a and b are absolutely equivalent, they 
are substitutab le (Lorrain and W hite 1971 )^  This definition is made less restrictive using the 
concept of continuous “social distance” (Burt 1976).
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2. ex tend the  scope of types of subgroups in which homogeneity of a t t i tu d e s  and ^
behaviour can be expected, _ _  _
3. have a  more consistent meaning as operationalised by available com puter 
a lgorithm s,
4 . can be subjected to statistical tests of goodness-of-fit,
5. are accordingly more robust for random errors in relations,
6. provide a basis for sampling population networks in large systems.
A lthough the shortcomings of the s truc tu ra l  approach  are not listed by Burt, 
several shortcom ings are evident. Individuals who in terac t  with only a  small num ber of 
o ther individuals can all be classified into one group with isolates, regardless of the 
existence of their interactions. Further, the results secured are dependent on the 
particu lar  m ethod of hierarchical clustering. A lthough W a rd ’s m ethod is usually believed 
to be the best method of hierarchical clustering (W ishart  1975), it seems th a t  B urt  and 
other proponents  of the s tructura l approach use the nearest neighbour m ethod of the 
hierarchical clustering.
Finally , a lthough a  complete substitu tability  of individuals in term s of the pa t te rn  
of in teractions ensures th a t  these individuals share identical information and have 
identical p a t te rn s  of interactions, a weak substitu tab il i ty  (weak s truc tu ra l  equivalence) 
may not necessarily ensure these two aspects. As the cut-off point for weak strwitural 
equivalence in a clustering analysis is raised and the num ber of individuals in a  particular 
cluster increases, the num ber of interaction pa t te rn s  in the  cluster increases. Hence, the 
cut-off point should be kept as low as possible, bu t then the approach tends to produce 
several groups with a small number of individuals, and many unclassifiable individuals. 
W ith the s truc tu ra l  approach, therefore, the cut-off point should be very carefully chosen, 
especially for a  study of a large system.
Burt  (1980c) provides a measure to cope with the last problem by including two-
n
step in teractions between a pair of individuals. ' This suggestion coincides with Rogers
7 . .Two-step interactions are defined as interactions of two individuals who do not interact with 
each other directly, but through a third individual(s). In the situation in which there are three 
individuals (A, B and C), suppose A interacts with C and C interacts with B. This exemplifies a 
two-step interaction between A and B.
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and K incaid ’s assertion th a t  indirect interactions beyond two steps are not reliable ^ i t h  
regard to com m unication between a pair of individuals, and corresponds with 
anthropological findings on the importance of two-step in teractions in exchange systems 
(Hage and Harary 1983). It also matches the sociological findings concerning the 
im portance  of “weak-ties” in job searches (G ranovette r  1973, 1982). The m easure can 
further reduce the risk th a t  individuals who in teract with only a small num ber of others 
m ight be classified into a group together with isolates.
3 .2 .3  I n te g r a t io n  o f  th e  T w o  A p p ro a ch es
T he relational and structura l approaches should be judged in the light o f  their 
capability  in identifying groups of individuals who share information and have similar 
roles in d isseminating agricultural information. Some further technical criteria  are th a t  a 
su itable approach should
1. be able to  ensure th a t  members of a group share information.
2. be able to ensure th a t  members of a group are similar in s ta tus ,  i.e., they are 
equals, and neither superior nor subordinate to one another,  and thus have 
similar pa t te rns  of preferences for sources of their welfare, particularly , similar 
p a t te rn  of their interdependence.
3. be able to deal with a large system, and to classify members of the system into 
significantly large groups so th a t  further analysis of the socio-economic 
characteris tics  of group members can be fruitful.
4. simultaneously use several types of interactions for the identification of groups 
(muiriplicity of interactions).
5. have an easily interpretable algorithm.
6. have less requirements for computing.
T he relational approach focuses on interactions between individuals, and identifies a 
group of individuals who share information which is t ransm it ted  by their interactions. 
However, the fact th a t  individuals share information does not ensure th a t  they play 
similar roles in disseminating information. Groups identified by this approach still 
include superiors and subordinates, opinion leaders and followers, landowners and lessees, 
and all these have different roles in disseminating information.
G roups identified by the structura l approach are clearly composed of individuals 
who are similar in terms of patterns  of interactions, and are thus  more or less
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su b s t i tu tab le  for each other in terms of roles in d issem inating information. Superiors^and 
subord ina tes  are thus  separated into different groups. However, the s truc tu ra l  approach 
classifies individuals who have no interactions with each o ther into one group if they do 
not in te rac t  w ith  many other individuals. This is not allowable.
As m entioned above, inclusion of two-step indirect in teractions into the structura l  
approach  seems to  reduce the difficulty of this problem. By pu tt ing  more emphasis on 
indirect in teractions, this method can identify groups of individuals who play similar roles 
and share m ore of similar information a t  the same time.
A m ultiplicity  of interactions can be trea ted  by both approaches, bu t,  as Knoke and 
Kuklinski (1983:60) noted, both approaches are “equally well (or ill) suited to” this 
problem. These two approaches are not robust enough in the sense th a t  they still allow 
plausible, b u t  arb itra ry ,  choices of weights for each single network. Researchers should 
carefully select the weights according to the purpose of their study.
W ith the N E G O PY  method where various types of similarity index can be handled, 
the sum s of two individuals’ coincidences in membership of groups across networks of 
several in teractions can be used to identify groups in the to ta l  system. Researchers may 
weight the  sum s of coincidences in membership according to the purpose of their study.
W ith  the  s tructura l  approach, the difference in two individuals’ patterns of 
in teractions (the square of their social distance) is trea ted  equally across networks of the 
several in teractions considered. However, since to tal num bers of entries in a network 
significantly influences classification results, the squares of social distance in each network 
m ust  be normalised by the s tandard  deviations and then summed across all networks 
considered. This  is an appropriate  weighting procedure.
In order to overcome the problem about characteristics of groups, the concepts of a 
“basic g ro u p ” and a “core group” are proposed. By cross-tabulating  individuals
o
according to  their memberships of relational and structura l  groups, it is ensured th a t  
individuals in cells share similar information and play similar roles in disseminating 
inform ation. A set of these individuals in a cell is defined as a  basic group. Among the
o
°A relational group is a set of individuals identified by relational approach. Similarly, a 
structural group is a set of individuals identified by structural approach.
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T a b le  3-1: Idea of a  Core C ro u p  and a  Basic G roup
Relational Groups
I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I total
Notes:
An * denotes a core group of a relational group, which 
corresponds with the largest cell within the relational 
group.
A # denotes a core group of a structural group, which 
correspond with the largest cell within the structural group.
basic groups, groups which can characterise relational or s truc tu ra l  groups are defined as 
a “core g roup“’ of either tlie relational or s tructura l  group. A core group of a relational 
group  is defined as a basic group which contains the largest proportion of members of the 
relational group. A core group of a structura l group is similarly defined as a basic group 
which contains the largest proportion of members of the s tructura l  group. For example, if 
there  are five relational groups and five structura l  groups identified, the cross-tabulation 
looks like Table  3-1. The core group of Relational G roup 1 is a  cell which corresponds 
w ith  S truc tu ra l  G roup 5, which contains 10 villagers of 15 villagers who belong to 
Relational G roup  1. If these s tructura l  groups are already ordered according to the socio­
economic s ta tu s  in the village, this cross-tabulation shows some interesting aspects.
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Relational G roup 1 is divided into two basic groups which are low in the socio-economic 
s ta tu s .  In th is  sense, this relational group is very homogeneous. B u t while Relational 
G roup  5 is also divided into two basic groups one of which is the top  in the socio­
economic s ta tu s  and the other of which is the lowest in the socio-economic s ta tus ,  this 
relational group can be regarded as a very heterogeneous group, and possibly the bo ttom  
basic g roup  is subordinate to the top  basic group.
3 .2 .4  S e lection  o f M ethod
W hile various clique identification, i.e. clustering, m ethods were developed for the 
relational approach, the s tructura l  approach lacked its par ticular method. The s tructura l  
approach  usually uses one of numerical taxonomic methods developed for bio-statistics 
(Sneath and  Sokal 1973). For example, Burt and other proponents of the s tructura l  
approach seem to have used the nearest neighbour (shortest distance) hierarchical 
c lustering method.
A reason for this difference seems to be the relational app roach’s focus on actual 
in teractions among members of a  system. The relational approach puts  much greater 
im portance  on strength or existence of interaction between two members. In the 
s t ru c tu ra l  approach, m em bers’ roles, which are assumed to be derived from pa tte rns  of 
one’s in teractions with others, are focussed. The similarity of m em bers’ roles in a system 
is then quantified and used to classify members into groups.
T he algorithm  of the N E G O PY  method is fairly simple. An individual is first given 
a random  rank, and his rank is then revised by calculating the weighted average of ranks 
of those with whom he interacts  directly or indirectly. Using this procedure, those persons 
with whom he interacts gradually converge into one area, given th a t  there are no strong 
in teractions with individuals outside the supposed convergence area.^ While the 
convergence area  is basically regarded as a clique, its nature  should be examined in the 
light of the definition of a clique made above, and some manual ad justm ent may need to 
be made.
^The N E G O PY  method is basically equivalent to the Power method to calculate 
eigen value and its eigen vector. Its convergence is assured (Higuchi 1983a).
a maximum
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T he N E G O P Y  m eth o d ’s requirement for com puting is the smallest am ong all^the 
m ethods used in applying both relational and s truc tu ra l  approaches. Since its  algorithm  is 
simple, its p rogram m e can be easily written and executed even with a  small memory, 
portable com puter.  All other m ethods require ready-m ade software which is only 
available in conjunction with main-frame com puters  a t  research institutions.
T he a lgorithm  of the s tructu ra l  approach is also quite  simple, bu t  the results 
secured depend on methods of hierarchical clustering. From the  point of view of sizes of 
identified groups, W a rd ’s method of hierarchical clustering with its objective function 
based on within- and between-group variances is generally believed to be the most 
suitable. T h e  nearest neighbour m ethod which has been used by B urt  and other 
proponents  of this approach tends to produce a large group and some small groups, and it 
is generally believed to be inferior to W a rd ’s m e th o d . 1^
In general, network researchers have developed their own grouping methods quite 
independently of numerical taxonomy which has been developed for bio-statistics or 
biological taxonom y (Sneath and Sokal 1973, Dunn and E ver it t  1982). However, their 
grouping m ethods basically belong to numerical taxonomy in the sense of grouping 
samples by their individual characteristics. A major difference between the grouping 
m ethods in network analysis and numerical taxonomy for bio-statistics is the definition of 
“s im ilar ity” between two samples (persons). In network analysis, emphasis is pu t on 
in teractions between these two samples (persons), especially in the relational approach. 
Even in the s tructura l approach, “sim ilarity” is defined on the basis of their interactions, 
not their individual characteristics.
Once “similarity” is defined, the statis tica l procedure is almost identical in both 
network analysis and numerical taxonomy. Hence, the findings on results of grouping in 
numerical taxonom y are relevant to those in network analysis. A m ajor lesson from 
numerical taxonomy is th a t  the results of grouping should be checked by one or two other 
m ethods, and  th a t  stable groupings should be chosen for further analysis. Therefore, also 
in network analysis, results of one grouping method should be compared with those of 
o ther grouping methods.
^ S e e  W ishart (1975) for general characteristics of hierarchical clustering methods.
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In th is  s tudy , the NEG O PY  method is adopted , albeit in a  slightly modified \ya^ so 
t h a t  co m p u ta t io n s  with a small-memory com puter may converge quickly on groups.** 
T h e  basic procedure employed was to group individual villagers using a  transportab le
1 o  -
m icro-com pute r in the field, and to conduct further precise analysis a t  the Australian 
N ational University with direct factor analysis as well. W a rd ’s method of hierarchical 
c lustering  analysis was adopted to identify s truc tu ra l  groups in the village socio-economic 
s t ru c tu re .  Considering cross-checking and producing stable groupings, the actual 
procedure  was set as follows:
i 1 9
1. After excluding isolated villagers and isolated g roups ,1 the remaining 
villagers were processed by the modified N E G O PY  method.
2. These remaining villagers were re-ordered within groups identified above 
according to  the factor scores calculated by direct factor analysis. In order to 
d isentangle villagers roughly ordered by the modified N EG O PY  method, 
m anual re-orderings were conducted within groups identified above.
3. G roups of villagers were derived according to coincidences of membership in
networks of selected interactions using the same procedure above (1 2).
G roups identified are for convenience called relational associations.
4. To  identify basic and core groups of already identified relational associations 
in the whole system, the structura l approach was used with W ard ’s m ethod of 
hierarchical clustering analysis.
3 .2 .5  S o m e  I m p o r ta n t  C o n cep ts
3 .2 .5 .1  C o n c e p t  o f  D is ta n c e
Social scientists have developed various types of distance between two agents within 
a  s y s te m .* '* They are classified into two categories:*"*
* *The complete FORTRAN programme called CLIQUE.FOR is listed in Appendix C.5.
i o
Osbourne 1 with two single density single-sided disk drives with 64K RAM.
13In network analysis, an isolate represents an individual who does not interact with any other 
individual, and with whom others do not interact. An isolate group represents a group of 
individuals who do not interact with individuals outside the group and with whom individuals 
outside the group do not interact.
* ^Economists tend to use physical distances measured in kilometers or minutes (See Lindner, 
Pardey and Jarrett 1982). Ongkili and Quilkey (1983) introduced “psychic distance” . Refer Section 
1.4.3.5.
*^See Burt(1976) and Rogers and Kincaid(1981).
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1. Individual distance (asymmetric)
a. Based on individual socio-economic characteristics
b. Based on socio-economic interactions
2. Social d istance (symmetric)
Individual distance is measured from the perspective of two agents in a  system as a 
pair (dyad) which is only secondarily associated with the overall system. It reflects an 
intensity  of relationship from one agent to another,  while all o ther agents  in the system 
are i g n o re d .^  In o ther words, the individual distance between two agents does not change 
when individual distances between other pairs of agents  change. In network analysis, the 
presence of interactions simply represented by 0-1 in a  m atrix  can be trea ted  as individual 
distance, and it is, in general, appropriate  to utilise a kind of individual distance in 
relational approach.
Social distance is measured from the perspective of two agents as elements of the 
overall system. The social distance between two agents changes when individual distances 
between other pairs of agents change. It hence represents a  contextual aspect of their 
relations within the system. For instance, if one agent is a member of one group and the 
o ther agent belongs to ano ther group, the social distance between them  is greater than it 
would be if both agents belonged to the same group — even if the individual distances are 
identical in both cases. The social distance is therefore suitable for the structura l 
approach , where roles in a system are focussed. This s i tuation  can be captured by defining 
social distance between two agents as difference between their patterns  of relations to all 
others  measured in term s of individual distances. The concept of social distance is
1 7therefore suitable for cap turing  institutional aspects of villagers in a  village system. *
T he social distance may be defined as follows:
^ E x c ep t for some measures which consider agents involved in the two agents’ relation. See Burt 
(1976).
17 This line of argument coincides with the classification of proxim ities by Rogers and 
K incaid(1981). They classified proximities into (1) com m unication proximity and (2) structural 
proxim ity. The criterion for their classification is almost identical with the one Burt used for the 
classification of concepts o f distance, but is more precisely defined in network terminology.
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(3.1)
' -  "V
8i j  ~  sn  ~
n
{ ( di j  -  dj i )2 +  Y 1  (dik ~ djk )2 +  (<**» -  d kj)2 }1//2 
k ^ i j
where d — stands  for a  type of individual distance between Villager i and Villager j. Social 
d is tance between two agents is zero, only if these two agents  have identical individual 
d istances to  and from all other agents  in a system and their individual distances are 
identical.
T he  individual distance used for capturing villagers’ socio-economic interactions 
should not be based on their personal socio-economic characteristics, because a  similarity 
of such characteris tics  does not always ensure the presence of interactions between two
i o
a g e n ts .10 T he  distance should be based upon their socio-economic interactions.
Using the network approach, the actual socio-economic interactions am ong villagers 
in a village can be depicted in m atrix  form. As noted above, several types of socio­
economic in teractions among villagers can also be incorporated. Substi tu ting  the contents 
of the network m atrix  for individual distance between two villagers in Equation (3.1), we 
can elicit the  social distance between those villagers.
Social distance based on network matrices of several socio-economic interactions has 
a definition slightly different to th a t  embodied in E quation (3.1). Individual distances 
depicted by the network approach are based on various types of villagers’ socio-economic 
in teractions. The following definition, therefore, becomes applicable:
(3.2)
si j  =  s ji  =
n
( £ « < * ,„ •  -  < y 2 + £  (dqtk -  V )2 + (<*,*.- -  < W 2» 1/2
q
where the subscript q represents the q-th type of their socio-economic interactions. The
18°Rogers and Bhowmick (1971). While similarity (homophily) of characteristics may well assure 
particular kinds of interactions between two agents, difference (heterophily) of characteristics may 
also assure other kinds of interactions.
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first term  in the  second sum m ation indicates the  difference in their o u tp u t  patterns,^and 
the second te rm  indicates the difference in their inpu t p a t te rn s .1^
A smaller social distance means th a t  Villager i in teracts  w ith a  g rea ter  proportion 
of villagers w ith  whom Villager j also interacts. These two villagers are s tructu ra lly  more 
equivalent th an  other sets of two villagers who have greater  social distances. The 
proportion of villagers with whom the two villagers m utually  in teract determ ines their 
s truc tu ra l  equivalence in a system.
This type of Euclidean distance was used to cluster and aggregate various industrial 
sectors in United Sta tes according to the 1967 inpu t-ou tpu t  m atrix  (Blin and Cohen 
1977). In the la t te r  s tudy, only the input-side is made use of, i.e., only the second term in 
the second sum m ation  in Equation (3.2).
In Section 3.8, this measure of social distance is used to  identify s truc tu ra l  groups 
whose members play more or less identical roles in terms of disseminating agricultural 
information, and thus more in terdependent with each other than  with outsiders.
3 .2 .5 .2  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e  C o e ff ic ien ts
Poliak (1976) studied “in terdependent preferences” , and used interdependence 
coefficients in linear expenditure systems. Burt (1980a) used s truc tu ra l  equivalence 
proximities as interdependence coefficients in interdependence utility functions as already 
indicated (Sections 1.4.4.2, p.31, and 1.4.6). The mechanism of determ ining such 
interdependence coefficients has been rarely studied by economists.
A villager’s interdependence with another villager is defined as the similarity of the 
two villagers’ roles in terms of disseminating agricultural information in the  village. If 
they play similar roles, they concern with each other more strongly than  w ith  others who 
do not play such roles. The similarity of roles is defined as the difference in the two 
villagers’ p a t te rn s  of interactions with others which transm it  agricultural information.
The village’s interdependence structure  can thus be elicited by using the structura l
^ T y p e s  of interactions are assumed to be independent of each other. In Appendix C.4, relations 
among these interactions are shown and found to be very low. If they are high, dependence among 
these interactions should be considered. Principal com ponents of these interactions should replace 
0-1 representation of interactions. However, this approach has not been so far proposed in network 
analysis literature.
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approach of network analysis. This  s tructura l approach  is based on the concept of -social 
d is tance” between any two villagers.
Villager i’s in terdependence on Villager j is defined as a  function of the  difference 
between (1) the social distance between Villager i and  the villager(s) who is fa rthes t  away 
from him in term s of social distance (Villager m^), s-m , and (2) the social d istance 
between Villager i and Villager j, s-j. Therefore Villager i’s interdependence on Villager j 
is:
Sirrij Sij'’ 
where
sim  ■ =  m l x s ik- i  k
The most remote villager from Villager i (Villager m-) is thus used as his reference point. 
As the difference between ( l )  and (2) becomes greater,  Villager j ’s influence on Villager i 
becomes stronger, i.e., the l a t t e r ’s interdependence with Villager j is assumed to become 
stronger.
Villager i’s independence in decision-making is defined as the rem nan t  after 
removing all o thers’ influence. Considering independence in this subsidiary way is quite 
different from the orthodox s ta r t ing  point for discussions, but for generality of the 
defin i t ion 'o f  the interdependence above, it is app ropria te  to s ta r t  with interdependence 
and to  derive independence as a  special case.
According to  the definition of interdependence above, Villager i’s interdependence 
with himself, i.e. his independence, is
si m * Sii ~  s im-'
i  i
Because the social distance between Villager i and himself, s - ,  is defined as zero, Villager 
i’s interdependence with himself is thus his d istance from the villager fa rthest away, Sjm . 
In o ther words, since the m ost remote villager, Villager m^, is used as his reference point, 
he becomes more independent as the radius of his area of interactions becomes greater.
Interdependence is a  relative concept. The to tal m agnitude of a  villager’s
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interdependence with others, or the absolute m agnitude of his interdependence wiJJi a
particular villager, does not affect his decision making. As in the planetary system,
changes happen only when the relative pattern  of other planets changes. By using a
method of standardisation, it is possible to determine comparable measures of villagers’
independence and interdependence in their decision making. On the basis of the analogy
to the relationship between gravity and distance in the planetary system, the following
9 0standard isation  is proposed:
Villager Vs interdependence coefficient with Villager j:
si m • s i j)i J
 ^^  (sim - sik)
k= 1 1
U £  0 (3.3)
Villager i 's  independence coefficient:
/* ^  Km- s ik)
T = i
these sum up to unity: 
n
lki =  L
k =  1
(3-4)
where the summation in the denominator corresponds with the total m agnitude of 
influence from or interdependence with other villagers.
These standardised indices are, as a group, especially called “interdependence 
coefficients” in this study. If the two subscripts are different, as in the first equation, they
20 In the planetary system, gravity is related to the square of the distance.
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are called “interdependence coefficients” . If th e  subscrip ts are  identical, as in the second 
equa tion , they are called “independence coefficients” . In m atrix  form  w here colum ns and 
rows represen t villagers, diagonal elem ents of th e  m atrix  are independence coefficients and 
non-diagonal elem ents are interdependence coefficients. These coefficients can be 
sum m arised as follows:
Interdependence coefficients
(1) Independence coefficients (diagonal elements),
(2) Interdependence coefficients (non-diagonal elements).
An increase of Villager i’s interdependence w ith Villager j m eans th a t  either:"^ (1) 
the social d istance between Villager i and Villager j becomes shorter or (2) the social 
d istance  between any th ird  villager (Villager k) and Villager i increases. A dditionally , if 
the  social d istance to  Villager j is greater th an  a certain  length, an increase in the 
d istance to  the  m ost rem ote villager, s-m , causes an increase of his interdependence on 
V illager j. On the o ther hand, if Villager j is located w ithin the certain  radius, the 
increase in the  distance to the m ost rem ote villager reduces his interdependence w ith 
V illager j . ^
An increase of V illager i’s independence coefficient, 1-, m eans either"^ (1) a decrease 
of social d istance from his farthest villager (V illager rrij) or (2) an increase of social 
d istance from any villager except the one who is m ost rem ote. F igure 3-1 illustra tes the
0 1
While a visual impression of Equation (3.3) may suggest the opposite, its derivatives with 
respect to the relevant distance variables give the results explained. Derivatives are supplied in 
Appendix C .l.
22 This finding may correspond with the classification of members of a village system in terms of 
reciprocity of exchanges, which was conceptualised by the economic anthropologists Service (1966) 
and Sahlins (1968, 1974). The reciprocity is classified into the following three levels according to 
the closeness of a villager’s counter-part, as follows: (l) generalised reciprocity with members of his 
kinship group, (2) balanced reciprocity with villagers of other kinship groups, and (3) negative 
reciprocity with non-villagers or outsiders. The suggestion here may correspond with the first two 
levels because Villager i’s reference point, Villager m-, seems to correspond with the boundary of his 
area of interactions (exchanges), i.e., his village in Service and Sahlins’ conceptualisation.
9 0
While a visual impression of Equation (3.4) may suggest the opposite, its derivatives with 
respect to the relevant distance variables give the results explained. Derivatives are supplied in 
Appendix C.2.
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F ig u re  3-1: Independence Coefficient and Social Distance
m ovem ents  which cause an increase in Villager i’s independence coefficient, and the 
u l t im a te  situation  resulting from these movements. These m ovements imply an 
equalisa tion  of social distances. If the social distances to o ther villagers are all equal, 
Villager i has the m axim um  independence coefficient, which equals one. B urt  called this 
villager a  s tructura lly  unique villager, meaning th a t  he is completely independent of 
o thers  in his decision making, like the individual assumed in neo-classical economics.
3 .2 .5 .3  N u m e r ic a l E x a m p le s
Some numerical examples are now given of eliciting the  social distance and the 
interdependence coefficients defined in Equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4). For simplicity, 
only one aspiect of socio-economic interactions among five villagers is used, i.e., relations 
in giving agricultural information.
Tables 3-2 and 3-3 include networks of villagers’ hypothetical information flows, 
social distances, and interdependence coefficients. Thus in the information flow section, 
th e  arrow s represent a  flow of agricultural information, and 0 and 1 in matrices 
respectively denote the non-existence and existence of a  flow of information between a
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donor villager (rows) and a receiver villager (columns). In the social distance-^and 
in terdependence coefficient sections, the numbers in each cell respectively indicate these 
coefficients between two villagers (rows and columns). Especially, it should be noted th a t  
in terdependence of a villager (columns) with ano ther  villager (rows) is indicated by a 
num ber in a  corresponding cell.
For unders tand ing  of the numerical procedures explained above, the procedure to 
calculate  social distance and interdependence coefficient between Villagers 1 and 2 in 
Table  3-2 is described here. In a system depicted in the “information flows” in Table 3-2, 
since Villager 1 is a  sole donor of information and all o thers  are receivers of information 
from Villager 1, this system of information flow can be represented by a m atrix  “Matrix 
P re se n ta t io n ” . “1” represents an information flow from a  villager in a row to  a  villager in 
a  colum n, and  “0” indicates a non-existent information flow between these two villagers. 
Social d is tance between Villager 1 and Villager 2 is calculated as follows, comparing 
Villager 1 and  Villager 2’s column vectors and row vectors.
S 12 =  S 21 =  { (0 - l )2+ (0 -0 )2+ (0 -0 )2+ (0-0)2+ ( l - 0 ) 2-t-(l-0)2T ( l -0 )2}1/ 2 =  2.0 
Subsequently , Villager l ’s interdependence coefficient with respect to  Villager 2 is 
calculated  as follows with the m axim um  social distance shown in Villager l ’s column:
/ 21 =  (2-2)2/ { ( 2 - 0 ) 2+( 2- 2)2+(2 -2 )2+(2-2)2T(2-2)2} =  0.
This coefficient is placed in the cell of Row 1 and Column 2.
T ab le  3-2 shows tha t:
1. Villager 1 is unique, because his independence coefficient is one. He is not 
in te rdependen t with any other villagers and neither are others in terdependent 
w ith  him. Since he is the only villager th a t  t ran sm its  information, he has a 
unique role in the village.
2. O th er  villagers are in terdependent with each o ther to a small degree. 
A lthough they do not pass agricultural information to each o ther,  their 
positions are similar in the sense th a t  they do not t ransm it  any information 
and  only receive it from Villager 1. This aspect gives these villagers’ 
interdependence.
Tab le  3-3 shows that:
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Table 3-2: Numerical Example 1
Information Flows
1 2 3 4 5
11 0 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
2| 2.000 0 0 0 0
3| 2.000 0 0 0 0
4| 2.000 O 0 0 0
5| 2.000 0 0 0 0
Max. 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Matrix Presentation
1 2 3 4 5
1 | 1 . 0. 0. 0. 0.
2| 0. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
3| O. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
4| 0. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
3 | 0. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Total 1 . 1 . 1 . 1 . 1.
Social distance Interdependence Coefficient
Table 3-3: Numerical Example 2
donor
Information Flows
1 2 3 4 5
l| 0 1.732 1.732 2.000 2.000 
2 1 1.732 0 1.414 2.449 1.732 
3 1 1.732 1.414 0 1.732 2.449 
4 j 2.000 2.449 1.732 0 1.414 
5 j 2.000 1.732 2.449 1.414 0
Max. 2.000 2.449 2.449 2.449 2.449
receiver
1 2 3 4 5
1 1 O i 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
3 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
4 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 =,1 ‘
5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
Matrix
1
Presentation 
2 3 4 5
1| 0.91 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01
2 | 0.05 0.74 0.13 0 . 0.07
3 | 0.05 0. 13 0.74 0.07 0 .
4 | 0 . 0 . 0.06 0.79 0.14
3 | 0 . 0.06 0 . 0.14 0.79
Total 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01
Social distance Interdependence Coefficient
1. Villager 1 passes information only to Villagers 2 and 3, both of whom pass it 
on to each other. Villager 2 passes it on to Villager 4. Villager 3 passes it on
I l l
to  Villager 5. Villagers 4 and 5 pass it on to each other. This is a mor£v  
decentralised structure than the first case. _ _
2. Villager 1 is less independent, and more interdependent with Villagers 2 and
3. All other villagers are interdependent with Villager 1 to a small degree. His 
role in term s of transm itting  information is less special, because all other 
villagers are also transm itting  information to others.
3. Villagers 2 and 3 are interdependent with each other, because they assume 
sim ilar roles in receiving information from Villager 1 and passing it on to two 
villagers.
4. Villagers 4 and 5 are interdependent with each other, because they are in 
sim ilar roles in which each receives information from another villager and 
passes it on to the other.
Com paring these two networks, we can draw an implication for the effectiveness of 
extension services, on the assumption tha t a villager’s greater interdependence with 
others affects his decision making more strongly. If the extension personnel choose a 
village head like Villager 1 in Table 3-2, the new agricultural technology which they pass 
on to him may not be implemented in the village, even though the information is diffused. 
Villager 1 is too different from others in term s of his role in the village. No other villager 
is interdependent with him. On the other hand, other villagers are strongly 
interdependent with each other. In this sense, the new technology has the potential to 
spread among them  very quickly, but since they are not affected by the donor of the 
inform ation, where only Villager 1 is approached, this does not occur.
If the extension personnel pass on the new technology to a village head like Villager 
1 in Table 3-3, the new' technology will be implemented, sooner or later, as the 
information about it diffuses within the village. In a village with a structure like th a t 
portrayed in Table 3-3, where, in terms of transmission of information, several groups are 
established, an innovation may well be more quickly diffused and implemented than in a 
village like Table 3-2, where the information is spread through a centralised network.
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3 .3  S e le c t io n  o f  N e tw o r k  S y s te m s  ^ r
In selecting network systems for elicitation of the structure of a West Sum atran 
village, Dahlan (1979) chose networks with seven types of interactions. The approach in 
D ahlan’s study may be very relevant to the present study owing to its nearby location. 
However, the size and agriculture of the W est Sum atran village are different from those of 
Belatung.
D ahlan’s study was oriented towards the identification of the importance of 
religious leaders, Ad at leaders, and agricultural leaders in disseminating information in 
villages. He chose seven types of consultation activities, and examined the numbers of 
citations pertaining to the respective leaders. The consultations concerned (1) wedding 
ceremonies, (2) family planning issues, (3) financial m atters, (4) epidemics, (5) deaths 
and funerals (6) agricultural intensification programmes and (7) crop failures.
D ahlan’s selection of these consultations may be sufficient for the purpose of his 
study, but it seems tha t they are not sufficient for elucidation of the village structure with 
respect to the diffusion of agricultural information. There are three drawbacks if his 
selection of these consultations is adopted for the present study.
The first shortcoming of Dahlan’s selection of interactions was his failure to include, 
and take account of, the village kinship system. In a traditional society the kinship 
system can be regarded as the most im portant network, on which many other socio­
economic interactions may be based. Ben-Porath (1980) pointed out the importance of 
kinship and friendship relations for economic transactions in developing countries in his 
study of uF-connections” .
The second drawback in Dahlan’s selection of interactions was th a t he did not 
include many other kinds of socio-economic interactions which could have assisted in 
elucidating the village structure. The chosen consultation activities, other than these 
concerning agricultural intensification programmes and crop failure, did not seem very 
im portan t, especially in relation to the diffusion of agricultural information.
Agricultural and economic transactions which transm it agricultural information 
among villagers should be considered more intensively. While villagers mainly sell their 
produce to  m erchants from outside, they consume their profits in purchasing their food
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and household goods from grocery shops inside the  village. Villagers may also hofrow 
household goods from certain o ther villagers if they temporarily  lack those goods. They 
may again lend or borrow money, exchange labour for agricultural and ceremonial 
activities, hire family labour in or out; and  buy, sell or lease plots of land. All these 
activities may be conducted with certain villagers.
The th ird  drawback in D ah lan ’s selection of interactions was th a t  he chose 
consulta tion  activities which clearly involved hierarchical relationships between villagers. 
Such relationships can be used to identify whether one villager is superior or inferior to 
o ther villagers, bu t not to identify a  group of equals in the village s tructure . A group of 
villagers of alm ost equal socio-economic s ta tuses  can only be identified by examining 
relations which take place between villagers with the same subjectively and mutually 
perceived s ta tu s .  The hierarchy of individual villagers or groups can then be identified by 
investigating  hierarchical relations between groups which have been identified as having 
different s ta tu ses  or belonging to different groups. Hierarchical or non-hierarchical 
relations can be identified by considering the na tu re  of an interaction in terms of 
reciprocity. In general, exchanges of items involved between two villagers are recognised 
as reciprocal and  thus as non-hierarchical relations. A question like “W ith whom do you 
exchange .... ?” reveals non-hierarchical relations. On the o ther hand, answers to a
question which involves a direction of a villager’s action such as “For whom did you work 
as a  hired labourer?” can indicate hierarchical relation between two villagers.
It is m ain ta ined  th a t  all the activities and relationships mentioned may well 
t ran sm it  the  agricultural information indirectly between two individual farmers. They 
should therefore be recorded and utilised in the form of m atrix  for elucidating the 
agricultural information s truc tu re  of the village. This should be in addition to d a ta  
ob tained by asking questions about villagers’ direct exchanges of information on 
agricu ltura l m a t te rs  (direct agricultural information).
Resources which are involved in in teractions between villagers can be classified into
the following six categories:
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1. K inship
2. C ap ita l
3. Labour
4. Land
5. Household Goods
6. Inform ation
In the  present study of Belatung, the following aspects of villagers’ agricu ltura l  and 
socio-economic interactions are selected to elicit the agricultural information structure :
1. Kinship relations. Information abou t  ±  2 generations of a  villager and  his wife 
(50 types  of kinship relations used).
2. Money Borrowing/Lending. “If you w ant to borrow a small am ount of money, 
w hom  do you deal w ith?” .
3. Exchange labour. “W ith whom have you exchanged family labour for 
agricultural or ceremonial activities?”
4. Hired labour. “For whom have you worked as a hired labourer?” , “W hom  did 
you hire for your agricultural activities?”
5. Land sales and purchase. “From whom have you bought a plot of land since 
1965?” , “To whom have you sold a plot of land since 1965?”
6. Land lease. “Whose land do you lease-in?” , “To whom do lease-out your 
land?” , “Whose rubber are you tapp ing?” .
7. Household goods exchange. “If you do not have some groceries today , from 
w hom  do you borrow them ?” , “To whom do you lend groceries?”
8. Meeting-at-shops. “A t which grocery shop in this village do you buy your 
daily needs?” . To shop owners, “W ho has an account in your shop?” .
9. D irect communication on agricultural information. “W ith whom do you often 
talk  ab o u t  your agricultural problems?”
10. C itru s  Siam observation. “Whose citrus siam plot do you m ost often 
observe?”
Am ong these relations and interactions, kinship relations, money
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borrow ing /lend ing , household goods exchanges, meeting-at-shops, and d i r e c t  
com m unica tion  of agricultural information are regarded as reciprocal and thus  non- 
h ierarchical, and others are hierarchical.
3.4 K in sh ip  S y s tem
Figure 3-2 shows how the villagers of Belatung re lated to each other. Kinship ties 
are carefully selected within the range of 2 generations so th a t  the reciprocity of ties is 
not v iolated. Thus, if Villager 1 is Villager 2’s g randfather ,  Villager 2 is Villager l ’s
cy a
grandson or g randdaughter and both relations are equally recorded in the m a t r i x /
T he  kinship groups identified from the kinship network and the villagers in such 
groups are listed in Table 3-4.
T here  are two findings concerning the characteris tics  of the Belatung kinship 
system.
F irs tly ,  there were two obvious sets of kinship groups. One was the set comprising 
the na tive  Belatung villagers (Groups 1 - 7), and the o ther was the set comprising the 
Javanese  who were working for the National Railway (P JK A ).  The la tter  set consisted of 
four isolated kinship groups (Groups 8 - 1 1 ) . ^
Secondly, and as shown in Figure 3-2, the kinship relations of the  native Belatung 
villagers (Groups 1 - 7) were all located on a continuum . There was no discontinuity  from 
the villagers a t  the top  end of the figure to those at the bo ttom  end, and there \^as~ no
^ I n  the following sections, villagers’ major socio-economic characteristics are frequently referred 
to. The list of characteristics for all individual villagers is found in Appendix C.6. In Figure 3-2 
(and in the networks in later figures), the numbers on the left side identify villagers, and 
corresponding rows indicate their patterns of interactions with the villagers in the columns (placed 
in the same order as the villagers in rows). Thus, the ^-symbols on the diagonal line represent 
villagers’ interactions with themselves (regardless whether these interactions exist or not). Other 
^-symbols represent the interactions of a villager in a row with villagers in columns. In several 
networks, the locations of ^-symbols are not symmetric along the main diagonal line, and here, 
non-reciprocal hierarchical interactions such as hired labour are denoted. Thus, a villager in a row 
may hire-in a villager in a column, but the reverse does not happen. The rectangles which enclose 
^-symbols along the diagonal line represent identified groups within which there are, in general, 
many more interactions among villagers within the group than with villagers of other groups. The 
numbers in the top right corners of the rectangles indicate the identification numbers of groups.
o r
J An isolated group is a group of persons who only interacts with other members of the group, 
and not with persons outside the group.
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distinct loop which connects kinship groups which were located far a p a r t /  In this*sense, 
the villagers’ saying that “We are all members of one fam ily” turns out to be true, 
although they were not members of the family to the same degree. They had a clear 
concept of distant relatives even within their village.
The characteristics of several kinship groups are discussed, in the following sections.
3 .4 .1  M in o r  G ro u p s
The members of Groups 1, 2 and 3 were very loosely connected with members of 
their own groups. These groups were also loosely connected^' to other groups. The 
number of members of these groups was smaller than that in other native Belatung 
groups (Groups 4 - 7). In this sense, these groups are regarded as minor kinship groups in 
this village.
Group 1
The prominent member of Group 1 was the ex-religious teacher, Villager 103. The 
members of this group were all related to this ex-religious teacher. Half the members of 
this group were originally from Karta Mulya, a neighbouring village (See Figure 2-2).
Group 2
C\ Q
Group 2 consisted of four su b-grou ps/0 Villagers 60 and 108 were somewhat 
distinctive in that the former was the wealthiest villager by reputation, and the latter was 
an active trader/grower of citrus siam. Villagers 58 and 66 were the oldest members of 
this group.
op
uT he  term “d iscon tinu i ty” m eans here the s ituation  where there is no direct and indirect 
in te ract ion  between two persons concerned. T he  term “loop” means the in te raction  between two 
persons who belong to two different groups which are located far ap a r t  in the figure of the 
identified network. If one person who in teract with two other  persons th a t  belong to two different 
groups, this person is called especially a “bridge” , and this person is regarded as not belonging to 
any group at all.
27C onnectiv ity  of a group is defined as the ra t io  of the num ber  of observed in teractions between 
m em bers  of the group to the possible m ax im um  num ber of interactions, and  the  connectivity of 
two groups is defined as the ra t io  of the num ber  of observed in teractions between members of the 
two groups to the  possible m ax im u m  num ber  of interactions between them . Visually the first 
connectiv ity  is identical with density  of ^ -sy m b o ls  in a rectangle which corresponds with the 
group. T he  second connectivity  is identical with the density of ^ - s y m b o ls  in the area which 
corresponds with both  groups. If this  density  is low, the two groups are regarded as being “loosely 
connected” .
28A group m ay consists of several smaller sub-groups. The m em berships of these sub-groups may 
largely overlap. While a m em ber  of a sub-group strongly in teracts  w ith  o the r  members of the 
sub-group , he may in teracts  with m em bers  of another  sub-groups of the  group.
Figure 3-2: Kinship Network
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Table 3-4: Groups in the Kinship Network
Group Villagers
Group 1 153,78,70,83,82,51,13,103,129,39
Group 2 96,80,108,60,109,35,21,64,79,46,65,58,56,37,36,66,77
Group 3 110,74,14,16,106,94,68,18,93,49,41,15,114,54,34,33,67, 
139,73,87
Group 4 40,98,55,113,104,97,111,121,116,25,117,148,151
Group 5 120,127,85,lOO,122,61,47,132,134,135,89,126,128,149
Group 6 102,76,71,112,50,32,72,86,44,91,95,101,84,140
Group 7 92,29,130,42,10,30,31,81
Group 8 20,22,24,2,3,150,6,9,4,1
Group 9 7,8
Group 10 23,125
Group 11 5,124
Unclassified
Isolates 17,19,88,115
Bridges 59(97,32), 57(114,91)
Note:
Numbers in parentheses indicate two villagers with whom the 
bridge villager has a kinship tie. See a footnote on p. 116.
Source:
Figure 3-2
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G ro u p  3
G ro u p  3 consisted of three sub-groups. Villager 34 was an elder of this group, bu t
OQ
was born in ano ther village, and came to Belatung as a d u k u n . Recently he did not 
have s trong  influence on villagers, however, and in this sense, the group was not closely 
tied by kinship.
3 .4 .2  M a jo r  G ro u p s
M em bers of Groups 4 to 7 were very closely connected by kinship ties both within 
and between groups, and can be regarded as the major kinship groups of this village.
G roup  4
M em bers of this kinship group were relatives of Villager 113 and his wife. T he son 
of Villager 113, Villager 104, was a very active farmer living in the Lekis area of the 
village (he assisted with the a u th o r’s research in this area). Villagers 104 and 121 
m arried daugh te rs  of Villager 34, a dukun of this village. Villager 121 was a very 
politically active villager, and had wide experience of trade in Jav a  and a  good education. 
He was once described by the  present village head as “O rang Politik” , a  political man.
On Villager 113’s wife’s side, there were several farmers who had come back from 
the Lam pung area. They produced coffee in th a t  region, but after the fall of coffee prices,
 ^  ^ > or\
they gave it up and came back to their native village.
G roup  5
This kinship group consisted of Villager 100’s sons-in-law (Villagers 120, 127 and
o  -I
85) and his wife’s relatives. Villager 120 was an assistant to the incum bent kerio, 1 and 
owned a  shop a t  the centre of the village. Villager 89, who was Villager 100’s wife’s 
s is te r’s husband , was an ass is tan t village official during the period of Federation  
(1946-1954) and was the fa ther of Villager 128, who owned a shop a t  the  southeast end of 
the village.
^ A  traditional healer.
^ R e fe r  Section 2.2.2.3 for villagers’ migrations.
*** A traditional head of a South Sumatran village.
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G roup  6
M em bers of this kinship group were all related to  Villager 71, who was the 
incum bent religious teacher of Belatung. His son, Villager 112, was a teacher in the 
prim ary school of Lebuk Batang  Lama, the neighbouring village. His sis ter’s husband was 
the kerio during  the Federation period. His wife’s bro ther,  Villager 76, was the principal 
of the Bela tung  primary school. This kinship group was a t  the centre of cultural and 
religious affairs in the village.
G roup  7
This kinship group was centred around Villager 29, the ex-village head. This group 
included two of his younger brothers, the incum bent village head (Villager 130) and 
Villager 92, three of his sons, two of whom were teachers of the village prim ary school, 
and two sons-in-law.
This had been the ruling family of Belatung. Villager 29’s father was the pasirah ,*^ 
and the owner of the largest area of land in the village and its surrounding regions. His 
son, Villager 29, became a kerio after his education in Jav a ,  several years before the  
Japanese invasion. Following independence, Villager 29’s younger brother succeeded the 
pasirah by popular election and Villager 29 resigned as the kerio. After a period of 
leadership Ly two successive kerios from different families (a t present these correspond' to 
G roups 5 and 6), Villager 130 became a kerio in 1969 and he is still incumbent. He
o o
became a  kepala desa in the administrative reform of April 1983.
National Railway groups
T he villagers who worked for the National Railway (P JK A ) were basically m igrants 
from Java ,  mainly from C entra l  Java. The children of these workers have married each 
other, and isolated kinship groups have accordingly been formed. These groups were 
completely isolated from the native Belatung villagers’ kinship groups. Although some
oo
ZA traditional head of a m arga, a unit im m ediately above villages (dusun).
O O
°A n official term for a village head in the present administration system .
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native  Belatung National Railway workers were living in the bedeng,34 they did not have 
any kinship ties with the Javanese workers.
O thers
T here  were six villagers who could not be classified into groups. Among them , four 
villagers, Villagers 17, 19, 88 and 115 were isolates, who did not have any relatives in the 
village. Villagers 17 and 19 were Javanese National Railway workers and Villagers 88 and 
115 were Sum atrans. Villager 115 was a resident jun io r extension worker for the Dinas 
P erkebunan  (E sta te  Crop Agency). Villagers 59 and 57 were “bridges” 35 who 
respectively had only two relatives in two different kinship groups. Villager 59 was a 
rela tive of Villager 97 of Group 4 and of Villager 32 of G roup 6. Villager 57 was a 
relative of Villager 114 of G roup 3 and of Villager 91 of G roup 6.
3 .5  E c o n o m ic  E x ch a n g e  N e tw o r k  S y s te m  
3 .5 .1  M o n e y  L en d in g -B o rro w in g
In the Islamic religion, the lending and borrowing of money with interest is 
prohibited . Because South S um atra  province is strongly Islamic,* 3® reliable answers to 
questions about transactions among villagers of large sums of money could not be 
expected. If much money was involved, interest may have been charged in some form, and 
the transactions would thus have been treated  to be formal and non-reciprocal, so th a t  
some form of hierarchy was established between th e  two villagers involved. Where 
accura te  d a ta  can be secured on such transactions, they can be used to identify 
re lationships between a superior villager and an inferior villager in the village s tructure . It 
is anyhow' more useful in examining villagers’ informal relations to ask questions about 
t ransac tions  of small sums of money. Such transactions often do not involve any type of 
form ality , and can be used to identify relationships between two equals in term s of their
O  A
long house for workers’ families.
3 5See a footnote on p.116.
3^For example, South Sumatra sent 2321 persons to Mecca to become Haji in 1980. The ratio to 
the whole population of the province is one of the highest among provinces (Biro Pusat Statistik, 
1982).
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Figure 3-3: Money Lending-Borrowing Network
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Table 3-5: Groups in the Money Lending-Borrowing Network
Group Villager
Group 1 7,1,135,134
Group 2 113,115,117
Group 3 73,87
Group 4 15,139,104
Group 5 3,150,5,124,8
Group 6 85,37,101,91
Group 7 21,20
Group 8 59,57,49
Group 9 36,33,41,121,34,46,60
Group 10 19,153,17,125,23
Group 11 76,96,18,98,77,97,95
Group 12 82,86,149,148,127,120
Group 13 126,81,92,109,130,10,128,89,71,84,112,31,14
Group 14 108,80,29
Group 15 72,67,66,64,58,132
Group 16 13,51,42,151
Group 17 93,68,106,16,79,50
Group 18 129,103,44,35,65
Isolates 2,4,6,9,22,24,25,30,32,39,40,47,54,55,56,61,70,74,78, 
83,88,94,100,102,110,111,114,116,122,140
Source: Figure 3-3
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socio-economic sta tus in the village structure. These transactions may also be promoted 
by other informal activities and relations, and may promote other informal activities and 
relations. Agricultural information can also be dissem inated through them.
The identified groups in this money lending-borrowing network are mostly small, 
implying th a t such activity is confined within limited numbers of mutually intim ate 
villagers (Figure 3-3). In the following paragraphs, several major groups are described 
with a focus on prominent members but it does not necessarily suggest tha t these 
villagers were the sources of money in the groups.
The workers of the National Railway formed the three separate groups (Groups 5, 7 
and 10), between which there were no considerable transactions.
Amongst the more im portant group were Group 9 whose members centred around 
Villager 121, who was one of the active entrepreneurial farmers. In addition, another 
member, Villager 60, was by reputation the most wealthy villager.
Group 11 was composed of middle class villagers a t the east end of the village, who 
centred around Villager 76, the principal of the primary school. Villager 18 was a 
National Railway worker, but belonged to this group because of his deceased father’s 
relation.
Group 12 consisted of wealthy villagers a t the East end of the village together with 
Villager 100’s relatives.
The core of Group 13 was the ruling family of the village, which corresponded to 
Group 7 in the kinship system.
Other groups consisted of a small number of villagers and it is difficult to describe 
characteristics of each group. Descriptions of each group, except th a t they were mutually 
intim ate villagers, may not be crucial for the sake of the further discussion.
There were thirty  isolates, who did not cite any others as partners of this activity. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, South Sum atran people is generally believed to be very 
independent especially in financial m atters, the presence of many isolates in this activity 
is naturally expected.
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3.5 .2  Labour
T ransac tions  among villagers which involve family labour can be viewed from  two 
aspects. F irstly ,  Indonesian-Malay peoples exchange family labour, in p repara tions  for 
religious ceremonies and agricu ltura l activities, doing this in accordance with A d a t . This 
trad it ion  has been especially s trong  in the rice-growing areas in Indonesia and M alaysia, 
and observed in a s tric t m anner. However, in South S um atra ,  the long history of cash 
cropping has weakened the exchange labour custom  for agricultural activities. As already 
indicated, smallholders’ rubber production in particu lar  does not require any add ition  to 
family labour, or any periodical concentration  of labour usage. Yet, exchange labour still 
continues for such ceremonial purposes as wedding ceremonies, babies’ circumcisions, 
house construction  and funerals, where villagers m utually  help each o ther over a  long 
time span.
At the village level the range of villagers who exchanged family labour w ith  each 
other included almost the whole population. Although questions were asked ab o u t  this 
exchange labour network, the answers were, as expected, a lm ost always “m ost of the 
villagers” or “cannot specify” . This network was therefore not included in the  fur ther 
analysis.
Secondly, hired labour was sometimes used for agricultural activities, although 
villagers rarely hired S um atrans  and recruited Javanese from either outside or inside of 
the village. ' If Sum atran  workers were hired, they were often villagers, and the  purpose 
seems to have been (I) financial assistance for the hired w orker’s household which also 
fulfilled unskilled jobs such as weeding, or (2) utilising skilled labour for work such as 
lumbering, house construction and boat-making. Hired labour transactions for these 
purposes do not seem to effectively transm it  agricultural information between villagers, 
and no a t te m p t  was, therefore, m ade to identify groups in the hired labour network.
Figure 3-4 shows th a t  76 of the 118 villagers were involved in the h ired-labour 
transactions. 28 of these persons only hired-in while 34 only hired-out, and 14 bo th  hired- 
in and hired-out.
37 Refer Section 2.4.3.3 for actual hired labour usage.
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Figure 3-4: Hired Labour Network
(Asymmetric)
V I L L A G E R S ( i n  t he  same o rd e r  as  in  rows)
83 
70
116 _
7
13 _ 
4 _ 
129 _
97 
128
31
24 _ 
117 
66
77 _ 
3 _
16
91
37 _ 
40 _
134 _ 
130 _ 
101
42 _
135 
21
56 _ 
2 _ 
120 
68
58
98 _ 
72
94 "
78 _
75 _ 
47 _ 
86 
65
49 _ 
35
95
150 _
79 ~ 
61
59 '  
149 .
96 '  
85 
93
76 
82 '  
64 ‘
80 ‘ 
30 '
108
60 '  
106 '
29 '  
44 _ 
46 
81
92 '  
54 
34 
20
114 '
17 
111
18 '
8 ' 
23 ' 
10
1 1 2 '
50 ' 
103
74
NOTE: /
# F
M I f f
Tlf 
' f t  “ 
#
W
T M M f T  
T  1 T  
W f
■ r~
m
m
i n f
Tf
~tf¥f
n m u m rr_  -^------------------------
j j f
a #
T  T  
# §
m  nr arm #
~ f ~ i —
J J T
m
# #
m
i —
I F
m
#
d e n o te s  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  betw een a v i l l a g e r  in  a  column and a v i l l a g e r  in  a row. 
a lo n g  th e  d ia g o n a l  l i n e  d e n o te s  a v i l l a g e r  h im s e lf  numbered in  a row.
127
Distinctive hiring-in villagers were Villagers 13, 128, 130, 42, 120, 78, 86, 108, 60 
and 92. These pemborongs were all shop owners and entrepreneurs, and provided some 
tem porary jobs, especially in the fruit harvesting seasons (duku in March, and citrus siam 
in July). On the other hand, Villagers 24, 117, 135, 36, 73, 79, 96, 80, 44 and 17 were 
distinctive suppliers of labour. They were all less wealthy, and either very young or very 
old.
3 .5 .3  L and
Socio-economic interactions related to land are sales, purchases, and leases.
3 .5 .3 .1  S a les  an d  P u r c h a se s  o f  L and
W hether or not sales and purchases of land transm it agricultural information can be 
determ ined by what crops are grown on the relevant plots of land, and by whether 
relationships between ex-owners and new owners after the transactions continue to 
influence crop choices.
If a plot of land with old stands of rubber trees is sold, it is not expected th a t any 
agricultural information will be transferred between the two villagers concerned. 
Techniques to grow and m aintain rubber are known to alm ost all farmers, and new 
technologies for rubber production have not been absorbed by any villagers in this area. 
The cases examined in Belatung correspond with such an expectation.
Thus, even though 58 villagers had been involved in land transactions since 1965, 
these all concerned old rubber and it could not be expected th a t any effective 
dissem ination of agricultural information occurred through these transactions. Thus 
groups in this networks were again not identified.
Figure 3-5 shows the network expression of these land sales-purchases transactions 
among villagers. Distinct sellers were Villagers 111, 64, 42, 84, 112, 58 and 82. Except for 
Villagers 58 and 64, these sellers had also bought land. It seems th a t they sold lower- 
quality plots and bought better-quality ones.
Distinctive buyers were Villagers 56, 41, 60 and 15. Villager 60 was reported to be 
the m ost wealthy farmer, and it seems th a t he bought more plots of land from more 
farm ers than could be recorded from interviews. Villager 56 was an energetic farmer and 
bought plots of land in the lebak area for citrus siam production. Villager 41 bought
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F ig u re  3-5: Land Sales/Purchase Network
(Asymmetric)
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some plots using profits from the  coffee boom in Lam pung in the  late 1970’s. Villager 15, 
who lived in the Lekis area, was a  very successful and economically independent farmer. 
He was the only farmer th a t  produced enough rice for his household’s subsistence, and 
even sold some.
3 .5 .3 .2  L eases o f  L and
The types of land lease in the village are ( l )  one-to-one sharecropping, “p a ru h an ” , 
and (2) the “num pang” system in which, as already described (Section 2.4.2.2), a  lessee 
can use a  lessor’s land w ithout charge. However, these two types of land lease do not seem 
to  be differentiated in term s of the dissemination of agricultural information. T he crop 
grown on these plots of land was w ithou t exception rubber, and only 29 villagers were 
involved in the land lease transactions. T he overall effect on agricultural information 
dissemination can, therefore, be regarded as negligible.
3 .5 .4  H o u se h o ld  G oods
Socio-economic interactions which involve household goods such as rice, cooking oil, 
kerosene, sugar, etc., can be largely classified into two categories. The first category is 
exchanges among households. The second is related to meeting-at-shops a t  grocery shops 
in the village, which seem to enhance the possibility for villagers to meet others  and 
exchange information.
3 .5 .4 .1  E x ch a n g e s  am o n g  H o u se h o ld s
Villagers often borrow small am oun ts  of foods, kitchens tools or sometimes 
furniture , when they are temporarily  short of these items. This relation is reciprocal. 
Once they borrow, they are not required to  re turn  the items im mediately, but they have 
to  be prepared for the reverse transac tion  when the former lender is short  of some 
household goods, often the identical items. Agricultural information may well be 
transferred via these interactions.
Figure 3-7 and Table 3-6 show the household goods exchange network and the 
groups within this network.
M ost of these groups consisted of villagers who lived very near to  one another.
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F igu re 3-6: Land Lease Network
(Asymmetric)
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Some of them comprised villagers with very strong kinship ties.*^
Examples of the former sort were Groups 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16 17 and 18, while 
those of the latter sort were Groups 3, 4 and 5. O ther groups appeared to be a m ixture of 
the two sorts.
Workers of the National Railway were somewhat isolated, from the native Belatung
38Table C -l in Appendix C.4 shows the statistically very significant relations between the 
household goods exchange and ( l)  kinship relation, (2) money lending/borrow ing, or (3) 
geographical distance.
F igure 3-7: Household Goods Exchange Network
( o
V I L L A C B R 3 ( I d t h« **■• o r d e r  ae  Id row e)
102
35
109
-124
125
1 l t ~ f  ' i t r r  
~ nr
wnTTT
> w
444
44 4 (8)
4
I W H f  
'it 44i4144 
### imf ## ;
444
##i*"
* 14 
1447T  
' 44
4 444 
~ ~44 ' 
4 M
____ t i
4MTT
' 4 4~-
4 444
;___ 44
L 151 ■ 
L 139
wrr'44m4mr_
44
f f i 4  w r  
- 4 4 ' r i n
44W 4 T 
" 4444
46 4 44 4 4
33 4 4 4 1 ( T T T
36 4 m
37 14
122 1 4 r r n
117 44
116 1 144
115 44 (1 8 )
39 T4
41 144
42 4 4 4 S
103 4 44
79 4 M T
58 4 I F
59 4 M
44
9 ff
25 1
40 4
50 1
55 4
56 1
61 1
78 1
83 1
89 1
91 1
98 1
111 I
112 1
113 1
114 1
120 f
129 1
132 1
134 1
135 1
140 r
148
153
MOTS: # d e n o te s  th «  e v i a t e n c e  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  b etw een  ■ v i l l a g e r  i n  •  colum n and a v i l l a g e r  in  a row. 
# a lo n g  th e  d ia g o n a l  l i n «  d e n o te a  a v i l l a g e r  h i a e e l f  n u n b e red  in  a  row.
M uabere in  p a re n th e a e a  a r e  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  n u a b e ra  o f  g ro u p « .
132
Table 3-6: Groups in the Household Goods Exchange Network
Group Villager
Group 1 85,87
Group 2 100,101,102
Group 3 35,109
Group 4 13,51
Group 5 68,88
Group 6 1,2,4,3,150,127,7,6,126,128
Group 7 5,8,124,125,19
Group 8 18,17,20,23,24,22,21
Group 9 16,15,110,14
Group 10 86,149,70,71,74,72,73,67,66
Group 11 97,95,76,77
Group 12 84,82,64,65,44,60,47
Group 13 96,93,94,106,108,80,54,49
Group 14 92,31,81,10,130,29,32,30,151
Group 15 139,104,34,121,46,33
Group 16-41 . 36,37,122
Group 17 117,116,115
Group 18 39,41,42,103,79,58,59,57
Isolates 9,25,40,50,55,56,61,78,83,89,91,98,111,112,113,114, 
120,129,132,134,135,140,148,153
Source: Figure 3-7
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villagers in term s of these types of interactions. They basically formed G roups 6 to  8, 
a lthough G roup 6 also included Villagers 1, 128 and 126 who also lived close to~these 
workers.
There were 24 isolates identified. They responded to  the questions abou t  the 
household goods exchanges by saying th a t  they were financially independent of others  and 
th a t  they did not borrow or lent household goods. Their answers have been cross-checked 
by examining whether o thers quoted them  or not.
3 .5 .4 .2  M e e t in g -a t-sh o p s  - D a ily  S h o p p in g  an d  C u sto m e rs
A further type of socio-economic in teractions relating to  household goods is 
m eeting-at-shops relations. There were seven small grocery shops in Belatung, which were 
owned by Villagers 6, 13, 49, 111, 120, 128 and 153. The three shops run by Villagers 13, 
49 and 120 each had tables and benches for customers. Villagers were often seen there 
having a  glass of Sum atran  coffee, and conversing with shop owners or o ther villagers. 
This is a Sum atran  version of the “kedai kopi . y
These small grocery shops offered opportunities  to  exchange information, and 
especially th a t  concerning agriculture. The owners of the shops also provided credit for 
villagers. Further ,  workers of the National Railway received their salary in kind (rice) a t  
the  shops of Villagers 13 and 120, and they had debts  there as well as a t  the nearest shop 
of Villager^ 128. Other villagers also had debts  a t  some shops, and m ade repaym ents 
w ithou t obvious interest charges when they had money.
Figure 3-8 and Table 3-7 show the groups of villagers who used these grocery shops 
for their daily shopping and conversations. This network is called especially 
“m eeting-at-shops” network. Figures in a cell indicate num bers of shops where the 
corresponding villagers met.
There were four groups of villagers and seven isolates in the m eeting-at-shops 
network. Members of G roup 1 were users of shops owned by Villagers 49 and  153, which 
were located in the south-east half of the village. G roup 2 was a  set of villagers who used
yIn the Malay language, this means a coffee shop. In Indonesian, toko kopi is equivalent.  
Tsubouchi, Kuchiba and Maeda (1976), p.312-335.
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F ig u re  3 -8 : Meeting-at-shops Network
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T a b l e  3-7: Groups in the M eeting-at-shops Network
Groups Villagers
-
Group 1 40 44 46 47 
76 81 82 89 
(153)
(49) 50 51 54 57 58 59 60 61 64 66 70 72 73 
91 92 95 96 97 98 103 106 108 109 114 121
Group 2 2 3 8 20 21 
65 67 71 74 
115 116 117
24 25 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 39 41 42 
77 79 80 84 85 86 88 93 94 100 101 102 110 
(120) 122 127 132 135 148 149 151
Group 3 1 4 5 (6) 7 
113 124 125
9 10 (13) 14 16 17 18 19 22 23 (ill) 112 
126 (128) 129 130 150
Group 4 15 104 139 140
Isolate 55 56 68 78 83 87 134
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are villagers who owned grocery shops. 
Source: Figure 3-8
Villager 120’s shop which was located a t  the centre of the village. G roup  3 consisted of 
villagers who used four shops run by Villagers 5, 13, 111 and 128, th a t  were s i tua ted  in 
the n o r th w e s t  half of the village. G roup 4 was a group of villagers who only used the 
weekly m arke t  a t  Lebuk Batang Lama. 4. ' .
3 .6  D i r e c t  A g r i c u l t u r a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  N e t w o r k  S y s t e m
The direct agricultural information network was constructed from villagers’ answers 
to the question “W ith  whom do you often talk abou t  your agricultural problem s?” . 
Because of the characteristics of this question, choices of par tners  to  talk with, which 
were identified by these answers, were regarded as reciprocal, and the network m atrix  was 
processed to be symmetric.
The network shown in Figure 3-9 is much more complicated th an  the network 
expression of any other socio-economic interaction. This indicates th a t  the  direct 
agricultural information activities were fa rther reaching than  other socio-economic 
interactions, and not restricted within small ranges of villagers.
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Nine groups were identified from the network and listed in Table 3-8. ,*
G roup 1
This was a  group of National Railway workers. Eight of them  were living in the 
National Railway bedengs on the north  side of the railway where they had been given a 
small plot of land by the Railway, as already indicated.
These workers, nevertheless, had an interest in agriculture in general, and  especially 
in profitable cash crops such as pineapples, ram b u tan  and citrus siam. They also looked 
for opportunities  of being hired or being penum pangs of native villager’s rubber lands. 
A ctually , Villager 17 was a  sharecropper for the Director of the Belatung station, who 
lived in Lampung.
Figure 3-9: Direct Agricultural Information Network
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ROTS: # d e n o te s  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  be tw een  a v i l l a g e r  In  a c o lu a n  and a  v i l l a g e r  in  a  row. 
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H uabers  in  p a re n th e s e s  a r e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  n u a b e re  o f  g ro u p s .
Table 3-8: Groups in the Direct Agricultural Information Network
Group Villager -
Group 1 23,19,24,20,22,21,4,17,18,5,150,7,3
Group 2 15,104,110,139,140
Group 3 101,42,46,29
Group 4 66,65,64,47,56,30,151,81,67,40,60,35,121,109,34, 
148,33,39,36,103
Group 5 108,37,115,10,31,130,112,72,84,78,120,128,127, 
149,102,122,1,2,74,116,51,126,135,89,114,41
Group 6 83,70,86,58,59,54,82,55,87,85,91,73,44,57
Group 7 71,76,80,96,92,14,95,77,106,93,94,68,97,88
Group 8 32,49,79,50
Group 9 25,117,132,134
Isolates 6,8,9,13,16,61,98,100,111,113,124,125,129,153
Source: Figure 3-9
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G roup  2 .»
T he  members of G ro u p  2 lived in the Lekis area, a l though they had theif  own 
houses in Belatung, as already explained. Every Tuesday, they went to  the weekly 
m arke t  in Lebuk B atang  Lama, the neighbouring village, to sell the  week’s rubber harvest 
and to  purchase daily household goods and foods. They had good contac ts  with Javanese 
m ig ran t  farmers in the Lekis area and in Lebuk B atang  Lama.
G roup  3
This group consisted of younger middle-aged farmers looking for new knowledge of 
agricu ltura l  technology and of general economic opportunities. Villager 29’s son, who 
lived with his father, was a  teacher of the Belatung prim ary school, and the other 
m em bers of the group were centred around him in terms of in teractions. This teacher 
asked the  au tho r  for a  textbook of techniques of citrus siam production (R ism unandar 
1981), and  was himself a  diligent par t- tim e farmer. The others had considerable outside 
experience as tax i/ truck-dr ivers ,  traders  or mechanics.
G roup  4
T he members of this group lived a t  the geographical centre  of the village, or had 
good-quality  lebak plots along the Ogan river, especially on the north  side of Belatung. 
On the  way to their plots from their houses in the village, they could observe each o ther’s 
agricu ltura l  situation, and possibly shared opinions on their agricultural activities.
G roup  5
This group consisted of the more distinctive villagers and their followers. Villager 
130 was the incumbent village head. Villagers 10, 31, and 112 were prim ary school 
teachers. Villager 120 was a village official and a  shop-owner. Villager 84 was an ex­
village head and Villager 89 was an ex-village official. Villagers 108, 149, and 41 were 
successful farmers. Villager 128 was a  t rad e r  and shop-owner. Villager 78 was a part- tim e 
farm er who worked in the arm y office in B aturaja ,  and recently became the village head 
of K a r ta  Mulya, the neighboring village. In this sense, this group can be regarded as the 
leaders’ group, although it also included some followers of these people.
140
G roup 6
T he members of this group lived a t  the East side of the village, and had Villagers 82 
and 86 as leaders. Villagers 85 and 91 were brothers, while Villagers 70 and  83 had coffee 
production plots in K ota Bumi, Lampung, and always travelled there and back together. 
Villager 54 had been a village official.
G roup  7
T he leaders of this group were Villager 71, a  religious teacher (K hotib ), Villager 76, 
the head-m aster  of the Belatung primary school, and Villager 92, an energetic young 
trad e r / fa rm e r .  Except for Villager 14, the members lived close to  one ano ther a t  the East 
end of the  village. Villager 14 was a  bro ther of Villager 95, and both worked for the 
N ational Railway as senior staff a t  Belatung station .
G roup  8
Excepting Villager 32, this was basically a group of young villagers who often met 
a t  Villager 49’s shop. Villager 32 was Villager 50’s grandfather,  had already retired, and 
was cared for by his unmarried daughter . Villager 49’s shop was located in the middle of 
the old section of the village. It sold coffee, had several benches inside and outside, and 
was a  na tu ra l  meeting place for many villagers. However, Villager 49, the shop owner, 
had long been sick and too wreak to work on the land. He was not, therefore, a t t ra c t iv e  as 
a source of agricultural information. The young villagers of this group helped Villager 49 
when he went to B atu ra ja  to buy commodities for his shop, and used this excursion to 
look for o ther economic opportunities.
G roup  9
T he plots of members of this group were located close together in the Talang  Kisam 
area  of the  village (Figure 2-2), where their geographical s i tuation  offered them 
opportun it ies  to exchange opinions. Villagers 25 and 117, as well as Villagers 132 and 134, 
were bro thers .  However, the two sets of brothers  did not have close kinship ties.
Isolates
T h e  isolates were either (1) uninterested in agriculture because of their primary
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occupation or declining physical s treng th ,  or (2) self-asserting independent farmers who 
claimed th a t  they had their own external sources of agricultural information.
Villagers 8, 9, 124 and 125 were National Railway workers. Villagers 6, 13, 111 and 
153 owned small grocery shops. Villagers 100 and 113 had alm ost retired, and were cared 
for by their sons or daughters .  Villagers 16, 98 and 129 claimed th a t  they had private 
con tac ts  with agricultural extension officers in B atu ra ja  or K ota  Bumi.
3.7  C itru s S iam  O bservation
The observation of o ther villagers’ citrus siam can be considered as the  most direct 
and effective way of obtain ing agricu ltura l information ab o u t  techniques of growing the 
crop. These observations are of course subject to a time lag. T h a t  is, a  villager can only 
observe o ther villagers’ citrus siam plots after they adopt the crop, and indeed may not 
have much observation until they s ta r t  producing it in a large quan tity .  In this sense, the 
network of citrus siam observation is much more dynamic than the networks of other 
interactions. For pioneers, this network does not exist, bu t as the adoption  process of 
citrus  siam proceeds, the number of par tic ipan ts  in this observation activ ity  increases and 
consequently the network changes and grows. While it is thus  not necessary to include 
th is  network in eliciting the basic aspects  of village socio-economic s truc tu re ,  it is surely 
im p o rtan t  in investigating the dynam ic change of the village socio-economic s tructure  
(Refer Section 1.4.5.2 for a  discussion of network stability .).  - r
Figure 3-10 is the network expression of villagers’ citrus siam observation activities. 
58 villagers were involved in these activities (Refer Section 2.4.1 for num bers  of villagers 
who had adopted certain crops.). In this network, citrus siam plots of Villagers 128, 130, 
78, 60, 108 and 33, who were either early adopters or growers of large plots of citrus siam 
were observed by a  relatively large num ber of others.
3.8 B e la tu n g  Socio-E conom ic S tru ctu re
The results in the preceding sections clearly indicated th a t  the num bers  of villagers 
involved in non-hierarchical in teractions were much greater than  those of villagers 
involved in hierarchical interactions. As discussed elsewhere, hierarchical relations 
between villagers can be elicited after identifying groups of villagers who shared almost
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Figure 3-10: C itru s  S iam  O bserva tion  N e tw o rk  .»
(A s y m m e tr ic )
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ide n tica l _ a g r ic u ltu ra l in fo rm a tio n  th ro ug h  e ithe r the  d ire c t exchanges w h ich  are 
represented by the d irec t a g r ic u ltu ra l in fo rm a tio n  exchange in te ra c tio n s , o r in d ire c t 
exchanges represented by o the r non-h ie rarch ica l in te ra c tio n s . The fa c t th a t  the  num ber 
o f v illa g e r invo lved  in  h ie ra rch ica l in te rac tio ns  was m uch sm a lle r than  those invo lved  in 
non -h ie ra rch ica l in te rac tio ns  im p lies  th a t the effect o f in co rp o ra tio n  o f h ie ra rch ica l 
in te ra c tio n s  in to  the e lic ita t io n  o f groups o f v illage rs  w ho shared a lm os t iden tica l 
in fo rm a tio n  d id  no t seriously a lte r the  e lic ita t io n  o f those groups w ith o u t these 
h ie ra rch ica l in te rac tio ns . Hence, h ie ra rch ica l and non -h ie ra rch ica l re la tio n s  can be 
separa te ly  analysed fo r the e lu c id a tio n  and e xp lan a tio n  o f the v illage  socio-econom ic 
s tru c tu re . In the  analysis o f th is  section, f ir s t ly ,  the  fo llo w in g  five  non -h ie ra rch ica l 
re la tions  are used:
1. D ire c t a g r ic u ltu ra l in fo rm a tio n  exchange,
2. Household goods exchange,
3. M oney le n d /b o rro w in g ,
4 . K in s h ip  re la tions,
5. M eet,ing-at-shops.
I f  these five  types o f non -h ie ra rch ica l re la tions  are used w ith  re la tio n a l approach, 
associations4^ ide n tifie d  may represent sets o f v illage rs  w ho shared a lm ost id e n tica l d irec t 
or in d ire c t a g r ic u ltu ra l in fo rm a tio n . These associations are ca lled, from  here on, re la tiona l 
associations. H ie rarch ica l re la tionsh ips  am ong these re la tio n a l associations are then 
id e n tif ie d  by exam in ing  the rem a in ing  fou r types o f h ie ra rch ica l in te rac tio ns  am ong them .
Secondly, the  five  non -h ie ra rch ica l re la tions are exam ined by s tru c tu ra l approach, 
and s tru c tu ra l associations are derived. M em bers o f these s tru c tu ra l associations are 
considered as p la y ing  s im ila r roles in  d issem inating  a g r ic u ltu ra l in fo rm a tio n  in  the  v illage .
F in a lly ,  m em berships o f the re la tio n a l and s tru c tu ra l associations are cross-
4^The term “association” is used to avoid confusions expected if the term “group” is used again 
for labelling a set of villagers identified according to villagers’ memberships of groups in various 
interactions.
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tab u la ted ,  and basic associations are derived. Member-villagers of a basic-association are 
regarded as bo th  sharing similar information and playing similar roles in disseminating 
inform ation. Since relational associations, being based on actual interactions among 
villagers, are though t  to be more observable, socio-economic characteristics and cropping 
p a t te rn s  of the  relational associations are investigated.
3 .8 .1  R e la t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n s
T he village socio-economic s truc tu re  was elicited according to the networks of socio­
economic in teractions am ong villagers, namely, those of direct agricultural information, 
kinship relations, household goods exchange, money lending/borrowing, and meeting-at- 
shops relations. The procedure in eliciting this village socio-economic s tructure  was based 
upon villagers’ membership in certain groups within socio-economic networks. Their 
m em bership  in the same group in respective network systems was summed across all five 
networks. Any two villagers who had a high coincidence of membership in several groups 
were grouped together in one association in the village socio-economic structure. The 
procedure is in fact alm ost identical to th a t  employed for identifying groups in the 
respective network system .41 The results are shown in Figure 3-11.
In Figure 3-11, the num bers on the left side of the m atrix  represent the villagers’ 
identification numbers (one for each row). The symbols in the rows indicate the s trength  
of in teractions with the villagers in the  columns who are in the same order as those in the 
rows. T he S-symbols on the diagonal line represent villagers’ interactions with 
themselves. The + ,  *, and ^ -sy m b o ls  stand for the strength  of interactions. Thus if a 
villager in a row belonged to  the same group as a villager in a .colum n for one network 
only, a  +  symbol is given. The * and the #  symbols respectively indicate correspondence 
in two and three or more networks. Identified associations are enclosed in rectangulars.
Five associations were identified in the analysis of network systems of the above five
J O
types of socio-economic interactions am ong villagers. L
41T or actual procedures, see Section 3.2.4.
49zAs reviewed in Section 3.2.4, numerical taxonomy recommends some other clustering methods 
for confirming results by the first method. A discriminant analysis was conducted on the results of 
this group identification, whose results were 100% justified.
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F ig u r e  3-11: Relational Associations
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Table 3-9: In teractions between R elational A ssociations - 1
A S S O C I A T I O N S
1 2
AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION
3 4 5
DENSITY(b) N
A 1 50(.89) o(.oo) 0(.OO) 5(.09) 1(02) 0.13158 20
S 2 0(.00) 72(.56) 17 ( . 13) 24(.19) 15(.12) 0.17143 21
S 3 0(.00) 17(.20) 42(.49) 17(.20) 9(.ll) O.11053 20
0 4 5(.03) 24 (.15) 17(.10) 86(.53) 31(.19) 0.12251 27
C. 5 1(01) 15(•ll) 9(.07) 31( .23) 76(.58) 0.08736 30
HOUSEHOLD GOODS EXCHANGE
1 64(.94) 1(01) 0(.00) 2(.03) 1(01) 0.16842 20
2 1(02) 38(.88) 0(.00) 2(.05) 2(.05) 0.09048 21
3 0(.00) 0(.00) 12(.55) 6( .27) 4(.18) 0.03158 20
4 2(.04) 2(.04) 6(.12) 32(.63) 9(•18) 0.04558 27
5 1(02) 2(04) 4(.09) 9( .20) 30(.65) 0.03448 30
LEND/BORROW MONEY
1 22(.76) 1(•03) 4(.14) 2(.07) 0( .00) 0.05789 20
2 1(•02) 28(.61) 6(•13) 6(.13) 5( • 11) 0.06667 21
3 4(.ll) 6(•17) 12(.34) 7(.20) 6(•17) 0.03158 20
4 2(.03) 6(.09) 7(10) 44(.65) 9(•13) O .06268 27
5 0(.00) 5(•lO) 6(•12) 9(•18) 30(.60) 0.03448 30
KINSHIP RELATIONS
1 40(.75) 2(.04) 2(•04) 0(.00) 9(•17) 0.10526 20
2 2(.0l) 46(.32) 18(.13) 29(.20) 49(.34) 0.10952 21
3 2(.0l) 18(.1l) 56(.35) 50(.31) 35(.22) 0.14737 20
4 0(.00) 29(.08) 50( . 14) 232(.66) 39(.11) 0.33048 27
5 9(.04) 49 (.20) 35(.14) 39 ( .16) 112(.46) O.12874 30
TOTAL (a)
1 176(.85) 4(•02) 6(.03) 9(.04) 11(.05) 0.11579 20
2 4 ( .01) 184(.51) 41(•1l) 61(.17) 71(.20) 0.10952 21
3 ' 6(.02) 41(.14) 122(.40) 80(.26) 54(.18) 0.07895 20
4 9(•01) 61(.10) 80(.13) 394(.62) 88(.14) 0.13960 27
5 11(.02) 71(.1S) 54(.11) 88(.19) 248(.53) 0.07126 30
Source: 
Notes:
Figures 3-2, 3-3, 3-- 7, and 3-9
Figures without parentheses are total numbers of interactions.
Figures in parenthesis axe ratios of number of interactions between 
two groups to total number (across) of interactions.
(a) The meeting-at-shops network only indicates weakly probable 
interactions, while other four networks above indicate the actual 
presence of or strongly probable interactions. Therefore, this network 
is excluded from the totals. No arbitrary weights were used for 
summation, (continues to Table 3-10)
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Table 3-10: Interactions betw een R elational A ssociations - 2
A S S O C I A T I O N S  
1 2 3 4 5
HIRED-IN/OUT LABOUR H I R E D  DENSITY(b) N
H 1 2(.67) 0( .00) 0( .00) 1(.33) 0(.00) 0.00526 20
I 2 O(.OO) 6( .38) 6(.38) 1(06) 3(.19) 0.01429 21
R 3 2( .08) 4(.16) 9(.36) 2(.08) 8(.32) 0.02368 20
E 4 16(.39) 3(.07) 8(.20) 8(.20) 6(•15) 0.01140 27
R 5 3(.17) 4(•22) 5(.28) 1(•06) 5( .28) 0.00575 30
LAND SALES/PURCHASE S E L L E R
B 1 0(.00) 0(.00) 0( .00) 0(.00) 1(1.0) 0.00000 20
U 2 0(.00) 5(.50) 1(10) 1(10) 3(.30) 0.01190 21
Y 3 o(.oo) 2(•12) 6(.35) 4(•24) 5 ( • 29) 0.01579 20
E 4 0(.00) 1(.0S) 7(.33) 8( .38) 5(•24) 0.01140 27
R 5 1(•09) 2(18) 3(.27) 1(09) 4(.36) 0.00460 “ 30
LAND LEASE L E A S E - I N
L 1 1(1.0) 0(.00) 0(.00) 0(.00) 0(.00) 0.00263 20
E 2 o(.oo) 1(.50) 0(.00) 1(.S0) 0(.00) 0.00238 21
A 0 3 0(.00) 0( .00) 1(1.0) 0( .00) 0(.00) 0.00263 20
S U 4 0(.00) 1(.20) 2(■40) 0(.00) 2(.40) 0.00000 27
E T 5 0(.00) 3( .38) 0( .00) o(.oo) 5( .63) 0.00575 30
CITRUS SIAM OBSERVATION 0 B S E R V E R
0 1 2(1.0) 0( .00) 0(.00) 0(.00) 0(.00) 0.00526 20
B 2 0(.00) 3(.25) 2(•17) S(.42) 2(.17) 0.00714 21
S V 3 1(•08) 4(•33) 1(08) 2(•17) 4( .33) 0.00263 20
E E 4 9(.16) 10(.18) 7(•13) 17(.30) 13(.23) 0.02422 27
R D 5 o(.oo) 4(.18) 6(.27) 5(.23) 7(.32) O .00805 30
TOTAL I N F E R I 0 R TOTAL N AVE.
S 1 5(.7l) 0(.OO) 0(.00) 1(14) 1(14) 7 20 .35
U 2 0(.00) 15(.38) 9(.23) 8(.20) 8( .20) 40 21 1.90
P I 3 3(.05) 10(.18) 17(.31) 8(.1S) 17(.31) 55 20 2 .75
E 0 4 25(.20) 15(.12) 24 ( .20) 33(.27) 26(.21) 123 27 4.56
R R 5 4(•07) 13(.22) 14(.24) 7(12) 20(.36) 59 30 1.97
TOTAL 37(.13) 53(.19) 64(.23) 57(.20) 73(.26) 284 118 2.41
AVE. 1.85 2.52 3.20 2.11 2.43
NET(c) -1.50 -0.62 -0.50 2.45 -0.46
(b) (continued from Table 3-9) Density is a measure of
intensity of interactions within an association, defined as ratio of 
the number of actual interactions within the association to the 
possible maximum number of interactions within the association. If 
there are N members in an association, the latter is N(N-l).
(c) NET is the difference between the average number of superior 
relations (average in row) and the average number of inferior relations 
(average in column). If negative, the association is net inferior,- and 
if positive, the association is net superior.
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T he original network system of direct agricultural inform ation represents the 
re lationships of villagers in term s of the ir  “direct” inform ation flows, such as 
conversations abou t agricultural problems. O ther  networks are regarded as m edia which 
indirectly transm it ted  agricultural inform ation, through their respective socio-economic 
in teractions and relationships. The relational associations revealed by s tudying these 
network systems of socio-economic in teractions and relationships can accordingly be 
viewed as indicating how agricultural inform ation was transferred both  directly and 
indirectly, and as indicating those who shared agricultural information w ith  each other.
This  function of the relational associations can be examined by checking 
in teractions between associations, ra the r  than  between individual villagers. Tables 3-9 
and 3-10 show how relational associations in teracted  with each other and themselves in 
particu la r  socio-economic networks.
Table  3-9 summarises how relational associations in teract  with each other in 
networks of four non-hierarchical relations. As indicated by num bers along the diagonal 
lines in matrices, the largest proportion of all interactions were w'ithin each association. 
On the o ther hand, hierarchical relations were mostly between different associations, as 
shown in Table  3-10, with an exception of Relational Association 1. This association had 
few hierarchical relations as superior, and therefore, can be excluded from considerations.
3 .8 .2  S tr u c tu r a l  A ss o c ia t io n s
As shown in the “T o ta l” section of T able 3-9, members of each association shared 
inform ation more with each other than  with villagers of other associations. This satisfies 
one condition whereby the members of a set of villagers may be expected to behave 
similarly. Another condition still to be assumed is th a t  the villagers in an association 
played alm ost identical roles in the network of agricultural information diffusion in the 
village. ^
Villagers who played similar roles in te rm s of disseminating agricultural information 
in the  village are expected to  have been more interested in each o ther’s socio-economic 
condition and behaviour than  other villagers’. T hus it is plausible to assume th a t  a
43Refer Section 3.2.3.
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villager was more or less substitutable with, and interdependent with villagers who played 
sim ilar roles, and all these villagers may be assumed to  have identical utility  functions in 
term s of their pattern  of interdependence. For the villagers who did not play similar roles, 
somewhat different utility functions should be assumed.
The adoption process model of Burt (1980b) with an interdependence utility 
function was constructed on this basis. For villagers to have identical utility  functions, 
they m ust play similar roles in disseminating agricultural information in the village, as 
well as having identical amounts of sources of their welfare.'*'*
To aggregate villagers with similar patterns of interdependence, social distances 
among villagers were calculated according to the Five types of reciprocal interactions used 
to identify relational associations, and W ard’s method of hierarchical clustering was then 
used, and Figure 3-12 shows the results. In this study, the author chose 35 of the fusion 
criterion (within-group variance) for the cut-off point, since the value of the fusion 
criterion (within-group variance) also started  increasing very rapidly around this point. 
According to the average independence coefficient of members of the structural 
associations (Table 3-11), S tructural Associations 5 and 3 were identified as being 
strongly independent, i.e., opinion leaders’ associations, while Structural Associations 4 
and 1 were identified as being the least independent. Structural Association 2 was in the 
middle, but closer to Structural Associations 4 and 1 than to Structural Associations 5 
and 3.
^ S e e  reviews in Section 1.4.4.2.
^ T h e  author utilised W ard’s hierarchical clustering method in two segm ents in this study  
(Section 2.4.1 and this section). A statistically  robust criterion for selecting the optim al number of 
clusters is not yet available, although there are numerous criteria in the literature. The values of 
the particular fusion criterion are plotted with the numbers of clusters. The point where the value 
suddenly increases is selected as the optim al number of clusters. For details, see Everitt (1977, 
1979).
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Figure 3-12: Cluster Analysis of S tructural Associations
F U S I O N - C R I T E R O N
Note: The fusion criterion of Ward’s method is twice the increase in the 
within-group variance caused by a fusion.
151
3 .8 .3  B a s ic  A s s o c ia t io n s
T a b le  3-11: Basic Associations
A
S S 
T S 
R 0 
U C 
C I 
T A 
U T 
R I 
A 0 
L N 
S
R E L A T I O N A L  A S S O C I A T I O N S
Average 
Independenc e
1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 | Total Coefficient
5. 1 o 1 0 1 0 1(14) 5# 1 o I 5 1 0.280177
3. 1 o 1(5) 1 1(9) 1 1(13) 4# 1 o I 6 | 0.172932
2. 1 0 1(4) 8# 1 (8) 6 1(12) 3 1 (17) 7 | 24 | 0.062650
4. 1 0 1(3) 3 1(7) 8* 1(H) 5 1(16) 15*# | 31 I 0.040549
1. 1(1) 20*# 1(2) 9* 1(6) 5 1(10) l 
i
1 
M
 
1 
1 
O
 
1 
1 
* 
1
1(15) 8 | 52 | 0.038335
Total | 20 1 21 1 20 1 27 1 30 | 118 | 0.060953
Notes:
A number in a parenthesis is an identification number of a basic association.
An asterisk denotes a core association of a relational association, which 
corresponds with the largest cell within the relational association.
A # denotes a core association of a structural association, which correspond 
with the largest cell within the structural association.
See also Table 3-1 for the idea of basic associations.
Sources:
Figure 3-11: relational associations.
Figure 3-12: structural associations.
T ab le  3-11 shows the  cross-tabu lation  of the villagers according to  th e  re lational 
and  s tru c tu ra l associations. Each cell is a  basic association, m em bers of which are 
regarded  as sharing alm ost identical inform ation and playing alm ost identical roles in 
d issem inating  inform ation. Seventeen basic associations were identified. A cell w ith  * or 
#  respectively represents a core association of a  p articu la r re lational or s tru c tu ra l 
associa tion .
R elational A ssociation 1 was not divided a t all, and com pletely corresponded to 
Basic A ssociation 1. Hence, this association can be regarded as a  hom ogeneous one. -
R elational Association 5 was divided into th ree basic associations and  m ainly 
charac te rised  by Basic Association 16 which corresponded to  S tru c tu ra l A ssociation 4. 
R elational Association 3 was divided into four basic associations, and  mainly
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charac terised  by Basic Association 7 which also corresponded to  S tru c tu ra l A ssociation 4. 
These tw o re la tional associations were th u s m ainly represented by one basic association. 
In th is  sense, these can also be regarded as hom ogeneous.
R elational Associations 2 and 4 were polarised and heterogeneous. R elational 
A ssociation 2 was divided in to  four basic associations and m ainly characterised  by Basic 
A ssociations 2 and 4 which respectively corresponded to  S tru c tu ra l A ssociations 1 and 2. 
R elational A ssociation 4 was divided in to  five basic associations and m ainly charac terised  
by th ree  basic associations. Two of them  correspond w ith s tru c tu ra l associations which 
had higher average independence coefficients, and the  rest corresponded to  the  lowest 
s tru c tu ra l association in term s of the independence coefficient. T his association was m ore 
polarised and heterogeneous th an  R elational A ssociation 2, because the higher 
ch a rac te ris tic  basic associations were much higher th an  th a t of R elational A ssociation 2 
in te rm s of independence coefficient. Though m em bers of these tw o re la tional 
associations shared alm ost identical in form ation, their roles in d issem inating the  
inform ation  were clearly different. M em bers of higher basic associations (Basic 
A ssociations 13 and 14 in R elational Association 4, and Basic A ssociations 4 and 5 in 
R elational A ssociation 2) may be regarded as groups of leaders of these re la tional 
associa tions, while the rem aining lower basic associations may be regarded as groups of 
subord ina tes or fo llow ers.^
T ab le 3-12 shows members of each basic association, their m em berships of groups in 
netw orks of in teractions, and their independence coefficients.
3 .8 .4  S o c io -E co n o m ic  C h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  R e la t io n a l A sso c ia t io n s
T able 3-13 details some im p o rtan t socio-economic charac teristics  of re lational 
associa tions in the village socio-economic s tru c tu re , and Table 3-14 presents th e ir 
cropping p a tte rn s . Six extremely successful villagers were excluded from the  form er tab le , 
since it was felt th a t  socio-economic charac teristics of these associations were th u s b e tte r  
indicated .
In the following paragraphs, th e  charac teristics of the five rela tional associations are
46Refer Section 3.2.3 and Table 3-1.
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Table 3-12 : V illagers in Basic A ssociations
ASSOCIATIONS 
BASIC RELATIONAL STRUCTURAL
Villager| 
ID(a)1
INTERACTIONS(b) 
1 2 3 4 5
|INDEPENDENCE 
1 COEFFICIENT 1
1 1 1 1 j 5 8 6 1 2
1
| 0.039116
2 1 5 8 6 3 j 0.039011
3 1 1 8 6 5 3 j 0.036711
4 j 1 8 6 2 j 0.040994
5 1 1 11 7 5 2 j 0.039691
6 j 8 6 2 1 0.037853
7 1 1 9 6 1 2 j 0.032023
8 1 9 7 5 3 j 0.032969
9 1 8 2 j 0.028751
17 1 8 10 2 j 0.037063
18 1 1 3 8 11 2 j 0.034437
19 j 1 7 10 2 j 0.041162
20 j 1 8 8 7 3 | 0.038347
21 1 1 2 8 7 3 j 0.036695 -
22 j 1 8 8 2 j 0.035813
23 1 1 10 8 10 2 j 0.040418
24 1 1 8 8 3 j 0.036134
124 j 11 7 5 2 j 0.039218
125 j 10 7 10 2 j 0.036096
150 j 1 8 6 5 2 j 0.041765 1
2 2 1 14 j 7 3 9 13 2
1
| 0.045360
15 j 2 3 9 4 4 j 0.044109
16 j 3 9 17 2 j 0.032167
68 1 7 3 5 17 | 0.035361
88 j 7 5 3 j 0.030646
97 j 7 4 11 11 1 j 0.043477
104 1 2 4 15 4 4 j 0.048328
139 1 2 3 15 4 4 1 0.039719
140 j 2 6 4 j 0.039429
3 2 4 49 1 8 3 13 8 1 | 0.035378
54 1 6 3 13 1 j 0.040927
110 | 2 3 9 3 j 0.036570 1
4 ' "2 2 77 j 7 2 11 11 3
1
| 0.053350
80 | 7 2 13 14 3 j 0.071032
93 1 7 3 13 17 3 j 0.070387
94 j 7 3 13 3 j 0.082397
95 1 7 6 11 11 1 j 0.080256
96 j 7 2 13 11 1 j 0.046496
106 | 7 3 13 17 1 j 0.038940
108 1 5 2 13 14 1 j 0.120180 * 1
5 2 3 76 | 7 6 11 11 1 | 0.313290 *
Notes are shown on page 156. (continues)
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Table 3-12, continued
ASSOCIATIONS 
BASIC RELATIONAL
Villager| 
STRUCTURAL ID(a)| 1
INTERACTIONS(b) 
2 3 4 5
|INDEPENDENCE 
1 COEFFICIENT 
1
6 3 1 13 j 1 4 16 2
1
| 0.030488
32 j 8 6 14 3 j 0.044188
50 1 8 6 17 1 j 0.037997
85 j 6 5 1 6 3 j 0.043591
153 j 1 10 1 j 0.034087
I
7 3 4 44 j 6 6 12 18 1
1
| 0.030476
51 j 5 1 4 16 1 | 0.032218
57 j 6 18 8 1 1 0.031821
58 j 6 2 18 15 1 1 0.042262
70 1 6 1 10 1 j 0.036200
73 j 6 3 10 3 1 j 0.033980
79 j 8 2 18 17 3 j 0.037421
83 j 6 1 j 0.035413 - 
I
8 3 2 55 j 6 4 | 0.037770
59 j 6 18 8 1 j 0.041760
78 1 5 1 j 0.077648
82 j 6 1 12 12 1 j 0.051732
87 j 6 3 1 3 j 0.048850
91 j 6 6 6 1 j 0.046745
I
9 3 3 86 j 6 6 10 12 3
1
| 0.070787 
1
10 4 1 29 j 3 7 14 14 3
1
| 0.082289
61 1 5 1 1 0.029349
89 1 5 5 13 1 | 0.043904
100 | 5 2 3 1 0.032759
120 1 5 5 12 3 j 0.059030
122 j 5 5 16 3 j O .045448
126 j 5 5 6 13 2 j 0.032078
127 j 5 5 6 12 3 1 0.043639
134 1 9 5 1 1 0.033429
135 1 5 5 1 3 1 0.033744
I
11 ' 4 4 37 j 5 2 16 6 3
1
| 0.046370
42 1 3 7 18 16 3 1 0.051150
101 j 3 6 2 6 3 j 0.036799
102 1 5 6 2 3 j 0.052506
132 j 9 5 15 3 j 0.034467 
1
12 4 2 30 j 4 7 14 3
1
| 0.040626
81 j 4 7 14 13 1 1 0.052853
92 7 7 14 13 1 0.055865
Notes are on page 156. (continues)
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Table 3-12, continued
ASSOCIATIONS 
BASIC RELATIONAL STRUCTURAL
Villager| 
ID (a) |
I
1
INTERACTIONS(b) 
2 3 4 5
|INDEPENDENCE 
1 COEFFICIENT 1
13 4 3
1
* 71 | 7 6 10 13 3
1
| 0.088135
72 1 5 6 10 15 1 1 0.115545
84 1 5 6 12 13 3 j  0.128561 *
149 j
I
5 5 10 12 3 1 0.321273 *
I
14 4 5 10 j 5 7 14 13 2 | 0.182356 *
31 j 5 7 14 13 3 1 0.307934 *
112 j 5 6 13 2 j  0.197614 *
128 j 5 5 6 13 2 1 0.308205 *
130 j 
1
5 7 14 13 2 j 0.404775 * 
1
15 5 1
1
25 | 9 4 3
1
| 0.032566
65 j 4 2 12 18 3 j 0.032035
m  j 4 2 j 0.033260 -
113 1 4 2 2 j 0.034648
115 j 5 17 2 3 j 0.037371
116 1 5 4 17 3 j 0.032329
117 1 9 4 17 2 3 1 0.031444
129 1 
1
1 18 2 j 0.030866 
1
16 5 4
1
33 | 4 3 15 9 3
1
| 0.066439
34 | 4 3 15 9 3 1 0.056449
35 j 4 2 3 18 3 1 0.042124
36 1 4 2 16 9 3 j 0.043463
39 1 4 1 18 3 1 0.055818
41 j 5 3 18 9 3 1 0.033760
46 j 3 2 15 9 1 | 0.041574
74 j 5 3 10 3 1 0.035531
98 1 4 11 1 1 0.030670
103 | 4 1 18 18 1 j 0.041678
109 j 4 2 3 13 1 j 0.040270
114 j 5 3 1 j 0.033053
121 1 4 4 15 9 1 1 0.055980
148 j 4 4 12 3 1 0.034697
151 I 
1
4 4 14 16 3 j 0.031547
17 5 2
1
40 | 4 4 1
I
| 0.046176
47 1 4 5 12 1 1 0.042763
56 1 4 2 j 0.095467
60 1 4 2 12 9 1 j 0.179143 *
64 1 4 2 12 15 1 1 0.050165
66 j 4 2 10 15 1 1 0.037520
67 j 4 3 10 15 3 1 0.035469
Notes are on page 156. (continues)
156
Table 3-12, continued
Notes:
(a) ID: Identification numbers of villagers.
(b) INTERACTIONS
Figures are group identification numbers in the network of:
1. Agricultural Information, Figure 3-9, Table 3-8.
2. Kinship, Figure 3-2, Table 3-4.
3. Household Goods exchange, Figure 3-7, Table 3-6.
4. Money Lending/Borrowing, Figure 3-3, Table 3-5.
5. Meeting-at-shops, Figure 3-8, Table 3-7.
(c) A figure in a column is the number of a group to which villagers 
belong in the network of interaction represented by the column 
number.
(d) An asterisk indicates the independence coefficient is greater 
than the average plus one standard deviation (about 
0 . 12) .
described from the point of view of the network systems to which they relate, referring to 
Table 3-9 as well as Tables 3-13 and 3-14. Further, some prominent villagers are 
identified according to independent coefficients from Table 3-12.
3 .8 .4 .1  R e la t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  1
This association consisted of the National Railway workers and two villagers who 
lived a t the southwest end of the village, where most of the Javanese National Railway 
workers outside the bedengs lived. As seen in previous sections, the National Railw'ay 
workers formed very isolated groups in every network system. Hence, they were naturally 
classified into this association in the village socio-economic structure.
The figures in Table 3-9 show th a t the isolation of this association was outstanding. 
The highest proportion of interactions were confined within the association itself. In to tal, 
85 percents of all interactions were confined within this association, compared with 40 - 
62 percent of all interactions for the other associations.
Although interactions with other associations were relatively few, there were some 
conspicuous ones. Thus, nine percent of direct agricultural information exchange 
interactions were with Association 4, 14 percent of money lending/borrowing interactions 
were with Association 3, and 17 percent of kinship relations were with Association 5. 
Association 4 included most of the village elites, and it therefore seems natural th a t 
members of Association 1 should have had contact with its members. Association 3 
includes Villager 153, a widow of a section head of the National Railway, who bought 
groceries for the National Railway workers who could not often go to Baturaja. She often
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Table 3-13: Socio-Economic C haracteristics  of R elational A ssociations
Relational Associations
1 2 3 4 5 All
Annual Income 680070 1051963 1034741 1382177 978623 1034911
(Rp) (253424) (437727) (533320) (712283) (602840) (581402)
Agricultural 15750 692563 689941 905885 815366 645672
Income(a) (66989) (477912) (396114) (570760) (664481) (586615)
Non-Agric. 664320 359400 344800 476292 163257 389239
Income (206396) (440264) (425180) (510306) (287624) (416848)
Land 0.60 3.56 4.72 4.54 6.39 4.13
(Ha) (0.61) (3.47) (3.77) (3.05) (6.88) (4.70)
Age 41.00 46.30 45.53 40.00 44.34 43.34
(Yr.) (10.81) (13.44) (18.34) (12.42) (13.47) (13.75)
Household 5.40 5.90 5.07 5.79 5.71 5.62
Size (1.79) (2.61) (1.71) (2.47) (2.64) (2.31)
Male [0,15] 1.50 1.65 0.87 1.42 1.43 1.40
(1.19) (1.79) (0.99) (1.35) (1.37) (1.37)
[16,60] 1.45 1.65 1.20 1.13 1.43 1.37
(0.60) (1.04) (1.08) (0.85) (0.92) (0.91)
[61,— ] 0.00 0.10 0.40 0.08 0.21 0.15
(0.00) (0.31) (0.63) (0.28) (0.42) (0.38)
Total 2.95 3.40 2.47 2.63 3.07 2.93
(1.43) (1.93) (1.13) (1.69) (1.59) (1.60)
Female[0,15] 1.00 1.15 1.13 1.67 1.04 1.21
(0.92) (0.93) (0.92) (1.49) (1.29) (1.18)
[16,60] 1.40 1.30 1.27 1.46 1.46 1.39
(0.82) (0.73) (0.70) (0.78) (0.79) (0.76)
[61,-- ] 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.04 0.14 0.09
(0.22) (0.22) (0.41) (0.20) (0.36) (0.29)
Total 2.45 2.50 2.60 3.17 2.64 2.69
(1.23) (1.32) (1.35) (1.58) (1.75) (1.49)
Farming 16.50 19.95 21.27 15.13 18.89 18.13
Experience(Yr )(11•12) (12.12) (19.02) (10.90) (14.86) (13.53)
Education 4.80 4.95 6.47 7.79 5.89 6.02
(proxy) (3.72) (3.20) (3.64) (5.00) (3.40) (3.96)
Radio 0.30 0.35 0.47 0.58 0.39 0.42
Radio Agric. 1.00 1.30 1.27 2.75 1.93 1.73
Prog.(time/wk)(1.97) (2.30) (2.22) (2.77) (2.94) (2.56)
Visits to 20.8 61.6 50.9 81.7 34.5 49.9
Baturaj a (17.4) (107.0) (97.7) (106.0) (69.4) (86.5)
(time/yr.)
Notes: (a) Agricultural income from sources in and outside Belatung.
(b) Figures in parentheses axe standard deviations.
Source: Fieldwork
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T a b le  3-14: Cropping Pattern  of Relational Associations
Relational Association
Crop 1 2 3 4 5 All
Coffee 5% 522 50% 67%* 62% 50%
Duku 25 57 45 52 60* 49
Citrus S . 40 38 40 74* 50 50
Rice 40 81 70 81 87* 74
Rambutan 40* 14 25 22 7 20
Pineapple 25* 10 10 15 0 11
Rubber 5 57 70* 56 63 52
Cloves 0 5 25* 19 17 14
Durian 0 43 50* 48 50* 40
Ave.Crops 1.80 3.57 3.85 4.33* 3.97 3.59
Note: Asterisks denote the highest proportions or average 
among associations.
Source: Fieldwork
lent money to these workers. The connections with Association 5 involved two members 
of Association 1 who were Belatung native villagers.
Association 1 had seven superior and 37 inferior relations with villagers of other 
associations with a net average of 1.5 inferior relations per member. The association is 
therefore regarded as the most inferior association in the village (Table 3-10).
There was no particularly prominent member in this association, but in fact 
Villager 1 was relatively im portant (Table 3-12). He was born in the neighbouring village, 
Lebuk B atang Lama, but his daughter married Villager 4. Villagers 1 and 2 had a great 
degree of coincidence in their memberships of network systems, and a t the same time had 
close associations with members in Association 4 in the village socio-economic structure. 
The reason for this strong association may be a ttribu ted  partly to their meeting-at-shops
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rela tionship with Villager 128, who owned a grocery shop in their residential area, bu t  
mainly to  their relations with Villager 122, 128 and 149 in the d irect agricultural 
inform ation network. Villager 2 was a hired labourer for the National Railway. He needed 
additional income from employment by native villagers.
Association 1 had the lowest annual income, abou t  two th irds  of the village average, 
and since the N ational Railway workers involved are given only a small plot of land, the 
area  under their m anagem ent was the smallest am ong all associations (Table  3-13). The 
m em bers were also young on average, with less farming experience. They also had the 
lowest educational a t ta in m en t ,  the lowest radio possession ra tio ,  the lowest agricultural 
p rogram m e listening ra te ,  and even the lowest frequency of visiting B atura ja .  In these 
senses, Association 1 was the lowest socio-economic association in the village, which ap a r t  
from ethnic differences explains their isolation from native Belatung villagers’ 
associations. The cropping pa tte rn  of this association was also markedly different from 
th a t  of the rest of the village, essentially because of the small areas of land (Table 3-14). 
The members grew on average 1.8 crops, with the distinctive aspect th a t  25 to  40 percent 
of them  cultivate  c itrus siam, ram bu tan  and pineapple. These are perennial fruit crops 
which do no t require large areas. The association also had the highest proportion of 
m em bers growing ram b u tan  or pineapple, while the proportion of those growing citrus 
siam was almost on the average village level.
3 .8 .4 .2  R e la t io n a l  A ss o c ia t io n  2
This association consisted mainly of members of G roups 2 and 7 in the direct 
agricultural information network system, and Groups 2 and 3 in the kinship system 
(Table 3-12). These villagers had relatively loose connections with each other, if
a n
com pared with members of other associations in the village socio-economic s tructure . 1
Although villagers in the Lekis area were included in this association by virtue of 
their kinship and money lending/borrowing relationships, they were quite isolated.
O ther  m embers of this association had many con tac ts  with native villagers’ 
associations, especially Association 4 through direct agricultural information exchanges
47 For the definition of “loose connection” , see a footnote on page 116.
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and money lending/borrow ing  interactions. T he hierarchical relations of Association 2 
with Associations 3, 4 and 5 were m ost commonly inferior in net term s (Table 3-10), and 
this association can be regarded as the second m ost inferior in the village.
Association 2 included three prom inent villagers, in term s of independence 
coefficients (Table 3-12): Villager 76, the principal of the prim ary school, Villager 95, a 
bro ther of the  ex-village head, and Villager 108, a  no tab le  citrus siam trader/g row er.
Association 2 may be term ed as an “average” association in the village, w ith its 
average features approxim ately  equal to  the Belatung averages in most respects (Tables 
3-13 and 3-14). However, m embers had the highest average age and the shortest formal 
education. T he cropping pa t te rn  was relatively more oriented tow ards traditional crops, 
rice, rubber,  coffee, duku and durian.
3 .8 .4 .3  R e la t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  3
T he members of Association 3 were mainly m embers of G roups 6 and 8 of the direct 
agricultural information network, and membership in groups in o ther network systems 
did not seem im p o rtan t  in determ ining their membership of this association. Members of 
this association were not particularly  closely connected to each other. Only 40 percent of 
their in teractions were within the association. They were well connected to Association 4, 
the “Village Elites” . Thus in the networks of the non-hierarchical relations (Table 3-9), 
more than  20 percent of in teractions in each network were with Association 4. 
Association 3 had inferior relations only with Association 4, and had superior relations 
with all o ther three associations (Table 3-10). This association is accordingly viewed as 
the equal second superior, together with Association 5.
There was no prom inent villager in this association (Table 3-12). However, if 
relationships in the direct agricultural information network were examined (Figure 3-9), 
it appeared th a t  four villagers were well connected to  those outside the association. 
Villagers 78 and 59 had many con tac ts  with members of Association 2, Villager 86 with 
Association 4, and Villager 87 with Association 5. These villagers were relatively more 
p rom inent th an  other members of this association.
Association 3 is ano ther association not too far from the average but had slightly 
more land, the smallest household size, the smallest male labour, the longest farming
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experience, and the second longest formal education (Table  3-13). T he assoc ia tion’s 
average cropping p a t te rn  was more oriented towards rubber and new perennial crops, 
ra m b u ta n  and  clove, since more of its m em bers’ lands were si tuated  in the ladang area. 
T h e  proportion of those growing rubber was the highest (Table  3-14).
3 .8 .4 .4  R e la t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  4
The village head (Villager 130), the ex-village head (Villager 84), four primary 
school teachers (Villager 10, 29’s son, 31, 112), the Islamic religious teacher (Villager 71), 
a  village official (Villager 120, shop owner) and two notable en trep reneur/fa rm ers  
(Villagers 128 and 149) were all included in this association (Table 3-12).
M embers of G roup 7 of the kinship system were all in this association and  formed 
its core in the sense th a t  they provided most of the above leaders. They also formed a 
significantly d istinct group in each network system in which they appeared. As mentioned 
in the section on the kinship system, G roup 7 had always been the politically and 
economically ruling entity  of Belatung.
O ther members of this association were mostly from G roups 5 or 6 of the  kinship 
system , which also included im portan t  families in the village.
This association was quite independent, with the second highest proportion of 
in teractions contained within itself (after Association 1, Table 3-9). It also had superior 
relations with all other associations. It may thus be justifiably labelled as the village elite 
association (Table 3-10).
Seven members of Association 4 had distinct prominence (Table 3-12), and five 
villagers had many contacts  with villagers of other associations.. Villager 130, the village 
head, had the best contacts  with all others except Association 1. Villagers 84, 71 and 92 
had many contac ts  with Association 2, and Villagers 37, 31 and 30 had many contacts  
with Association 5.
Association 4 was significantly different from all o ther associations in socio­
economic characteristics, and th is  was connected with its elite s ta tu s  previously described. 
Its annual average income was the highest among all associations, a l though its average 
landholding was similar to  the village average. The average age of its m em bers was the 
lowest, w ith the shortest farming experience, bu t these members had the best educational
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a t ta in m en t ,  with 58 percent of them  possessing radios and listening to agricultural 
p rogram m es on radio abou t 3 times a week. The average frequency of visits to B atu ra ja  
was also the highest a t  82 times a year, i.e., roughly twice a  week (Table 3-13). The 
average cropping pa tte rn  of this association was significantly different from th a t  of the 
o ther associations of native Belatung villagers (Associations 2, 3 and 5), with higher 
proportions growing cash crops, and especially coffee and citrus siam (Table 3-14). The 
average num ber of crops grown was thus  the highest of all, 4.33 crops. The members of 
th is  association seem to have succeeded best in diversifying their cropping p a t te rn ,  to 
avoid the adverse effects of fluctuations of rubber price.
3 .8 .4 .5  R e la t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  5
This relational association consisted of members of Groups 4 and 5 of the direct 
agricultural information system, and of Groups 2, 3 or 4 of the kinship system (Table 
3-12). Although some members also belonged to Group 5 of the direct agricultural 
inform ation network, these were villagers quite different from the members of Relational 
Association 4; they belonged to entirely different kinship groups.
This association was more connected with Association 4 than  other associations, 
a l though the connection was not particularly  strong (Table 3-9). It had superior relations 
with Associations 1 and 2, and inferior relations w ith  Associations 3 and 4 (Table 3-10).
Among the members of Association 5, four villagers had many contac ts  with other 
groups in the direct agricultural information network. Villager 39, 47 and 56 had good 
con tac ts  with Association 4, and Villager 60 had many contacts  with Association 3. 
However, only Villager 60 was prom inent in this association (Table 3-12).
Association 5 was again very different from other associations, but had the average 
annual income approximately equal to the village’s (Table 3-13). The proportion of 
agricu ltura l income, 83 percent, was much higher than  th a t  of o ther associations. Except 
for this, this association was quite an average association in term s of age, household size, 
fa rm ing experience, education, and radio possession/listening to programmes. The 
average cropping pa t te rn  was similar to th a t  of Association 2, a lthough there was more of 
a lm ost all crops.
This  association had the largest area  of land under m anagem ent,  bu t the second
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highest agricultural income. Its cropping p a t te rn  was oriented to  coffee, citrus siam, 
durian  and rice, with less rubber and duku, where the  la t te r  was presently the booming 
fruit cash crop (Table 3-14). In particu lar ,  its citrus siam was still young and not 
producing a t  full capacity.
3 .9  S u m m a r y
In this chapter,  two approaches to identifying groups in a socio-economic 
in teraction  system were reviewed, and the procedure of eliciting groups in the village 
system was determined in light of the strengths  and weaknesses of these approaches. Ten 
types of socio-economic in teractions were originally selected, with a focus on the 
capability  to t ransm it agricultural information among villagers. Because of the 
unavailability  of the da ta ,  one type of in teractions, i.e., exchange labour, was later 
excluded. In the first step using a  relational approach, relational associations of villagers 
who were regarded as sharing alm ost identical information were identified. In the second 
step using a s tructura l  approach these relational associations were divided into basic and 
core associations of villagers who were considered as both sharing almost identical 
inform ation and playing similar roles in disseminating information. Finally, socio­
economic characteristics and cropping pa tte rns  of the relational associations were 
examined with use of the basic and core associations.
Figure 3-13 conceptualises the village socio-economic s truc tu re  and presents some of 
the representa tive statistics of the relational associations.
According to the analyses of basic and core associations, the average socio-economic 
characteris tics , and their hierarchical and non-hierarchical interactions, Relational 
Association 1 was identified as the low-class association, Relational Association 4 as the 
leaders’ association and Relational Associations 2, 3 and 5 as the middle-class 
associations. The associations can be labelled similarly from the point of view of villagers’ 
interdependence. Again, the associations’ adoption rates of citrus siam gave a  similar 
ordering.
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Figure 3-13: Socio-Economic S tructure of the Village
Annual
Income
(Rp)
Average
Independence
Coefficient
Average
Net
Relation
Citrus
Siam
Adoption
Rate
1380000 0.105952 2.45 74$
1050000 0.064181 -0.62 38$
1030000 0.042272 -0.50 40$
980000 0.046476 -0.46 50%
680000 0.037213 -1 .50 40$
Notes:
(a) Arrows indicate relations from inferior to superior, with figures 
showing their magnitude.
(b) A positive average net relation indicates that members of an 
association are superior to others on average, and a negative net 
relation denotes the opposite.
(c) Numbers in circles denote relational associations.
Sources:
Annual Income from Table 3-13,
Independence coefficients from Table 3-12,
Average Net Relations from Table 3-10,
Citrus Siam Adoption Rate from Table 3-14.
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C H A P T E R  4
C itru s Siam  A d o p tio n  P ro cess
4.1 In trod u ction
In Belatung and the surrounding areas, there were several relatively new crops, the 
adoption of which, villagers hoped, may improve their agricultural economic s i tuation , 
which had been and was highly dependent on rubber production. Historically, villagers 
had tried various new crops. Coffee seems to have been the first a l ternative , followed by 
several types of citrus, including citrus siam. Cloves, pepper, pineapple, and ram bu tan  
had come after th a t .  Except for coffee and citrus siam, these alternative  crops had been 
either unsuitable for the climate or were still too recent in adoption for any conclusions to 
be reached.
In this chapter,  firstly, the  aggregate adoption processes of citrus siam in South 
S u m a tra  and in Belatung are described, and the aggregate adoption process in Belatung is 
explained by the relative prices of major crops. Since the purpose of this study is an 
explanation of intra-firm diffusion process and individual adoption behaviour, results here 
will not be detailedly pursued. Secondly, citrus siam adopters  and non-adopters are 
compared from the point of view of their individual socio-economic characteristics. 
Thirdly, these adopters and non-adopters are examined in the light of their 
interdependence in the village socio-economic s tructure , to see w hether interdependence is 
an im p o rtan t  factor in explaining differences between villagers’ times of adoption.
4.2 H isto ry  o f A d option  P rocess
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4.2 .1  South  Sum atra
C itrus  siam (C itrus Nobilis M icrocarpa Hoslk (A.A.K. 1980)) is a  type of m andarin  
orange with a  green or orange skin and orange flesh. The name suggests its origin, bu t no 
confirmation is available. There seems to  have been little varie tal im provem ent,  as each 
sac contains several seeds. A fruit t rad e r  from Lahat reported th a t  a  project in Riau 
province (Figure 2-1) had adopted a Japanese  seedless variety of m andarin  orange, but 
this inform ation could not be confirmed.
4.2 .1 .1  P reh istory
T he planting of citrus siam in South S u m a tra  can be traced back to the 1950’s, 
according to  elders of the village. It is said th a t  citrus siam was even exported to 
Singapore through Palem bang or nearby islands such as Bangka. K abupaten  Ogan 
Komering Ilir (O.K.I.), which is ad jacent to Palem bang and K abupaten  Bangka, was the 
main production area.
T he elders also recall th a t  a disease a ttacked  citrus siam in O.K.I. in the late 1960’s 
or early 1970’s, exterm inating citrus siam in the area. While the story of the 
ex term ination  is certainly exaggerated, the disease, identified as C .V .P.D . (C itrus Vein 
Phloem Degeneration), damaged c itrus siam production in the area  extensively.
4.2 .1 .2  F irst  B oom  and C .V .P .D .
Official d a ta  on citrus siam in South S um atra  first became available in 1969. 
Figure 4-1 shows the harvested area, production and yields in South S um atra  after 1969. 
Table 4-1 gives the statistics for both South S um atra  and the five K abupa tens mainly 
involved. Price d a ta  first became available in 1967, when an officer of the Food Crops 
Agency (Dinas Pertanian  dan T an am an  P an g an ) in B a tu ra ja  s ta r ted  privately collecting 
price d a ta  on various commodities traded  in B a tu ra ja  m arkets  (Matroni n.d.). Figure 4-2 
presents the  real prices of citrus siam and m ajor crops based on this set of da ta .
T he  official d a ta  does not give any major indication of the effect of C .V .P .D . in 
O.K.I. However, a small decline in the to ta l  harvested area  in South S u m a tra  (Figure 
4-1), followed by an expansion in 1970-1971 and a  surge in the  price of citrus siam (Figure 
4-2), suggest th a t  extensive dam age occurred and which initially led to a  price rise. This 
was followed by an expansion in area  which probably included B atu ra ja  and other
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T a b le  4-1: Citrus Siam Production in South Sumatra 1969-1982
Year South K A B P A T E N
Sumatra O.K.I. O.K.U. Muara Lahat Bangka
Total Enim
ton (ha.) ton (ha.) ton (ha.) ton (ha.) ton (ha •) ton (ha.)
1969 2574 ( 769)
1970 3375 ( 450)
1971 7500 (1931)
1972 6750 (1899)
1973 5407 (1580)
1974 5900 (1345)
1975 10717 (1429)
1976 7476 (1246)
1977 8412 (1363)
1978 7258 (1246) 3384 (600) 550 (100) 390 (105) 321 ( 50) 2050 (343)
1979 110437(1325) 3984 (636) 750 (125) 392 (115) 322 ( 50) 2250 (350)
1980 17351 (2038) 4750 (673) 7544 (757) 1520 (178) 648 ( 75) 2500 (300)
1981 19823 (2040) 6770 (758) 6041 (511) 6011 (629) 431 ( 33) 175 ( I?)
1982 13933 (1845) 5770 (544) 1419 (473) 3015 (450) 1760 (160) 1500 (150)
Sources:
BAPPEDA Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I, Sumatera Selatan (1971-80) 
Dinas Pertanian dan Tanaman Pangan Sumatera Selatan (1970-82) 
Note:
(?) South Sumatran total production in 1979 is doubtful judging 
from Kabupaten level productions.
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F igu re 4-1: C itrus Siam Production in South Sum atra 1969-1982
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Table 4-1.
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Figure 4-2: Real Price of Major Crops in Baturaja 1967-1982
YEAR
Crops
Citrus Siam 
Coffee 
Rubber 
Rice
Notes:
(a) January 1967 Price (Rp/Kg).
(b) Consumer Price Index shown in Figure D-2 is used. 
For detail, see Appendix D.2.
Sources:
Matroni (n.d .).
Dinas Perdagangan Baturaja (1980-1983).
Figure D-2.
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surrounding  producing areas. However, since an expansion in harvested area  requires an 
expansion in p lanted  area  three or four years earlier ,1 thus the a t tack  of the C .V .P .D . 
may have occurred during the period of 1967-1970. Considering the paucity  of available 
in form ation, the above period is taken as the estim ated  time of a ttack .
T he occurrence of an a t tack  of C .V .P .D . in O.K.I. is also supported  by the 
imposition of a local government prohibition on the export of citrus siam grafts from 
O.K.I., which was imposed in the early 1970’s. This type of prohibition also occurs in 
Java .  B ut owing to the eagerness of O uter Islands farmers to obtain grafts of this 
profitable crop, the prohibition has not been very successful (Kompas 1983b).
In South S um atra ,  the C .V .P .D . is gradually spreading in areas o ther than  O.K.I., 
following the expansion of citrus siam, and it has resulted in considerable damages. 
Declines in harvested areas and production in O.K.I. (1982) and Bangka (1981) were 
caused by this disease. The M inistry of Agriculture and its Food Crops Agency (Dinas 
P er tan ian  dan T an am an  P an g an ) have been very slow in responding to the disease and to 
fa rm ers’ dem ands for a cure. Thus, while Kompas (1983a) printed a news release from 
the Food Crops Agency abou t a  m ethod for curing citrus siam trees a ttacked  by the 
C .V .P .D .,  it turned out th a t  the m ethod was extremely costly and th a t  the  antibiotics  
required were not available to farmers.
4 .2 .1 .3  S e c o n d  B o o m
After the first boom in 1970-1971, the price of citrus siam dropped gradually in real 
term s reflecting the steady increase in supply of citrus siam up to the end of 1973. It rose 
up to  a round 1980, but has subsequently fallen again.
A second surge of harvested area  took place in O.K.U. in 1980 implying a  p lanting 
boom in 1976-77 (Table 4-1). In 1976-1977 there was reportedly also a  surge in coffee 
prices due to  the Brazilian coffee disaster. In R anau , a higher a lt i tude area  in O.K.U., 
coffee farm ers suddenly became rich, and many of them  built new houses and bought 
m otor vehicles. The increase in coffee prices strongly s tim ulated  business activity  in 
B a tu ra ja ,  the  closest m arketing centre, and this town visibly showed its new prosperity.
1Citrus siam’s gestation period is about three to four years.
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The_ non-coffee producing areas were not directly affected because the prices of basic 
consum er goods were no t influenced much. There was an obvious psychological effect, 
however, and Belatung villagers often told the au thor th a t  their relatives in Ranau had 
suddenly become rich owing to coffee, and th a t  they contem plated  w hat to  do to “catch 
up” . Some planted coffee, even though they knew th a t  it was not suitable for the climate 
of Belatung. Some tried pepper or cloves, only to find them  failing several years later. 
Many others  m ust have tried citrus siam, and these probably caused a  p lanting boom in 
1976-77, This boom appears to  have spread to the neighbouring areas, M uara  Enim 
(1977-78) and Lahat (1978-79) (Table 4-1).
These increases in production grew to a peak for South S u m a tra  of alm ost 20,000 
tonnes in 1981, somewhat depressing prices in B a tu ra ja  from the heights of 1979 (Figure 
4-2). Subsequently, however, as supplies fell, reflecting the considerable a t tacks  of 
C .V .P .D . in the lower-altitude area of O.K.U., the price began increasing again.
T he yield of citrus siam steadily increased over the whole period after 1969. The 
yield nearly tripled in 12 years, from 3.35 to n /h a  in 1969 to 9.72 to n /h a  in 1981.
T he  au tho r  was told by fruit traders  th a t  their es tim ate  of yield was 40-70 k g /tree  
w ithou t  fertiliser, and a m axim um  of 200 k g /tree  with fertiliser. As villagers generally 
believe th a t  trees should be planted six meters apa rt ,  these es tim ates  convert to yields of 
10-21 to n / h a  without fertiliser and 50-60 to n /h a  with fertiliser. Thus, there is a  wide 
discrepancy between actual average yields and the yields which, the traders  feel, can be 
achieved. This discrepancy suggests a very low level of fertiliser application or even 
virtually  no fertiliser application in the citrus siam cultivation in South Sum atra .
4.2 .2  B e la tu n g
In Belatung, citrus siam was first planted around 1950 by Villager 29 and Villager 
86’s late father. Their trees seem to  have died or stopped producing by the mid-1960’s, 
and o ther villagers did not plant citrus siam until abou t 15 years later.
T he  current adoption process is thought to  have s ta r ted  in 1969, when the  then 
newly-appointed Milage head planted 200 grafts. A planting of this size was
2Citrus siam’s length of productive life is about 15 years.
F igu re 4-3: Citrus Siam Adopters in Belatung 1969-1983 (monthly)
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unprecedented, and, since then the growth in num ber of adopters  and  of c itrus siam trees 
p lanted  in Belatung has not declined, except due to diseases or o ther na tu ra l  causes 
(Figures 4-3 and 4-4).
In 1979, the num ber of adopters reached 10 out of 118 households in Belatung, and 
s ta r ted  to  increase very rapidly. In general, as Rogers (1983) pointed out,  the time when 
10 to 25 percent of potential adopters  have adopted an innovation may be considered as 
the “take-ofP  point in its adoption process. This rapid increase in adoption continued 
until 1982, after which it slowed down. T he number of trees, too, grew rapidly with the 
num ber of adopters  until 1982. In June 1983, the num ber of adopters  had reached 59 
(two villagers discontinued temporarily) , half of the village households, and the  num ber of 
citrus siam trees planted totalled 8579.
T he initial plantings in 1969 and the “take-off5 in 1979 correspond closely to the 
first and  second boom periods in South Sum atra . Thus in 1969, when the C.V.P.D. 
a t tacked  citrus siam in O.K.I., the prices rose sharply, and the diffusion to areas other 
than  O.K.I. then began. Only the village head in Belatung responded to this change with 
his large planting, reflecting his knowledge as a fruit trade r  and his s trong initiative. 
After a successful first harvest, he responded to the price increase in 1974 by increasing 
his num ber of trees. Other villagers observed his success, and followed his lead. By the 
second boom in 1979, the foundations of citrus siam adoption had been laid for other 
villagers. This second boom increased the citrus siam production of O.K.U. ten-fold, and 
also seems to have stimulated villagers in Belatung.
T he growth of the cumulative num ber of adopters and the cumulative num ber of 
trees p lanted  peaked in m id-1980. After m id-1980, the growth of both adopters  and 
p lantings slowed down. Hence, in a m anner analogous to the generalised sigmoidal 
diffusion curve, the citrus siam adoption process in Belatung seems to  have passed 
through its mid-point a t  this stage.
However, this boom continued until 1982 in Belatung, when the areas around 
Bela tung  were invaded by the C .V .P .D . from the lower-stream O.K.U. areas around 
Penin jauan . The local government’s prohibition on the exporta tion  of grafts from O.K.I. 
was apparen tly  ignored, for traders openly brought grafts to  B a tu ra ja  and other villages,
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selling them  to villagers who were unaw are of the prohibition. T he other cause of the 
slow-down in adoption was a  d rough t  in the dry season of 1982, in which many adopters  
lost their newly planted grafts.
4 .2 .3  C itr u s  S ia m  and  A l t e r n a t iv e  C rops
As seen in C hap ter  2, the  major crops in Belatung are citrus siam, rice, coffee and 
rubber. Rice is the subsistence crop and rubber the dom inant cash crop. Coffee was the 
initial a l ternative  crop to rubber,  and now competes with citrus siam. However, villagers 
know th a t  coffee is not ideally suited for the climate and o ther na tu ra l  conditions of 
Belatung, though many of them  still grow coffee.
Figure 4-2 on page 169 shows the real prices of these four crops after 1968, in term s 
of Janua ry  1967 Rupiahs (Appendix D.2). The price of rice was the most stable during 
the period partly  because the weighting of rice price in the consumer price index was the
o
highest a t  abou t 35 percent. The rubber price was also stable, and appears to have 
followed international price trends.
Coffee prices changed dram atically  during the period 1975 to 1982. In 1977 the price 
peaked, following international price hikes in the wake of the Brazilian coffee disaster, bu t 
by 1982 it had returned to the pre-boom level.
C itrus  siam prices also changed considerably, with the trends already described in 
Section 4.2.1.
Table 4-2 shows how changes in prices of three other m ajor crops relative to  citrus 
siam prices are statistically related to changes in citrus siam adoption process in 
Belatung.
In examining the effects of prices of citrus siam relative to major crops on the citrus 
siam adoption process, the coefficients in the following equation were estimated:
3See Appendix D.2 for the derivation of the consumer price index.
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Table 4-2: Citrus Siam Adoption in Belatung and Relative Prices of M ajor Crops
12 M onth Lag - Best Results
Changes in 
Relative 
Prices(a) 
Year
| Changes in 
| No. of Trees Planted 1
Changes in 
No. of Adopters
1
| coeff. (t-ratio) coeff. (t-ratio)
C 74 36.57967( 2.735) 0.19554( 2.534)
0 75 -76.73858( -0.484) -0.61922( -0.677)
F 76 -82.70555( -0.496) -0.43337( -0.450)
F 77 -156.99367( -0.892) -0.91087( -0.897)
E 78 -409.48330( -3.240) -2.77479( -3.806)
E 79 32.81286( 0.145) 3.47445( 2.663)
80 -825.66534( -1.383) 3.08731( 0.896)
81 7333.05977( 7.750) 12.76905( 2.339)
82 1596.47565( 0.506) 19.81611( 1.090)
R 74 -126.63243( -4.728) -O.63018( -4.079)
U 75 123.61482( 0.086) 5.45315( 0.661)
B 76 -1774.07561( -1.872) -2.43301( -0.445)
B 77 -7283.64306( -1.529) -36.17833( -1.317)
E 78 -9111.17333( -4.120) -60.04993( -4.707)
R 79 -6567.71019( -3.412) -92.54779( -8.335)
80 2481.66745( 0.452) -49.10421( -1.549)
81 -25349.13148(-10.079) -17.24104( -1.188)
82 -8076.61941( -0.657) -81.13276( -1.144)
R 74 -49.90184( -2.216) -0.27037( -2.081)
I 75 345.32240( 0.191) -0.61322( -0.059)
C 76 1189.68204( 1.495) 4.42386( 0.964)
E 77 3623.79308( 1.355) 15.60436( 1.012)
78 6067.80420( 3.661) 40.57631( 4.244)
79 8074.76690( 3.210) 86.16387( 5.938)
80 159.76019( 0.037) 25.53103( 1.013)
81 60759.88601( 8.930) 119.03281( 3.033)
82 7376.85196( 1.109) -1.17541( -0.031)
I 74 10.66693( 0.887) 0.04355( 0.628)
N 75 264.15608( 0.438) 1.27250( 0.366)
T 76 414.25927( 1.058) 2.62025( 1.160)
E 77 643.09757( 1.876) 3.11955( 1.578)
R 78 1085.65935( 5.069) 7.34205( 5.943)
C 79 2211.97671( 14.420) 22.82722( 25.798)
E 80 980.80166( 1.762) 18.61100( 5.796)
P 81 8851.21170( 9.658) 24.40259( 4.616)
T 82 2952.29020( 3.697) 5.70516( 1.238)
ADJ.R-SQ 0.99218 0.99224
D.W. 2.18102 1.62467
Notes:
(a) Changes in relative prices of crops to citrus Siam prices.
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where A P L A N T mrp indicates an increase in the num ber of citrus siam trees a t  time T 
since time T —m, and Z lC O FF E E m'p, Z \RU BBERmrp and Z \R lC Emrp indicate increases in 
the prices of corresponding crops relative to citrus siam a t  the T -th  m on th  since the 
(T  —m )-th  m onth . The dum m y variable Y E A R ^  equals one if the T -th  m onth 
corresponds to  k-(-1973, bu t Y E A R ^ j  equals one if T  is less than  or equal to  1974. The 
lag, m, is 3, 6, 9, or 12 months.
For convenience, results obtained with twelve-month lags which showed the highest 
ad justed  R-square are shown in this table.
Some coefficients are of interest. Changes in relative price of coffee were negatively 
correlated with changes in citrus siam adoption until 1978. After 1981, they appeared to 
be positively correlated in term s of both numbers of trees planted and adopters .  After the 
coffee price fell drastically in 1979, these relationships appear to have changed.
Changes in relative price of rubber to citrus siam were negatively related to changes 
in citrus siam adoption process in term s of both num bers of trees planted and adopters. 
Rubber has, therefore, always been regarded as an alternative  crop to c itrus siam in the 
a lm ost whole period since 1974, or ra ther,  citrus siam has been considered as an 
a l te rna tive  crop to rubber in this period.
Changes in relative price of rice to citrus siam were always positively related to 
changes in citrus siam adoption process. Although most of the villagers produced rice 
(Table 2-6), the am ount of rice produced was much less than w ha t  they consume. They 
had to  buy rice from local rice dealers or village grocery shops. Hence, an increase in the 
rice price tended to raise their cash expenditure and may have s t im ula ted  them  to 
produce more of cash crops.
On the whole, it was found th a t  absolute values of the coefficients of relative price 
changes increased almost exponentially over time as if they were directly related to the
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accum ulated  scale of adop tion  or the accum ulated  num ber of adopters . This implies th a t  
a lthough the adoption process was very well explained by relative price changes of three 
major crops, there was ano ther  significant de te rm inan t  which was closely related to  the 
accum ulation  of adoption . The accum ulated to ta l of p roducts  or adopters  has been 
usually and simply employed to  explain th is  situation  because these accum ulation  
variables are regarded as representing the contextual effect of the adoption process on 
itself in the form of cum ulative  information. However, as discussed in C hap ter  1, this 
em ploym ent is too intuitive. According to the discussion of this study set out in C h ap te r  
1, these exponentially increasing coefficients seem to imply the existence of 
in terdependence among adopters  and potential adopters , and th a t  a further more detailed 
study is necessary to  explain the empirically detected trends.
4 .3  I n d iv id u a l  C h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  A d o p te r s  an d  N o n -a d o p te r s
Table  4-3 shows the characteristics of citrus siam adopters  and non-adopters  in 
Belatung in 1982/83. These characteristics are classified into five categories: ( l )
economic, (2) cropping pa t te rns ,  (3) hum an capita l,  (4) m edia exposure and (5) o ther 
occupations, each of which have already been defined and explained in C hap ter  2.
Am ong the economic characteristics, to ta l  annual expenditure, total annual 
consum ption, and farm location in Kisam area  were found to  be significantly different 
between adop ters  and non-adopters.
A dopters  also had more income than  non-adopters, although the difference was not 
statis tica lly  significant. Since not many of citrus siam trees of most adopters  had no t yet 
s ta r ted  producing, this income difference indicated th a t  villagers with higher incomes 
were more likely to adopt citrus siam earlier than those with lower incomes.
A d o p te rs ’ average farm size was 1.4 ha which was higher than  th a t  of non-adopters, 
and their household size was also greater, bu t these differences were not statis tica lly  
significant. The adop ters’ households had less male labour and more female labour than  
non-adop te rs’. A possible explanation may be th a t  a  household with more female labour 
tends to  seek a  crop requiring less physical labour; citrus siam needs less physical labour
than  rubber.
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Table 4-3: Average C h arac teris tics  of A dopters &; N on-A dopters 1982-3
Adopters Non-Adopters T-test
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY
PRODUCTION
CHARACTERISTICS
CROPPING PATTERN
HUMAN CAPITAL
MEDIA EXPOSURE
OCCUPATION
TOTAL INCOME 
EXPENDITURE 
CONSUMPTION 
FARM SITE
(million Rp.) 
( " )
(a)
(b)
(b)
( " ) 
LEKIS 
KISAM 
(ha.)FARM SIZE 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE (No.)
MALE LABOUR (No.)
(Equiv.)(c) 
FEMALE LABOUR(No.)
(Equiv.)(c) 
COFFEE (proportion)
DUKU ( ” )
CITRUS SIAM (")
RICE ( " )
RAMBUTAN ( " )
PINEAPPLE ( ” )
RUBBER ( " )
CLOVES ( " )
DURIAN ( " )
NO. OF CROPS (No.) 
EDUCATION (d)
INDEPENDENCE COEFFICIENT 
FARM EXPERIENCE (yr.)
AGE (yr.)
RADIO (proportion)
PROGRAM (times/week) 
BATURAJA (times/yr.) 
PRABUMULIH (times/yr.) 
PALEMBANG (times/yr.) 
LAMPUNG (times/yr.)
JAKARTA (times/yr.)
TEACHER (proportion) (e) 
SHOP OWNER (proportion) 
KERIO (proportion.)
KHOTIB (proportion)
TENANT (proportion) 
SICK/RETIRED (proportion) 
NAT’L RAILWAY (proportion)
5.814
1.322
1.492
1.475
1.212
1.225 (0.849) 
1.115 (0.578) 
1.290 (0.697) 
0.0339(0.183) 
0.0508(0.222) 
5.208 (6.488) 
(2.360) 
(0.955) 
(1.054) 
(0.838) 
(0.803) 
0.5593(0.501) 
0.5424(0.502) 
1.0000(0 .000) 
0.7966(0.406) 
0.3390(0.477) 
0.1186(0.326) 
0.5254(0.504) 
0.1525(0.363) 
0.4237(0.498) 
4.458 (1.735) 
6.831 (4.001) 
0.0811(0.086) 
20.44 (13.57) 
46.41 (13.28) 
0.5763(0.498) 
2.644 (2.935) 
60.71 (98.43) 
0.4068(1.763) 
2.780 (4.672) 
1.729 (3.050) 
0.2373(0.678) 
0.0678(0.254) 
0.0678(0.254) 
0.0508(0.222) 
0.0339(0.183) 
0.0678(0.254) 
0.0678(0.254) 
0.2373(0.429)
0.992 (0.892) 
0.926 (0.567) 
0.993 (0.625) 
0.0508(0.222) 
O .0000(0.000) 
3.842 (4.775) 
5.542 (2.223) 
1.407 (0.853) 
1.606 (0.879) 
1.271 (0.665) 
0.991 (0.742) 
0.4407(0.501) 
0.4407(0.501) 
0.0000(0.000) 
0.6780(0.471) 
0.0678(0.254) 
0.1017(0.305) 
0.5085(0.504) 
0.1186(0.326) 
0.3729(0.488) 
2.729 (1.910) 
5.288 (3.723) 
0.0408(0.014) 
16.10 (12.98) 
39.76 (13.41) 
0.2542(0.439) 
0.9661(2.059) 
35.46 (61.55) 
0.0508(0.289) 
1.780 (4.457) 
3.170 (13.47) 
0.1186(0.560) 
0.0000(0.000) 
0.0508(0.222) 
0.0000(0.000) 
0.0000(0.000) 
0.2034(0.406) 
0.0339(0.183) 
0.1186(0.326)
1.42 
1.75* 
2.44** 
0.45 
1.76* 
1.30 
0.64 
0.51
0.64
1.46 
1.56 
1.29 
1.10 
---**
1.47 
3.85** 
0.29 
0.18 
0.53 
0.56 
5.15** 
2.17** 
3.57** 
1.77* 
2.70** 
3.72** 
3.60** 
1.67* 
1.53 
1.19 
0.80 
1.04 
2.05** 
0.39 
1.76*
1.43 
2.18** 
0.83 
1.69*
Notes:
** significant at 5 percent level. * significant at 10 percent level. 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
(a) CONSUMPTION includes EXPENDITURE and home-production. Refer 
Figure 2-10 and Table 2-2.
(b) Proportion of villagers whose farm locates in these areas to all 
adopters or non-adopters.
(c) Male Adult Equivalence Scale. Refer Table B-l.
(d) Educational Attainment Proxy. Refer Table 2-3.
(e) Proportion to either all adopters or all non-adopters.
Source: Fieldwork
180
Among nine crops (used to  identify cropping pa tte rn  groups of villagers in Section 
2.4.1, T able 2-6), the only s ta tis tica lly  significant difference between adopters  and non­
adop ters  was th a t  adopters  had more ram bu tan .  The high correlation between citrus siam 
and ram b u tan  (Table 2-5) was suggestive of this association. R am butan  was one of 
indigenous crops which have recently reconsidered profitable by farmers. The average 
num ber of crops grown by c itrus siam adopters, 4.5, was also significantly greater than  
th a t  of non-adopters, 2.7.
S ta tistically  significant differences were also found between adopters  and non­
adop ters  in hum an capital variables. Adopters had more education, were twice as 
independent in their decision making, four years more experienced in farming, and ab o u t  
seven years older than non-adopters.
A m ongst media exposure variables, adopters  had more radios and listened to 
agricu ltura l programmes three times as often. Except for Lampung, frequencies of 
visiting o ther places (regarded as proxies for villagers’ extent of exposure to media) were 
higher for adopters ,  although the only significant difference was for Baturaja .  As already 
described, Lampung was an a rea  where some Belatung villagers grew coffee. Non- 
adop ters  were more frequent visitors to  Lampung, probably to look after their coffee. 
Such villagers may have tended to pay less a t ten t ion  to farming in Belatung and this may 
explain their non-adoption of citrus  siam.
There were some occupational differences which were statistically  significant 
between adopters  and non-adopters. Teachers and incumbent or former village heads, as 
leaders of the  village, tended to be adopters , as were National Railway workers. These 
la tte rs  were part- tim e farmers with farming as a  secondary occupation who produced 
some agricultural crops for their subsistence. These workers were som ewhat isolated and 
regarded as lower-class villagers by native Belatung residents, and m ight thus  be expected 
to  be slow in adopting citrus siam or any new technology. However, they may have been 
led to ad o p t  citrus siam to supplem ent their low (albeit regular) salaries. On the o ther 
hand , very few tenan ts  adopted citrus siam and this may have been due to  their low 
viability to  decide w hat crops to  be grown on the tenanted land.
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4 .4  A d o p te r s  a n d  N o n -a d o p te r s  in V illa g e  N e tw o r k  S y s te m
B elatung’s village network system was described in C hap ter  3, and villagers were 
classified into five relational associations (See Figure 3-11). In relational associations, 
m em bers frequently exchanged agricultural information through channels of direct 
agricu ltura l information exchange activities, kinship ties, money borrowing/lending, 
household goods exchange activities and meeting-at-shops activities. The members are 
regarded as sharing an almost identical set of agricultural information. On the o ther 
hand , villagers were also classified into five s tructura l  associations (Figure 3-12) where 
m em bers are regarded as influencing each other to the degree th a t  they play similar roles 
in the village in d isseminating agricultural information.
In Figure 4-5, villagers are placed in a row according to their memberships in the 
relational associations described in Figure 3-11, where closeness between two villagers 
w ith in  the same relational association indicates the degree to which they share 
agricu ltura l information. In each relational association, there is one or sometimes two 
relatively early adopter(s).  It can be seen from Figure 4-5 how the adoption process 
proceeded in each relational association, and how agricultural information exchange 
related to the adoption process.
After Villager 130^ of Association 4 adopted citrus siam, Villager 58 of Association 
3 and Villager 33 of Association 5 adopted . These two villagers may have diffused 
agricu ltura l information, experience or recommendations to nearby villagers, wTo 
eventually  followed. We can clearly observe the relationships between villagers’ closeness 
to these pioneers (Figure 4-5 or 3-11) and their times of adoption.
In Association 4, Villager 130 was followed by Villager 102, and then Villagers 10, 
92 and 128. Villager 102 seems to have been influenced by Villagers 130 of this 
association, and by Villager 58 of Association 3. Villager 128 inherited his fa th e r’s citrus 
siam and added new trees. Other villagers of the association seem to have followed these 
early adopters.
^In Figure 4-5, only adopters in the current adoption process are shown. The adopters in the 
previous adoption process can still be identified from the time of adoption listed in the third and 
fourth colum ns. The latter had been already inactive in producing citrus siam when the current 
adoption process was started by Villager 130, the present village head.
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ln Association 5, Villager 33 was followed by Villagers 60, 56 and 121, who m ust 
have p lanted  these trees before Villager 33 commenced his successful production. The 
coincidence of proximity in the association with time of adoption clearly shows a  diffusion 
of citrus siam along with the diffusion of information.
In Association 3, the influence of the pioneer of the association seems to have been 
less than  in the associations above, while the influence from outsiders was stronger 
(Figure 4-5).
In Associations 1, and 2, there was no conspicuous early adopter ,  but proximity in 
the association still seems to have determ ined the times of adoption.
Although flows of agricultural information from adopters  to non-adopters (Figure 
4-5) thus  seem to be an im portan t  factor affecting villagers’ decisions to adopt citrus 
siam, the more im portan t factor seems to be their memberships of the same basic 
association identified in Section 3.8.2 (Table 3-11). Members of a basic association share 
an alm ost identical set of agricultural information and play similar roles in disseminating 
agricultural information. Table 4-4 shows the ratios of adopters  to all members of basic 
associations.
As to  relational associations, the sole significant difference can be found for 
Association 4. Other associations do not have significant difference between adopters  and 
non-adopters. In relational associations, agricultural information is supposed to diffuse 
step by step  directly through each interaction. Therefore, in each relational association 
there are always some adopters and some non-adopters. As the adoption process proceeds 
the ra tio  gradually changes.
In a  s tructura l association, villager-members are regarded as playing almost 
identical social roles and thus influencing each other strongly. There are two structura l  
associations almost all members of which are adopters. Differentiation in term s of 
adoption ra te  is greater than am ong relational associations.
Adoption rates of basic associations clearly show their strong relationships with the 
independence coefficients. Basic associations with more than  50 percent adoption ra te 
have generally much greater independence coefficients than  those with lower adoption
rates.
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F ig u r e  4-5: A dopters and N on-adopters in R elational A ssociations
ADOPTION 
1970 75 74 75
: : I
80 81 82 85
Z 20 81 5
T 19 80 1
N 124 81 12
108 10
A 97 79 6
S 78 78 12
A 82 82 5
I 91 82 10 
0 86 52 12
59 90 
58 75
A 101
S 102 76 12 
S 84 79 5
0 112 79 6
C 72
1 71 90 10
A 57
T 155 90 10 
I 120 81 10 
0 149 79 8
N 122 82 5
127 90 7
4 128 78 11 
126 79 7 
89 65 12 
1 50 69 12 
51 79 2
10 78 1
92 78 2
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Table 4-4: Adopters in Relational, Structural and Basic Associations
RELATIONAL NO. OF NO. OF ADOPTION
ASSOCIATION ADOPTERS MEMBERS RATE (%)
1 8 20 40.0
2 8 21 38.1
3 8 20 40.0
4 20 27 74.1
5 15 30 50.0
STRUCTURAL NO. OF NO. OF ADOPTION
ASSOCIATION ADOPTERS MEMBERS RATE (%)
1 24 52 46.2
2 13 24 54.2
3 5 6 83.3
4 12 31 38.7
5 5 5 100.0
INDEPENDENCE
BASIC ASSOCIATION NO. OF NO. OF ADOPTION COEFFICIENT(xlOO)
(1) (2) (3) ADOPTERS MEMBERS RATE (%) MEAN SD
14 4 5 5 5 100.0 28.018 9.147
5 2 3 1 1 100.0 31.329 0.000
9 3 3 1 1 100.0 7.079 0.000
10 4 1 9 10 90.0 4.357 1.630
13 4 3 3 4 75.0 16.338 10.660
8 3 2 4 6 66.7 5.075 1.410
17 5 2 4 7 57.1 6.953 5.246
4 2 2 4 8 50.0 7.038 2.555
15 5 1 4 8 50.0 3.306 0.208
16 5 4 7 15 46.7 4.287 1.091
11 4 4 2 5 40.0 4.426 0.824
1 1 1 8 20 40.0 3.721 0.331
3 2 4 1 3 33.3 3.763 0.292
12 4 2 1 3 33.3 4.978 0.807
7 3 4 2 8 25.0 3.497 0.377
2 2 1 2 9 22.2 3.984 0.610
6 3 1 1 5 20.0 3.807 0.594
TOTAL 59 118
Notes :
(1) Identification numbers of basic associations.
(2) Identification numbers of relational associations.
(3) Identification numbers of structural associations.
See Tables 3-1 and 3-11 for the concept of “basic associations".
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The m agnitude of the influence is represented by their s truc tu ra l  equivalence 
proximity, i.e., the interdependence coefficients defined in Section 3.2.5. If an earlier 
ad o p te r ’s influence on a later adop ter  is greater, then the la t te r ’s time of adoption m ay be 
earlier than  it would otherwise have been. Interdependence coefficients are not reciprocal. 
T h a t  is, Villager i’s dependence on Villager j, represented by ljj, is not always equal to 
Villager j ’s dependence on Villager i, represented by 1-. Thus if Villager i is the  later 
adopter ,  his dependence on the earlier adopter ,  Villager j, 1-, is expected to  affect the  lag 
of their times of adoption negatively. On the o ther hand, the earlier ad o p te r ’s dependence 
on the later adopter ,  1—, is not a de term inan t of the time lag between the earlier and later 
adopters . To illustrate, consider two adopters  A and B who adop t a t  t ime T O A ^  and 
T O A g  where T O A ^  < T O A g. Now, the dependence of B on A is de term inan t of T O A g ,  
bu t the dependence of A on B is not a  de term inan t of T O A ^ .
F urtherm ore ,  the direct representation of the interdependence by lj- does not include 
the many types of influence the earlier adopter  has. If the later adop ter  is dependent on 
the earlier adopter ,  who is more independent in his decision making, the influence of the 
earlier adop ter  on the later adop ter  is even more significant. In this case it is considered 
th a t  the interdependence coefficient should be multiplied by the independence coefficient 
of the villager supposed to influence the other. T hus the influence of an earlier adop te r  on 
a later adop ter  should be represented by h. =  lji*ljj*
T he relationship between the lag between the times of adoption of two adopters  and 
the flows of agricultural information between them, i.e., their interdependence can be 
statis tica lly  tested. This may be done by regression analysis0 of the difference between 
two villagers’ times of adoption,^ with independent variables representing the flows of 
agricultural information between them , their interdependence, and differences in their 
socio-economic characteristics. The following equation is used:
^It would have been preferable to use Tobit analysis, for reasons which will be discussed in 
Section 6.5.3. But the available software, SHAZAM, did not permit analysis with a large number 
of observations (6105). Therefore, the simpler approach of OLS in SPSS was used.
^Difference between two villagers’ tim es of adoption, DTOA-j, is defined as difference between  
dates of their First planting, not dates of their first knowledge.
DTCXA ■ ■ — TO A- — TO A - — ctn -|- cx / •• T o J  T  exO ••/ ■■i j  i  j  U 1 l l  A  } J  A  J l  J ]
m
+  Y l QS+kRij^ +  a 4 + mT IM E i j +  a 5 + m D U j +  a 6 + m D 2ij
k= 1
r
+ 1 2 Q6+m+A:(ZiA: ~  Zjk) +  S';
/:=  1
where Villager i and Villager j are later and earlier adopters  respectively. Hence
TO A - > TO A . 
i  ~  J
E xplanatory  variables are:
1. 1-- and I- are independence coefficients.
2. 1-- is Villager i’s (later adopter) interdependence coefficient with respect to 
Villager j (earlier adopter).
4
3. RV b ; indicates the existence of an agricultural information flow between 
Villagers i and j through the k-th channel such as direct agricultural 
information.^exchange activity or household goods exchange activity. Since 
these R 5 .. ;,s are com ponents of independence and interdependence 
coefficients, 1--, 1- and lj-, if both are included multicollinearity should be 
carefully examined.
a. R 1: Direct Agricultural Information
o
b. R : Kinship
o
c. R°: Household Goods Exchanges
d. R^: Money Lend/Borrow ing
e. R 5 67: Meeting-at-shops
4. T IM E -  indicates the time during which the interaction between Villager i and 
j takes place. This can be represented by any time between an earlier 
ad o p te r ’s time of adoption, TOA-, and a later a d o p te r ’s time of adoption, 
TOAj. To avoid statistical redundancy, the mid point of these two villagers’ 
t imes of adoption, TIME-j =  (TOAj +  T O A -)/2 ,  is used. As the adoption 
process progresses, the quan tity  and  quality of agricultural information about 
the innovation increases cumulatively. Hence, the lag between two villagers’ 
times of adoption may be shortened, other things remaining equal.
5. Djjj indicates th a t  Villager i is really a non-adopter, and Ö2jj indicates th a t” 
Villager j is really a non-adopter. For convenience, 1985 has been assigned to 
non-adopters  as their t ime of adoption.
6. Zjj. and Zjj. represent two villagers’ k-th socio-economic characteristics.
7. Cj- is an error term.
187
T he coefficient of the later ad o p te r’s independence, c*j, is expected to  be negative, 
because independence in his decision making leads to more economically optimal decisions 
in which others  are not considered a t  all. Thus, when the profitability  of the innovation 
concerned is rising, it will be adopted earlier. For the same reason, the coefficient of the 
earlier a d o p te r ’s independence coefficient, is expected to  be positive. Again, the 
coefficient of the later ad o p te r ’s interdependence (coefficient) on the earlier adopter 
adopter ,  a g, is expected to be negative. If the later adop ter  is more dependent on the 
earlier adopter ,  the lag is shorter. The coefficient of the existence of agricultural 
information flows through the k-th channel, (k =  l ,2 , . . . ,m ),  is expected to have a
negative sign. If agricultural information flows exist between the two villagers concerned, 
they may prom ote earlier adoption by the later adopter. T IM E ” is expected to have a 
negative coefficient, for as the adoption process proceeds, agricultural information 
accum ulates and the lags generally become shorter. This may be ano ther evidence for the 
existence of the contextual effect.
To indicate the existence of agricultural information flows through certain 
activities, the groups identified with respect to these activities in C hap ter  3 (summarised 
in Table 3-12) were used. This was a superior approach to the direct usage of original 
sociometric in teractions as depicted in Figures 3-2, 3-3, 3-7, 3-8, and 3-9. Even though 
there is a  flow of information or an interaction between two villagers, the fact th a t  they 
are in two different groups may mean th a t  the conten t is different from, and less 
favourable to, the promotion of agricultural innovation, th an  the conten t in the flow 
between two villagers of the same group.
Table 4-5 shows the results of four regressions examining independence and 
interdependence coefficients, channels of agricultural information flows, and a wide range 
of socio-economic characteristics. The first three equations were run for all villagers, and 
the last one only for adopters.
T he results indicate th a t  the hypotheses made above with respect to the 
independence coefficients, 1” and 1” , and to the interdependence coefficient, L., cannot be 
rejected. W ith respect to channels of agricultural information flow, R ^ ,  three channels 
were found to be effective in shortening lags (Regression 1). The direct agricultural
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Table 4-5: Regression Analyses of Differences of Tim es of A doption
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)Variable All(a) All All Adopters(b)
iii — -5.09804* * * -5.04482** * -3.82175***— 3.38274* * * 3.38182*** 6.10047***
1^*1 j i* J j — -388.30499*** -351.87042*** -369.13542* * *
Rl -0.11776** — -0.04923 -0.07549
R2 0.04201 — 0.07391 -0.00738
R3 -0.04265 — -0.03532 -0.18717
R4 -0.31499*** — -0.21080** -0.24512
R5 -0.05808** — -0.01614 0.08811
TIMEij -1.31632*** -1.25322*** -1.25631*** -0.70097* * *
D1 5.94429*** 5.74090* * * 5.74414* * * —
D2 -1.46515* ** -1.55049* * * -1.54675* * * —
Income -0.11113*** -0.13068*** -0.13019*** -0.38556* * *
H.H. Size 0.00691 0.01227 0.01170 -0.01117
M. Labour -0.01128 0.01541 0.01679 0.09910*
F . Labour 0.02031 0.02577 0.02635 0.16007* *
Farm Size 0.00108 -0.00097 -0.00083 0.02090*
Lekis -0.24352* * * -0.28903* * * -0.28963 * * * -0.70216* * *
Kisam -0.26996** -0.35490*** -0.36946* * * -0.69740***
Age 0.00353* * 0.00416* * * 0.00415*** 0.00120
Farm Experience -0.00886*** -0.01059*** -0.01050*** -0.02366* * *
Education -0.01459*** -0.01581*** -0.01617* * * -0.06370* * *
Programme -0.03099*** -0.02948*** -0.02949* * * -0.04881* * *
Baturaj a -0.00085*** -0.00092 * * * -0.00090 * * * -0.00168* * *
Prabumulih -0.02706** -0.00166 -0.00166 -0.04033
Palembang 0.01553* * * 0.01501*** 0.01522* * * 0.03875* * *
Lampung 0.00552* * * O .00622 * * * 0.00623*** 0.08102***
Jakarta 0.05509** -0.00828 -0.00833 0.07278
Village Head - 1.07664*** -0.58408*** -0.59338*** -1.34398***
Relig’s Teacher -0.34369*** -0.30589* * * -0.30829* * * -0.47934**
Nat’l Railway -0.18202* * * -0.25224* * * -0.25015* * * -0.72815***
Shop Owner -0.04511 0.07101 0.07171 0.65842* * *
Sick/Retired 0.55076* * * 0.40113* * * 0.40076*** 0.35060*
Teacher -0.12632* 0.48565 * * * 0.48956* * * 0.94091* * *
Tenant -0.04508 -0.06159* -0.06202* 0.25740*
Constant 107.50384*** 102.59532*** 102.84464*** 57.76952* * *
Adj. R-square 0.87026 0.87735 0.87753 0.56691
F 1321.79 1506.58 1287.38 61.71
(D.F.) 31, 6073 29, 6075 34, 6070 32, 1452
N 6105 6105 6105 1485
Notes:
There is no serious correlation among explanatory variables. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance levels.
*** 0.1 percent level ** 1.0 percent level * 5.0 percent level
(a) All villagers including adopters and non-adopters.
(b) Adopters only.
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information channel, r (*), the money lend/borrow ing  channel, R^4), and the meeting-at- 
shops channel, R i5), showed significantly non-zero and negative coefficients where 
independence and interdependence coefficients were not included.
However, since the correlations between the interdependence coefficients and the 
agricultural information channel variables are relatively high, the  results where both these 
groups of variables were considered a t  the same time (Regression 3) showed th a t  the 
interdependence coefficients were relatively more significant in explaining lags. The 
money lending/borrow ing channel, R ^ ) ,  still effectively shortened the time lag in this 
regression, however.
Among other variables, the most distinctively significant one was T IM E -.  It 
showed, as expected, th a t  the progress of the adoption process promoted the process itself 
by increasing the quality and quan tity  of agricultural information transm it ted  through 
the channels of information, and by the influences tran sm it ted  via villagers’ interactions 
and interdependence. This is another evidence for the existence of the contextual effect in 
the adoption process.
Among socio-economic characteristics used in the regressions (3) and (4), almost all 
are significant. For example, differences in income levels were significant. If a  later 
ad o p te r ’s income level was greater than  th a t  of an earlier ad o p te r’s, the lag was 
shortened.
D eterm inants  which significantly shorten time lags, o ther than income level, are the 
locational factors (Lekis and Kisam), farming experience, education, radio agricultural 
p rogram m e listening, visits to B a tu ra ja ,  and three occupation variables (village head, 
religious teacher, and National Railway worker). In con trast,  de term inants  which 
significantly lengthen time lags are, visits to Palem bang and Lampung, two occupation 
variable (sick or retired, and teacher). As mentioned before, frequent visits to Palem bang 
and Lam pung lead to their neglect of agriculture in the village. Visits to Lampung affect 
time lags more than  those to Palem bang, since the dura tion  of the visits to Lampung is 
much longer than  the latter.
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C H A P T E R  5
M od el o f In terd ep en d en ce
5.1 I n tr o d u c t io n
Recently it has been increasingly argued th a t  income (or w ealth) may yield 
individual satisfaction in two d istinct ways. Firstly, income provides an individual w ith 
control over consumables. " An increase in income increases the size of an individual’s 
consumption choice bundle and thus increases his welfare. Secondly, and this is the novel 
element in the interdependence approach , income relative to others provides a  social 
ranking. An increase in an ind ividual’s income has the additional effect of increasing his 
social ranking and this, it is argued, is an additional source of utility.
In this chapter, an interdependence utility function is formulated on three  
assumptions. Firstly, higher-order interdependence is absent. Secondly, a person derives 
his satisfaction from his relative income level as well as his own income level. Thirdly, a 
person is “envious” of all o thers outside of his household. His relative income level is a 
ratio of his income level to  his subjectively perceived system average income level. T he 
concept of the “reference group” is incorporated to derive such a system average income 
level. To derive a measure of this person’s r isk-a ttitude, the A rrow -P ra tt  type risk- 
premium has to be modified in considering his ability to expect o thers’ income changes 
even if he cannot control these o th e rs ’ income levels. Application of this interdependence 
risk-premium is made to give an explanation tow ards the Cancian Dip in sociological 
studies of rural adoption process.
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5.2 In terd ep en d en ce U tility  F u n ction
An interdependence u tility  function has been studied by few scholars. Duesenberry 
(1949) applied an interdependence utility function to  an analysis of the choice between 
consum ption and saving, and to an analysis of dem and growth. Leibenstein (1950) 
introduced the concepts of “bandwagon effect” , “snob effect” , and “Veblen effect” . 
Johnson (1952) used an interdependence utility function in an analysis of the effects of 
income d is tribution on aggregate consumption. Poliak (1976) incorporated the idea of 
“in terdependent preferences” into dem and analysis with a  linear dem and system. 
H ayakaw a and Venieris (1977), Kapteyn et al.(1978, 1980) and Van P raag  et al. (1979) 
introduced a sociological concept of “reference groups (space)” into their s tudy  of 
consumer interdependence.
Person i’s interdependence utility function is generally defined as follows:
( 5 - 1)
V' = W*( X v  A'2, . . . , X J
where Xj. (k =  l ,2 ,.. . ,n) is Person k’s income level. Variables inside the utility function 
can be am ounts  of commodities Person i and other persons consume, or their u tility  
levels.1
Person i’s marginal utility with respect to another person, for example, Person j (j 
f  i), is
i f .
J
dW1
dX.
(5.2)
If this marginal utility is negative, Person i is regarded as being envious to Person j ’s 
condition, in this case, his income level. An increase in Person j ’s income level decreases 
Person i’s utility. On the contrary , if it is positive, Person i is considered as being 
benevolent to Person j. An increase in Person j ’s income level causes an increase in Person 
i’s utility . Hence, a  person’s first-order marginal utility with respect to Person j ’s income 
level can be termed as his interdependence coefficient with respect to Person j ,  if the
*Ng (1983) classifies types of the interdependence utility function into various categories 
according to the variables inside of the function.
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marginal utility is constant. However, the marginal utility is generally considered to
change depending on the income levels of persons involved, and can be written as follows:
(5.3)
lf}.=  f ( x v x 2, . . . , x n).
Since Person i’s marginal utility with respect to Person j above includes all others’ income 
levels, this indicates there are higher orders of interdependence between these two 
persons. That is, for example,
(5.4)
jk ^  0(* ^  '> h  a n d  3 £  •)•
The interdependence between Persons i and j is affected by a third person’s (Person k) 
income level. Since the existence of the higher-order interdependence seems certainly to 
com plicate the further analysis, the absence of the higher-order interdependence is 
assumed in this study, and Person i ’s first-order interdependence with respect to Person j 
is thus defined as follows:
(5.5)
Person i’s interdependence with respect to Person j is a function of solely these two 
persons’ income levels, and hence third person’s income level does not affect these two  
persons’ interdependence.
(5.6)
U;k =  n (* £  ]■ and j  f- i)
5.3 R e la tive  Incom e U tility  F un ction
In another set of literature, a utility function which includes a person’s relative 
income level together with his own (absolute) income level has been considered. Pigou 
(1962) noted that “ ... the satisfaction which a man derives from the possession of a 
given income depends not only on the absolute amount of income, but also on the relation 
subsisting between it and the incomes of other people”. Duesenberry (1949) stated that 
“Our theory ... depends upon the validity of a single hypothesis, viz.: that the utility  
index is a function of relative rather than absolute consumption expenditure” , and
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developed his relative income hypothesis. And G albraith  (1958) more dram atically  
argued th a t  “people are poverty stricken when their income ... falls markedly behind th a t  
of the com m unity” . Hirsch (1976) introduced the concept of the  “positional goods” . Thus, 
economists have known the existence and im portance of the contextual effects^ on 
persons, bu t  rarely constructed a  formal model of the contex tua l effects following such 
sta tem ents .
Only recently, formal models of contextual effects in the above framework have 
s tarted  emerging. Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) considered the  optimal redistributive 
taxation  system  using a utility function which includes a person’s relative income level as 
well as his absolute  income level. This contribu ted  to solve Mirrlees’ problem of the 
regressivity of marginal tax -ra tes  (Ng 1983).° Layard (1980), w ithout referring to  the 
Boskin-Sheshinski model, developed a utility function model which includes the relative 
income level as well as the absolute income level. This model was s t im ulated  by the study 
of relative deprivation by Runcim an (1966). The concept of “relative depriva tion” 
indicates t h a t  a person’s satisfaction decreases if o thers’ satisfaction, or characteristics 
from which satisfaction is derived, increases or is expected to increase.
Person i ’s relative income utility function is generally defined as follows:
(5-7)
U1 =  V (  X,, S. )
where Xj represents Person i’s income level, and S-, Person i’s subjective relative income 
level.
Person i’s marginal utility functions with respect to both his income, Xj, and his 
subjective relative income level, S-, are, of course, positive. The utility function, V1, is also 
assumed to be strictly concave. Hence,
(5.8)
b  > 0 ,
o
^Hamaguchi (1982) recognises a man as a “contextual” , rather than as an individual by 
em phasising that he is not an atom istic, independent and astructural being in a social system . In 
sociology, there are an increasing number of its formal models and statistical m ethods for testing.
9
Mirrlees (1971) derived an optim al tax scheme which has a progressive tax-rate but a regressive 
marginal tax-rate. Various forms of utility functions and social welfare functions are used in later 
studies (Atkinson 1973, Helpman 1974), but still the regressive marginal tax-rate is present.
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> t),
' n  < °.
v1 v1 _ ( \ S  )2 > ()
1 1 2 2  ' 12 '
(5.9)
(5.10)
(5.11)
(5.12)
Person i’s subjective relative income level is defined cardinally as the ra tio  of his 
income to his subjective system average income.
and
(5.14)
n
= X  ‘kSk
k ~ l  (5.15)
n
l?2lki= l -
k=  1
His subjective relative income level is thus  higher when S- is greater. Person i’s subjective 
system  average income, X-, is a weighted average of all persons’ incomes (Equation 
(5.14)). 1^ - (k =  1,2,...,n) is Person i’s weight on Person k ’s income level. This will be 
called Person i’s interdependence coefficient with respect to  Person k later, n is the 
num ber of persons in the system. A person has his own “small world” or “reference 
group” , which consists of a par ticu lar  subset of all persons in the whole system .4 Persons 
who are outside his reference group are given weights of zero.
In place of the subjective relative income level, Layard introduced a person’s
4From the reference group viewpoint, Hayakawa and Venieris (1977) studied consumer 
interdependence, and Kapteyn et al. (1978, 1980) and Van Praag et al. (1979) studied utility  
functions. If one considers equally all members of the system  he belongs to, including himself, his 
subjective relative income level is always equivalent to the system  average income level (objective 
not subjective like above), and there is no point in including these coefficients in the model.
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percentile rank-order in the earnings d is tr ibu tion  into the u tility  function as a continuous 
variable. This  presents a  m ajor problem. Although he had recognised a  person’s 
differentiated suffering on account of different persons’ income levels, he did not account 
for this by merely transferring the relative income into a  rank order. Thus it seems th a t  
Layard misunderstood w hat Runciman m eant.  W hat Runcim an really implied in his 
book is the im portance of the reference group to which a  person belongs. A person’s 
relative income level should be derived in reference to the income levels of members of his 
reference group. The concept of social rank does not represent this a t  all. For example, if 
Person B whose social rank is ju s t  one rank above Person A swaps his social rank with 
Person C whose social rank is two ranks above Person A, Person A is not affected a t  all, 
because his social rank is unchanged. If Person B belongs to Person A ’s reference group 
and Person C does not, a change in Person A ’s utility can be expected. In order to 
introduce this aspect, Layard should have first identified a  person’s reference group, and 
then calculated the person’s relative, ra ther,  subjectively relative, income level by, for 
example, p u tt in g  different weights to the reference group’s m em bers ' income levels as well 
as non-m em bers’ income levels.
This relative income utility function can be regarded as an interdependence utili ty  
function because Person i’s subjective relative income level (Equations (5.13) and (5.14)) 
includes income levels of all persons in the system.
(5.16)
Iß  = V( A-,, s t ) = VV( xv x2,. . . ,xn)
Hence, Person i’s marginal utility with respect to  Person j ’s income level is
(5.17)
‘ji
n
( E  lkix k?
k= 1
Therefore, the ratio of Person i’s marginal utili ty  with respect to  two different persons’ 
income levels equals the ratio of the weights, lj- and lj^.
(5.18)
dW/* dW1
------: ------- =  / : l k{ (k £  t, j ,  and j  £  i)
dX-  d x k 11 Kl
<Mn
a x i
= vi
dS,
3 X }
-
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Simultaneously, the  sign of the marginal utility with respect to  Person j is determ ined  by 
the sign of the weight, lj-. If the weight is positive, as it is usually assum ed, the m arg ina l 
utility is negative (Equation (5.9)), and this indicates th a t  Person i is envious of an 
increase in Person j ’s income, and th a t  he welcomes a  decrease in Person j ’s income. In 
this sense, Person i can be regarded as being “envious” of Person j. Contrari ly ,  if the 
weight is negative, the marginal utility is positive, and this indicates th a t  he welcomes an 
increase in Person j ’s income and th a t  when Person j ’s income decreases, his u tility  
decreases as if he sympathises to Person j ’s misfortune. In this sense, Person i can be 
regarded as being “benevolent” to Person j.
For these reasons, weights in Person i’s subjective relative income level can be 
term ed as Person i’s interdependence coefficients with respect to others.
A “benevolent” person may be observed within a household, like a  fa ther of a 
“ro tten  kid” in Becker’s (1974) social interaction model. However, am ong households it 
may be rarely observed. There are charity  activities am ong households, but they are 
often regulated by religious codes, or they are not between specific households, and often 
through an institu tion  specifically established for the charity  purpose. In this s tudy , 
hence, all persons are assumed to be “envious” of others, like a Hobbesian being, and  all 
interdependence coefficients are thus  positive.
F urther ,  from Equations (5.15) and (5.17), the ra tio  of the sum of Person i’s 
marginal utility levels with respect to  all o thers ’ income levels to his marginal utility with 
respect to Person j ’s income level equals the ratio  of the  sum of Person i’s all 
interdependence coefficients to his interdependence coefficient with respect to Person j. 
The former is, by definition, equivalent to one minus Person i’s weight on his own income 
level in his subjective system average income level.
E dlF* dW1k ^ d X k d x d V  / ,■: / • •  =  1 -  /•• : / ••Z—/ ki j i  u  j ik ^ i
(5.19)
Therefore, the weight on his own income level may well be termed as his independence
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coefficient.^
If Person i is “completely independent” , his independence coefficient equals one, 1- 
=  1, and all in terdependence coefficients are zero, lj^ =  0 ( k ^ i ) .  In this case, his 
subjective system  average income to equal his own income over the whole range of 
income. This makes his subjective relative income level, S-, always equals one, and thus 
his in terdependent u tility  depends only on his income level, i.e., his utility function is an 
independent utility function.
A completely independent person is thus a t  the  end of the scale. However, since a 
person who never appreciates his own income in his consideration of his subjective system  
average income cannot be imagined, the  independence coefficient, 1-, cannot be zero nor 
negative. Hence, the independence coefficient and interdependence coefficient respectively 
satisfy
(5.20)
0  < / „  <  1 ,
t i  —  ’
and
(5.21)
0 < Iki < C (* £  *)•
The relative income utility is, as seen above, a type of interdependence utili ty  
functions. As discussed in the last section, if the absence of higher-order interdependence 
is assumed, the following condition should be satisfied by the relative income u tili ty
^There are three ways to empirically derive these coefficients: ( l)  categorical approach by 
Kapteyn et al. (1978, 1980) and Van Praag et al. (1979), (2) relational approach by Rogers and 
Kincaid (1981), and (3) structural approach by Burt (1980, 1982). The last two approaches belong 
to sociological network analysis, and particularly Burt’s structural approach was combined with an 
interdependence utility function which can be interpreted as a relative income utility function. For 
the interpretation, see Section 1.4.6.
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function^
" (5.22)
l 22'S'. +  = °-
The general solution of the above partial differential equation is
(5.23)
exp(f(X i))
n  Xi, s,) = - ------ -----+ 9(Jf,.).
Although there are many forms of mathematical functions for the above two 
functions which satisfy Equations (5.8) to (5.12), it is difficult to interpret them 
reasonably without further complicacy and unnecessary arbitrariness.
A start  is made with the marginal utility function with respect to a person’s own 
income level. A person’s marginal utility function with respect to his own income level is 
assumed to consist of two parts and to be multiplicatively separable.” Therefore, Person 
i’s marginal utility function with respect to his own income level, which embodies the 
above properties, can be formulated as follows:
^Differentiating Person i ’s marginal utility with respect to Person j ’s income level (X:, j yt i), 
Equation (5.17), with respect to Person k’s income (Xj., k i, j),
a2w*
d x kd x j
x iljilki
( 4  S i + < )
iE vV
<7=1
is obtained. Since the assumption of the absence of higher-order interdependence means
------------- =  0 (k ^  i, j, and j  ^  i) ,
d x kd x J
the following condition can be obtained:
S i +  2 l > = 0
where subscripts of the function V indicate arguments in the function V by which the function V is 
differentiated.
7
An additive form requires an arbitrary constant and restricts the range of income levels.
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d W i^ u’p y
a * i ~  s i
where
ut-’ =  u’p Q  > 0,
(5.24)
(5.25)
and
V  =  «’ (X,-) < 0.
The numerator is his independent marginal utility function, which is equivalent to the 
conventional marginal utility function. This function is assumed to be positive and 
decreasing. The denominator is his subjective relative income level. The addition of the 
denominator to the conventional marginal utility function represents the fact that a 
person’s subjective value of $1 is greater if he becomes poorer in absolute money terms, 
and/or if he falls in terms of the subjective relative income level. As discussed above, a 
completely independent person, who has the independence coefficient which equals one (1- 
=  1), has a subjective relative income level which equals one (Sj = 1 ) .  Therefore, the first 
part indicates the marginal utility function of his income, and is called his independent 
marginal utility function.
This formulation of a person’s marginal utility function is equivalent to the
(5.26)
200
fo llow ingjbrm ula tion  of his utility function. 8
I f  =  V'( A',, S,. ) =  / tt. { «(X,.) -  A-tFt } +
X F -l l
(5.27)
where, for notational convenience, Fj is defined as
d X :
(5.28)
If, again, Person i is completely independent having his independence coefficient
which equals one, this utility function yields,
I f  =  u(X,-)
(5.29)
Hence, u(Xj) can be called his independent utility function.
8Integrating both sides of
d l f
axt
x i
with respect to X-,
i f k M x i) + X lkiX k
k f ^ i
+  / ( A 1,...,X t _ 1,A t.+  1, .. .,A Il)
is obtained. Assuming f(Xj,. . . ,X j_^,X-_^j,. . . ,Xn) =  0,
I f  =  1{{U(X-) +
is obtained. Since
E ‘kix k
k ^ - i
T . ‘kix k = x i ( j .  -»*•>. 
k ^ i  1
Person i’s utility function is
Xi Fi
I f  = V(X,.,S,.) = { »(*,) -  A.-F, } + —
where
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When this utility function, Equation (5.27), is corresponded to the generally 
admissible form, Equation (5.23),
(5.30)
/(*,) -  i°gA  ~ x i F, )
and
g(x{) = h A  « T O  -  x{Fi}
(5.31)
are obtained.
With this form of a person’s utility function, the conditions above, Equations (5.8) 
to (5.12), can be rewritten as follows:
, “>•’ + 
v, = -  h i F i + > °>
,• x i FiV =  - ---- >o,
2
5.i
v h  = x r (
1 -
11 X : S;l l
i  2 x i Fi
V 22 — <
s 3l
-  hi) < <>,
^  -  h iS i) -  K ’ +  Fi) 2
K l V22-  = ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > ° -
s4l
(5.32)
(5.33)
(5.34)
(5.35)
(5.36)
where p . is the Arrow-Pratt relative risk-aversion index of Person i’s independent utility 
function, u(Xj).
R
Pi
(5.37)
The elementary algebraic function which satisfies the conditions, Equations (5.25), 
(5.26) and (5.32) to (5.36), to be Person i’s independent utility function, u(X-), is the 
natural log of income
“ (*,•) =  logtXi
(5.38)
or
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1
(5.39)
These two types of functions both yield a  constan t A rro w -P ra t t  relative risk aversion 
index. The A rrow -P ra tt  relative risk-aversion index for the  former function is:
(5.40)
and for the la tter
(5.41)
R
p- — 1 +  a ,  a  > 0.
This indicates th a t ,  a completely independent person’s relative A rro w -P ra t t  risk- 
aversion index should be constan t  and greater than  or equal to  one in the framework of 
the relative income utility function. This theoretical finding m atches empirical findings of 
d is tribution of the A rrow -P ra tt  relative risk aversion index, if farmers in the empirical 
studies can be regarded as independent person in an experim ental environm ent. Hamal 
and Anderson (1982) found a lm ost all farmers have relative risk aversion index greater 
than  or equal to one.
Intuition suggests th a t  a person’s risk-aversion decreases as his income level 
increases (Deaton and M uellbauer 1980:399, Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker 1977:90), 
and experiments by Binswanger (1980) and others in several developing countries 
reinforce this intuition. It is not specified whether it is his independent absolute risk- 
aversion as derived from u-, or his interdependence absolute risk-aversion as derived from 
U1, th a t  decreases. However, psychological experiments in isolated or confined spaces like 
laboratories support the in tu it ion  th a t  a  person’s independent absolute risk-aversion 
decreases as his income level increases (Stevens 1957). The person’s independent absolute 
risk-aversion index is thus regarded here as being determ ined by his income level alone, 
along with its negative derivative. The independent utility functions identified above give 
a constan t  A rrow -Pra tt  relative risk-aversion index which is g reater than  or equal to  one
( p f  =  1 +  <x >  1 )-
A person’s utility function, Equation (5.27), implicitly consists of all persons’
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incom e levels, accord ing  to  the  d e fin it io n  o f a person’s sub jec tive  system  average incom e, 
E qua tions  (5.13) and (5 .14). P roperties  o f the  u t i l i t y  fu n c tio n  w ith  respect to  each 
person ’s incom e level can be exam ined.
n
u ’ (X - )  l h iX ki  v i ’ i ~  i
=  — —  =  u ’ (X - )
1 X,
> 0,
u ' ( X i ) » « ’ ( * ; )  _
m/- = —  E l k i x k-  —  E <«  X-1 k— 1 k ^ i
i
(5.42)
(5.43)
^ ' = ' ^ • < 0  U&),
=  0
(5.44)
(5.45)
u ’ ( j y
w 1. . =  IV*.. =  / •• — —  > 0 ( j^ti ) ,
i j  j i  J l  x ■ ~  w  ;
(5.46)
and hence
v f  .w1. . -  (IV*. .)2jj v ly -  ( < / 2 < 0.
(5.47)
Person i ’s m a rg ina l u t i l i t y  o f his own income is pos itive  and decreasing, and 
depends on o the r persons’ income levels (E q u a tio n  (5 .42)). As Person j ’s income level 
increases, Person i ’s m arg ina l u t i l i t y  o f his own income increases (E q ua tion  (5 .46)). As 
has been im p lied  by the d e fin it io n  o f his m a rg ina l u t i l i t y  o f his own income, his va lu a tio n  
o f an a d d it io n a l $1 increases when he becomes poorer in his sub jective  re la tive  incom e 
level. Since an increase in Person j ’s income is equ iva len t to  a decrease in  his sub jective  
re la tiv e  incom e level, the above im p lic a tio n  is q u ite  n a tu ra l.
Person i ’s m arg ina l u t i l i t y  w ith  respect to  ano ther person ’s (Person j ’s) incom e is 
negative  (E q ua tion  (5 .44)), and i t  is constan t w ith  respect to  th a t person’s incom e 
(E q u a tio n  (5 .45)). No m a tte r  how h igh Person j ’s income m ay be, an increase in Person 
j ’s incom e has the same effect on Person i ’s u t i l i t y .  The m agn itude  o f th is  m arg ina l u t i l i t y
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depends on Person i’s interdependence coefficient with respect to Person j and on Person 
i’s income level (Equation (5.46)). As Person i’s interdependence with Person j increases, 
the absolute m agnitude of this m arginal utility increases. The more in terdependen t a 
person is with others, the more affected he is by others. As Person i’s income increases, 
the absolute m agnitude of this marginal utility decreases.
The last equation (Equation (5.47)) indicates th a t  the indifference curves of Person 
i with respect to Person i and Person j ’s income levels are not concave. If Person i is not 
dependent on Person j, lj- =  0, then his indifference curves are a  set of s tra igh t  vertical 
lines. But if not, his indifference curves are a  set of curves with an increasing positive 
slope.
5.4 A t t i tu d e s  to w a r d s  R isk
5 .4 .1  D e r iv a t io n  o f  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e  R is k -P r e m iu m
As shown in Equation (5.16), Person i’s utility function can be rewritten as an 
in terdependent utility function which includes all persons’ income levels.
(5.48)
U1 = V( S, ) = Wl( xv xT . . . , x n)
This form of the utility function resembles a m ulti-com modity utility function in an 
algebraic form. However, the multi-person interdependence utility function has properties 
radically different from a m ulti-com modity utility function in term s of expectations."
For deriving Person i’s risk-premium, it is considered th a t  Person i has his own 
particu lar  expectation of his personal income level, of its variance, of o thers’ income 
levels, and of the covariances between the distributions of his expected income level and 
o thers’ expected income levels. His own expected income level is
(5.49)
x\ = £*'(X,•),
and his expected income level for Person k, xj^, is
K =  £•'(**)•
(5.50)
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The variance o f his expected incom e leve l, <7 .., is '
4 =  ^
(5.51)
and the covariance between his own expected incom e level and w h a t he expects to  be the 
level o f Person k ’s income, is
4 = c o v ' (  x k )•
(5.52)
Person i ’s ce rta in ty  e qu iva len t is defined as the  ce rta in  incom e w h ich  gives the  same 
u t i l i t y  as the  u t i l i t y  expected fro m  the risky  s itu a tio n . In a single v a ria te  u t i l i t y  fu n c tio n  
case, a single level o f the va riab le  as the  c e rta in ty  e qu iva len t can be selected, b u t in a 
m u lt i-v a r ia te  u t i l i t y  fu n c tio n  case, e ithe r in m u lti-c o m m o d ity  or in  m u lti-pe rso n  
s itu a tio n , i t  is no t possible to  derive  a single p o in t w ith o u t a co n s tra in t. There is a set o f 
c e rta in ty  equ iva lents.
A lg e b ra ica lly , Person i ’s set o f c e rta in ty  equ iva len ts , C 1, is
(5.53)
Cl = \ Y  I £*{IV*(X)} =  W^'(Y) ],
i.e., a set o f income levels o f a ll persons w hich  give the same u t i l i t y  level as the u t i l i t y  
level expected from  the risky  s itu a tio n .
By T a y lo r ’s expansion a round a ll persons’ present incom e level v e c to r :1^ *
Person i ’s expected u t i l i ty  in  the risky s itu a tio n  is:
« Vf*(X°) + (£ *(X ) -  X V  <?rad{lT*(XU)}
+ trace{Zl Z 1) +  ^ (£*'(X) -  X 0} 1 Zl {E*(X) -  X 0}
^To avoid more superscripts, the order of power, 2, is om itted, and instead, the subscript, i, is 
repeated. Therefore, this does not indicate the standard deviation, and in the further analysis, the 
standard deviation does not appear at all.
^R e fe r to Malinvaud (1971), page 290-292.
206
where Z 1 j s  the Hessian m atrix  of Person i’s multi-person interdependence utili ty  function 
W '(X )  a t  X  =  X ^, and X 1 is a  variance-covariance m atrix  of Person i ’s expecta tion  of all 
m em bers’ income levels.
On the assumption th a t  the difference between the certa in ty  equivalent and  his 
present income level is negligible a t  its second order, his u tility  a t  the certa in ty  equivalen t 
Y  can be expanded as
W*(Y) = ^ ‘(X ° +  (Y  -  X 0))
«  W*(X°) +  (Y  -  X 0)* grad{W*(X0)}.
Therefore, any certainty equivalent, Y ,  satisfies 
trace(Zl XX) +  ^ {£*(X ) -  X 0 }1 Z { {EX(X)  -  X 0}
=  (Y  -  X ° ) f grad{U ^(X 0)}.
(5 .54)
If Person i’s expected income level vector, E*(X), equals the present income level vector,
X ° ,
(5 .55)
-  trace{Zi XX) =  (Y  -  X 0)* grad{Wi (X°)}  
is obtained.
So long as another constra in t  is not provided, a single certain ty  equivalent canno t 
be derived. In the multi-person interdependence utility case, any one certa in ty  equivalent 
canno t be dom inant over others. A plausible assumption is needed to ob ta in  one ce r ta in ty  
equivalent in the multi-person interdependence utility function case.
Person i can expect o thers’ income levels, but cannot control their income levels. In 
the framework of the multi-person interdependence utility function, Person i’s ce rta in ty  
equivalent can be defined as the am o u n t  of income he can obta in  with ce rta in ty  while he 
expects some am ount of income increase happens to others  with certa in ty . However, in 
the  framework of a relative income utility  function in th is  s tudy, a plausible scenario 
should also be based on a person’s “envy” or “malevolence” .
Consider a  risky situation which is expected by Person i. Suppose he can ob ta in  a
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certain windfall gain with certainty while nobody else gets such a windfall. Now if he is 
indifferent between this situation and the risky situation, the amount of this windfall is 
defined as his certainty equivalent to the risky situation he expects, and the difference 
between this certainty equivalent and the expected income level is defined as his risk- 
premium, which represents the degree of his risk-aversion.
Algebraically, this definition of the certainty equivalent vector is
Y  =  (X lv  . . * i+ r
(5.56)
where Cj is Person i’s certainty equivalent (scalar). This scenario is obviously based_on a 
person’s “envy” or “malevolence” for he does not think others are as lucky as he is.11 
Therefore, Equation (5.55) can be modified according to the scenario as
(5.57)
I  trace(V& )  = (ct- -  X°)IV*'(X°).
d X t
Hence, Person i’s interdependence risk-premium is
n traceiZ1 X?)
PREMIUM• = X.  -  c: =  ---------- ---------L
i i i  a
(5.58)
d X :
VE^X0)
The particular form of the relative income utility function formulated in Equation 
(5.27) yields the following interdependence risk-premiums:
^ I f  a person’s interdependence utility function is not based on relative income levels, and based 
both on “benevolence” or “altruism ” , two other scenarios can be plausible. Details are in 
Appendix E.2.
19 • « iCom ponents of the Hessian m atrix, Z , for the relative income utility function, Equation  
(5.27), are
i R
-------------(1 +  P-  — V Ü - )S-X- v ** 111i i
i u ’i
wn = ljiy.l
(k ^  i and j  ^  t).
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(5.59)
i i
a . .  <7..
}? xi  v - ^  l k
PREMIUM= (1 + pt. -  u,,.,-)---- --  E  .
2X ° ^  X°,X K
where is the A rro w -P ra tt  relative risk-aversion index of Person i’s independent utili ty  
function, u(Xj), and
(5.60)
i*A
u ik = -------------  (k=  1,2,...,n)tA Tl
V /  Ar°qx q
9=1
is an interdependence weight indicating Person i ’s interdependence with Person k, derived 
from the combination of Person i’s all interdependence coefficients and all persons’ income 
levels. If k =  i, then this weight is especially called Person i’s independence weight 
following the convention of the nam ing of the interdependence and independence 
coefficients. They can also be in terpreted  as the proportion  of Person k ’s income in 
Person i’s subjective system average income (Equation (5.14)). The signs of these two 
types of risk-premium are identical because the independence weight, cu-, is less than  or 
equal to one, the functions Fj and m ’ are respectively negative and positive for any Xj > 0, 
and they satisfy Equation (5.32). The above interdependence risk premium includes a
i 9
completely independent person’s, i.e., 1- =  1, risk-premium as a  special case.10
T he first par t  of the interdependence risk-premium, Equation  (5.59), is actually  the 
risk-premium given by the A rro w -P ra t t  risk-aversion indices. It is based on the first- and 
second-order partial derivatives of Person i’s interdependence utility function (Equation 
(5.27)) with respect to his own income level. If the covariances in the  second p a r t  is 
ignored on some assum ption, the A rro w -P ra t t  risk-aversion indices can be also used for 
the interdependence utility function. The simplest assum ption which enables this may be 
th a t  Person i considers th a t  the d is tr ibu tions of all o thers’ income levels are independent 
of the d is tribution of his own income level. All the covariances, therefore, equal zero. 
However, this assumption will not be made in this study.
1 9
A “completely” independent person’s independence coefficient, 1-, equals 1 by definition. 
Hence, = 1 and = 0 (k yt i).
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The second p a r t  of the num era to r  of the interdependence risk-premium thus plays a 
crucial role. Where the first pa r t  together with interdependence weights, (k =  l ,2 , . . . ,n ) ,
and income levels, (k =  l ,2 , . . . ,n ) ,  are positive, the covariances are im p o rtan t  in
determ ining the sign of Person i’s risk-premium.
Let this second par t  be called the interdependence expectation  effect on a person’s 
risk-premium, because this p a r t  aggregates the person’s expectation  of o ther persons’ 
income changes.
5 .4 .2  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e  E x p e c ta t io n  E ffect
If Person i expects th a t  Person k ’s income level is positively correlated with, his 
income level, i.e., <7.  ^ is positive, Person i ’s risk-premium can be pulled down tow ards 
zero, and further into the negative range. He may thus be a  risk-taker when he expects 
th a t  o thers ’ income levels are positively correlated with his own in this way. The o th e rs ’ 
income levels are in his utility function as sources of relative deprivation (decreasing his 
u tility  level); the belief th a t  his income level is thus positively correlated with those of 
o thers  means th a t  the expectation of an increase of his own income has simultaneously 
both  a  positive and a negative effect on his utility. Due to its effect on o th e rs ’ incomes, 
his utility will decrease while it increases his independent utili ty , u(X-). A person of this 
type may have a low degree of risk aversion or even be a risk-taker.
On the o ther hand, if Person i expects th a t  Person k ’s income level is negatively 
correlated with his, i.e., is negative, his risk-premium is pushed up and he becomes 
more risk-averse. His utility is increased by both an increase in his income level and 
associated decreases in those of others.
The second par t  of the num era to r of the interdependence risk-premium only 
includes covariances between Person i’s income levels and those of all others. It does not 
include the variances of these income levels (a j^ ,  k ^  i), or their covariances (er^, j, k yt 
i, j k ) as expected by him. This  reflects the assum ption of the absence of the higher- 
order interdependence, i.e., a th ird  person’s income level (Person k) does not influence 
Person i’s marginal utility with respect to  a  second person’s (Person j ’s) income level, 
E quation (5.6). Person i is not required to  have expectations regarding all the variances 
and covariances of all other persons’ expected income levels. For a measure of the risk
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prem ium  to  be derived, he is only required to  have expectations ab o u t  the levels and 
covariances between his own income and those of others. In o ther words, his density  
function of the risky situation is not necessarily complete.
T he covariance between Person i’s and Person k ’s income levels expected by Person 
i, cr!^, is not observable. Person i may plausibly construct this expected covariance on the 
basis of the  variance of his own income level and his relationship with Person k. This  is 
because the variance, aj., is the sole variable which Person i is sure of. Therefore, it is 
assumed th a t
(5.61)
where Q-^ is an index indicating Person i’s relationship with Person k. If Person i th inks 
th a t  his expected income is negatively correlated with th a t  of Person k, Q-^ is negative, 
and if he th inks th a t  his expected income is positively correlated with Person k ’s, is 
positive. This new index may be a  function of their interdependence coefficients, 1j.j and 
ljk, or of their interdependence weights, and o;^, Equation (5.60), or of o ther 
completely different indices. Because the interdependence coefficients are the m ost 
fundam ental measures of interdependence in this s tudy, it is assumed th a t  Person i’s 
aggregate relationship with all o ther persons in term s of his expectation can be 
represented by the following weighted average of Qjjfs:
Qi
L h-. f i i k
k ^ i
i
(hi  ^ 1 )
(5.62)
If this weighted average is positive, Person i is regarded as forming his expectation  
on the basis th a t  all other persons’ income levels are, on the whole, positively correlated 
w'ith his income level. On the o ther hand, if Qj is negative, Person i is regarded as 
forming his expectation on the basis th a t  all o ther persons’ income levels are, on the 
w'hole, negatively correlated w ith  his own. This new index is termed Person i’s 
in terdependence expectation index from now on, and the “interdependence expectation  
effect” and “interdependence expectation index” are, hereafter in this chap te r ,
abbrevia ted  to  the “IE effect” and “IE index” .
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W ith this IE index, Person i’s interdependence risk-premium, E quation (5.59), is 
modified as follows:
(5.63)
ia ■ ■
D  21
P R E M IU M ^  =  {1 +  p. -  -  2(1 -  yg.-s,-} —
2X°
l
If Person i considers th a t  all o thers’ income levels are d istributed  independently of his 
own income level, then Qjj. =  0 (k^=i), and further Qj =  0. This gives the  A rro w -P ra tt  
risk-premium of his interdependence utility function. Again, if positive and negative 
Qjk’s happen to cancel each other in the process of the sum m ation  with weights, Qj can 
be zero. If, however, statistical testing  shows Qj to be significantly non-zero, these two 
cases are rejected and the existence of a kind of interdependence among persons in term s 
of expectations is supported, i.e., an IE effect.
5.5 P r o p e r t ie s  o f  th e  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e  R is k -P r e m iu m
Since it was found th a t  elementary algebraic functional forms of a person’s 
independent utility function, u(X j), which satisfy Equations (5.32) to (5.36) are
u(A-) =  logeX i
(5.64)
and
1
u(X ) = -  , o > 0,v Q
.(5.65)
these forms are used for investigation of the properties of risk-premium. Thus, the
R
A rro w -P ra t t  relative risk-aversion index of Person i’s independent utility function, p. , is 
equal to or greater than one. Person i’s interdependence risk-premium trea ted  from here 
on is:
PREM IU M • =  P{ = {2 +  a -  oj{{ -  2(1 -  y Q ,-S ,-}
(5.66)
where
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a >  0 .
5 .5 .1  R isk -A verse  or R isk -T ak ing
Person i can either be risk-averse or risk-taking, depending on his IE index, Q-, his 
present income level, X j , and his independence coefficient, f-. If he is completely 
independent, 1” =  1, then there is no possibility for him to be risk-taking. Or if he is not 
completely independent and his IE index, Qj, is less than or equal to B j, there is no such 
possibility either. Person i is thus always risk-averse, no m atter what the levels of his 
present income and his independence coefficient may be. But if his IE index, Qj, is 
greater than B^, his attitude towards risk changes depending on his present income level 
and his independent coefficient. His a ttitude changes from risk-averse to risk-taking as his 
present income level, X p  increases and surpasses a certain person-specific point, Aj. From 
now on, Xj is simply used to represent Person i’s present income level, instead of X p
r > 0  i f  la  =  i
i f  I a  ^  1 and Q { <
l Xi f  /p  1 and Qj  > B^ and < A ^
\  = 0  i f  /p- jz 1 and Q i > B* and X i =
\ < 0  i f  /p- yt 1 and Q - > B j and X^ > A j
where
(2 + o) Y .  lkiX k 
Al = ______ Mi_______
1 2(1 -  lü )Qi -  (1 +  <*)/„■
and
i0 +  « ) ' «
B t — ---------------------- > 0 .
1 2 ( 1 -  y
(5.68)
(5.69)
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5 .5 .2  Incom e Effect on R isk -P rem iu m
T he m agnitude of Person i’s risk-premium changes as his income level increases.
T he first-order partial derivative of his risk-premium with respect to his income level is14
(5.70)
d p t
d x t
=  - { 2  + a -  « 2 -  2 ( l - r > , ,Q ,S ,}
X
C  ■ ■ 
X X
u > x x ^ x  x> 2  ^  2
f <  0 i f  ki  =  1
i f  l -  jz 1 and Q% < B*
i f  l -  1 and Qi > R *  and X i < A^
=  0
l l
i f  /jt- i=- 1 and Q i > B  and X i — A 2
> 0 i f  l -  jz 1 and Q- > B* and X^ > A^
where
i i lH +  “  l i i ) Q i  .  /9
4  ■-■!■+<
(5-71)
In examining the possibility of a person being risk-taking and higher order 
derivatives, it appears th a t  if Person i’s IE index, Qj, is less than  or equal to  B j ,  or if he 
is independent, 1” — 1, then the effect of his income level, Xj, on his risk-premium, P-, is 
monotonic. As his income level increases, his risk-premium decreases a decreasing rate, 
and converges to zero. Figure 5-1-a shows the relationship between his income level and 
risk-premium if his IE index is less than  or equal to B^.
If Person i’s IE index, Qj, is greater than  B j,  the effect of his income level on his 
risk-prem ium  is not monotonic. As his income level increases from zero, his risk-premium 
decreases, and after it passes A^, he becomes risk-taking. His risk-premium continues 
decreasing until his income level reaches a !,. Beyond A^, his risk-premium s ta r ts  
increasing and converges to zero (Figure 5-1-b).
44Note that co-j’s (j =  l,2,... ,n) include Xj.
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F igure 5-1: Risk-Premium and Income
*1 a n d  Q, > Bt
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Appelbaum  and Katz (1981) and Katz (1983) studied a  person’s u tility  function, 
consisting of his own wealth level and the  rank of his wealth  level in the society in which 
he is located. Katz (1983) assumed th a t  a  person’s a t t i tu d e  tow ards  risk with respect to 
these tw o variables is risk-averse in term s of the A rro w -P ra t t  partia l abso lu te  risk- 
aversion index, and showed th a t  this person’s a t t i tu d e  tow ards risk with respect to  his 
wealth  level as a  whole could not be determ ined because of the  combined effect of these 
two variables. Or possibly his u tility  function corresponds to  a  F riedm an-Savage utili ty  
function.*0 This  person can be either risk-taking or risk-averse despite these assum ptions 
depending on the wealth d is tr ibu tion  within the society. T he result shown above 
coincides with K a tz ’s findings.
5 .5 .3  In d e p e n d en ce  C o effic ien t E ffect on  R isk -P r e m iu m
The m agnitude of a person’s risk premium changes as his independence coefficient 
changes. The effect can be represented by the derivative of Person i’s risk prem ium  with 
respect to his independence coefficient. Person i’s independence in his decision-making is 
assumed to change independently, under the constra in t  th a t  all in terdependence 
coefficients add up to one. Thus, Person i’s interdependence coefficient with respect to 
Person k, differentiated by Person i ’s independence coefficient is
dl ki
d l -ii
(V/r ■£ i).
(5.72)
W ith this relationship, the first-order partial derivative is:
a p ,
dl-ll
/ • •( 1 —ui ■ •) o l..Xl l v n '  n  *
; W i -  :-----77 TT ) V2
2 w« ( 1 _ /»'i) *
r > 0  i f Q t > B 2
= 0  i f  Q; — B,
< 0  i f  Q < Br
(5.73)
where
*°Friedman and Savage 1948. See also Section 1.4.3.3.
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(5.74)
i  1 ~  “ a )
B ‘Z 2 u  -(1 -  / . . )
II' Ilf
T he second- and th ird -order partial derivatives are:
d LP-l au x i
-  {Q ■  -------------------} --------
' 2 « , , ( 1- 1, , )
cTPl
d l /ii
' « f 1 - “ « )  t4 ' X >
= {Q . -  --------------- } -----
(5.75)
(5.76)
These three partial derivatives change their signs according to  the same condition as the 
condition for the first-order partial derivative. Therefore, the re lationship between the 
risk premium and the independence coefficient is monotonic.
The effect of a person’s independence coefficient on his risk-premium changes as the 
relation between his IE index, Qj, and changes. If his IE index, Qj, is smaller than B^, 
the effect is negative. On the o ther hand, if Qj is greater than  B.2, the effect is positive. If 
B!2 happens to be a  very small positive num ber, this can be in terpreted  as follows. If the 
person thinks th a t  o thers ’ income levels are on the whole negatively correlated with his, 
an increase in the independence of his decision making, which is represented by his 
independence coefficient, leads to a decreased risk-premium, i.e., leads him to become less 
risk-averse. T h a t  is, as the influence from others decreases, the  portion of risk-premium 
determ ined by o thers ’ influence, or his concerns with others, decreases. On the other 
hand, for a person with a  positive IE index, an increase in his independence in decision 
making increases his risk-averseness, because the portion which reduces his risk-premium 
due to his optimistic concern with o th e rs ’ income levels decreases. He is thus  pushed back 
to the more risk-averse a t t i tu d e .
To examine the effect as the person’s independence coefficient changes, especially 
when his IE index is positive, Equations (5.67) and (5.73) are used, and Figure 5-2 is 
drawn. The half plane constructed  with his income level and his independence coefficient 
is divided into five areas by curves and lines in the two equations. Horizontal lines with 
arrows represent p a t te rn s  of changes in the effect of the independence coefficient as it
Figure 5-2: Effect of Independence Coefficient on Risk-Premium
(when Qj > 0)
X,
P, > 0 ,  Pj'>0 P , > 0, pf > o
P > 0 , P,'< o
Note: P i ’ denotes d P i/<9 1 ^ .
F igure 5-3: P atterns of Effect of Independence Coefficient
on Risk-Premium
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Pi
(3) or Qj < 0
Note: (l), (2) and (3) respectively correspond to the same signs in 
Figure 5-2.
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moves from  zero to  one. These pa tte rns  are shown in  F igu re  5-3. I f  the  person ’s IE  
index, Q j, is negative , the effect is s im p ly  p os itive  and decreasing, as shown in the  las t 
p a rt o f F igu re  5-3.
5 .5 .4  E ffe c t o f  V a r ia n c e  o f E x p e c te d  In c o m e  D is t r ib u t io n  on R is k -P r e m iu m
The effect o f the  variance o f the d is tr ib u t io n  o f the  person’s expected incom e on his 
r isk -p re m iu m  can be exam ined using the de riva tive s  o f h is r isk -p re m iu m  w ith  respect to  
the  variance.
(5.77)
<)l\ P{ ,
—  =  —  = {2 +  a -  -  2(1 -  y g . s , }  —
„ i  1 ^"2d o . • o ■
l l  x i
' f  lu = 1
i f  la  ^  1 and Q{ < B*
i f  1 and Q% > and
i f  /jj ^  1 and Q- > B j and X % =  A*
i f  I a  ^  1 and Q ;>  and X i > A*
The effect o f the variance on Person i ’s r isk -p re m iu m  is com p le te ly  dependent on 
w he ther he is a c tu a lly  risk-averse or r is k -ta k in g , because the variance m erely func tions  as 
a m u lt ip lie r  in the risk -p rem ium . Therefore, the effect is ide n tica l w ith  E qua tion  (5.67), 
w h ich  ind icates w he ther Person i is risk-averse or r is k -ta k in g . I f  he is independent, 1 - - =  1, 
then the effect is a lw ays pos itive . O r, i f  his IE  index, Q-, is less than  or equal to  B^, the 
effect is also a lw ays pos itive . O therw ise, the effect depends on the re la tio n  between his 
incom e level A j defined in E qua tion  (5.68).
f  > 0 
\  = 0
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5 .5 .5  E ffec t o f  In te r d e p e n d e n c e  E x p e c ta t io n  In d e x  o n  R is k -P r e m iu m
T he effect of Person i ’s IE index, Q-, on his risk-prem ium  is represented by the  
partial derivative of his risk-premium with respect to  Qj.
dQi
i
a . .n
-  (i i )  —  <  
" x
(5.78)
The effect is always negative. If he thinks th a t  o ther persons’ income levels are, on the 
whole, more highly positively correlated with his income level than  before, his risk- 
premium  is decreased. He should be less risk-averse (or more risk-taking) to ob ta in  a 
certain level of utility . If, on the contrary , he thinks th a t  o ther persons’ income levels are 
more negatively correlated with his income level than  before, his risk-premium is 
increased. He does not need to  act in a risk-taking way to obtain a certain  level of utili ty , 
ra ther he can act in a more risk-averse way.
5 .6  A p p lica t io n : A d o p tio n  o f  In n o v a tio n s  a n d  R isk -P r e m iu m
In the l i te rature on the  adoption of new agricultural technology, it is widely 
acknowledged th a t  a person’s risk-aversion is a  positive de term inan t  of his time of 
adoption and a negative de te rm inan t  of his scale of adoption. T h a t  is, if he is highly 
risk-averse, he is slow to adop t and adopts less, and if he is less risk-averse he is quick to 
adopt and adopts  more.
In a formal framew'ork, Feder (1978, 1980), as reviewed in Section 1.4.1.3, 
formulated an expected utility maximising model and determ ined th a t  a  person’s Arrow- 
P r a t t  risk aversion index is a negative determ inan t of the scale of adoption. As to the 
time of adoption, Lindner and Fischer (1982), as reviewed in Section 1.4.1.4, formulated a 
Bayesian model and showed the time of adoption is partly  determined by a person’s 
a t t i tu d e  tow ards risk.
In this s tudy, it is assumed th a t  the adoption behaviour, I-, such as time and scale 
of adoption, is a function of a  person’s risk-premium, P-, and other individual socio­
economic characteristics, (k =  l,2 ,.. . ,m), already identified as im p o rtan t  to adoption.
These characteristics are educational a t ta inm en t,  labour constra in ts ,  tenure  s ta tus ,  age, 
farming experience, etc.
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h: -  / (  PP z i v  z i v Z im
(5.79)
where
h
df_
ÖP: < ^  /1 1 —
d Zf
d P ll
< 0 , and f  1 1 1  =
a3/
d P 'l
< 0 i f  I >  0
(5.80)
are assumed.
The first assumption in Equation (5.80) obviously indicates th a t  if a  person 
becomes less risk-averse, he adopts more. The second and third assum ptions indicate 
rapid progress a t  the initial adoption stage. Figure 5-4 illustrates the relation between 
the risk-premium and the adoption scale. Once a person’s risk-aversion has decreased and 
surpassed the threshold level, he suddenly s ta r ts  adopting  the innovation by a  relatively 
large am ount.  The marginal increase of adoption  scale decreases, however, as his risk- 
aversion decreases further.
From  the definition of the risk-premium, P- (Equation  (5.66)), this functional 
relation yields
(5.81)
i
a .
h  =  /(  (2 +  o -  u,,,. -  2(1 -  y o .-S ,-}  ^ r ,  Ziv  Za r .., Zim )
5 .6 .1  I n c o m e  E ffects  on th e  Scale  o f  A d o p t io n
Income level, either expected or present, has been regarded as an im p o rtan t  
d e te rm inan t  of adoption behaviour. Yet, as will be reviewed later in Section 6.2.2, 
income level is a surrogate of many other characteristics which affect adoption behaviour. 
Thus, income level is excluded from the socio-economic characteristics, Z ( k = d , 2 , . . . , n ) ,  
and is regarded solely as the determ inant of risk-premium. This is on the assum ption that  
these o ther socio-economic characteristics together cover the characteristics for which 
income level is a surrogate. Thus, the effect of expected income level on adoption 
behaviour works only through the risk-premium, P-.
If the la tter  is not the case, then income level m ust be included as one of the socio­
economic characteristics independently of the risk-premium. While the need to include 
income level is tested later in the next chapter,  it is assumed, in this section, th a t  income 
level can be excluded from the set of socio-economic characteristics.
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F ig u r e  5 -4 : R e la tion  between R isk -P re m iu m  and A d o p tio n  Scale
Scale of 
adoption
risk-premium
I
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T he first-order partial derivative of the scale of adoption  with respect to income 
level is
(5.82)
dl- dP-i  i
d X i d X
i
a  . ■
i t
2AV
> »  »7 !,•,• =  1
i f  hi ^  1 and Qi -
i f  l -  1 and Q t- > B * and X i < A*
i f  l -  1 and Q i > B* and X i =
l  li f  1 and  > B and X^ > A^
where and Bj are respectively as defined in Equations (5.71) and (5.69).
If Person i is independent, or with an IE index less than  or equal to B^, then the 
effect of his income level is always negative. As his income level increases, his scale of 
adoption increases and converges tow ards a certain level. However, if Person i is not 
independent, and his IE index is greater than  B j,  his scale of adoption first increases up to  
A^, and thus decreases beyond this point (Figure 5-6).
Higher-order derivatives suggest th a t  the inflexion point in the relation between the 
risk-premium and the income level is moved to right, if the IE index is greater than  B?. 
Otherwise, there is no m axim um  point or inflexion point a t  all as depicted as Curve-3 in 
Figure 5-6, since these partial derivatives are respectively always negative and positive 
over the whole range of income level.
5 .6 .2  In d e p e n d en ce  C o effic ien t and  th e  S ca le  o f  A d o p tio n
The effect of the independence coefficient on the scale of adoption changes as the 
relation between a person’s IE index and B^ changes.
^  T
a i i ~a
ai -  fAQi~ 2 { l , y  *2
° u x i
}
(5.83)
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< 0 i f  Q{ > b \
=  0 a  Qi  =  b \
> 0 i f  Qi  < b \
where is as defined in Equation (5.74).
As discussed in Section 5.5.3, the effect of a  person’s independence coefficient on his 
risk-premium captures the relationship th a t  others  have on his decision making, including 
his belief regarding the relation between his income level and th a t  of others. The effect of 
a person’s independence coefficient on his scale of adoption also cap tures  this relationship. 
If the person’s IE index is greater than B«,, th a t  is, his income level is on the whole highly 
positively correlated with o thers’ income levels, his scale of adoption decreases with his 
growing independence in decision making. On the contrary , if the person’s IE index is less 
than  B^, he increases his scale of adoption as he becomes more independent in decision 
making.
5 .6 .3  V a r ia n c e  o f  E x p e c te d  In co m e  D i s tr ib u t io n  a n d  th e  S ca le  o f  A d o p t io n
The effect of the variance of Person i’s prospect of his own income changes is shown 
by the following derivative:
d l {  Pi 1
—  = / ,  —  = / ,{2 + o -  -  2(1 -  !fi)Q,.St.} —
i %
d o ■. a ■ .
ii ii
< 0
=  0
> 0
•'/ /u  =  1
i f  1 and Qi < B!*
i f  I a  1 and Qi > B  ^ and X t- <
l  l
i f  l -  1 and Qi > B  and X i =
i f  l -  1 and Qi > B  ^ and X-  > A*
where and B^ are as defined in Equations (5.68) and (5.69).
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The effect of the variance of Person i’s expected income on his scale of adoption is 
always negative if he is independent, or if his IE index is less than  or equal to  B^, because 
he is risk-averse and the  variance is a  multiplier of his risk-premium. On the o ther hand, 
if he is risk-taking, the effect of the variance of expected income is positive. T h a t  is, if 
the variance increases he becomes more risk-taking and his scale of adoption increases.
5 .6 .4  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e  E x p e c ta t io n  In d ex  a n d  th e  S ca le  o f  A d o p t io n
As examined in Section 5.5.5, the effect of a person’s IE index, Q-, on his risk- 
premium , Pj, is always negative. Therefore, its effect on the  scale of adoption  is always 
positive.
dh
dQr
i
a ■ ■ n
~ h (» - y  - T >
i
(5.85)
As his IE index increases, his scale of adoption increases. T h a t  is, if he th inks th a t  his 
income is more positively correlated with o ther persons’ income levels th an  before, his 
scale of adoption is greater.
5 .6 .5  I n d iv id u a l  S o c io -E c o n o m ic  C h a r a c te r is t ic s  an d  th e  S ca le  o f  A d o p t io n
The effects of individual socio-economic characteris tics  on scale of adoption are 
shown by the derivative with respect to individual socio-economic characteristics, Z-^
(k =  l ,2 ,.. . ,m ).
dh
d Z rk
f l  + k ( fc= l?2,...,m)
(5.86)
The signs of these derivatives cannot be determ ined in this model, and will be 
discussed in the next chap ter  in relation to empirical studies.
5 .6 .6  A n  I n te r p r e ta t io n  o f  C a n c ia n  D ip
C ancian ’s argum en t for his two h y p o th e s e s ^  does not really explain these 
hypotheses and empirical findings of the existence of the Cancian Dip in areas of various 
types of agriculture. It seems, on the o ther hand, th a t  the relationship between a person’s
16Refer Section 1.4.4.3.
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in terdependence risk-premium and his income level m atches to  the Cancian Dip. If his IE 
index is less th an  or equal to the certain positive value, the re lationship is monotonically 
decreasing. However, if it is greater than th a t  value, there is a  dip (Figure 5-1, and 
Equations (5.67) to (5.71)). Further,  an investigation  tow ards conditions which 
determ ine the  sign of his interdependence expectation  index seems to  lead to the 
explanation of the divided empirical findings of the existence of the Cancian Dip.
Suppose there is the following relationship between a  person’s innovativeness, Ij, 
risk-premium, P-, and income level, X
(5.87)
h  =  “  a P i +  b x i + z L  ckz ik 
k= 1
where a and b are both positive coefficients. T he second te rm  represents th a t  there is an
income-related factor which directly affects his innovativeness, not via his risk-premium.
For example, a person’s income level may represent his accessibility to capital market.
Hence, the relationship between a person’s income level and his innovativeness is
(5.88)
di, OPi
a +  b.
d.X{ d X t
Figure 5-5 shows this relationship when
dpt
b < a M a x  (----- )
X, a x f
(5.89)
This indicates th a t  as the direct effect of his income level on his innovativeness increases, 
the probability  of the existence of the Cancian Dip decreases.
The second hypothesis can be explained by the following relationship derived from 
Equation (5.70) differentiated by another person’s income level, Xj.
a2/,. d 2P t
------------=  — a -------------> 0 for all X -  > 0.
d X JS X l d X S X i
As the diffusion process proceeds and others’ income levels increase, the negative portion
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F ig u re  5-5 : Innovativeness and Income Level
X,
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• • • 1 7of d l J d X  • gradually disappears, and hence the Cancian Dip also d isappea rs .1
T he relation ju s t  described is shown in Figure 5-6, for a  s i tuation  where Person i’s 
IE index is g reater than  As the adoption process proceeds and o th e rs ’ income levels 
increase, Curve-1 shifts tow ards Curve-2, being stretched and s tra igh tened , and further 
converges tow ards Curve-3. If income level is included in the functional relation of
Equation  (5.79) independently of the risk-premium, the horizontal line should be replaced
1 8with a  s tra igh t  line with a positive slope or an increasing curve.
Cancian  (1967, 1979) classified persons into quartiles according to measures of their 
socio-economic s ta tus ,  such as income level, and found a curvilinearity  in the  relationship 
between ( l)  persons’ innovativeness (expressed in such measures as t im e and scale of 
adoption) and (2) their socio-economic s ta tus .  A cubic curve with a hum p and a trough
I m  2
J ^This can also be shown when the relation between the switching point, A^, and others’ income 
levels is examined.
d A 2 lj i
------ = ----------------- \  > 0  [j  ^  i, i f  Qi > B l ).
dx- V /  x J Z ^ Lkix k
k ^ i
As others’ income levels increase, the switching point also increases, and the non-monotonicity  
becomes more stretched and straightened over the range of income levels.
The minimum risk-premium, P. =  P-(Xj =  A^), also increases together with the switching point, 
A.,, as others’ income levels increase. The scale of adoption associated with this minimum risk- 
premium point therefore declines.
P.i
and
(2 + a K  i li, 
i Y . lk,x k
k ^ i
{ i -  (
2+«)
) ‘ / 2}2 <o.
a p i (2+ QK , y , - ,
a x i  2 ( E / * A ) 2
k^jhi
therefore
zü + 2( i - y ^
/u-(2+a)
) l /2 }2 > 0.
* *
dl .  dP.i i
------------=  / j  -------------- <  0 .
d X ■ dX-
J  J
I Q
1 The slope of the line or the curve depends on the function assumed, 
more plausible, and matches with observations in the literature.
A non-negative slope is
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F ig u re  5-6: Relationship between Scale of Adoption and Income
I i
S ca le  o f  
A d o p t io n
In c o m e  Level
M a rg in a l  
S ca le  o f  
A d o p t io n
In c o m e  Leve l
a M a x
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was used to fit th is  relation (Boyd 1 9 8 0 ) .^
While the interdependence utility function approach  w ith o u t  the income level being 
included independently of the risk-premium, and with o ther d e te rm inan ts  held equal, does 
not denote any such relationship, this approach  with the  income level included 
independently of risk-premium does confirm the use of a  cubic curve relationship. The 
interdependence utility function approach thus  covers the  empirically found relation 
between socio-economic s ta tu s  and innovativeness. T he simplest “lower-class 
conservatism ” is covered by the case in which a  person’s IE index is less than  or equal to 
B j,  or where he is (completely) independent, i.e., 1-j =  1. C an c ian ’s “upper-middle-class 
conservatism ” is dem onstra ted  by the case in which a  person’s IE index is greater  than 
Bj and income level is included in the functional relation independently of his risk- 
premium. F urther ,  the possibility of the “upper-class conservatism ” is derived from the 
case in which a person’s IE index is greater than  B^ and income level is excluded from the 
functional relation, as shown in the above analysis.
The Cancian Dip hypotheses are thus related to the interdependence risk-premium. 
However, the divided empirical findings discussed above are still left unexplained. For 
the answer to the question of the conditions of the Cancian  Dip, the interdependence 
expectation index should be investigated. Conditions which determ ine the sign of the 
interdependence expectation index should be identified.
Person i’s IE index, Qj, indicates a weighted average of the ra tio  of the covariance 
bet ween his income changes and the o thers’ income changes to  the variance of his income 
changes. If the index is positive, he generally expects th a t  o th e rs ’ income changes are 
similar to his own income changes. If his income increases, o th e rs ’ income levels increase, 
and if his income decreases, o thers’ income levels decrease. On the o ther hand, if the  index 
is negative, he anticipates th a t  o thers’ income changes are tow ards  the  opposite direction 
to his income changes. If his income increases, o thers ’ income levels generally decrease, 
and if his income level decreases, o thers’ income levels increase.
^B oyd  proposed a statistical method to examine the significance of the hump. But this method 
is not statistically justifiable, because the ratio of two variables which have t-distributions does not 
have a t-distribution; it actually has a Cauchy distribution, which has no moment of any order at 
all.
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These s itu a tio n s  can be s im p ly  expla ined by F igu re  5-7. Suppose there  are tw o  
groups o f persons: G roup  1 consists o f Person i alone and G ro u p  2 consists o f a ll o th e r 
persons. They have th e ir  supply fu nc tio ns  under e x is tin g  technology o f respective ly , 
S(j(P )  (F igu re  5-7-a) and S ^ P )  (F igure  5-7-b). The supp ly  fu n c tio n  o f a ll persons is thus  
ind ica ted  by S ^(P ) (F igu re  5-7-c), w h ich  is the sum o f tw o  supp ly fu n c tio n s , S ^(P ) and
s“ (P).
F ig u re  5 -7 : Supply-D em and D iagram s fo r In terdependence E xp e c ta tio n
(a) V illager i (b) O thers (c) All
T he  demand fu nc tio n  is illu s tra te d  as D (P ) in  the  d iag ram , and the  e q u ilib r iu m  
price determ ined under the ex is ting  technology is Pq. Areas O q^E^Pg and O q^E^Pg 
respective ly ind ica te  income levels o f ( l )  Person i and (2) o thers  as a whole.
Suppose Person i adopts a new technology and his supp ly  fu nc tio n  sh ifts  r ig h tw a rd s  
to  Sj (F ig u re  5-7-a), the to ta l supp ly fu nc tio n  also sh ifts  r ig h tw a rd s  to  the  same degree to  
S1 (F igu re  5-7-c). Then, a new e q u ilib r iu m  price is dete rm ined  as P j.  A t  th is  new price  
Person i supplies q j ,  and others supp ly q*. I t  is n o t ce rta in  th a t Person i ’s incom e, 
represented by the rectangle O q ^E ^P j is more or less than  his in it ia l incom e, b u t o the rs ’ 
income level ce rta in ly  decreases (F igu re  5-7-b).
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The conditions for Person i’s income to increase can be derived from the following 
mathematical analysis:
(5.91)
Supply-Demand Equality D(P)  =  t S ,(P )  +  S 2(P)
where t indicates the technological level of Person i’s supply function, and initially equals 
one.
The income levels of the two groups are:
Person i I  ^ =  P  t S^(P)
Others I2 — P S 2(.P)
(5.92)
(5.93)
By totally differentiating Equation (5.91) with respect to P and t, the technological
change effect on the equilibrium price is obtained.
c (5-94)
d P—  ------------------------ < o
d t  D ' -  t S j’ -  S2’ 
because
D ’ < 0, S j ’ > 0, and S2’ > 0.
The effect is always negative under the usual conditions of demand and supply functions 
such as above.
The technological change effect on income levels is obtained by totally  
differentiating Equations (5.92) and (5.93) with respect to P and t.
d l  j
dt
P S
t S , ( 1 +
S
1 d P  
~ ] d^ +
es, J o
d>2
dt
5 2 ( 1 -1-
(5.95)
(5.96)
As Person i’s supply curve shifts rightwards, his income level changes, but the 
direction of change is indeterminate. The other persons’ income level, on the other hand, 
always decreases as Person i shifts his supply curve in this direction.
Thus, the relation between Person i’s income change and others’ income change 
when Person i changes his supply function by increasing the index, t, is:
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dI 2 dt
d/j d/j
dt
The sign of this der iva tive  depends on the sign of the technological change effect on 
Person i’s income level shown in Equation (5.95). Since the sign of the technological 
change effect on o th e rs ’ income level shown in Equation (5.96) is always negative, the 
sign of the derivative above is opposite to the sign of E quation (5.95).
The condition for this derivative to be positive is:
(5.98)
eD P > ( 1 "  7 ) ( 1 +  e2p )  ~
where is the price elasticity of dem and, p 1S the Pnce elasticity of o th e rs ’ supply, 
and 7 is the ratio of Person i ’s income to the to ta l  income which is the sum of Person i’s 
income and o thers’ incomes. This condition clearly indicates two aspects of the IE effect.
Firstly, this condition indicates the relationship between ( l )  the probability  th a t  
the IE index is positive and (2) the crop produced. Generally, it is agreed th a t  the  price 
elasticity of demand for locally-traded subsistence crops or highly perishable crops is 
closer to zero than  th a t  of widely-traded cash crops such as rubber, coffee and citrus. 
T h a t  is, demand for the former is less elastic than  dem and for the la t te r  with respect to 
price. Hence, the probability  th a t  the above condition is violated is greater  for widely-
traded cash crops than  for locally-traded subsistence crops. In o ther words, the
probability th a t  the IE index is negative is greater for farmers who grow w idely-traded 
cash crops than for those who grow locally-traded subsistence crops.
Secondly, this condition indicates the relationship between ( 1) the probability  th a t  
the IE index is positive and, (2) the ratio  of a person’s income level to the system  to tal
income level. As described above, 7 indicates the ratio  of Person i’s income level to the
system to ta l  income level. Therefore, the probability  th a t  the  IE index is positive is 
g reater for a person with the greater 7 . In o ther words, the correlation between the IE 
index and the ratio, 7 , is positive.
A person who grows a  subsistence crop with relatively inelastic dem and, a n d /o r
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who subjectively feels he has a  large share in the to ta l  system  income, tends to have a 
positive IE index. He generally thinks th a t  when his income level from such a  crop 
decreases, o thers ’ incomes also decrease. However, he does not think th a t  when his income 
increases due to  a  shift of his supply curve, o th e rs ’ incomes also increase. Hence, in a 
com m unity where there are many persons of this kind, the Cancian Dip is expected.
In con tras t,  a person who grows a cash crop, a n d /o r  who subjectively feels he has a 
smaller share in the to ta l system income, tends to  have a negative IE index. He generally 
thinks th a t  when his income level increases, o th e rs ’ incomes decrease. He does not, 
however, think th a t  when his income decreases, o thers ’ incomes increase. W hatever the 
technology adopted  by this one person may be, o th e rs ’ income level has to  decline. This 
indicates th a t  the Cancian Dip seldom appears in a com m unity  where there are many 
person of this kind.
5.7  C o n c lu s io n
Generally, studies of an interdependence utility function have been halted because 
of the complicated nature of the interdependence am ong persons. In this s tudy , firstly it is 
assumed th a t  there is no higher-order interdependence am ong persons. Secondly, it is 
taken th a t  a person’s interdependence utility function has the form of a function which 
includes the absolute level of a person’s income and the  subjectively perceived relative 
level of his income. Finally, a  person is assumed to be “envious” to o thers  outside his 
household. By assuming as above, the interdependence utility function study can be 
conducted with much less complication. In this par ticu lar  study , it was thus  found th a t  
only two types of elementary algebraic functions are suitable for formulating an relative 
income (interdependence) utility function.
The risk a t t i tu d e  of a person who has the above interdependence u tility  function 
was then analysed. One scenario was considered, then the relationship between the 
interdependence risk-premium and a person’s income level was studied. It was found th a t  
a  person can be risk-averse and risk-taking according to his interdependence 
characteristics and his income level, as having been expressed in a  Friedman-Savage 
utility function.
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Finally, the sociological findings of the “Cancian Dip” was theoretically analysed 
from the above viewpoint. It tu rned  out th a t  the in terdependence risk-prem ium  can 
explain not only the original two hypotheses of the “Cancian Dip” but also the empirical 
findings th a t  the “Cancian D ip” can appear more often in areas where locally t raded  
crops are grown.
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C H A P T E R  6
E m pirica l A n a lysis  o f th e  C itru s S iam  A d o p tio n  P ro cess
6.1  I n tr o d u c t io n
In this chapter, the theoretical derivations of hypotheses from the  model of the 
interdependence approach are tested , using d a ta  on the villagers’ citrus siam adoption 
behaviour. In examining villagers’ adoption behaviour, the primary in terest  is in the 
continuous variables of scale and t im e of adoption.
A villager’s scale of adoption is measured in te rm s of the num ber of citrus siam 
trees planted, and his time of adoption is measured by length of years since his first 
p lanting of citrus siam. Earlier adopters  have greater values of the la tte r  variable.
In Section 6.2, individual socio-economic characteris tics  which the agricultural 
technology adoption literature has identified as de te rm inan ts  of adoption behaviour are 
discussed. In Section 6.3, memberships of basic associations in the village socio-economic 
s truc tu re  are examined as respectively representing sets of agricultural information 
received, and villagers’ roles in disseminating agricultural information in the village. 
Villager’s memberships of basic associations are thus included as the aggregated form of 
the contextual effects.
In Section 6.4, the “objective” risk of citrus siam production in the village is 
calculated. As already indicated, villagers have experienced the  risk of the citrus siam 
production, through their own production and observations of o thers’ production. In the 
interdependence approach, every element of information is evaluated  in accordance to the 
relation between its source villager and its recipient villager. Villager’s subjective average 
risk and their subjective variance of risk, in relation to  citrus siam production, are 
calculated using the interdependence coefficients elicited in C hap ter  3. A villager’s 
subjective variance of risk is incorporated into the regression analysis as one of his 
individual socio-economic characteristics.
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In Section 6.5, the s t ru c tu re  of s tatis tica l procedures is set out,  and the suitability 
of the s ta t is t ica l  m ethods required for the analysis of adoption behaviour is discussed.
In Section 6.6, the  results of statis tica l analysis on the scale of adoption and time of 
adoption are presented . Finally, in Section 6.7, the  various results are in terpreted  as a 
whole, in the light of the comparison between the models with and w ithou t variables 
associated with the interdependence approach. Some individual socio-economic 
characteris tics  are given fur ther in terpre ta tion .
6.2  I n d iv id u a l  S o c io -E c o n o m ic  C h a r a c te r is t ic s
L itera tu re  on the process of adopting agricultural innovations has identified many 
socio-economic characteris tics  which are im p o rtan t  explanatory  variables.
6 .2 .1  F a r m  S ize
While fa rm  size has been found to be a positive de te rm inan t  of adoption in some 
empirical studies, it has also been identified as a negative or non-determ inant in others. 
These conflicting findings suggest th a t  “(farm)size is a surrogate for a large num ber of 
potentially im p o r tan t  factors such as access to credit,  capacity to bear risks, access to 
scarce inputs ,  w ealth , access to  information, etc .” (Feder, Ju s t  and Zilberrnan 1981, p.8). 
It is also seen as a  surrogate  for “the effectiveness of on-farm use of improved technology” 
(Schutjer and Van der Veen 1977, quoted from Feder et al. 1981).
In this s tudy , because of the incorporation of a villager’s risk-premium as the  focal 
de te rm inan t  of his adoption behaviour, farm size can only be regarded as a surrogate  for 
access to  scarce inpu ts  and wealth. Access to credit in this village, as described in C hapter  
2, is alm ost nil. Access to informal information is represented by villagers’ membership of 
relational associations (See C h ap te r  3 and Section 6.3 in C hap te r  6.), and access to formal 
information can be represented by access to extension services, bu t  as seen in C hap te r  2 it 
is again nil.
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6 .2 .2  I n c o m e
A villager’s income can also be viewed as a proxy for his accum ulated  wealth , and 
can further be regarded as his living s tandard .  This variable is also one de term inan t  of 
his risk premium , as theoretically derived by the interdependence approach. It should 
therefore be incorporated in the regression analysis (1) as one of his individual socio­
economic characteristics, excluding variables associated with the  interdependence 
approach, and (2) as the de term inan t  of his risk-prem ium  in the regression analysis, 
including the variables of the interdependence approach.
A nother element of the income level is the ra tio  of the  agricultural income to the 
to ta l income level, which reflects a villager’s dependency on agriculture. It may be 
postu lated  th a t  if the ratio is zero, the villager will be very slow to s ta r t  adopting the 
innovation; as the ratio increases, he may be quicker to  adop t .  Even if the villager is a 
completely subsistence farmer, he may regard the adoption  of the innovation as an 
opportun ity  to become a commercial farmer. This ra tio , therefore, may be a good 
de term inan t for explaining the adoption behaviour, together with o ther socio-economic 
characteristics which indicate villagers’ primary or secondary occupations.
6 .2 .3  L abou r A v a i la b i l i ty
Labour availability has very often been listed as a significant de term inan t of 
fa rm ers’ adoption behaviour. T hus when a new technology is labour-saving, its adoption 
is prom oted by labour shortages. For example, ox cultivation  is labour-saving compared 
with man-power cultivation, and its adoption  is prom oted by labour shortage in some 
areas (Weil 1970). On the o ther hand, if a  new technology requires more labour input,  a 
labour shortage prevents farmers from its adoption. The high yielding variety (HYV) 
cereal technology particularly in its early period generally corresponded to this case, 
especially it often increased the seasonal demand for labour. It may consequently be 
regarded as less a t t rac t ive  for farmers with limited family labour or those with bad access 
to labour m arkets.
A nother im p o rtan t  aspect of labour availability is the sexual differentiation of 
labour. In Islamic societies, the sexual differentiation of labour is often marked, for
women tend to  be kept in the vicinity of their houses and men work outside. In
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smallholding rubber production, however, a couple usually works together, where the 
husband taps rubber trees and later his wife collects the latex in bowls. Yet, if a more 
profitable opportunity arises, the husband tends to take this opportunity, leaving the wife 
behind to maintain rubber production often at a lower level. This reduces the risks 
associated with the new opportunity. In Belatung, rubber production has recently been 
declining, because of falling output prices and the age of the trees (See Chapter 4). Citrus 
siam production gives opportunities for the differentiation of sex-roles; the wives would 
look after citrus production, while the men looked for other economic opportunities. 
Therefore, family labour availability is divided into male labour and female labour, and 
are separately incorporated into the regression analysis in addition to household size.
Hired labour is another source to be considered. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, 
hired labour is little utilised and often comes from within the village. It is thus not 
considered to be an important factor in explaining adoption behaviour in this village.
6 .2 .4  T e n u r e  S ta tu s
In Belatung, a small proportion of villagers are sharecroppers or penumpang (See 
Section 2.4.2.2.). They do not have power to select which crops to grow on the land they 
look after. Landowners decide what to grow and how to grow it, and lessees have to  
follow such directions.
In a number of studies, tenure status has been considered as a negative determinant 
of adoption scale and production efficiency. However, this effect will only operate if 
lessees have control of what is grown on the land.*
In Belatung, however, the lessees also have their own small parcels, and lease in 
other parcels of land if their own parcels are insufficient for household subsistence. 
Therefore, tenure status as sharecroppers or penumpang is incorporated into the 
regression analysis as a dummy variable, indicating whether a villager partially or fully 
controls his parcels of land.
^Neoclassical sharecropping theories are abundant in recent literature. Some recent models utilise 
game theory, in which relations between a landlord and lessees are regarded as a game.
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6 .2 .5  H u m an  C apital
Educational a t ta in m en t  has been viewed as a s trong positive d e te rm in an t  of a 
villager’s allocative ability, and thus his scale of adoption . Schultz (1964) dem onstra ted  
the im portance of human capital in the s i tua tion  of disequilibrium resulting from the 
introduction or adoption of new technology. This  work inspired many studies on the role 
of education in developing agriculture. Most of these studies also found th a t  educational 
a t ta in m en t  is a  strong de term inan t of the scale of adoption  of new technology in 
agricultural development.
A monotonic or linear relationship between scale and time of adoption  and
o
educational a t ta in m en t  is m ost plausible h o w e v e r /  Higher educational a t ta in m en t  tends 
to  lead a villager to emigrate and seek out o ther opportunities ,  and to shorten his farming 
experience. Even if he stays in the village or re tu rns  to  it subsequently, he may prefer 
o ther jobs to farming and may become a par t- t im e farmer. The relationship between scale 
of adoption and educational a t ta in m en t  may thus be found to be linear with these other 
factors above being considered in the regression analysis.
O ther sources of human capital are villagers’ age and farming experience, measured 
in years. These two factors are expected to be highly correlated, and to represent aspects 
negatively correlated with modern or formal education, which has only begun in recent 
years, as described in Section 2.3.4. T rad itional informal education which has taken place 
within the village, such as learning-by-doing, and other experiences which help to  better 
villagers’ economic or production decisions, are represented by these two factors.
Interestingly, Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) who examined 228 empirical studies, 
found th a t  48% showed th a t  there is no relationship between a  villager’s age and time of 
adoption, 19% showed th a t  earlier adopters were younger and 33% showed th a t  earlier 
adopters  were older. Hence, it is not possible to generalise the relationship between age 
and time of adoption, or between age and scale of adoption. However, it is believed th a t  
these two factors should be included in the regression analysis as individual socio­
economic characteristics.
A
^Rogers and Kincaid (1971) showed 74 percent of studies they surveyed supported the linear 
relation between time of adoption and educational attainment.
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6 .2 .6  M e d ia  E x p o s u r e
Various types of information from outside th e  village have been used as explanatory  
variables for adoption behaviour in the literature . Frequency of visits to cities and of 
listening to agricultural programmes on radio are used in this study to represent villagers’ 
media exposure. Visits to extension service personnel and visits by th em  are not 
im p ortan t ,  as described in Section 2.4.7. Extension services are not ac tive  in the 
Belatung area, a lthough extension officers are s ta tioned in the village.
Visits to four cities, B atu raja ,  P rabum ulih , Palem bang and Ja k a r ta ,  and  to one 
province, Lampung, were selected as being likely to influence adoption behaviour. The 
characteristics of these places were described in Section 2.3.5.
Listening to agricultural program mes is a measure of a villager’s desire to  obtain 
agricultural information.
6 .2 .7  L o ca tio n a l  F a c to rs
Belatung’s villagers’ citrus siam farms are s i tua ted  in several distinct areas  within 
the village. The most distinct areas are Lekis and Kisam (See Figures 2-2 and  C -l) .  The 
Lekis area is located on the o ther side of the Ogan river and abou t an h o u r’s walk from 
the river, and this area is more easily approached from the neighbouring village (Lebuk 
B atang  Lama). Villagers there have good contacts  with Javanese m igran ts  who grow 
citrus siam quite independently of them , bringing budgrafts  directly from Java .  The 
Kisam area is also far away from the  Ogan river bu t on the same side as the village 
residential area, and is located in the middle of the rubber grow ing area.
These two locational factors are regarded as influencing information and techniques 
of citrus siam production, and accordingly adoption behaviour.
6 .2 .8  P r im a r y  and  S eco n d a ry  O ccu p a t io n
Villagers of Belatung are basically farmers, bu t as seen in Table 2-1 they have 
several sources of income other than agriculture. These are accordingly included am ongst 
the individual socio-economic characteristics as likely to affect adoption behaviour (as 
well as a tt i tudes  tow ards agriculture in general). The dum m y variables included are for 
shop-owners, sick or semi-retired household heads, National Railway workers, school 
teachers, present and ex-villager heads, present and ex-religious teachers, and 
sharecroppers or penum pangs.
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6 .3  A s s o c ia t io n s  in V i l la g e  S tru c tu r e
In C h ap te r  3, the village s tructure  was examined and five relational and s truc tu ra l  
associations of villagers were drawn out.
As already indicated, relational associations are based on the villagers’ direct socio­
economic in teractions which transm it agricultural inform ation am ong the  villagers. A 
relational association can therefore be regarded as a  set of villagers who shares alm ost 
identical agricultural information. Two villagers in different relational associations may 
receive different agricultural information.
S truc tu ra l  associations are based on villagers’ positions in the village s tructu re , i.e., 
their roles in the village system. Two villagers who belong to  two different s truc tu ra l  
associations may react to an identical set of agricultural information differently, 
according to  their respective roles in the village, even if they belong to the same relational 
associations.
As T ab le  3-11 shows, villagers can be classified into 17 basic associations,* 
according to  the quality of agricultural information they receive, and to their roles in 
dissem inating such information in the village. These basic associations can be considered 
as villagers’ reference groups. Thus the average adoption  behaviour of a reference group 
such as its average adoption scale is considered to  affect the decisions of its members on 
adoption behaviour.
T he group averages for basic associations are shown in Table 6-1.
6 .4  E x p e c te d  Loss in C itru s  S ia m  P r o d u c t io n
6 .4 .1  O b je c t iv e  Loss in C itr u s  S ia m  P r o d u c t io n
O bjective loss in physical citrus siam production (as opposed to  income) can be 
represented by the “loss ra tio” of the number of trees lost after being planted, to the 
num ber of all trees actually planted. Figure 6-1 shows the d is tribution of this measure 
am ong 55 adopters. The distribution has a m axim um  of 100%, a  m inim um  of 0% and a 
mean of 22.4%. There are 14 adopters  who have not lost any trees so far, and 2 adopters
o
^Theoretically 25 (5 x 5) categories are possible.
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Table 6-1: Averages of D ependent V ariables for Basic A ssociations
Basic
Association
No. of 
Villagers
Average(a) 
PLANTl
Average(b) 
TIMEPASS
Proportion(c) 
Adopters (/£)
1 20 20.0 1.183 40.0
2 8 35.0 0.906 25.0
3 3 6.7 1.694 33.3
4, 5 9 (8+1) 79.1 1.407 55.6
6 5 35.0 0.906 20.0
7 7 17.7 1.643 28.6
8 6 51.7 1.542 66.7
10 6 168.7 2.722 100.0
11 5 144.4 2.067 40.0
12 3 20.0 1.806 33.3
13 4 177.5 2.708 75.0
14 5 237.8 6.450 100.0
15 7 77.9 0.310 57.1
16 15 60.8 1.683 46.7
17 7 118.4 1.857 57.1
Note:
Due to missing observations, 110 observations axe used.
Because there is only one member of Basic Association 5, whose 
data are available, this association is combined with Basic 
Association 4.
(a) PLANTl: Total number of existing citrus trees including
non-adopters
(b) TIMEPASS: Length of years from a villager’s initial
adoption until June, 1983 (including non-adopters).
(c) Figures are different from Table 4-4
due to missing observations.
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who have lost almost all trees planted. The distribution is centred around the range of 
15% to 20%, and is skewed towards zero.
A villager’s objective loss can be regarded as information based on his own 
experiences. This is villager’s “direct information” (Lindner et al. 1982).
F ig u re  6-1: Objective Loss Ratio in Citrus Siam Production
OBJECTIVE
LOSS RATIO(a) O 5 10 15 20
RANGE N 7. : ..................: .....................: ...................... : ...................... :
0.00 14 25.5 ****************************
0.00-0.05 4 7.3 ********
0.05-0.10 5 9.1 **********
0.10-0.15 3 5.5 ******
0.15-0.20 7 12.7 **************
0.20-0.25 7 12.7 **************
0.25-0.30 5 9.1 **********
0.30-0.35 1 1.8 * *
0.35-0.40 2 3.6 * * * *
0.40-0.45 1 1.8 * *
0.45-0.50 2 3.6 ****
0.50-0.55 0 0.0
0.55-0.60 1 1.8 * * Mean = 0.230
0.60-0.65 1 1.8 ** SD = 0.224
0.65-0.70 O 0.0 Max. = 1 .OOO
0.70-0.75 0 0.0 Min. = 0.000
0.75-0.80 0 0.0
0.80-0.85 o 0.0
0.85-0.90 o 0.0
0.90-0.95 1 1.8 * *
0.95-1.00 1 1.8 **
55 100
(b)
Note:
(a) The ratio of the number of trees lost (damaged, died, etc) to the 
number of trees actually planted.
(b) Citrus siam adopters.
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6 .4 .2  S u b je c t iv e  L oss in  C itr u s  S ia m  P r o d u c t io n
F ig u r e  6-2: Subjective Average Loss Ratio  in C itrus  Siam Production
SUBJECTIVE (a)
AVERAGE LOSS RATIO 10 20 30 40
RANGE N % ...................: . . . .
0.13-0.14 2 1.8 * *
0.14-0.15 0 0.0
0.15-0.16 0 0.0
0.16-0.17 1 0.9 *
0.17-0.18 0 0.0
0.18-0.19 1 0.9 *
0.19-0.20 1 0.9 *
0.20-0.21 3 2.7 * * *
0.21-0.22 10 9.1 **********
0.22-0.23 33 30.0 *********************************
0.23-0.24 42 38.2 ******************************************
0.24-0.25 9 8.2 *********
0.25-0.26 1 0.9 *
0.26-0.27 3 2.7 * * * Mean = 0.231
0.27-0.28 2 1.8 * * SD = 0.023
0.28-0.29 0 0.0 Max. = 0.325
0.29-0.30 0 0.0 Min. = 0.132
0.30-0.31 0 0.0
0.31-0.32 1 0.9 *
0.32-0.33 1 0.9 *
110 lOO .
(b)
Note :
(a) As defined in Equation (6.1).
(b) All villagers (except for those with missing data).
Although a villager may be aware of the widely spread dis tr ibu tion  of objective loss 
in citrus siam production, he may not believe th a t  the worst will happen to  him. It is 
quite plausible to assume th a t  he has his own subjectively weighted average loss ratio  
because particu lar villagers differentially weigh information of o ther villagers’ losses in 
citrus siam production.
As the degrees of a  villager’s interdependence on o thers  are represented by his 
interdependence coefficients, the weighted average loss, in which his interdependence 
coefficients are used as weights, may be regarded as his subjective average loss. Non­
adopters  are, of course, excluded in the calculation of his subjective loss, bu t these non-
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adopters  can have their own subjective average loss. A villager’s subjective average loss 
ra tio  may thus be defined as follows:
(G.l)
n
Y.'k,LOSSkDk
k=  1______________
n
l k iD k
k =  1
where LOSS^ indicates Villager k ’s objective loss ratio , shown in Figure 6-1, and where 
indicates whether Villager k has adopted or not.
The distribution of subjective average loss ratio  perta in ing  to all villagers4 is shown 
in Figure 6-2. It is significantly concentrated around the mean, 23.1%, and has a much 
narrow er d istribution than  the objective loss ratio. Its m axim um  is 32.5% and its 
m in im um  is 13.2%. This subjective average loss ra tio  can be regarded as a villager’s 
aggregate for both “direct” and “indirect” information abou t losses in citrus siam 
production.
A villager’s risk premium (Equation (5.66)) includes the variance of his prospects 
for his own income changes. This can be separated  into two com ponents, ( l )  production 
risk and (2) price risk, if these components can be assumed to be independent of each 
other.
The first component can be detected by examining a villager’s subjective variance of 
loss ratios. This is the weighted sum of squared deviations of all ad o p te rs ’ loss ratios from 
his subjective average loss ratio, p-. The second com ponent can be assumed to  be 
universal among all villagers, because prices associated with citrus siam are known to all 
villagers, and are taken as exogenously given param eters .
Therefore, the variance of the income prospects can be represented by the first 
com ponent. Thus,
4Because of missing data, 110 villagers were treated here.
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2
c .
i
Y,hiDk(wssk- Mt)2
k= 1_____________________
n
k=l
(6.2)
F ig u r e  6-3: Subjective Variance of Loss R atio  in C itrus  Siam Production
SUBJECTIVE VARIANCE
OF LOSS RATIO (a) 10 20 30 40 50
RANGE N 7. , . : ............. : .............. : .............. ;
0.000-0.005 0 0.0
0.005-0.010 0 0.0
0.010-0.015 0 0.0
0.015-0.020 0 0.0 Mean = 0.060
0.020-0.025 2 1.8 * * SD = 0.009
0.025-0.030 0 0.0 Max. = 0.098
0.030-0.035 1 0.9 * Min. = 0.022
0.035-0.040 1 0.9 *
0.040-0.045 1 0.9 *
0.045-0.050 1 0.9 *
0.050-0.055 13 11.8 * * * * * * * * * * * * *
0.055-0.060 30 27.3 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
0.060-0.065 50 45.5 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
0.065-0.070 8 7.3 * * * * * * * *
0.070-0.075 0 0.0
0.075-0.080 1 0.9 *
0.080-0.085 1 0.9 *
0.085-0.090 0 0.0
0.090-0.095 0 0.0
0.095-0.100 1 0.9 *
110 100.
Note:
(a) As defined in Equation (6.2).
The distribution of the subjective variance of loss ratio  is shown in Figure 6-3. It is
quite a  concentrated distribution about the mean of 0.060, with a  s tan d a rd  deviation of 
0.009. More than 90% of villagers have their subjective variance of loss ra tio  between
0.05 and 0.07.
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6 .5  S ta t i s t i c a l  In feren ce  M e th o d
Statis tica l testing of hypotheses derived from the interdependence approach has to 
be m ade carefully, owing to the special charac teris tics  of the model. T he dependent 
variable of this model is limited (or trunca ted ) .  For example, a  non-adop te r’s scale of 
adoption is always zero and it should not be es tim ated  to be negative. Negative es tim ates 
cannot be sensibly interpreted.
In the next section, the statistical inference procedures are set out, and appropria te  
techniques to deal with the special tra i t  of the model are selected.
6 .5 .1  S tr u c tu r e  o f  S ta t is t ic a l  Inferences
The s truc tu re  of statis tica l inferences is set ou t  here in three steps.
Step A
Simple correlation coefficients between any two among dependent and independent 
variables are checked to find significant de term inan ts  of dependent variables and sources 
of multi-collinearity among independent var iables .5 An a t te m p t  is made to explain each 
dependent variable by individual socio-economic characteristics, w ithout using variables 
associated with the interdependence approach. Income is included, as it simply represents 
villagers’ economic sta tus .  Results a t  this level are regarded as the basis for the 
comparison a t  the succeeding levels of s tatistical analysis.
Step B
There are four basic assumptions in the analysis conducted above, namely,
5Multicollinearity can be detected by checking ( l )  simple correlations among explanatory 
variables, (2) determinant or eigen values of data product sum matrix, X ’X ,  where X  is a data  
matrix of explanatory variables, (3) auxiliary regression or (4) the matrix decomposition of the 
data product sum matrix, X ’X  (Judge et al. 1982).
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R1. a person’s independent A rrow -P ra tt  relative risk-aversion index, p is 
g reater than  or equal to one,^
2. a  person’s IE index, Q-, is significantly non-zero, a  person’s IE index is 
correlated positively with his interdependence weight, a ;- ,* 78 *
3. a person’s income level determines his adoption behaviour, only in conjunction 
with his risk-premium.^
By expanding Equation (5.79) with only first-order derivatives, and replacing the 
risk-premium with Equation (5.63) and the first socio-economic characteris tics , Z^,  with 
his income level, X-, the following equation is obtained for s ta tis tica l testing.
(6.3)
i i
a .. o . .j? ii ii
!i ~  ^0 +  ^ l U 1 +  pi ~ 03i d  Y Y  ~ ~ li d ® i  Y  ^
m
+  @2X i +  Y + k Zik +  et
k=2
As pj* and are not known, this equation is non-linear with respect to  param eters  to  be 
estim ated , / ^ ’s, pj^ and Qj. For testing the basic three hypotheses m entioned above, this 
equation is expanded as follows:
(6.4)
i i i
u )  ■ a .. <7 •. <j  ..«  ii ii ii
!i =  +  ^ i i ( -  YYY  ^ +  ^ 12 YY  +  ~  lid y . ^
rn
+ @2X i +  Y P\ + kZik +  €i
k—2
It can be expected th a t  the IE index, Q -, and A rro w -P ra tt  relative risk-aversion 
R,
index, p. , vary over individual persons. But, because of the limited d a ta ,  the IE effect is 
examined group by group instead. This is done in the following equation using dum m y 
variables which represent groups of persons:
^See Equations (5.37), (5.38), (5.63) and (5.66).
7Refer to Section 5.4.1 on page 209.
8Refer to Section 5.6.6.
^Refer to Section 5.6.1.
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h = 00 + /»lit" ? F )  + *12 ^
l l
Xr a . .  m
+  ~ /tt) } +  ^2A f +  z L  P \  +  k Z ik  +  €i‘
k= 1 Ai fc=2
where
if Person i belongs to Group k (k =  l ,2 ,.. . ,r)  
otherwise.
(6.5)
( 6 .6 )
Regression analysis of this equation gives
-  b() +  b^^(~
oj--o ■ ■ n  i i
2 X ,
i
o ■. xi
12 2 A\-l
r
+ - c
k~  1
m
} + b2X t + ^  b] + k Zxk
k=2
(6.7)
where b jfs  are estimated coefficients in Equation (6.5). the resulting equation, it is 
possible to test
1. b j 2 /  b j j  > 2 for > 1,
2. b j 3k /  b j j  ^  0 (k = l ,2 , . . . r )  for the existence of IE effect,
3. positive correlation between Qj and cu-,
4 ^ 2  =  0 for the exclusion of income level.
S ta tis tica l significance levels of ( l )  and (2) should be calculated with the M onth- 
Carlo m ethods because divisions involved with these hypotheses produce Cauchy 
d is tr ibu tions which have no finite m om ents  bu t a  finite average. W ith knowledge of 
variances and averages of the num era to r and denom inator,  and covariance, d istributions 
of these divisions can be produced by the M onte-Carlo m ethod and proportions in certain 
ranges can be calculated as significant levels.
(k)
T he IE index for persons of Basic Association k, Q- , can be estim ated from
W ith these estim ated IE indices, the following regression can be run for testing  the 
effects on adoption behaviour of income level, independence coefficient, variance of
uncerta in ty  and IE indices:
h  -  ßo + ß\  X i + /¥ «  +^3aii + ^  ^3+ k Zik + €i
k = 2
(6.9)
If the es tim ated  IE indices are negative, coefficients in the above regression equation 
are as follows:
/3j > 0 ,  /?2 > 0, /?3 < 0, and ß 4 > 0.
In the following equation, the higher order derivatives and the non-monotonicity  
can be tested.
( 6 . 10)
h  = ßo + ^ ll^ t  + 012 X i + 0\ZX i + 021 lii + 022lü  +
m
02Zlü  + 0Z°U + 04 Q% + 0Z+kZik + €i
k=2
If the es tim ated  IE indices are all negative, the expected signs of coefficients are:
ß\  \ > 0, ß 12 < 0, ß^o > 0,
021 > 022  > 02Z >
ß z < o, 0 4 > o.
The statis tica l significance test for the existence of a hum p and trough is quite 
complicated. Boyd (1980) proposed a testing m ethod, b u t  it is not s tatistically  
acceptable. A M onte Carlo method to check the statistical significance of the existence of 
a hum p and trough has been developed by the au thor,  and details are given in Appendix 
F.2.
Step C
The curvilinear relationship between villagers’ innovativeness and socio-economic 
s ta tu s  th a t  Cancian (1967, 1979) and others  proposed has been investigated basically in a
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one-dependent-one-independent-variable framework (Section 1.4.4.3). They do not
consider villagers’ o ther characteristics as explanatory  variables for innovativeness. On 
the o ther hand, in the interdependence approach above, many other characteristics are 
considered, and even then curvilinearity may be found.
In this s tep , curvilinearity  is investigated firstly by construc ting  an income-quartiles 
table, and secondly, by T obit  regression analyses with only polynomials of a socio­
economic s ta tu s  variable as explanatory variables. The following socio-economic 
variables are used:
1. Income, Xj
2. Rank of Income, Rj (Ascending order: the poorest person gets IT =  1)
3. Subjective Relative In c o m e ,^  Sj =  X-/X-
4. Independence Coefficient, 1-
5. Independence W eight, a;- =  1-Sj
The results of th is  step are compared with those of Step B and in terpre ta tions  are
given.
6.5.2 Tobit A n a lys is
As pointed out by Feder, Jus t  and Zilberman (1981), adoption process studies have 
only concentra ted  on the  dichotomous dependent variable, th a t  is, whether an individual 
has adopted an innovation or not. In these studies, a limited dependent variable, such as 
the scale of adoption  or time of adoption, has not been trea ted  rigorously. This dependent 
variable has a  specific characteris tic  which makes it unsuitable to apply a  simple multiple 
regression analysis w ith OLS, because it is limited or t runca ted  (censored) a t either or 
both ends of its d is tribution.
A statis tica l  m ethod for the explanation of these types of dependent variables 
corresponds with a m ultiple regression model which M addala  (1977) described as follows:
10vXj denotes Villager i ’s subjective average village income level. Refer Equation (5.14).
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Sometimes in m ultiple regression models we do no t observe the  dependent 
variable over the entire  range. For instance, suppose the  regression model is
Y  = ß X +  u
( 6 . 11)
and we observe Y only if Y > 0 . T hus our model is
Y  =
ß X  +  u if ß X  T  tt > 0 or u > - ß X  
0 otherwise
( 6 . 12)
Here we cannot use ju s t  the observations for which Y > 0 to  es tim ate  the 
regression equation by ordinary least squares because the residuals do not satisfy 
the condition E(u) =  0 if we consider only those residuals such th a t  u > — ßX.  
If we make some specific assumption abou t  the d is tr ibu tion  of u, we can use the 
ML (m axim um  likelihood) method to es tim ate  the param eters .  For instance, if 
we assume th a t  u has a normal d is tribu tion  with mean zero and variance c^, the 
jo in t  d is tribution of the observation is ...
L =
n  i n  -  ßx i
(6.13)
where f( ) is the s tandard  normal density and F( ) is the cum ulative normal 
density (...where the first term corresponds to those observations for which we 
observe Yj and the second term  corresponds to  these observations for which all 
we know is th a t  Yj is less than or equal to zero). The ML estim ates  are 
obtained by maximizing L with respect to  ß  and a.  [pp. 162-163]
This model is called T ob in ’s norm it model, in short ,  the Tobit  model (Johnston 
1984). Tobin (1958) first used this model for explaining the relationship between the 
expenditure on automobiles and i n c o m e . A s  Olsen (1978) proved th a t  the T obit  model’s 
log-likelihood function is globally concave if normalised coefficients {ß^ / o)  are estim ated, 
it is not necessary to worry abou t convergence to a  local m axim um . Moreover, the T obit 
es tim ators  have specific relationships with the OLS es tim ators  with samples whose 
dependent variables are non-zero (Fair 1977). Using this property , the calculation of the 
model can be made to converge more quickly.
For limited dependent variable m axim um  likelihood regression models, Amemiya 
(1980, 1981) compared the following scalar criteria  for selecting the op tim al model and 
optimal model size for small-size sample cases:
11See Amemiya (1984) for the survey of the use of the Tobit model.
1. Num ber of wrong predictions (for d ichotom ous dependent variables)
2. Sum of squared errors (SSE)
3. Efron’s
4. T heil’s adjusted
5. SSE weighted by estimated probabilities
6. Squared correlation coefficient
7. Log-likelihood function
8. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
9. M cF adden’s R^
10. A m em iya’s Prediction Criterion (PC)
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and preferred the Akaike Information Criterion, for its simplicity and its ability to ad just 
for the degrees of freedom, although no single criterion dom inates the others. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) has the following form:
2 . . ( 6 H )  
A IC  =  — { —{log-likelihood) T  p  +  1 } 
n
where “n” is the number of samples, “p T l ” is the num ber of coefficients to  be estimated. 
If the intercept should be suppressed, “1” is excluded. Because of the non-dominance of 
the above criteria over each other, results of regression analysis with the A.I.C., adjusted 
R-square and Likelihood Ratio test are compared. R-square is most often used in the 
following study for convenience, if the evaluation of two criteria are not contradictry.
6 .5 .3  M e th o d s  to  D e te c t  C o n te x tu a l  Effect
Statistical inference procedures usually assum e the independence of samples. Since a 
m atrix  of interdependence coefficients of villagers was elicited in the interdependence 
approach , their interdependence upon each o ther has to be considered in relation to 
s ta tis tica l inferences. This problem of interdependence am ong variables, either dependent 
or independent, has been called the contextual effect, and it has been treated  in two 
frameworks (Erbring and Young 1979). The first framework is the “social te lepa thy” and
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the second is the “endogenous feedback” . For each framework, specific s tatis tica l 
m ethods have been developed.
In the first framework, it is assumed th a t  an ind iv idual’s behaviour is influenced 
directly by the o thers’ behaviours he witnesses. Hence, “group averages” of a dependent 
variable are incorporated for the separate detection of individual effects of individual 
characteris tics  and contextual effects.* 1 In the  second framework, the contextual effect is 
assumed to be mediated by interactions am ong individuals, and the network
i  o
autoregression m odel10 has been developed in which a  contiguity  m atrix  represents their 
interactions.
T he la t te r  framework is quite relevant to  the interdependence approach in which a 
m atr ix  of interdependence coefficients is utilised and can be regarded as the contiguity 
m atrix . However, it seems th a t  it is no t always necessary to use the network 
au tocorrelation  model. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the elicited independence 
coefficient and other variables which const i tu te  villagers’ risk-premium represent 
contex tua l as well as individual effects. For instance, if a villager’s independence 
coefficient is low, it is implied th a t  he is greatly affected by others, and vice versa. 
Secondly, the incorporation of “group averages” of a dependent variable into the 
regression analysis as an explanatory variable is technically much more s traightforw ard 
than  the  network autocorrelation model. E stim ated  coefficients of the group average of 
the dependent variable may be interpreted as the proportionate  effect of group 
mem bership  in an individual’s decision making. However, it is very obvious th a t ,  as 
groups become smaller, correlation between the dependent variable and the group average 
becomes higher. Hence, there is no point to  include o ther variables into regression 
analysis. In o ther words, causal relations among explanatory  variables become obscured. 
Thirdly , ranges of dependent variables in this s tudy are limited. As discussed in Section 
6.5.2, the  d istribution of a dependent variable is trunca ted  a t  zero or a  certain level, and 
thus negative values for these variables are not allowed to  exist. If such a limited
^ F o r  detailed discussions, see Blalock (1984) and Boyd &; Iversen (1979).
1 o
i0Details are given in Appendix F.l.
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dis tribu tion  of dependent variables is incorporated in to  the network au tocorrelation  
model, com putation  procedure becomes much more com plicated. In fact, there is no 
available com puter program me for th is  revised network au tocorre la tion  model.
For these reasons, it was decided th a t  only the variables associated with the risk- 
premium are included in regression analysis.
6 .6  S ta t i s t ic a l  R e su l t s
In this section, s tatistical results according to the procedure set ou t in the  last 
section are presented. Since there is no time element in the  theoretical framework, the 
results of the scale of adoption are discussed First, and those of the time of adoption 
second. Variables which appear in this section are listed in Table  6-2.
6 .6 .1  S te p  A
6 .6 .1 .1  S im p le  C o r re la t io n s
The dependent variables of adoption behaviour, P L A N T l  (the existing num ber of 
citrus siam trees), and TIM E PA SS (the period since adoption) (Table 6-2) are highly 
correlated with each other, and have high correlations with almost identical sets of 
independent variables which are themselves highly correlated (Figure 6-4). The 
independent variables, IN D E PE N D  (independence coefficient), VARLOSS (subjective 
variance of loss ra tio  in citrus siam production), PR O G  (frequency of listening to 
agricultural programmes on radio) and KERIO (incum bent or ex-village head), appear to 
be primary candidates as the de term inan ts  of the dependent variables. As seen in 
Equation (5.66), there are four m ajor components of the risk-premium, i.e., IN D EPEN D , 
VARLOSS, INCOM E (income level), and Q (interdependence expectation  index). 
Interestingly, the third component, INCOM E, is found to be an insignificant variable in 
term s of the simple correlation coefficient. PR O C  is found to  have a  strongly positive 
correlation with adoption behaviour. There are no significantly negative determ inants ,  
except for VARLOSS, which is obvious from the definition of risk-premium.^4
Among other explanatory variables, there are several notable relations. VARLOSS
*4Refer Equation (5.84).
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Table 6-2: List of Variables
Classification Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
PLANT1 
TIMEPASS
Independent Variables
Number of Existing Citrus Siam Trees 
Length of Period since adoption (yrs.)
Income Level INCOME
INC2 
INC3
Rank of Income RANK 
RANK2
Annual Income ( x Rp 106 )
Square of INCOME 
Cube of INCOME
Rank of income level (ascending order) 
Square of RANK
RANK3 Cube of RANK
Subjective Relative Income
RELINC
RELINC2
RELINC3
= St = Xj/Xj 
Square of RELINC 
Cube of RELINC
Independence Coefficient 
INDEPEND 
INDEP2 
INDEP3
= 1ii= Square of INDEPEND 
= Cube of INDEPEND
Subjective Variance of Loss Ratio .
VARLOSS =
Interdependence Expectation Index
Q
Production Factors
to be estimated for every Basic Association
AGRATIO
HHSIZE
MLABOUR
FLABOUR
LANDAREA
LEKIS
Proportion of Agricultural Income
No. of Household Members
No. of Male Members(15-60yrs.)
No. of Female Members(15-60yrs.)
Farm size (ha.)
Dummy for Farm Location in Lekis area
KISAM Dummy for Farm Location in Kisam area
Human Capital Factors (household heads)
FARMEXPE
AGE
EDUCATE
EDUC2
PROG
Visits to City BATURAJA 
PRABUMUL 
PALEMBAN 
LAMPUNG 
JAKARTA
Years of farming experience 
Age
Educational attainment proxy 
Square of EDUCATE
No. of times listening to agricultural 
programme
Frequency to Baturaja (in one yeax) 
Frequency to Prabumulih (in one year) 
Frequency to Palembang (in one year) 
Frequency to Lampung province (in one yeax) 
Frequency to Jakarta and Java (in one year)
Socio-Economic Characteristics (dummy variables)
SHOP
SICKRETI
PJKA
TEACHER
KERIO
KHOTIB
TENANT
for shop-owner
for sick or retired household head
for National Railway workers
for school teachers
for village head (present k past)
for religious teachers (present k past)
for lessees
F ig u re  6-4: Simple Correlations among Variables
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is highly negatively correlated with 1NDEPEND. From  the definition of the subjective 
variance, E qua tion  (6.2), a positive relation may be expected between these two variables. 
This con trad ic tion  denotes th a t  there are very s trong negative relationships between 
P L A N T 1 /T IM E P A S S  and VARLOSS, and very s trong positive relationships between 
PLANT1 /T IM E P A S S  and IN D EPEN D .
F A R M E X P E  (years of farming experience) is, as expected, strongly positively 
correlated with A G E (household head’s age). SH O P (being a  shop owner) is highly 
correlated with S IC K R ETI (being retired or semi-retired). Villagers in the la t te r  class had 
been m erchants ,  and accumulated their capital before they opened grocery shops in the 
village.
P JK A  (being a National Railway worker) is negatively correlated with A G R A T IO  
(the agricu ltura l  income ratio). National Railway workers have their plots of land, and 
grow subsistence crops such as cassava and banana. They do not usually sell these 
products, and their  agricultural income ratios are therefore very low or non-existent.
T E A C H E R  (being a  teacher) is highly correlated with IN D E PE N D . The teachers 
consti tu te  an elite group in the village, and have a  very strong influence on other villagers 
through their widely spread networks of interactions. They are tru s ted ,  and asked for 
both inform ation and judgm ent on various m atte rs .  This high correlation is accordingly 
to be expected.
6 .6 .1 .2  T o b it  A n a ly s is  w i th o u t  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e  V a r ia b le s
Table 6-3 shows results of Tobit analysis where variables associated with the 
interdependence approach are excluded. Columns ( l )  and (3) show results of the 
regression analyses in which all the explanatory  variables are included (full-sized 
regression). Columns (2) and (4) show results of optimally reduced size regression 
analyses (optimal-sized regression). Using a backward elimination m ethod, statistically 
insignificant explanatory variables were excluded one-by-one until the Likelihood Ratio  
test reached 5 percent significance level. Significant variables which remained in the 
optimal-sized regressions are discussed in the following text.
A bout 50 percent of the variation (in term s of R-square) of PLANT1 (the scale of 
adoption) is explained in the full-size regression. In the optimal-sized regression, abou t 47
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T ab le  6-3: Tobit Analysis without Interdependence Variables
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable PLANT1 PLANTl TIMEPASS TIMEPASS
FULL SIZE OPTIMAL SIZE FULL SIZE OPTIMAL SIZE
COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
INCOME -7.6953 (-0.30) — 0.56834 ( i.io) 0.54518 ( 1.10)
AGRATIO 1.4989 ( 2.27) 1.1102 ( 2.72) 0.029430 ( 2.10) 0.030431 ( 2.31)
HHSIZE 4.0788 ( 0.39) — -0.018933 (-0.09) —
MLABOUR -17.568 (-0.77) — -0.75132 (-1.56) -0.75246 (-1.72)
FLABOUR 29.392 ( 1.06) — 0.61105 ( 1.05) 0.75255 ( 1.56)
LANDAREA -2.3818 (-0.65) — -0.074344 (-0.96) -0.066188 (-0.93)
LEKIS -64.830 (-0.81) — 0.37181 ( 0.23) —
KISAM 419.25 ( 2.80) 380.17 ( 2.70) 4.6139 ( 1-47) 4.4274 ( 1.43)
FARMEXPE -0.64094 (-0.29) — 0.015725 ( 0.34) —
AGE 2.6615 ( 1-42) 2.2935 ( 2.02) 0.049453 ( 124) 0.062030 ( 2.50)
EDUCATE 16.027 ( 1.41) 19.581 ( 1-92) 0.33362 ( 1.40) 0.30418 ( 1.42)
EDUC2 -1.0513 (-1.49) -1.1693 (-1.76) -0.018890 (-1.27) -0.018204 (-1.28)
PROG 20.092 ( 3.01) 17.580 ( 2.93) 0.40034 ( 2.89) 0.41166 ( 3.02)
BATURAJA 0.35833 ( 1.89) 0.29569 ( 1-67) 0.012045 ( 2.93) 0.012057 ( 2.97)
PRABUMUL 11.174 ( 0.85) 10.781 ( 1.05) 0.37415 ( 1.32) 0.34735 ( 1.38)
PALEMBAN -0.63585 (-0.15) — -0.11456 (-1.21) -0.10413 (-1.15)
LAMPUNG -7.7425 (-1.72) -6.5923 (-1.51) -0.11383 (-1.29) -0.12135 (-1.28)
JAKARTA 61.902 ( 1-94) 47.527 ( 1.66) 0.63299 ( 0.95) 0.60445 ( 0.95)
SHOP -13.166 (-0.16) — -0.20490 (-0.12) —
SICKRETI 111.80 ( 1-32) 111.60 ( 1-74) 1.5240 ( 0.85) 1.2340 ( 0.87)
PJKA 29.531 ( 0.44) — 2.3285 ( 1.66) 2.3441 ( 2.34)
TEACHER 125.18 ( 1-37) 122.85 ( 1-45) 4.6544 ( 2.37) 4.5398 ( 2.41)
KERIO 114.60 ( 1.14) 158.18 ( 169) 2.7420 ( 1-27) 2.5563 ( 1.21)
KHOTIB -21.320 (-0.20) — 1.5929 ( 0.69) —
TENANT -137.44 (-2.50) -137.00 (-2.63) -1.5308 (-1.42) -1.6022 (-1.52)
CONSTANT -310.25 (-3.09) -270.32 (-3.91) -6.5790 (-3.12) -7.0243 (-3.63)
L.L.H. -366.06293 -367.86665 -163.06491 -163.41388
A.I.C. 7.1284 6.9612 3.4375 3.3530
R-SQUARE 0.4979 0.4748 0.4898 0.4844
Adj.R-sq 0.3489 0.3974 0.3380 0.3685
N 110 110 110 110
P 25 14 25 20
LR-TEST(a) 65.12616** 61.51872** 59.49576** 58.79782**
LR-TEST(b) --- 3.60744* — 0.69794*
Notes:
L.L.H. Value of log-likelihood function.
A.I.C. Akaike Information Criterion.
P Number of Explanatory Variables.
N Number of observations.
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios.
Variables statistically significant at less than 5 7. level (|t-ratio| > 1.98) 
in the optimal-sized regressions are discussed in the text.
(a) : Likelihood Ratio test against all zero coefficients.
(b) : Likelihood Ratio test against corresponding full size regression.
* no significant difference at 5 percent level,
significant at 0.5 percent level.* *
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percent of the variation is explained, and five explanatory variables are found to be 
significant. AGRATIO (the ratio of agricultural income), FLABOUR (female labour), 
KISAM (the location of Kisam), AGE (household head’s age), PROG (frequency of 
listening to radio agricultural programmes), and JAKARTA (frequency of visits to 
Jakarta)  are positive determinants. TENANT (being a tenant) is found to be a negative 
determinant.
About 49 percent of the variation of T1MEPASS (time since adoption) is explained 
in the full-sized regression. In the optimal-sized regression, about 48 percent of the 
variation is explained, and five variable are found to be significant. AGRATIO 
(proportion of agricultural income), AGE (household head’s age), PROG (frequency of 
listening to radio agricultural programmes), BATURAJA (visits to Baturaja), and 
TEACHER (being a teacher) are positive determinants.
PROG is found to be positive determinants for both dependent variables. This 
shows, as usually found in literature, that a villager who frequently listens to agricultural 
programmes on radio tends to adopt earlier and on a larger scale. AGRATIO and AGE 
are also found to be positive determinants for both dependent variables. The results 
suggest that a villager who relies more on agriculture and /or  who is older adopts citrus 
siam more and earlier.
Variables significant specifically for PLANTl (scale of adoption) are KISAM and 
TENANT. This may indicate that a better agro-economic environment of a villager’s 
household and farm stimulates him to adopt more. If his farm is located in the Kisam 
area (Figure 2-2), he adopts more due to wide areas of land being available after the 
cutting and burning of old rubber jungle. If a villager is a tenant, he cannot control what 
he grows, and his financial position is also likely to be poor; hence, he grows less or he 
may not have adopted citrus siam yet.
Variables significant specifically for T1MEPASS (time since adoption) are 
BATURAJA and TEACHER. This may imply that the information a villager receives, 
and his capability to digest it, are important to him in deciding the time of adoption. 
With more frequent visits to Baturaja, or being a teacher, a villager tends to adopt
earlier.
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6 .6 .2  S tep  B
Table  6-4 shows the results of regression analysis with Equation  (6.5) for the 
es tim ation  of re lative risk-aversion index and interdependence expectation  indices, and for 
the exclusion of income level. For P L A N T l (the scale of adoption),  there are very 
significant positive coefficients of (k = l ,2 , . . . ,1 7 ) ,  and  negative coefficients of Dj and 
D 2-15 For T1M EPASS (the time since adop tion),  similar bu t less significant results are 
observed. For tes ting  the hypotheses here, the  M onte-C arlo  m ethod is employed due to 
the complicacy of hypotheses and significantly correlated estim ated  coefficients. The 
ac tua l procedure is described in detail for the detection  of the Cancian  Dip in Appendix 
F.2.
6 .6 .2 .1  R e la t iv e  R is k -A v e r s io n  In d e x  o f  th e  I n d e p e n d e n c e  U t i l i t y  F u n c t io n
T he coefficients for Dj and D 2 were both significantly negative, as expected, and
R R
M onte-Carlo  significance tests for p. > 1 suggest th a t  the hypothesis, p. > 1, cannot be 
rejected for both scale of adoption (significance level =  5.45%) and time of adoption 
(significance level =  7.37%). It is therefore assumed in further analysis th a t  the Arrow- 
P ra t t  relative risk-aversion index of a villager’s independent utility function is constan t,  
and equals one.
6 .6 .2 .2  In te r d e p e n d e n c e  E x p e c ta t io n  In d e x
Table 6-5 shows the estim ated  interdependence expectation  indices of villagers who 
belong to basic associations. The indices for scale of adoption are significantly negative, 
excepting villagers of Basic Association 14, while those for time of adoption are a  little 
less significant.
T he indices estimated for each basic association from the two regressions are alm ost 
p ropor tionate  (correlation 0.8625), except for few' basic associations. This suggests th a t  
the interdependence expectation index is based on constan t  factors a t  least in the village 
and differentiated by types of adoption behaviour.
T he relation between the interdependence expectation  index, Qj, and the
^ D j ,  D 2 and D ^’s represent respectively -u>jj<7../2Xj, a . . /2X - and — DjJl-1-j)a../X- in Equation  
(6.5).
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Table 6-4: E s t im a t io n  o f  In te r d e p e n d e n c e  E x p e c ta t io n  In d ic e s
PLANT1 TIMEPASS - ~
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-RATIO COEFFICIENT T-RATIO
Dl -0.16157D+05 (-2.SI) -0.66647D+02 (-2.83)
D2 -0.91246D+05 (-2.93) -0.29981D+03 (-3.11)
D301 0.70363D+04 ( 3.50) 0.28852D+02 ( 0.66)
D302 0.10105D+05 ( 4.29) 0.15282D+03 ( 2.66)
D303 0.11000D+05 ( 3.99) 0.12201D+03 ( 2.00)
D304 0.83836D+04 ( 4.09) 0.10082D+03 ( 2.03)
D306 0.92769D+04 ( 4.10) 0.11359D+03 ( 2.11)
D307 0.95278D+04 ( 4.32) 0.96832D+02 ( 1.86)
D308 0.84094D+04 ( 3.97) 0.82099D+02 ( 1.70)
D310 0.66047D+04 ( 3.31) 0.85450D+02 ( 1-79)
D311 0.71030D+04 ( 3.29) 0.60234D+02 ( 1.17)
D312 0.99798D+04 ( 4.56) 0.12250D+03 ( 2-34)
D313 0.10338D+05 ( 4.77) 0.16331D+03 ( 2.81)
D314 0.47984D+04 ( 1-70) -0.46385D+02 (-0.59)
D315 0.67408D+04 ( 3.35) O .84685D+02 ( 1.79)
D316 0.92641D+04 ( 4.26) 0.95796D+02 ( 1-91)
D317 0.78393D+04 ( 3.54) 0.71280D+02 ( 1.36)
AGRATIO 0.46585D+00 ( 0.89) 0.24438D-01 ( 1.66)
INCOME 0.83002D + 01 ( 0.32) 0.77716D+00 ( 1.19)
HHSIZE 0.67610D+00 ( 0.10) -O.11773D+00 (-0.59)
MLABOUR -0.28674D+02 (-1.79) -0.81570D+00 (-1.82)
FLABOUR 0.19522D+02 ( 1.02) 0.56101D+00 ( 1-07)
LANDAREA 0.88267D+00 ( 0.30) -0.71916D-01 (-0.92)
LEKIS 0.93960D+02 ( 1.09) 0.41533D+01 ( 1-87)
KISAM 0.31902D+03 ( 2.89) 0.33286D+01 ( 1-08)
FARMEXPE 0.55742D+00 ( 0.36) 0.22703D-01 ( 0.54)
AGE 0.15737D+01 ( 1.17) 0.47916D-01 ( 1.35)
EDUCATE 0.14735D+02 ( 1-64) 0.44763D+00 ( 1.83)
EDUC2 -0.10689D+01 (-1.84) -0.28245D-01 (-1.76)
PROG O.13275D+02 ( 2.94) 0.28652D+00 ( 2.26)
BATURAJA 0.14899D+00 ( 1.12) 0.11719D-01 ( 2.91)
PRABUMUL -0.48698D+01 (-0.53) 0.23607D+00 ( 0.92)
PALEMBAN -0.21442D+01 (-0.70) -0.97384D-01 (-1.15)
LAMPUNG -0.54300D+01 (-2.01) -0.10105D+01 (-1.58)
JAKARTA 0.49903D+02 ( 2.32) 0.43920D+00 ( 0.74)
SHOP -0.69757D+02 (-1.17) -0.12611D+01 (-0.75)
SICKRETI 0.10028D+03 ( 1.71) 0.23211D+01 ( 1.41)
PJKA -0.20389D+01 (-0.03) -0.26529D+00 (-0.15)
TEACHER -0.21942D+03 (-2.05) -0.53214D+00 (-0.18)
KERIO -0.48922D+02 (-0.66) 0.19508D+01 ( 0.90)
KHOTIB -0.13110D+02 (-0.15) 0.28483D+01 ( 1.13)
TENANT -0.30763D+02 (-0.81) -0.70622D-01 (-0.07)
CONSTANT 0.30544D+03 ( 1.80) -O.25560D+00 (-0.07)
L.L.H. -333.98763 -147.61102
A.I.C. 6.8543 3.4657
R-SQUARE 0.8250 0.6625
LR-TEST 129.27676 90.40354
Notes:
Tobit analysis using Equation (6.5).
See also Notes of Table 6-3.
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F.2.
Table 6-5 : E stim ated  In terdependence E xpec ta tion  Indices
BASIC INTERDEPENDENCE EXPECTATION INTERDEPENDENCE
INDEX WEIGHT
ASSOCIATION PLANT 1 Qn TIMEPASS Q2i (AVERAGE) u>±± NO. VILLAGERS
1 -0.43551*** -0.43290 0.025420 20
2 -0.62542*** -2.2930 *** 0.041196 8
3 -0.68081*** -1.8307 ** 0.034988 3
4, 5 -0.51889*** -1.5128 * * 0.097725 9 ( B + 1 )
6 -0.57418* * * -1.7044 ** 0.032855 5
7 -0.58972*** -1.4529 ** 0.078573 7
8 -0.51907*** -1.2318 ** 0.048171 6
9
10 -0.40879*** -1.2821 ** 0.078659 6
11 -0.43963*** -0.90378 0.045023 5
12 -0.61770*** -1.8380 * * * O .090497 3
13 -0.63984*** -2.4504 *** 0.187424 4
14 -0.29700* +0.69599 0.307714 5
15 -0.41721*** -1.2707 ** 0.023111 7
16 -0.57338* * * -1.4374 ** 0.046746 15
17 -0.48521*** -1.0695 * 0.073719 7
AVERAGE -0.50914 -1.2198 TOTAL 110
S.D. 0.091441 0.69077
Qli = 0.36677 (2.71) o;ii -- 0.53402 (-42.78) (R=0.2528)
Q2\ = 3.0707 (3.03) w... - 1.4281 (-15.27) (R=0.2802)
Qli = 0.11418 (i7.7i) q2i - 0.36986 (-40.98) (R=0.8625)
Note :
Significance tests were conducted with Monte-Carlo methods. 
Asterisks denote significance levels.
*** less than 1 percent 
** less than 5 percent 
* less than 10 percent 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
in terdependence w eight, w -, is found to be significantly  positive for tw o dependent 
variables (regressions a t  bo ttom  of Table 6-5). T his resu lt, therefore, suggests th a t  the 
way a villager expects o th ers’ incom e changes may well be based on the type of behaviour
discussed in Section 5.6.6.
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6 .6 .2 .3  E x c lu s io n  o f  In c o m e  L evel
The coefficients for income levels were found to be insignificant for both scale of 
adoption and time of adoption. Income levels are thus not entered independently as a 
socio-economic characteristic in the function which relates a villager’s risk-premium and 
his adoption behaviour.
6 .6 .2 .4  S ca le  o f  A d o p tio n
Table 6-6 shows the results of regression analysis using Equations (6.9) and (6.10) 
for PLANT1 (scale of adoption).
In the full-sized regression based on Equation (6.10), about 82 percent of the 
variation in PLANT1 is explained, which is 30 percent more than in the regression 
without the interdependence variables. In the optimal-sized regression, about 78 percent is 
explained, and 14 variables are found to be significant.
Variables associated with the interdependence approach are all found to have the 
theoretically expected signs. Among income level variables (INCOME, INC2, INC3), only 
INCOME is found to be significant, others being excluded in the process of the backward 
elimination due to their low levels of statistical significance. Among the variables of 
independence coefficient (INDEPEND, INDEP2, INDEP3), only INDEP3 is excluded in 
the elimination process. VARLOSS (subjective variance of loss ratio) is also found to be a 
significantly negative determinant, as expected in Equation (5.84). The interdependence 
expectation index is a positive determinant, as expected in Equation (5.85).
Nine minor explanatory variables are significant. MLABOUR (male labour) is a 
significantly negative determinant of the scale of adoption. This suggests tha t  households 
with greater male labour tend to continue producing rubber or other crops, while 
households with smaller male labour forces adopt citrus siam to a greater extent because 
of its smaller labour requirements of this crop. FLABOUR (female labour) is found to be 
a positive determinant though less significant. This reinforces the earlier argument about 
labour requirements. Households with greater female labour forces grow more citrus, 
because post-planting activities for citrus siam are relatively light and quite manageable 
by female members.
KISAM (farm in Kisarri area) is a significantly positive determinant. In Kisam area,
Table 6-6: Tobit Analysis of Scale of Adoption
Equation (6.9) Equation (6 .10)
Full Size Full Size Optimal Size
REGRESSION T-RATIO REGRESSION T-RATIO REGRESSION T-RATIO
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
INCOME 0.31343D+2 ( 1-69) 0.89808D+2 ( 0.88) 0.47989D+2 ( 3.37)
INC2 -0.17655D+2 (-0.33)
INC3 0.14101D+1 ( 0.19)
INDEPEND 0.14925D+3 ( 0.36) 0.85681D+3 ( 0.49) 0.27310D+4 ( 3.62)
INDEP2 0.46092D+4 ( 0.43) -0.75815D+4 (-4.20)
INDEP3 -0.20340D+5 (-1.09)
VARLOSS -0.10697D+5 (-3.38) -0.10021D+5 (-3.32) -0.11119D+5 (-4.51)
Q 0.52605D+3 ( 3.18) 0.69088D+3 ( 4.12) 0.69356D+3 ( 4.62)
AGRATIO 0.25703D+0 ( 0.50) 0.27276D+0 ( 0.56)
HHSIZE -0.13081D+1 (-0.17) -0.25162D+0 (-0.04)
MLABOUR -0.27524D+2 (-1.64) -0.32712D+2 (-2.00) -0.38877D+2 (-2.88)
FLABOUR 0.22110D+2 ( 1.12) 0.18695D+2 ( i.oi) 0.19997D+2 ( 1-44)
LANDAREA 0.13601D+1 ( 0.48) 0.12483D+1 ( 0.45)
LEKIS 0.41018D+2 ( 0.68) 0.77485D+2 ( 1.34) 0.97894D+2 ( 1.92)
KISAM 0.32903D+3 ( 3.11) 0.33387D+3 ( 3.40) 0.39219D+3 ( 4.09)
FARMEXPE 0.79085D+0 ( 0.52) -0.30641D+0 (-0.22)
AGE 0.12482D+1 ( 0.94) 0.17351D+1 ( 1-40) 0.15089D+1 ( 2.01)
EDUCATE 0.19649D+2 ( 2.32) 0.18977D+2 ( 2.38) 0.23475D+2 ( 3.17)
EDUC2 -0.15374D+1 (-2.75) -0.15913D+1 (-2.94) -0.18310D+1 (-3.41)
PROG 0.13153D+2 ( 2.82) 0.14606D+2 ( 3.32) 0.14711D+2 ( 3.54)
BATURAJA 0.20368D+0 ( 1.55) 0.14677D+0 ( 1.20)
PRABUMUL -0.60890D+1 (-0.64) 0.56937D+1 ( 0.61)
PALEMBAN -0.13368D+0 (-0.04) -0.37207D+1 (-1.18) -0.29896D+1 (-1.24)
LAMPUNG -0.48610D+1 (-1.65) -0.42232D+1 (-1.61) -0.38770D+1 (-1.66)
JAKARTA 0.40592D+2 ( 1-73) 0.38230D+2 ( 1-70) 0.37801D+2 ( 2.09)
SHOP -0.77388D+2 (-1.24) -0.14813D+3 (-2.39) -0.12691D+3 (-2.37)
SICKRETI 0.10448D+3 ( 1.73) 0.15184D+3 ( 2.69) O.14342D+3 ( 2.69)
PJKA -O.10149D+2 (-0.22) 0.58008D+1 ( 0.13)
TEACHER -0.32195D+2 (-0.34) -0.17321D+3 (-1.80) -O.15162D+3 (-1.88)
KERIO -0.82934D+1 (-0.11) 0.22562D+2 ( 0.27)
KHOTIB -0.18764D+2 (-0.25) 0.62333D+1 ( 0.09)
TENANT -0.58549D+2 (-1.49) -0.33837D+2 (-0.91)
CONSTANT 0.75026D+3 ( 3.24) 0.71116D+3 ( 3.08) O.75459D+3 ( 4.12)
L.L.H. -342.27990 -334.37062 -336.77830
A.I.C. 6.7505 6.6795 6.4869
R-SqUARE 0.7458 0.8163 0.8019
ADJ.R-Sq 0.6579 0.7400 0.7601
N 110 110 110
P 28 32 19
LR-TEST(a) 112.69222** 128.51078** 123.69542**
(b) — — 4.81536*
Notes:
Tobit analysis using Equations (6.9) and (6.10).
See also Notes of Table 6-3.
(a) : Likelihood Ratio test against all zero coefficients.
(b) : Likelihood Ratio test against corresponding full-size regression.
* no significant difference at 5 percent level.
** significant at 0.5 percent level.
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large plots are available after opening old rubber plots. This  factor seems to  significantly 
affect the size of adoption. A G E (household h e a d ’s age) is also a  significantly positive 
determ inan t.  Since F A R M E X P E  (length of fa rm ing experience) and  A G E  are strongly 
correlated, th is  result suggests th a t  a villager who is older and has longer farming 
experience ad o p ts  more citrus siam.
Educational a t ta in m en t  (E D U C A T E  and ED U C2) is found to  affect the scale of 
adoption non-monotonically. There is a certain m axim um  effect point of educational 
a t ta in m en t ,  corresponding with the sixth year of prim ary education. After primary 
education, educational a t ta in m en t  had a decreased but positive effect on scale of 
adoption, and after jun ior high school education (12 educational a t ta in m en t  point, See 
Table 2 - 3 ) ,^  it affected it negatively. Most villagers have only prim ary  education or less, 
and those with higher educational a t ta in m en t  may possess o ther  socio-economic 
characteristics which reduce the educational influence.
PRO G  (listening to radio agricultural program m es) is found to be a  highly 
significant d e te rm inan t  of adoption. JA K A R T A  (visits to J a k a r ta )  is significant.
SHOP (shop-owner) is a  negative de term inan t.  Running a  grocery shop is a  busy 
occupation, and shop owners usually cannot spare much time for farming even though 
they have farm plots.
S1CKRET1 (semi-retired from trade) is a  positive de term inan t.  J u s t  before villagers 
retired or semi-retired, they planted large areas of citrus siam, using capital they had 
accum ulated through their business. They adop ted  citrus siam owing to  its smaller 
labour requirement. It was often said in the village th a t  income from citrus siam 
production is a  pension, and th a t  citrus siam can be inherited by sons.
*®The ratio of the coefficient of EDUCATE to that of EDUC2 is 12.78, 11.93 and 12.82 in the 
three regressions in Table 6-6.
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6 .6 .2 .5  T im e o f  A d op tion
T able  6-7 shows the results of regression analysis of E quations (6.9) and (6.10) for 
the tim e of adoption. In the  full-sized regression based on Equation (6.10), about 70 
percent of the varia tion  in T IM EPA SS is explained; this is 20 percent more than  in the 
model w ith o u t  the interdependence variables. In the  optimal-sized regression, about 69 
percent is explainned, and 11 variables are found to  be significant, with relationships 
being quite  similar to those already discussed for scale of adoption.
Polynom ials  of income level and independence coefficient (IN CO M E, INC2, INC3, 
IN D E PE N D , IN D EP2, IN D EP3) and in terdependence expecta tion  index (Q) all have the 
expected signs, except for INC3 which was excluded in the elimination process. The 
subjective variance of loss ratio  in c itrus siam production (VARLOSS) is found 
insignificant, as might also be an ticipated . The present values of this variable would not 
seem likely to have any relation with the pas t  decision on t im e of adoption.
Among other minor de term inants ,  LEKIS and A G E  are found to be significant, and 
to be different from the results w ithout the  interdependence variables. If a villager has a 
farm house in Lekis, he tends to adopt earlier due to the strong  influence from Javanese 
m ig ran ts  in the  neighbouring area. They have, as m entioned elsewhere, large areas of 
c itrus siam using sap lings/budgrafts  smuggled directly from Java. A G E  may have 
represented a  villager’s farming experience. As examined in Section 6.6.1.1, a  villager’s 
age and farm ing experience are strongly correlated and it was to be expected th a t  one of 
these variables would be excluded in the elimination process.
B A T U R A JA  (visits to B aturaja)  is found to be significant. A villager who more 
frequently visits B aturaja ,  the nearest town, adop ts  citrus siam earlier. Knowledge of 
citrus siam production may have been acquired by frequent visits to B a tu ra ja  where 
citrus siam traders  gather and m arket their  citrus siams.
Educational a t ta in m en t  (E D U C A T E , EDUC2) also has a similar effect, and the 
m axim um  positive effect is obtained a t  a  value of 7 for the proxy. This is equivalent to 
graduation  from primary schooling. When the educational a t ta in m en t  proxy value 
exceeds 13 points, which is equivalent to the second year of senior high school education, 
the effect becomes negative.
Table 6-7: Tobit Analysis of Time of Adoption
Equation (6.9)
Full Size
REGRESSION T-RATIO
Equation (6.10) 
Full Size
REGRESSION T-RATIO
Optimal Size 
REGRESSION T-RATIO
VARIABLE
INCOME
INC2
INC3
INDEPEND
INDEP2
INDEP3
VARLOSS
Q
AGRATIO
HHSIZE
MLABOUR
FLABOUR
LANDAREA
LEKIS
KISAM
FARMEXPE
AGE
EDUCATE
EDUC2
PROG
BATURAJA
PRABUMUL
PALEMBAN
LAMPUNG
JAKARTA
SHOP
SICKRETI
PJKA
TEACHER
KERIO
KHOTIB
TENANT
CONSTANT
COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
0.12101D+1 ( 2.66) 0.41304D+1 ( 1.56) 0.24955D+1 ( 2.38)-0.12590D+1 (-0.90) -0.31034D+0 (-1.50)
0.13309D+0 ( 0.70)
O .22057D+1 ( 0.26) 0.10335D+3 ( 2.18) 0.10140D+3 ( 2.52)-0.53215D+3 (-1.80) -0.50349D+3 (-2.10)
0.76068D+3 ( 1-47) 0.68305D+3 ( 1.69)
-0.63778D+2 (--1.16) -0.54873D+2 (-1.06) -0.61542D+2 (-1.33)0.23351D+1 ( 3.75) 0.25931D+1 ( 4.00) 0.28088D+1 ( 4.62)0.21740D-1 ( 1.69) 0.20702D-1 ( 1.68) 0.12541D-1 ( 1-42)-0.17775D+0 (--0.93) -0.15565D+0 (-0.84) -0.19506D+0 (-1.16)-0.68045D+0 (■-1.59) -0.10107D+1 (-2.35) -0.83072D+0 (-2.20)0.68109D+0 ( 1.37) 0.70033D+0 ( 1.49) 0.64366D+0 ( 1.51)-0.76320D-1 (--1.11) -0.33911D-1 (-0.48)0.30696D+1 ( 2.01) 0.32656D+1 ( 2.15) 0.36172D+1 ( 2.52)0.39531D+1 ( 1.50) 0.43118D+1 ( 1-70) 0.36941D+1 ( 1.55)0.30783D-1 ( 0.81) 0.11672D-1 ( 0.32)0.42204D-1 ( 1.28) 0.45035D-1 ( 1-43) 0.53868D-1 ( 2.69)0.47678D+0 ( 2.23) 0.52749D+0 ( 2.53) 0.52433D+0 ( 2.81)-0.30664D-1 (■-2.20) -0.38947D-1 (-2.75) -0.38247D-1 (-3.06)0.29911D+0 ( 2.57) 0.30426D+0 ( 2.70) 0.28706D+0 ( 2.74)0.11337D-1 ( 3.22) 0.10187D-1 ( 3.05) 0.94713D-2 ( 3.05)0.27932D+0 ( 1.14) 0.33327D+0 ( 1.31) 0.38845D+0 ( 1.58)-0.79232D-1 (-1.02) -0.11539D+0 (-1.42) -0.12973D+0 (-1.67)-0.10382D+0 (-1.81) -0.79423D-1 (-1.37) -0.67833D-1 (-1.24)0.41301D+0 ( 0.73) 0.53267D+0 ( 0.94)-0.15706D+1 (-0.98) -0.17957D+1 (-1.10) -0.21210D+1 (-1.37)0.22073D+1 ( 1.43) 0.27691D+1 ( 1.83) 0.27134D+1 ( 1.84)0.63051D+0 ( 0.51) O.10684D+1 ( 0.90)0.80736D+0 ( 0.37) O.56815D+0 ( 0.25)0.86873D+0 ( 0.44) -0.86076D+0 (-0.40)0.27277D+1 ( 1.39) 0.19237D+1 ( 101) 0.19725D+1 ( 1.12)-0.38706D+0 (-0.42) -0.17316D+0 (-0.19)0.76501D+0 ( 0.19) -0.39380D+1 (-0.94) -0.19894D+1 (-0.56)
L.L.H. 150.93232 -145.28583 -146.31331
A.I.C. 3.2715 3.2597 3.1148
R-SQUARE 0.6413 0.7040 0.6884
ADJ.R-SQ 0.5173 0.5755 0.6004
N 110 110 110
P 28 33 24
LR-TEST(a) 93.76094** 95.05392** 92.99896**
(b) — — 2.05496*
Notes:
Tobit analysis using Equations (6.9) and (6.10).
See also Notes of Table 6-3.
(a) : Likelihood Ratio test against all zero coefficients.
(b) : Likelihood Ratio test against corresponding full-size regression
* no significant difference at 5 percent level.
** significant at 0.5 percent level.
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6 .6 .3  S te p  C
As already detailed, Cancian (1967, 1979) used income quartiles and found 
“upper-m iddle class conservatism ” , which was a  curvilinear effect of socio-economic s ta tu s  
(represented by income level) on villagers’ innovativeness. T he interdependence approach
. 1 7
also dem onstra tes  such a curvilinear effect on scale of ad o p t io n .1'
In this section, the curvilinear relationships between ( l )  income and (2) scale of 
adoption , t im e of adoption, and the num ber of adop ters  are first examined using income 
quartiles. These relationships excepting the num ber of adop ters  are next examined using 
the results of Tobit analysis with polynomials of a  single socio-economic s ta tu s  variable 
and also with all other variables included.
T a b le  6-8: Income Q uartiles Analysis
(a)
Quartile Average
Income
(Rp.)
PLANT1 
(No.)
TIMEPASS
(Yr.)
Adopters
25%
(Apr.80)
50%
(Jun.83)
No. of 
Villagers
1 441519 30.7 0.73 7.41% 29.63% 27
2 722014 50.1 1.31 17.86% 50.00% 28
3 1089953 99.7 1.86 29.63% 59.26% 27
4 2155268 105.0 2.85 46.43% 60.71% 28
All 1108306 71.5 1.69 25.45% 50.00% 110
Notes: (a) At 25% and 50% adoption levels in the village.
Table  6-8 shows th a t  the average num ber of citrus siam trees planted, average time 
of adoption  and proportions of adopters (a t  both 25 and 50 percent adoption levels) all 
increase with rising income quartile.
T here  is no obvious Cancian Dip observed in this case.
17See Figure 5-1 in Chapter 5 , page 214.
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According to  C an cian ’s second hypothesis, th ere  m ay be a  g rea te r possibility  of a 
C ancian  Dip a t  early stages of the adoption  process. A ctually , in B elatung , there  was 
seemingly a  C ancian Dip righ t a t the beginning stage (abou t four percen t adop tion  level 
in 1977 w ith four ad o p ters). However, since p resen t incom e levels w ere used for 
co nstruc ting  the incom e quartiles, the situa tion  six years previously m ay no t be well 
represen ted . In add ition , the  very small num ber of to ta l ad o p ters  a t  th a t  stage m ay lead 
to  a  m isleading conclusion.
T he second hypothesis also indicates th a t  the  upper-m iddle class villagers are quick 
to  ca tch  up the upper class villagers a t  la te r stages. T his s itu a tio n  is a p p a ren t in Table 
6-8. W hile there was a 14 percent increase in term s of the  proportion  of ad o p te rs  in the 
upper class, there was a 30 percent increase in the upper-m iddle class. T his observation 
su p p o rts  the second hypothesis.
T he results of the T o b it regression analyses of the curv ilinear effect of socio­
econom ic s ta tu s , m easured in term s of income level (IN C O M E ), incom e ranking  (RA N K ), 
subjective relative income (R ELIN C ), independence coefficient (IN D E P E N D ) and 
independence weight (W E IG H T ) on the scale of adoption  (PL A N T ) and the  tim e of 
adop tion  (T1M EPASS) are shown in T ables 6-9 and 6-10 respectively.
Socio-economic s ta tu s , as represented by villagers’ independence coefficients, best 
explains the  scale of adop tion , w ith  a  R-square 0.3711. T he coefficients of the  polynom ials 
ind icate  th a t  there is a  gap between 0.1835 and 0.2851, w ith a b o tto m  a t 0.2512 on the 
scale of the  independence coefficient. However, in th is  gap there  is only one villager, 
whose independence coefficient is 0.1976. Therefore, it is not felt th a t  the existence of the 
gap has s ta tis tica l significance. The significance of the  existence of a C ancian Dip was 
tested  by a  M onte-C arlo m ethod , which is explained in detail in A ppendix F .2. The 
probab ility  of a C ancian Dip w ith these estim ated  coefficients is merely 66.63 percent, 
which is equivalent to  a  significance level of 33.37 percent (one-side tes t) . T he existence 
of a  C ancian  Dip w ith th is low percentage cannot be accepted.
T he results of regression analysis w ith all o ther variab les on scale of adop tion  in 
T ab le  6-6 show also the insignificance of the existence of the C ancian Dip. The 
coefficients of polynom ials of IN C O M E and IN D E PE N D  are all insignificant in th e  full- 
sized regression.
Table 6-9: Simple C urvilinearity  Tests  - 1
Scale of Adoption and Socio-Economic S ta tu s
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VARIABLE COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
INCOME 0.36791D+2 ( 1.59) 0.22632D+3 ( 3.45) 0.22890D+3 ( 1.28)
INC2 -0.41735D+2 (-3.09) -0.43189D+2 (-0.45)
INC3 0.19762D+0 ( 0.02)
CONSTANT -0.49089D+2 (-1.44) -0.17542D+3 (-3.30) -0.17655D+3 (-1.97)
L.L.H. -0.39739D+3 -0.39251D+3 -0.39251D+3
R-SQUARE 0.0123 0.1174 0.1172
AIC 7.26163 7.19102 7.20920
ADJ.R-SQ. 0.0031 0.1009 0.0922
RELINC 0.35515D+2 ( 1-32) 0.24558D+3 ( 3.20) 0.33664D+3 ( 1.57)
RELINC2 -0.51078D+2 (-2.90) -0.10735D+3 (-0.86)
RELINC3 0.85058D+1 ( 0.45)
CONSTANT -0.45771D+2 (-1.26) -0.18003D+3 (-3.07) -0.21708D+3 (-2.16)
L.L.H. -0.39776D+3 -0.39342D+3 -0.39332D+3
R-SQUARE 0.0076 0.0928 0.0907
AIC 7.26841 7.20770 7.22400
ADJ.R-SQ.-0.0016 0.0758 0.0650
RANK 0.19102D+1( 3.04) 0.32393D+1 ( 1.15) -0.15944D+00 (-1.98)
RANK2 -0.10418D-1 (-0.49) 0.53033D-01 ( 0.37)
RANK3 -0.33474D-03 (-0.45)
CONSTANT -0.12721D+3 (-2.81) -0.15931D+3 (-1.98) -0.11367D+03 (-0.88)
L.L.H. -0.39396D+3 -0.39384D+3 -0.39374D+3
R-SQUARE 0.0764 0.0788 0.0811
AIC 7.19919 7.21341 7.23158
ADJ.R-SQ 0.0678 0.0616 0.0551
INDEPEND 0.13135D+4 ( 5.29) 0.27445D+4 ( 2.88) O .68254D+04 ( 3.21)
IND2 -0.40500D+4 (-1.57) -0.32181D+05 (-2.44)
IND3 0.49350D+05 ( 2.18)
CONSTANT -0.78605D+2 (-3.42) -0.13546D+3 (-3.13) -0.25775D+03 (-3.59)
L.L.H. -0.38446D+3 -0.38323D+3 -0.38085D+3
R-SQUARE 0.3079 0.3127 0.3711
AIC 7.02652 7.02238 6.99733
ADJ.R-SQ. 0.3015 0.2999 0.3533
WEIGHT 0.10402D+4 ( 5.27) 0.16624D+4 ( 3.42) 0.30577D+4 ( 2.80)
WEIGHT2 -0.15207D+4 (-1.41) -0.99077D+4 (-1.67)
WEIGHT3 O.H346D+5 ( 1.44)
CONSTANT -0.68378D+2 (-3.09) -0.93792D+2 (-3.26) -0.13150D+3 (-3.34)
L.L.H. -0.38458D+3 -0.38358D+3 -0.38254D+3
R-SQUARE 0.2863 0.2997 0.3275
AIC 7.02879 7.02880 7.02799
ADJ.R-SQ 0.2797 0.2866 0.3085
Table 6-10: Simple Curvilinearity Tests - 2
Time of Adoption and Socio-Economic Status
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VARIABLE COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
INCOME 0.95883D+0 ( 2.05) 0.46430D+1 ( 3.50) 0.59836D+1 ( 1-64)
INC2 -0.80658D+0 (-2.98) -0.15617D+1 (-0.81)
INC3 0.10270D+0 ( 0.39)
CONSTANT -0.90447D+0 (-1.31) -0.33711D+1 (-3.14) -0.39508D+1 ( 2.17)
L.L.H. -0.19075D+3 -0.18624D+3 -0.18616D+3
R-SQUARE 0.0342 0.1419 0.1402
A.I.C. 3.50450 3.44071 3.45748
ADJ.R-SQ. 0.0253 0.1259 0.1159
RELINC 0.95451D+0 ( 1-76) 0.50202D+1 ( 3.22) 0.86725D+1 ( 1-98)
RELINC2 -0.98256D+0 (-2.78) -0.32431D+1 (-1.27)
RELINC3 0.34194D+0 ( 0.90)
CONSTANT -0.85271D+0 (-1.17) -0.34644D+1 (-2.91) -0.49414D+1 (-2.41)
L.L.H. -0.19128D+3 -0.18734D+3 -0.18693D+3
R-SQUARE 0.0243 0.1086 0.1123
A.I.C. 3.51420 3.46065 3.47146
ADJ.R-SQ. 0.0153 0.0919 0.0872
RANK 0.43142D-1 ( 3.40) 0.63392D-1 ( 1-13) 0.71598D-1 ( 0.44)
RANK2 -0.15855D-3 (-0.37) -0.31185D-3 (-0.11)
RANK3 0.80894D-6 ( 0.05)
CONSTANT -0.25176D+1 ( 2.78) -0.30097D+1 (-1.87) -0.31195D+1 (-1.20)
L.L.H. -0.18696D+3 -0.18689D+3 -0.18689D+3
R-SQUARE 0.1174 0.1173 0.1175
A.I.C. 3.43562 3.45255 3.47071
ADJ.R-SQ. 0.1092 0.1008 0.0925
INDEPEND 0.25162D+2 ( 4.81) 0.42787D+2 ( 2.09) 0.17026D+3 ( 3.87)
IND2 -0.49770D+2 (-0.89) -0.93553D+3 (-3.40)
IND3 0.15593D+4 ( 3.29)
CONSTANT -0.12525D+1 (-2.53) -0.19622D+1 (-2.09) -0.56847D+1 (-3.89)
L.L.H. -0.18112D+3 -0.18073D+3 -0.17530D+3
R-SQUARE 0.2659 0.2546 0.3993
A.I.C. 3.32950 3.34049 3.25996
ADJ.R-SQ. 0.2591 0.2407 0.3823
WEIGHT 0.21304D+2 ( 5.26) 0.27220D+2 ( 2.75) 0.78560D+2 ( 3.61)
WEIGHT2 -0.14403D+2 (-0.65) -0.32646D+3 (-2.77)
WEIGHT3 0.42371D+3 ( 2.70)
CONSTANT -0.10833D+1 (-2.38) -0.13323D+1 (-2.24) -0.26362D+1 (-3.44)
L.L.H. -0.17882D+3 -0.17861D+3 -0.17496D+3
R-SQUARE 0.3131 0.3082 0.4099
A.I.C. 3.28758 3.30193 3.25389
ADJ.R-SQ. 0.3067 0.2953 0.3932
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W ith respect to the curvilinear effect of socio-economic s ta tu s  on tim e of adoption 
(Table 6-10), the interdependence weight (W E IG H T ) is the best explanator.  The three 
coefficients estim ated  suggest th a t  there is a gap between 0.1924 and 0.3858, with a 
bo ttom  a t  0.3213 on the scale of the in terdependence weight. There are seven villagers in 
this gap. All of them  are si tuated  a t  the left side down-slope of the gap. The significance 
level is 27.99 percent (one-tailed test) .  Again, therefore, the existence of a gap canno t be 
statistically  accepted.
The second best results are shown by the in terdependence coefficient (IN D E P E N D ), 
and the results suggest th a t  there is a gap between 0.1400 and 0.3200, with a  b o ttom  at 
0.2600. There are six villagers who fall into this gap, three on the left side down-slope 
and three on the right side up-slope. S tatistically  this gap has a  significance level of 7.94 
percent (one-tailed test) .  Although this is be tte r  than  the significance of the gap detected 
with the interdependence weight, it is statis tically  still unacceptable.
In the full-sized regression in Table 6-7, coefficients of IN D E PE N D  show relatively 
high significance levels. However, the s ta tis tica l  significance test of the Cancian Dip 
shows 9.34 percent level of significance. This is also unacceptable.
6 .7  I n te r p r e ta t io n s
The statistical results presented in the last section are strongly indicative th a t  the 
interdependence approach is superior to a non-interdependence approach in explaining 
villagers’ adoption behaviour.
As shown in Tables 6-3, 6-6 and 6-7, only 50 percent of the variation in the scale of 
adoption is explained w ithout variables associated with the interdependence approach, 
but with these variables 82 percent is explained. Similarly, the incorporation of the 
variables associated with the interdependence approach significantly increases the 
explanatory  power. The adjusted R-square increases by 0.3911 and the A.I.C. decreases 
by 0.4489. Only abou t  49 percent of the varia tion  in the time of adoption is explained 
w ithou t the interdependence variables, bu t  with these variables abou t  70 percent is 
explained. Similarly the incorporation of these variables considerably increases the 
explanatory  power. The adjusted R-square increases by 0.2375 and the A.I.C. decreases 
by 0.1778.
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T he variables of a  villager’s risk-premium are all very significant in explaining the 
scale of adoption, and all bu t  the subjective variance of loss ra tio  are very significant in 
explaining the time of adoption. Since the subjective variance of loss ra tio  is a  variable 
which represents a villager’s present condition in term s of the quality  of information 
abou t the citrus siam production, it cannot represent the quality  of information he had at 
his time of adoption. And it may be th a t  the particu lar  measure chosen did not reflect 
the ac tua l subjective variance very well. This la t te r  result may accordingly be expected.
T he interdependence expectation index is found to be negative for all villagers, 
excepting Basic Association 14. This means th a t  villagers generally hold the view th a t  an 
increase in his income level causes decreases in o thers’ income levels. According to  the 
analysis in Section 5.6.6, this is not difficult to understand. This s ituation  can happen 
when villagers are facing price elastic dem and for their agricu ltura l products  or their 
subjective shares in the  to ta l  village income are very small. While the relationship 
between the interdependence expectation index and the price elasticities of dem and for 
agricultural products could not be tested , the relationship between the index and 
villagers’ subjective shares were found to be positive. This supports  the in terpre ta tion  
based on the supply-demand diagram s (Figure 5-7 on page 231).
As a by-product of the villagers’ negative interdependence expectation indices, the 
relations between (1) their adoption behaviour, i.e., scale and time of adoption, and (2) 
income levels and independence coefficient, are theoretically predicted to be monotonic, 
o ther things remaining equal. The gaps detected by polynomials in regressions with other 
variables are all found to  be statistically  insignificant. This is also the case for the gaps 
detected in regressions w ithou t  other variables. This proposition is, therefore, supported 
empirically.
T hus  the analysis provides support to the interdependence approach, as it shows 
greater ability to explain adoption behaviour, and as s ta tis tica l  tes ts  show th a t  its 
theoretical propositions can be accepted.
T he  contextual effect in this study is represented by several variables, independence 
coefficient (1NDEPEND), subjective variance of loss ra tio  (VARLOSS), and 
interdependence expectation index (Q). These three explanatory variables are com ponents
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of a  villager’s risk-premium, and were all found to be significant and to  have th e  expected 
signs. It therefore seems th a t  the con tex tua l effect is successfully represented  by the 
interdependence variables above.
Among individual socio-economic characteristics, several variables showed 
interesting  results. Family labour availability , educational a t ta in m en t  and listening to 
radio agricultural program mes were found to  be very significant.
Family labour availability was incorporated  into the regression analysis in three 
forms: (1) num ber of male labourers (15-60 years old) (2) num ber of female labourers 
(15-60 years old) and (3) num ber of household members. Male labour was found to  be a 
negative de term inan t  of citrus siam adoption. Female labour and household size were 
found not significant. This sexual differentiation of labour force availability  can be 
in terpre ted  as representing the actual sexual differentiation of labour in relation to 
villagers’ rubber smallholdings and citrus siam production. As discussed in Section 6.2.3, 
if a villager finds th a t  citrus siam production is labour-saving, in comparison with his 
rubber smallholding or the production of o ther crops, he may leave his c itrus  siam 
production in his wife’s hands and try to pursue o ther economic opportunit ies  inside or 
outside the village. P lo ts  suitable for c itrus siam production are often found near the 
village’s residential area or along the Ogan river, which are easily accessible to  women, 
and m ain tenance activities required for citrus siam are much less in te rm s of hours. 
Villagers seem to perceive th a t  the m ajor activities for citrus siam production are 
p lan ting  and harvesting, which are concentrated  in July and December. T rim m ing  and 
weeding are not considered as im p ortan t .  On the o ther hand, ac tivities required for 
rubber production are alm ost daily m atte rs .  Once villagers decide to collect latex during a 
week, they have to work from early in the morning till noon on a t  least th ree  or four 
days, in order to sell a slab(s) of a reasonable size once a week (on Tuesday). T he typical 
villager of Belatung has a good num ber of rubber trees which can still produce latex. 
Therefore, if he has a  large male labour force available in the household, he is more likely
1 O
1 MLABOUR is found to be significant only in the regression with interdependence variables. 
The interdependence approach seems to have contributed in finding determinants otherwise 
undetected.
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to  continue tap p in g  these. If he has smaller male labour force, however, he is likely to 
consider o ther opportunities ,  like citrus siam production, for which not much male labour 
seems to  be required.
Educational a t ta in m en t  was found to have its m axim um  effect on adoption 
behaviour a t  a level corresponding to the sixth grade of the  prim ary education (proxy =  
6) or the g raduation  from the  primary education (proxy =  7), depending on w hat 
dependent variables were a n a ly s e d .^  Most villagers have educational a t ta in m en t  levels 
of less th an  7, which is equivalent to graduating  from prim ary school, and the effect of 
educational a t ta in m e n t  on c itrus siam adoption behaviour increases up to this level. It 
appeared th a t  there  was a  negative effect a t  a  high educational a t ta in m en t  level. 
Villagers with higher educational a t ta in m en t  correspond, however, to various non-farming 
occupational dum m y variables. Considering this, it may be hasty  to  conclude th a t  higher 
educational a t ta in m en t  has a  negative effect on c itrus siam adoption behaviour.
A nother hum an capital factor, listening to radio agricu ltura l programmes, was also 
found to  be a very significant positive de te rm inan t  of citrus siam adoption behaviour. 
A gricultural b roadcasts  include a reasonable am o u n t  of information on citrus siam 
production techniques, and other economic information. T he significant relationship 
found in this s tudy implies th a t  the type of information provided through radio 
program m es has some influence on villagers’ decision-making, and th a t  listening to  the 
agricultural radio programmes tend  to have an effect on citrus siam adoption behaviour.
^R efe r  to Table 2-3 for the definition of the educational attainment proxy. EDUCATE and 
EDUC2 are significant only in the regressions with interdependence variables. The 
interdependence approach seems to have contributed in finding determinants otherwise undetected.
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C H A P T E R  7 
C on clu sion s
7.1  S u m m a r y
Neo-classical economic analysis generally uses a model of hum an behaviour which 
tre a ts  individuals as atom istic , a s tru c tu ra l ,  self-interested, and independent beings. 
However, during the recent past, a  considerable l i te ra tu re  has grown developing models 
which will be tte r  appreciate  hum an behaviour. In this contex t,  there is increasing 
recognition th a t  individuals’ decisions are often greatly influenced by their social 
relationships, including their relative positions in society and interactions with o ther 
m em bers in society. This has led to the development of models where individuals’ u tility  
functions, in addition to the conventional variables such as own income, also contain 
a t t r ib u te s  of other persons as argum ents.  However, the a t te m p ts  to incorporate the 
relative social position of the individual into a utility function framework is yet in its 
infancy; a t te m p ts  made so far are ra ther  simplistic.
On the other hand, the sociological and anthropological l i terature has paid greater  
a t ten t io n  to these aspects for a long time. Techniques and approaches developed for 
analysis of a person’s social position can provide a useful source of ideas and concepts for 
economists to develop more realistic economic models of hum an behaviour. In particu lar,  
the techniques of network analysis used in sociology and anthropology, which have many 
similarities with inpu t-ou tpu t  analysis in economics, appear to show much promise as a 
useful approach for economists.
In this thesis, an a t te m p t  is m ade to draw on this body of 
sociological/anthropological l i terature to  develop a  model of utility maximisation which 
explicitly incorporates both social rank and social position. This approach is called in 
this thesis the interdependence approach.
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T o enable empirical testing , the particu la r  model developed was designed to explain 
the adoption  process of innovation in the con tex t of a  reasonably close-knit social setting. 
D a ta  were collected from a  village in South S u m a tra  where farm ers who traditionally  
grew rubber had rapidly adopted  a  new crop “citrus s iam ” . T he general model was 
modified to  address this par ticu la r  s i tuation , and empirically tes tab le  implications were 
developed and statistically  tested. In the course of this, some light was shed on 
de te rm inan ts  of adoption th a t  may have wider relevance.
In form ulating  an interdependence u tility  model, economic models of the contextual 
effect were reviewed. The contex tua l effect is an aggregated effect of economic 
externalities th rough relationships between an agen t and a  set of o ther agents. Relative 
income utility  models, in which an ag e n t’s relative income level is incorporated as an 
argum en t of his utility function, were found to be special cases of in terdependent 
preference models. The basically sociological concept of the “reference group” , which has 
been incorporated  into several in terdependent preference models, was identified as a 
crucial concept for an agent in perceiving his own relative income level. Thus the agent 
does not refer to  all agents in his surroundings, bu t  only to  a small set of o ther agents in 
gaining his perception of his own relative income level. It was decided to  construct an 
interdependence utility function including an ag e n t’s subjective relative income level and 
his absolute income level as a rgum ents ,  and to analyse his risk a t t i tu d e  derived from this 
function. T he function was specifically developed in a m anner designed to address 
questions of new technology adoption.
As formulated, a person’s subjective relative income level is the ra tio  of his income 
level to  the weighted average income level of all persons in a  system. Weights represent 
the degree of influence of the m em bers of his reference group, and the “interdependence 
coefficients” were used for this purpose. In o ther words, a  person’s interdependence is 
regarded as his weight to the o th e r ’s income in his subjective consideration of an average 
income of the system (village). F rom  this interdependence utility function, a person’s 
risk-premium was derived. This  provided a new viewpoint from which the person’s risk 
a t t i tu d e  could be examined. T h e  key factor is the  interdependence expectation effect, i.e, 
the person’s perception of opportunit ies  to increase his income level, and of o thers’
280
opportun it ies  to  do the same. If the  person believes th a t  his income increase is negatively 
correlated w ith  o thers’ income increases, this raises his risk-averseness. On the  o ther 
hand, if he th inks th a t  his income change is positively correlated with o th e rs ’ income 
changes, he becomes less risk-averse and possibly risk-taking.
T hus ,  the interdependence expectation  effect controls relationships between ( l )  a 
person’s income level and independence coefficient and (2) his risk-premium. If a person’s 
in terdependence expectation index is negative, these relationships are monotonically 
decreasing, b u t  if the index is positive (or ra th e r  more precisely greater th an  a certain 
positive value), they are not monotonic. T he risk-premium was then rela ted  to  the 
adoption behaviour, such as t im e and scale of adoption.
In this model, the relationship between adoption behaviour and income level is not a 
m onotonic one, but, is consistent with w ha t Cancian called “upper-middle class 
conservatism ” . It was shown th a t  if the crop has an inelastic dem and with respect to its 
price, the  possibility of the positive index increases. This is likely to be the case for 
subsistence crop) which have a limited regional market. This can also provide an 
explanation of the observation th a t  the Cancian Dip is found more frequently in areas 
where subsistence crops are grown, th an  in cash crop areas.
On the  o ther hand, if the person’s interdependence expectation index is negative, 
the relation above is a monotonically increasing one, and corresponds to  the situation  
widely analysed in studies of adoption behaviour by both economists and sociologist. In 
this case, this interdependence approach successfully presented an in tegrated  framework 
for both cases.
Tw o m ajor approaches in network analysis were reviewed, and it was found th a t  
B u r t ’s s truc tu ra l  (equivalence) approach can overcome the weakness of the relational 
approach , and th a t  it can quantify the intensity  of relations or influence am ong agents  in 
the system.
Network analysis was used to  identify relational and s tructu ra l  associations of 
persons according to their kinship, economic exchanges, and direct agricultural 
inform ation networks. By cross-tabulating  persons according to their m em bership of 
relational and  s tructura l associations, basic associations were identified. A basic
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association is a  set of persons who share a lm ost identical agricultural inform ation, and 
play similar roles in d isseminating agricultural information. It is a reference group for a 
person. The characteris tics  of relational associations were briefly discussed, and 
“interdependence coefficients” am ong persons were derived quan tita t ive ly  for the 
empirical analyses. These interdependence coefficients, then, became the  weights in the 
utility function to represent the degrees of influence of the members of these reference 
groups.
Information has been considered extremely im p o rtan t  in the adoption process. Two 
types of information can be distinguished. A person can immediately m ake use of 
knowledge based on his own experience in adopting  and using the  agricultural innovation, 
and he can also utilise the information based on the experiences of others. This indirect 
information may be the crucial inpu t in the pre-adoption stages. However, this indirect 
information will be evaluated by the person according to his relationship with the  given 
source of the information. The network of relationships am ong all potential adopters  of 
the agricultural innovation should thus be recognised an im p o rtan t  element.
The d a ta  for empirical testing  of the model came from a village in South S u m atra  
where farmers who had traditionally  grown rubber were rapidly adopting  a  new crop 
“citrus s iam ” .
The locations of citrus siam adopters  and non-adopters  in the village network 
system were examined, and it was found th a t  the lag between the times of adoption  of 
two adop ters  is very well determ ined by their interdependence coefficients and various 
in teractions, as well as by differences in their economic factors and socio-economic 
characteristics.
Belatung villagers were found to have negative interdependence expectation  indices, 
as expected from their long history of cash crop production. It was also found th a t  their 
interdependence expectation  indices were alm ost identical in any type of adoption 
behaviour, i.e., scale and t im e of adoption. The relations between their adoption 
behaviour, i.e., scale and time of adoption , and their income levels were, therefore, 
expected to  be monotonic, and were found to  be so in the village.
C an c ian ’s “upper-middle class conservatism ” hypothesis was also tes ted  with
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polynomials of variables which separately represent persons’ socio-economic s ta tus .  As 
expected, C an c ian ’s hypothesis was not supported  here since in the framework of the 
interdependence approach, “upper-m iddle class conservatism ” cannot occur when the 
persons’ interdependence expectation  indices are negative.
7.2 C itrus S iam  A d op tion  in B e la tu n g
In this s tudy , citrus siam adoption  behaviour in the South S um atran  village of 
Belatung was explained from the  point of view of the interdependence approach, and the 
use of the interdependence variables helped to  identify some im p o rtan t  de term inan ts  of 
adoption behaviour. It should be noted th a t ,  in this study , adoption behaviour is 
understood as “copying” behaviour of non-adopters , not as “diffusing” behaviour of 
adopters. This is because the relative income utility function was assured to represent a 
person’s relative deprivation, with positive interdependence coefficients.
The adoption of citrus siam in Belatung appeared to be determ ined by three major 
factors, a p a r t  from interdependence variables. T he first factor, which may be specific to 
this village and its surrounding areas, was a shortage of male labour. In such a situation , 
it was quite natura l  for households to search for a crop whose labour requirements are 
less, and m anageable for small families lacking male labour. C itrus  siam looks to  be one 
answer to  this problem. As already described, citrus siam is a  relatively less labour- 
intensive crop.
The second factor was educational a t ta in m en t .  P rim ary education was of much 
im portance and the influence of education declined as its level rose.
A th ird  factor was access to agricultural program mes on radio, and this highlights 
the potential role of public m edia in dissemination of information.
The theoretical and empirical analysis also brought into question commonly found 
views on the criteria for selection of farmers in a  com m unity  as agents  of technological 
information diffusion. In th is  s tudy, it was found th a t  the village head was the first 
adop ter  of citrus siam in the village, bu t was not followed by o ther villagers for a  long 
time. T he m atrix  of interdependence coefficients showed th a t  others  were not influenced 
by him a t  all, because he was “too unique” in term s of a role in disseminating agricultural
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information. In other words, he was not an “easily copiable” person to others. Thus, the 
nature of the socio-economic structure can have an important bearing on the 
characteristics of persons as agents of information diffusion.
7.3 L im ita tion s o f the S tu d y  and F u tu re  R esearch
The empirical analysis demonstrated that the interdependence approach developed 
in this study is superior to conventional approaches. It can provide a theoretical 
explanation of the “Cancian Dip” or “upper middle class conservatism”. Generally, 
adoption behaviour can be explained much better than in conventional approaches, and 
important determinants of the adoption behaviour including social factors can be more 
clearly identified.
However, this approach has certain lim itations. Firstly, researchers have to select a 
type of interdependence among persons. Monetary interdependence which can be derived 
from an input-output matrix of monetary transactions can be utilised, but it then 
excludes more general types of interdependence among persons. This introduces an 
elem ent of arbitrariness to the empirical analysis.
Secondly, there is also a problem in the choice of a particular measure of 
interdependence, which quantitatively represents interdependence among persons. In 
sociological and anthropological literature, numerous types of such measures have been 
proposed, but there is no consensus so far among network scholars as to which is best. In 
this study, the two major approaches of network analysis, the relational approach and the 
structural (equivalence) approach, were carefully examined. The structural equivalence 
proximity was then chosen as an interdependence coefficient owing to its statistical 
robustness.
Thirdly, it is necessary that all persons in a system  should be approached in the 
collection of data on interactions in the system . A census survey of a system  is required 
at this stage of the development of network analysis. However, it must be pointed out 
that this problem is an operational one, and will not be major as appropriate network 
sampling techniques are being developed.
A further lim itation arose from the fact that direct elicitation of subjective risk was
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not feasible and an indirect technique had to  be used to ob ta in  estimates. Due to time 
and d a ta  constra in ts ,  it was also not possible to  analyse the  influence of relative price 
changes on adoption p a t te rn s  in a comprehensive manner. The validity of empirical 
findings, of course, cannot be generalised as they are derived from a single village study.
Three  areas can be immediately identified where the application of th is  approach 
may prove to be of much value.
F irstly ,  this interdependence approach can provide a plausible explanation for the 
backward bending labour supply curve w ithou t  having to postulate a relatively 
complicated “independent” u tility  function; in fact, a simple Cobb-Douglas specification 
is adequate .
Secondly, in models of relative income utili ty , usually only relative deprivation 
(negative externality  of o thers’ incomes) can be explained. However, the approach can be 
applied to studies of charitable  activities, th rough widening the concept of the subjective 
relative income level by allowing negative values of interdependence coefficients. For 
example, adoption behaviour can also be in terpre ted  as a benevolent a t t i tu d e  towards 
o thers, in which adopters  willingly give information to non-adopters.
Finally , the methodology of the study presented here can be applied to the study of 
diffusion of new technology am ong firms in a industry . In most studies of technology 
adoption , the actual interdependence among firms in an industry is ignored. As shown in 
this s tudy , interdependence can be measured through the degree of independence of a 
firm. A firm ’s independence can be measured, for example, in terms of its self-finance 
ra tio  and  reliance on up- and dow n-stream  industries.
Despite the limitations of this s tudy, it is hoped th a t  the advantages  of this 
approach  have been sufficiently dem onstra ted , and th a t  the work done here will s tim ulate  
fu r ther theoretical and empirical studies to broaden and refine the approach.
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A p p en d ix  A  
F ieldw ork
A . l  F ie ld w o r k  S ta g es
Fieldwork was conducted in Indonesia between August 1982 and October 1983. The 
fieldwork in Belatung, South S u m a tra  was s ta r ted  on 7 Septem ber 1982, and ended on 20 
Septem ber 1983. The whole period can be divided into five stages.
Stage 1 (August - December 1982)
The au th o r  reached Indonesia on 15 August 1982. After contac ts  with relevant 
institu tes  and government offices, the au th o r  reached the fieldwork area on 7 September 
1982. A questionnaire survey was first conducted of citrus siam adopters  whom the village 
head of Belatung had identified. T he same questions were then asked of non-adopters. 
Since no reliable list of households was available, lists of all villagers’ households and of 
citrus siam adopters  were also compiled. The first report to the Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences (LIPI) was w ritten  in December (Higuchi 1982).
Stage 2 (January  - April 1983)
A questionnaire survey of citrus siam adopters identified in Stage 1 was conducted. 
The second report to LIPI was w ritten  in March (Higuchi 1983a).
Stage 3 (May - June 1983)
T he Javanese im m igran ts’ area  in Lekis of Lebuk B atang  Lama (a neighbouring 
village) was selected for com parative  s tudy , and a survey was conducted with the same 
questionnaires. However, because of the a u th o r’s bad health and the need to report to 
governm ent offices in Palem bang and Jak a r ta ,  this work was in terrupted  and left 
uncompleted. This d a ta  is not used in th is  study. The th ird  report to LIPI was written in 
June  (Higuchi 1983b).
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Stage 4 (July - Septem ber 1983)
Inaccurate  d a ta  ob tained in Stages 1 and 2 was checked, and gaps in the d a ta  were 
filled. T he fourth report to LIP1 was w ritten  in September (Higuchi 1983c).
Stage 5 (September - October 1983)
T he fieldwork in B elatung  was completed on 20 September 1983. Official d a ta  was 
then collected in Palem bang, Jak a r ta ,  Bogor and Bandung. The au tho r  finally left for 
A ustra lia  on 20 October 1983.
During the whole period of the fieldwork, d a ta  were stored immediately after daily 
survey excursions, in a m icro-com puter, O sbourne-1, provided by the Research School of 
Pacific Studies, Austra lian  National University. P a r ts  of the d a ta  were then processed to 
identify missing, inaccurate and exaggerated d a ta ,  and to identify groups and associations 
within the village in term s of villagers’ socio-economic interactions. P rogram m es for d a ta  
processing were written concurrently in Microsoft BASIC. These programmes were later 
revised in F O R T R A N  at  the A ustralian National University, and used for further detailed 
analysis.
A . 2 S tr u c tu r e  o f  D a ta
D ata  collected and used in the study can be classified into three categories.
Basic D a ta
The first category contains the basic socio-economic and agronomic d a ta  from all 
households of the village. This d a ta  covers the following:
1. Household Members - name, sex, age, relation with household head, education, 
main occupation.
2. Land Use - area, plots, crops, distance from house, tenure.
3. A gricultura l P roducts  - crops, area, harvest, o u tpu t  prices, marketing 
locations.
4. Rubber Production - classification of rubber by age, products, coagulation 
m ethods, hired tap p er  usage and relations, a t t i tudes  tow ards rubber 
rep lan ting  and continuation.
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5. Household economy - income, expenditure, m onthly average expenditure on
basic needs. _
6. Kinship S truc tu re  - identification of all close (±  2 generations) relatives of 
villagers.
C itrus  Siam D a ta
The second category of d a ta  contains d a ta  on citrus siam production, collected from 
citrus siam adopters .
1. P lan ting  history - da tes  of plantings, num ber of trees, area, usage of m ounds, 
d istance between trees, former crops, tree losses and reasons for loss.
2. H arvest history - d a ta ,  quan ti ty ,  prices and marketing.
3. A tt i tu d es  tow ards citrus siam
4. Detailed d a ta  of the first planting - incentives, sapling and o u tpu t  prices a t  
the time, labour usage, source of sapling, o ther costs.
5. D a ta  of replanting
6. Harvesting and m arketing  - harvesting costs, m arketing costs.
7. M ain tenance costs.
Socio-Economic In teractions
The th ird  category of d a ta  contains the answers of household heads to questions 
abou t  the socio-economic interactions am ong villagers and their exposures to various 
media. T he following types of socio-economic interactions were selected:
]. Agricultural information exchange
2. Household goods exchange
3. Money lend/borrow ing
4. Labour exchange (A dat labour exchange)
5. H ired-in /ou t Labour
6. Land lease
7. Daily shopping (village grocery shops used)
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8. Zakat,  W akap  (re lig ious/custom ary donations to the poor in the  form of rice
and money) ' _
9. Arisan (illegal association for m utual m onetary  assistance)
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A .3 Q u e stio n n a ir e
Questionnaire No. 4 (May-June 1983) ~
Name ____________ b i n ________________ ID NO._____
Interview Date
Time 
Place
1. How long have you been independent as a farmer? _________year
2. Place of Birth
3. Household Member (All persons in this household though one may have married.)
Name | Sex |Relation | Age |Education |Job | Help
1 | with 1 (year) (final) year | | farming?
1 |H. Head 1 |type |grade|finished 1
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
Farming Status
1. Total area of farm (ha.) _______ ha.
2. Number of plots.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10.
Place Ma j or 
Crop
Other
crops
Area
(dp x dp) (ha)
plots
Dist.I Status I Method 
from|00/SC |of 
House I/LH/LL|share 
(min.) I
I I
Land
owner
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Crops (in 1982)
Area
(dp*dp) (ha)
No. of 
trees
Harv’t 
(kg)
Sales
/not
Price I Market
1.Rubber
2.Citrus Siam
3.Coffee
4.Pepper
5.Cloves
6.Rice Lebak
7.Rice Ladang
8.Duku
9.Durian
10.Pineapple
11.Banana
12.Citrus Manis
13.Citrus Bali
14.Citrus Garut
15.Citrus Kambing
16.Cinnamon
17. Coconut
18. Rambutan
19.
20.
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Citrus Siam
1.Planting Citrus Siam
inter-
Month|Year 
1
|No. of 
| trees
|area |mound |val |Former
| (ha) | (dp*dp) | (Y/N) | (MxM) | crops
|Reason | 
|of loss |
1-st 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | ******** I
loss 1 1 | - 1- I 1 1 *****|******** 1 1
2-nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | ******** I
loss 1 1 |- 1- 1 1 1 *****|******** 1 1
3-rd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |********|
loss 1 1 | - | - | | | * * * * * 1 ******** 1 1
2. Harvest of Citrus 
Month|Year
Siam 
|Harvest |Price |Total |Market 1
1 1 (kg) i (E-P/kg) 1 (ftp) 1 1
1-st 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2-nd 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3-rd 1 1 1 i 1 1 1
4-th 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1
3. If you have not planted Citrus siam, are you interested in planting 
Citrus siam?
1. Yes, but not yet planned.
2. Yes, and already planned.
3. Not certain.
4 . Not. ----
4. If you are interested in planting Citrus siam, what is the reason 
why you do not plant it now?
1. No money for opening land ----
2. No time for opening land ----
3. No labour for opening land ----
4. No land for citrus siam ----
5. No money for buying saplings/budgrafts ----
6. No money for hedging ----
7. Information about citrus siam is not enough ----
8. because planting citrus siam is still risky ----
(chemicals and fertilisers not yet available)
9. Want to wait for colleagues to harvest ----
10. Other
5. To whose citrus siam plots are you paying attention?
1._________
2 .___________
3. ________
4. ________
5.
l-st planting
1. Date of the l-st planting Month____ Year_________ -
2. What is the reason to plant Citrus siam? _______________________
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3. Motives of this decision? (What convinced you to plant citrus siam?)
4. What did you grow before citrus siam?
Name of Crop 1.
2 .
3.
5. Price of citrus siam at that time?
Ep______ / (Unit______)
Harvest and productivity of the previous crops, before planting citrus siam?
Harvest ____________(Unit_______)
Productivity (*)___________ (Unit_______ /ha)
7. Labour costs for previous crops.
Labour Type I Labour---- I----
Month I FamilyI----
I day
External 
day Rp
Other costs
8. How many saplings/budgrafts of citrus siam were planted?
9. Why did you plant this number of saplings/budgrafts?
Reasons l._
2 ._______________
3._____________
10. Price of saplings/budgrafts, then?
Rp______ / one
11. Where did you buy those saplings/budgrafts?
Name of Market
12. Costs of planting citrus siam.
Type of Work
Month
Amount of Labour Other costs
Family 
day I men
External 
day I men | Rp
1.Opening
2.Mounding
3 .Hedging
4 .Planting
5.
6 .
7.
13. Price of citrus siam fruits when planting?
RP /Unit
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Re-planting (First/Second/Third/Fourth/Fifth)
1. Date of the re-planting Month______ Year
2. Reasons to re-plant citrus siam?
3. If already stop growing citrus siam, why?
4. What convinced you to re-plant citrus siam?
5. Previous crops?
6. Price of the previous crops, at the time of re-planting?
Rp_______ /Unit (
7. Harvest and productivity of the previous crop?
Harvest
Productivity
8. Labour costs for the previous crop.
Type of work | Labour
(Unit
(Unit
Month I Family
I--------
I day
External
men | Rp
Other costs
)
)
/ha)
9. How many saplings/budgrafts were planted?
10. Why did you plant this number of saplings/budgrafts?
11. Price of sapling/budgraft at the re-planting?
Rp______ /one
12. Where did you buy saplings/budgrafts then?
Name of Market
13. Costs of replanting of citrus siam
Type of work Labour Other costs
Month Family External
day I men day I men | Rp
1.Opening
2 .Mounding
3 .Hedging
4.Planting
5.
6.
7.
8 .
14. Price of citrus siam fruits at the time of re-planting?
Rp_______ /Unit (________)
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Harvesting t Marketing (First/Second/Third/Fourth/Fifth)
1. Date of Harvest Month Year
2. Harvesting costs 
Type of work
I Month
Labour
Family
day I men
External
day I men | Ep
Other costs
1 . Picking
2 . Packing
(box) * * * * 
* * * * 
* * * *
★ ** * * 
* * * * * 
* * * * *
****
* * * *
* * * *
* * * * * 
***** 
*** * *
* * * * * 
* * * * * 
* * * * *
Total=
Price=
Source^
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.Contract **** ***** **** ***** ***** Total=Rp
3. Date of Marketing Month_____ Year
4. Costs of marketing
Market/ | Month | Harvest | Price | Total |Transportation
merchant 1 1 1 1 costs
1.Belatung
2.Lebuk B. Lama
3.Baturaj a
4.Tanjung Kar’g
5.Palembang
6.Jakarta
7 .
8 .
Family consumption
Total
(kg) (&P/kg) (Bp) (Ep)
********** ******** ***************
**********
Annual Costs for Citrus siam
1. Year
2. Annual work costs for citrus siam
Type of work | Labour-----I---------
I times/ I Family | External
I year |--------
I day Imen Rp
Other costs
1. Fertilising
2. Chemicals I
3. Giving lime
4. Watering |
5.Weeding 
6.Selection
7.
8 .
Rubber
1. Condition of rubber
No.
plot
Area
(dp x dp) I (ha)
No. of 
trees
Year of | Status 
planting |(00/SC/LH/LL)
1.Immatured
2. Productive
3. Old
unproductive
2 .
3.
Harvest of rubber
Rainy season__________(kg/week)
What do you use for coagulation?
Usage I Price | 
(kg/week) j(Rp/kg) |
1.Asam Cuka|
2.Alum
3.Other
Dry
Source
season (kg/week)
4. Rubber Tapper
Name of 
Tapper
1.
2 .
3.
4.
I Origin of| Method | Harvest(kg/week)
I Tapper | of | Rainy | Dry
I I Sharing | Season | Season
I
5. Do you tap others’ rubber?
Name of 
Owner
1.
2 .
3.
I Origin |Method of|Harvest(kg/week)
I jSharing |Rainy Season|Dry Season
6. Do you want to re-plant rubber?
l.Yes, 2.Not decided, 3.No
7. Do you like to continue producing rubber?
l.Yes, 2.Not decided, 3.No
General Economic Data
1. Annual Income in 1982
Rp___________ /year
2. Source of Annual Income in 1982
Agriculture BP /year
Fishery Rp /year
Work outside ftp /year
village
Shop ftp /year
Remittances ftp /year
From whom 1
2
3
Others
1 ftp /year
2 ftp /year
3 ftp /year
3. Annual income in 1982 is lower or greater than usual?
Lower/Usual/Greater
4.
1.
2 .
Monthly Expenditure (1982) 
Regular expenditure 
Foods/Clothes/Housing 
Educational Costs 
Other costs
Special Expenditure
1. Lebaran 1 k 2
2. Medical
3 . Marriage 
4 .Festivity
5. Purchase of
Durables
6. Zakat
7. _____________
8.
Rp___________ /month
Rp___________ /month
Rp___________ /month
EP
ftp
ftp
ftp
ftp
ftp or Rice
ftp
other
ftp
3. Total Monthly Expenditure
Monthly ftp. /month
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4. Monthly Consumption
I Consumed iome production Bought Unit
1. Rice
2. Meat(beef)
(buffalo
(goat)
(chicken)
3. Fresh Fish
4. Dried Fish
5. Prawn
6. Vegetables
7. Coffee
8. Tea
9. Salt
10.Sugar
11.Coconut oil
12 .Kerosene
13.Cigarette
14.Soap
15.Flour
16.Milk
17-Eggs
18.Onion(m/p)*
19.Potatoes
20.Fruits
21.Cassava
22.
23.
Note
*: V '  stands for merah=red, red onion, and upM 
for putih=white, white onion.
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Information Network Data
1. Do you have a radio?
Yes/No
2. Do you listen to ’’Siaran Pedesaan" on radio?
1. 7 times/week (every day)
2. 4-6 times/week (often)
3. 1-3 times/week
4. 1-2 times/month
5. No
3 . Outside experience or job?
Name of city Year Type of Work
1. 1 19___ until i9__ 1
2. 1 19___ until 19__ 1
3. 1 19___ until 19__ 1
4. 1 19___ until 19 _ 1
5. 1 19___ until 19__ 1
4 . How many times a year do you go to cities?
City I Times Purpose
1. Baturaja
2.Prabumulih |
3.Palembang
4.Tanjung Karang
5.Jakarta
6.
7.
5. With whom do you often talk about agricultural problems?
Name 1.________________  5 ._________________ 9.
2 ._________________ 6 ._________________ 10.
3. 7.
4. 8 .
Kinship Relation
Grandfather Grandmother
father-side father-side
Grandfather Grandmother
mother-side mother-side
Father-in-law
Father Mother
Uncle 1 Wife’s uncle 1
2 2
3 3
Elder brother 1 Wife’s elder brother 1
2 2
3 3
Younger brother 1 Wife’s younger brother 1
2 2
3 3
Elder sister 1 Wife’s elder sister 1
2 2
3 3
Younger sister 1 Wife’s younger sister 1
2 2
3 3
Independent children
Son 1_________ Wife __________Son’s father-in-law 1______
2 _______Wife __________ 2_____
3 _______Wife __________ 3_____
Daughter 1_________ Husband_________Daughter’s father-in-law 1
2 Husband 2
3 Husband 3
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A .4 Q u e s tio n n a ir e  for E c o n o m ic  E x c h a n g e  N e tw o r k s
QUESTIONNAIRE-5 JULY-SEPTEMBER 1983 ECONOMIC EXCHANGE NETWORK DATA
N A M E _________________b i n ________________  ID NO.
INTERVIEW DATE
TIME 
PLACE
A. DAILY SHOPPING
1. PLEASE LIST NAMES OF SHOPS IN BELATUNG WHERE YOUR FAMILY BUY 
DAILY GOODS.
1. ____________4.
2. ____________5.
3.
2. IF YOU OWN A SHOP, WHO OFTEN COMES TO YOUR SHOP?
1. 6. 11. 16.
2. 7. 12. 17.
3. 8. 13. 18.
4. 9. 14. 19.
5. 10. 15. 20.
B. DAILY GOODS EXCHANGE
1. IF SHOPS ARE CLOSED OR IF WE DO NOT HAVE MONEY, WE SOMETIMES 
ASK OUR NEIGHBOURS, FAMILY MEMBERS OR FRIENDS TO LEND SOME 
DAILY GOODS, SUCH AS RICE, SUGAR AND SALT. PLEASE LIST NAMES 
OF PERSONS TO WHOM YOU CAN ASK FOR THIS SORT OF DAILY GOODS 
BORROWING.
1 . 6.
2 . 7.
3. 8.
4 . 9.
5. 10.
C. HIRED LABOUR SOURCES
1. IF YOU WANT TO USE HIRED LABOUR FOR YOUR AGRICULTURE, TO WHOM DO 
YOU ASK, OR TO WHOM DID YOU ASKED RECENTLY?
1. _________  4.
2. __________ 5.
3.
2. HAVE YOU RECENTLY BEEN HIRED AS LABOURER? IF SO, WHO HIRED YOU?
1. 
2 .
3.
4.
5.
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3. DO YOU USE TAPPERS FOR YOUR RUBBER? IF SO, WHO ARE THEY? 
AND WHAT SORT OF ARRANGEMENT DO YOU HAVE WITH THEM?
NAME 
1.
ARRANGEMENT NAME
4.
ARRANGEMENT
2. 5.
3.
YOU WORK FOR 
WHAT SORT OF
OTHERS AS TAPPER? 
ARRANGEMENT DO YOU
IF SO, FOR 
HAVE?
WHOM DO YOU WORK?
NAME 
1.
ARRANGEMENT NAME
4.
ARRANGEMENT
2. 5.
3.
D. ’’GOTONG ROYONG”
1. TO WHOSE FARM HAVE YOU OR YOUR FAMILY MEMBERS GONE TO HELP 
AS ’’GOTONG ROYONG”?
1. ___________  6 .
2. __________ 7.
3. __________ 8.
4. __________ 9.
5. 10.
2. WHO HAVE RECENTLY COME TO HELP YOUR FARM AS ’’GOTONG ROYONG”?
1. 
2 .
3.
4. 
5 .
6 .
7.
8 . 
9. 
10
E. ’’ZAKAT” RELATIONSHIPS
1. THIS YEAR, DID YOU PAY SOMETHING AS ’’ZAKAT”? IF SO, WHAT SORT OF 
GOODS, AND TO WHOM DID YOU PAY ’’ZAKAT”?
NAME
1. 
2 .
3.
4.
5.
GOODS NAME GOODS
(RICE.MONEY.ETC) (RICE.MONEY,ETC)
6.
7.
8 .
9 .  _____  _________  _
10.
F. "ARISAN” GROUP MEMBERSHIP
1. ARE THERE ’’ARISAN” GROUPS IN BELATUNG? IF ANY, PLEASE GIVE NUMBERS 
OF GROUPS.
GROUPS
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2. IF THESE GROUPS HAVE NAMES, PLEASE LIST THEIR NAMES.
1. _________  4.
2. _________  5.
3.
3. WHO ARE LEADERS OF THESE "ARISAN" GROUPS?
1. _________  4.
2. _________  5.
3.
4. ARE YOU OR YOUR WIFE A MEMBER OF AN "ARISAN" GROUP? 
IF SO, PLEASE LIST THE NAME OF THE GROUP.
1 .
2 .
3.
5. HAVE YOU WON SOME MONEY RECENTLY? IF SO, FOR WHAT DID YOU USE THAT 
MONEY?
1. 
2 .
3.
G. MONEY LENDING/BORROWING
1. IF YOU NEED MONEY, TO WHOM DO YOU ASK FOR SOME MONEY?
1. _________  4.
2. _________  5.
3.
2. HAVE YOU LENT SOME MONEY TO OTHERS IN BELATUNG? 
TO WHOM DID YOU LENT?
1. _________  4.
2 . _________  5 .
3.
H. LAND USE
1. IS ANY PLOT OF YOUR LAND USED BY OTHERS IN BELATUNG? IF SO, 
WHO IS USING A PLOT OF YOUR LAND? AND WHAT SORT OF ARRANGEMENT 
DO YOU HAVE WITH HIM?
NAME ARRANGEMENT
1 .
2 .
3.
2. TO WHOM AND WHEN DID YOU SELL PLOTS OF YOUR LAND? 
AND WHAT SORT OF ARRANGEMENT DID YOU HAVE WITH HIM?
NAME YEAR ARRANGEMENT NAME
1. __________ ___  ___________ 4.
2. 5.
YEAR ARRANGEMENT
NAME ARRANGEMENT
4.
5.
322
A p p en d ix  B
A p p en d ix  to  C h ap ter  2
B . l  E q u iv a le n c e  S ca les  o f  A g e -S e x  G ro u p s
Average consumption levels of age-sex groups are calculated with respect to 
m onthly subsistence consum ption, to monthly rice consumption and to annual total 
consum ption in Table B-l. These average consumption levels were adjusted by household 
size because the household size may affect the consumption related to the household itself.
While a lm ost all calculated average consumption levels for male age groups were 
s tatis tica lly  significant and exhibit a plausible pa tte rn ,  most of those for female age- 
groups were insignificant. Figures for household size ad jus tm ents  were all insignificant 
s tatis tica lly . B ut they indicate th a t  the economy of scale in term s of household size 
existed a t  least in the village and th a t  larger households consumed less than  smaller 
households in the village.
T he average consumption level of an average adult male was calculated as the 
average of the coefficients for adult males between 15 and 59 years old. The average 
adu lt  m ale’s average consum ption levels with respect to  monthly subsistence 
consum ption , m onthly rice consumption and annual total consumption were Rp.21,105, 
38.60 Kg and Rp.305,130 respectively. The average consumption level of an average 
adu lt  male was somewhat greater than thought plausible, bu t  when the correlations 
between male age-groups and certain female age-groups (5 to 10 years younger) which 
represent husband-wife relations are taken into consideration, the figures appear to be 
acceptable.
T a b le  B - l :  Equivalence Scales of Age-Sex Groups
Male 
Age (yr)
Monthly
Subsistence
Consumption
(Rp.)
Monthly
Rice
Consumption
(K g.)
Annual
Total
Consumption
(million Rp.)
(per person) (per person) (per person)
O 4542 (0.39) 6.19 (0.40) 0.08812 (0.40)
1-4 16692 (2.16) 33.75 (3.30) 0.15681 (1.08)
5-9 21398 (2.56) 32.94 (2.98) 0.34052 (2.17)
10-14 23968 (2.94) 29.31 (2.72) 0.30894 (2.02)
15-19 24553 (3.07) 41.53 (3.93) 0.29227 (1.94)
20-24 16382 (1.64) 34.53 (2.62) 0.28557 (1.52)
25-29 19478 (1.60) 30.51 (1.90) 0.38275 (1.67)
30-39 26980 (2.26) 45.52 (2.88) 0.40212 (1.79)
40-49 27444 (2.30) 43.17 (2.74) 0.28958 (1.29)
50-59 21794 (1.82) 36.33 (2.29) 0.47078 (2.09)
60- 29914 (2.72) 43.79 (3.01) 0.35179 (1.70)
Female
0
1-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-
13486 (0.97) 
11840 (1.22) 
9340 (1.21) 
31648 (3.88) 
15619 (1.67) 
12347 (1.34) 
4230 (0.33) 
1607 (0.14) 
15452 (1.26) 
13639 (1.13) 
14707 (1.10)
16.65 (0.91) 
23.73 (1.85) 
21.95 (2.15)
39.06 (3.62) 
26.75 (2.16) 
15.69 (1.29)
-16.15 (0.96) 
-2.23 (0.15)
15.07 (0.93) 
10.59 (0.67) 
22.89 (1.30)
0.19356 (0.74) 
0.09478 (0.52) 
0.29021 (2.00) 
0.42749 (2.79) 
0.24015 (1.36) 
0.11136 (0.64) 
0.11643 (0.49) 
0.21821 (1.02) 
0.52550 (2.28) 
0.23634 (1.04) 
0.33551 (1.34)
Household
Size
Household Size Adjustment
(difference from average consumption per household)
(person)(per household) (per household) (per household)
1-2 13597 (0.84) -3.44 (0.16) 0.06633 (0.22)
3-4 -11209 (0.47) -35.80 (1.14) -0.17381 (0.39)
5-6 -21076 (0.59) -59.91 (1.27) -0.27930 (0.42)
7-8 -35101 (0.74) -89.84 (1.42) -0.60420 (0.67)
9-10 -83525 (1.32) -129.48 (1.55) -1.28029 (1.08)
11-12 -81882 (1.09) -129.97 (1.31) -1.36909 (0.97)
R-square 0.90897 0.89120 0.88189
Adjusted 
F-value
R-square 
0.87898 
30.31236
0.85536
24.86700
0.84298 
22.66656
N 113 113 113
Note: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-ratios. 
Intercept is suppressed.
Source: Fieldwork
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A p p e n d ix  C
A p p e n d ix  to  C h a p te r  3
C . l  C h a n g e s  o f  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e  C o e ff ic ien t
Villager i’s interdependence with Villager j is affected negatively by the social 
d istance between them.
d s i j
2 K m ”  Sij> 1 «'
^  (Sim ■ Si k )
________
n
(X, Km ~ s ik )2 )2
< 0 , j  £  I, m {.
Villager i’s interdependence with Villager j is positively affected by the social 
distance between Villager i and  a third villager, Villager q.
k2
d l ■ 2 ,Si<7 ( s i m • Si<p (Si m •j i  ’ i ’ i  J
d s zc
( z L  ( s i m "  ) 2 
A = 1 1
> 0 , 9 *, j ,  m t -
Villager i’s interdependence with Villager j is both positively and negatively hy  the 
social d is tance between Villager i and the villager most remote from him, Villager m^, 
depending on the social distance between Villager i and Villager j.
s ij)
Si j )  -y (s i m ■ Sik^ Sik^Sim- Si k )
*=1 1 k = 1 7
-  * a )2 )2
fc=l 7
where the radius which distinguishes the effect is defined as:
n
^  s  s ik Km- s ik)
k= 1
S* = ~ r T "
y   ^ (s im •
fc=l
C .2  C h a n g e s  o f  I n d e p e n d e n c e  C oeff ic ien t
Villager i’s independence coefficient is negatively affected by the social distance 
between Villager i and the villager most rem ote from him, Villager nij.
n
y  sik^sim- Sik )
£=1_______ *______  ..
S*m { n <
( E  * « ) 2 )2 
*•= 1 1
Villager i’s independence coefficient is positively affected by the social distance 
between himself and any other villager, Villager q.
dl-ii
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C .3  L o c a t io n  o f  V i l la g e r s ’ H o u s e s
Figure C -l  shows the location of villagers’ houses. It should be noted th a t  there are 
several villagers who live on their farms. While some of them  have their own houses in the 
village residential area, these are used by their children of school-age, and rarely by them , 
except on weekly m arke t days.
These o ther areas are ( l )  Talang  Kisam, (2) Lekis South and (3) Lekis East. These 
areas are shown in the corner of Figure C-l (Refer Figures 2-1 and 2-2 for house locations 
in the wider area.).
The main residential area  of the village can be divided into several quar te rs  denoted 
by Rom an numbers.
C .4  R e la t io n s h ip s  a m o n g  N e tw o r k s
The villagers in teractions in the various networks are very likely to  be correlated 
with one another.  Thus, an interaction in a certain network may be partly  explained by 
in teractions in o ther networks, and by the geographical distances between villagers’ 
houses.
Kinship relations are regarded as the most basic relations, being ascribed to all 
villagers by b ir th . Geographical distances between houses are largely determ ined by 
villagers’ inheritances, which are themselves dependent on long-term kinship relations. 
Hence, kinship relations, and geographical distances remain solely as explanatory  
variables of o ther types of interactions.
In order to examine the relations between a particular in teraction and other 
in teractions, probit or logit analysis should be employed because of limited dependent 
variables (dichotomous variables). However, due to the very large num ber of 
observations, these m ethods could not be used. OLS was used instead. Table C -l  show 
results of OLS regressions am ong interactions.
It is obvious th a t  there is no serious multicoHinearity among variables because 
variables are a lternately  regarded as dependent variables in regression analyses and there 
is no high R-squares.
The direct agricultural information exchange is related positively to  all o ther types
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Table C - l :  Relationships am ong Networks
1
D E
2
P E N D
3
E N T
5
V A E I 
6
A B L E
7
S
8 9
1 *** 0.08895
(12.29)
0.05983 
( 7.87)
— 0.03127 
( 4.10)
0.01574 
( 2.64)
0.01960 
( 6.28)
0.04035 
( 5.45)
E 2 
X
P
0.24068
(12.31)
* * * 0.26512
(22.41)
— 0.04364 
( 3.57)
— 0.01363 
( 2.81)
—
L 3 
Aw
0.14466 
( 7.78)
0.23907
(21.72)
*** 0.16485 
( 2.85)
0.03886 
( 3.23)
0.02454 
( 2.66)
— —
A 4
Tn
0.07022 
( 7.77)
0.04695 
( 8.55)
0.04201 
( 7.21)
0.08194 
( 2.83)
— 0.02283 
( 4.93)
0.00737 
( 3.08)
—
E 5 
Y
— — 0.00672 
( 2.86)
* * * 0.01113 
( 4.72)
— --  --0.00517
(-2.18)
V 6 
A
p
0.06934 
( 3.73)
0.03520 
( 3.12)
0.03744 
( 2.86)
0.26359 
( 4.40)
* ** — — 0.05928 
( 4.90)
I 7 
A
■R
0.05022 
( 2.14)
— 0.03112 
( 2.06)
— — *** — 0.04269 
( 2.80)
L 8 
Ee
0.28820 
( 6.37)
0.07728 
( 2.80)
— 0.29874 
( 2.04)
— — * * * —
u
9 0.10306 
( 5.60)
— --  .-0.12945
(-2.18)
0.06023 
( 5.06)
0.02750 
( 2.91)
— ***
D 0.75777
(12.42)
0.86613
(23.98)
— 3.27755
(17.45)
— — — ---
CONST. 0.00943 -.01368 0.00263 0.40826 0.00591 0.00566 0.00093 0.01470
( 3.56) (-8.57) ( 140) (48.02) ( 3.15) ( 4.65) ( 1-49) ( 7.79)
Adj.E .sq 0.11884 0.21754 0.11715 0.05283 0.01709 0.00821 0.01114 0.00958
F 117.36 320.81 153.65 65.16 25.00 15.28 26.91 17.69
DFl 8 6 6 6 5 4 3 4
DF2 6894 6896 6896 6896 6897 6898 6899 6898
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-values. Adjusted E-squares are 
very low, but all regressions are significant at less than 0.1% level 
because of the large observation size. Estimations are conducted with 
stepwise OLS in SPSS with the inclusion-exclusion criterion at 5 % level.
--  denotes a variable excluded due to the low significance.
*** denotes a dependent variable itself.
Variables
1. Direct Agricultural Information 6. Hired Labour
2. Household Goods Exchange 7. Land Sales/Purchases
3. Money Lending/Borrowing 8. Land Lease
4. Kinship 9. Citrus Siam Observation
5. Meeting-at-shops D. Inversed Geographical Distance
between Houses
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of in teractions except m eeting-at-shops relation. When two villagers exchange household 
goods, the  possibility of direct exchange of agricultural information is higher. When they 
lend or borrow small am oun ts  of money, the possibility is also higher. If they are 
relatives, the possibility is higher. When they are in land sales-purchase or lease con trac t ,  
or hired labour con trac t ,  the possibility is increased. When one of them  observe, the 
o th e r ’s c itrus siam production, it increases the possibility. Finally, if they are living 
closely in term s of geographical distances, they have a higher possibility of information 
exchange.
T he household goods exchange interaction  is related positively to five types of 
in teractions and geographical distances. When villagers directly exchange agricultural 
inform ation, the possibility for them  to exchange household goods is higher. When they 
lend or borrow small am oun ts  of money, they are likely to exchange household goods like 
lending or borrowing of money. If they are relatives, they feel relatively more free to 
borrow or lend household goods. When they have land lease or hired labour con trac ts  
with each other, or if they live closer to each other, again the possibility is higher.
The lending/borrow ing of money is related positively to six types of interactions. 
When villagers directly exchange agricultural information, they are more likely to  lend or 
borrow a small am oun t of money each other. When they exchange household goods or if 
they are relatives, the possibility is higher. When they meet more often a t  the same shops 
in the village, the possibility is higher due to their increased opportunities  to meet each 
other. When they are in hired labour contract or when they have sold or bought between 
them , the possibility is higher.
The meeting-at-shops relation, which is measured in terms of the number of shops 
two villagers commonly use, is related positively to five types of interactions and 
negatively to the citrus siam observation activity . When they lend or borrow money with 
each o ther,  the relation is likely to increase. The causal relationship may be th a t  
increased opportunit ies  to meet a t  shops may create the opportunity  to lend or borrow 
money to  buy something a t  the  shops. If they are relatives or live closer, the possibility is 
higher. When they are in hired labour or land lease contract ,  the possibility is again 
higher. T he  negative sign of the  citrus siam observation activity implies th a t  these two
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activities do not coexist. A villager who observes the o ther villager’s c itrus siam 
production may avoid meeting the la t te r  villager a t  shops. This  argum ent may be too 
strong, bu t a t  least th is  sort of tendency exists between the two activities.
T he  hired labour relation is related positively to five types of in teractions. The 
direct exchanges of agricultural information, household goods exchange, lending and 
borrowing of small am o u n ts  of money, and opportunities to  meet a t  shops create more 
opportun it ies  to ob ta in  information abou t the demand of hired labour. T he c itrus siam 
observation activity  is also positively related to  the hired labour relation. T he direction of 
causality  may be opposite. If a  villager is hired to work on ano ther villager’s citrus siam 
plot, he certainly observes the citrus siam production.
T he  land sales and purchases relation is related positively to four types of 
interactions. When a  villager directly exchanges agricultural information with another, 
the possibility of land sales and purchases increases. When they lend or borrow small 
am o u n ts  of money each o ther,  the possibility also increases. If they are relatives, the 
possibility again increases, because villagers tend to keep their own plots of land 
redeemable. If a m em ber of the same kinship group is the new owner, the plots of land 
can be redeemed when the former owner financially recovers. The citrus siam observation 
activ ity  is positively related to the possibility of the land sales and purchases.
Land lease relation is positively related to  three types of interactions. When they 
directly exchange agricultural information, or when they exchange household goods, the 
possibility of land lease relation is higher. If they are relatives, the possibility is also 
higher. If two villagers are members of the same kinship group, and either one of them 
w ants  to  lease-out his plot, he tends to prefer a financially inferior member of his kinship) 
group to  look after his plot. On the other hand, if a  villager w an ts  a plot of land, he first 
looks for a member of his kinship group who has more pdots than  family labour can 
manage.
T h e  citrus siam observation is positively related to th ree  types of in teractions and 
negatively to  one type of interactions. When they directly exchange agricultural 
inform ation, the possibility to observe the o th e r ’s citrus siam production is higher, and 
when they are in hired labour contract or they have sold or bought land, the possibility is
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again higher. On the o ther hand, when they have a higher opportunity  to  meet a t  shops, 
the possibility is lower.
These results clearly indicate th a t  the first five types of non-hierarchical 
in teractions are related to each other quite significantly, and they are also very much 
re lated to hierarchical interactions. On the other hand, relations between hierarchical 
and non-hierarchical relations are not so significant, and especially hierarchical relations 
are qu ite  independent of each other. These findings may be based on the fact th a t  the 
num ber of villagers involved in the hierarchical relations are much smaller than  those 
involved in the non-hierarchical relations.
C .5 F O R T R A N  p rogram m e for M odified  N E G O P Y
C=c
C
C
C
C
C
C:cccccccccccccc
c
READ NETnnn.MAT and IDENTIFY Cliques 
by either NEGOPY or RANKING (modified NEGOPY)
PARAMETER (NMAX=153)
INTEGER A (NMAX ,NMAX) ,IJ(20) , IRANK (NMAX) ,
$ IROLD(NMAX),ID(NMAX),ISOLAT (NMAX) ,
$ IRBEST(NMAX),IACROS(NMAX),IDOWN(NMAX),
$ GROUP1(20),GR0UP2(20).BELONG(3.NMAX).GROUP(1225)
REAL ICHANG,CLIQUE
DIMENSION RANK(NMAX).TEMP(NMAX).RNKOLD(NMAX).
$ C(NMAX,NMAX).SUMACR(NMAX).SUMDWN(NMAX)
CHARACTER*10 IFILEl.CONYER
CHARACTER*20 FMT6.NAME(NMAX).NAMEl(NMAX).FMT7.NAMAE 
CHARACTER*30 NAMNET.FMTTTY.FMTFIL 
CHARACTER*! B (118,118) .YES
VARIABLES
A ORIGINAL SOCIOMETRIC MATRIX
C CONVERSION INDEX MATRIX
B GRAPHIC MATRIX FOR PRINT-OUT
IRANK RANKING
IROLD RANKING OF PREVIOUS ITERATION
ID IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ACTOR IN PRESENT ANALYSIS
ISOLAT =1: ACTOR=ISOLATE, =0:ACTORoISOLATE
IRBEST RANKING IN BEST PERFORMANCE TRIAL
IACROS NUMBER OF ACTOR-I’S CHOICES
IDOWN NUMBER OF ACTORS WHO CHOSE ACTOR-I
GROUP1 CLIQUE-I’S STARTING POINT
GR0UP2 CLIQUE-I’S ENDING POINT
NAME NAMES OF ACTORS
1
2
C
C
C
C
C
N=NMAX
FORMAT( ’1’ ) 
FORMAT( ’0 ’ )
TTY OR BATCH
TYPE 10
10 FORMAT ( ’ 1 TTY ’/’ 2 BATCH ’/’ = ’, $ )
ACCEPT *.TTYBAT
C===================================================c
C TYPE OF NETWORK 
C
0===================================================
TYPE 1010
1010 FORMAT ( ’ TYPE OF NETWORK ’/
$ ’ 1 AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION’/
$ ’ 2 SHOPPING fc CUSTOMERS’/
$ ’ 3 EXCHANGE’/
$ ’ 4 LEND fe BORROW MONEY’/
$ ’ 6 HIRED-IN fc -OUTLABOUR FROM’/
$ ’ 8 LAND SALES fc PURCHASE*/
$ ’ 10 NUMPANG/PARUHAN/RUBBER TAPPER-IN FROM TAPPER-OUT TO’/
$ ’ 14 ZAKAT WAKAP TO’/
$ ’ 16 KINSHIP GROUP’/
$ ’ 17 CITRUS SIAM OBSERVATION’//
$ ’ NETWORK NO.=’, $ )
ACCEPT *,NONET
IF (NONET.EQ.l) NAMNET=’AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION’ 
IF (NONET.EQ.2) NAMNET=’SHOPPING’
IF (NONET.EQ.3) NAMNET=’HOUSEHOLD GOODS EXCHANGE’ 
IF ((NONET.EQ.4).OR.(NONET.EQ.5)) THEN
NAMNET=’LEND/BORROW MONEY’
NONET=4
END IF
IF ((NONET.EQ.6).OR.(NONET.EQ.7)) THEN 
NAMNET=’HIRED-IN/OUT LABOUR’
NONET=6
END IF
IF ((NONET.EQ.8).OR.(NONET.EQ.9)) THEN 
NAMNET=’LAND PURCHASE/SALES’
N0NET=8
END IF
IF (NONET.EQ.10) NAMNET=’NUMPANG/PARUHAN’
IF (NONET.EQ.il) NAMNET=’SHOP CUSTOMERS’
IF ((NONET.EQ.12).OR.(NONET.EQ.13)) THEN 
NAMNET=’RUBBER TAPPER-IN/OUT’
N0NET=12
END IF
IF ((NONET.EQ.14).OR.(NONET.EQ.15)) NAMNET=’ZAKAT TO’
IF (NONET.EQ.16) NAMNET=’KINSHIP’
IF (NONET.EQ.17) NAMNET=’CITRUS SIAM OBSERVATION’
WRITE (6,1020) NAMNET 
TYPE 1020,NAMNET
1020 FORMAT ( //’ CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION OF ’,A30// )
C=====================================================================
C
C ALL ACTORS OR A PARTIAL SET OF ACTORS
C
C======================================================================
NALL=1
C======================================================================
c
C SYMMETRICISE ORIGINAL MATRIX OR NOT 
C
C======================================================================
TYPE 1040
1040 FORMAT ( ’ 1 SYMMETRIC ’/ ’ 2 NON-SYMMETRIC’/ ’ = ’,$)
ACCEPT *,NSYM 
IF (NSYM.EQ.l) THEN
WRITE (6,1050)
1050 FORMAT ( ’ MATRIX SYMMETRICISED ’ )
ELSE
WRITE (6,1060)
1060 FORMAT ( ’ MATRIX NON-SYMMETRICISED(ORIGINAL) ’ )
END IF
IF(NSYM.EQ.l) NACD=1 
IF(NSYM.EQ.2) NACD=3
C======================================================================
c
c======================================================================
TYPE 1065
1065 FORMAT(’ EXCLUDE SYCOPHANTS AND BRIDGES, TOO ? (1=YES/0=N0)’,$) 
ACCEPT *,NEXCL
C======================================================================
c
C CONVERSION INDEX
C
C======================================================================
1070 TYPE 1120
ACCEPT 1130,NINEEX
1120 FORMAT ( / ’ CONVERSION INDEX ’/ /
$ ’ (1)0-1 MATRIX ’/ ’ (2)OBJECTIVE NEGOPY MATRIX ’/
$ ’ (3)1.C.P. ’/
$ ’ WHICH INDEX TO BE USED=’,$ )
1130 FORMAT ( 12 )
IF (NINDEX.EQ.l) WRITE (6,1140)
IF (NINDEX.EQ.2) WRITE (6,1150)
IF (NINDEX.EQ.3) WRITE (6,1160)
1140 FORMAT ( * CONVERSION INDEX: 0-1 DISTANCE ’ )
1150 FORMAT ( ’ CONVERSION INDEX: OBJECTIVE NEGOPY ’ )
1160 FORMAT ( ’ CONVERSION INDEX: I.C.P. ’ )
C======================================================================
n
o
o
n CONVERSION METHOD
METH0D=2 
GOTO 1171 
TYPE 1170
ACCEPT 1180,METHOD 
1171 IF (METHOD.EQ.l) THEN
WRITE (6,1190)
ELSE
WRITE (6,1200)
END IF
1170 FORMAT ( / ’ CONVERSION METHOD ’/ /
$ ’ (1) NEGOPY ’/ ’ (2) RANKING ’/’ WHICH METHOD TO BE USED= ’, S )
1180 FORMAT ( II )
1190 FORMAT ( ’ CONVERSION METHOD: NEGOPY ’ )
1200 FORMAT ( ’ CONVERSION METHOD: RANKING ’ )
C=======================================================================
C
C CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION RATE 
C
C=======================================================================
CLIQUE=0.5 
GOTO 1211 
TYPE 1210 
ACCEPT *,CLIQUE 
1211 WRITE (6,1220) CLIQUE
1210 FORMAT ( ’ CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION RATE= ’, $ )
1220 FORMAT ( ’ CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION RATE= ’, F10.6 )
0=======================================================================
C
C MATRIX INITIALISATION 
C
C=======================================================================
DO 1230 1=1,N
DO 1240 J=1,N
A(I,J) =0 
C(I, J)=0.
1240 CONTINUE
1230 CONTINUE
C====================================================================
c
C READ ID numbers of farmer-actors included
C
C====================================================================
IFILE1=’IDINCL. DTA ’
OPEN (UNIT=11,FILE=IFILEl)
DO 2000 1=1,N
READ (11,2010,END=2020) ID(I)
2010 FORMAT (IX,13 )
2000 CONTINUE
2020 NID=I-1
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.l) TYPE 2030,NID
2030 FORMAT ( ’ NO OF FARMER-ACTORS= ’,13 )
CLOSE(UNIT=11)
IFILE1=’NAME.DTA’
OPEN (UNIT=11,FILE=IFILEl)
DO 2031 1=1,N
READ(11,2032,END=2033) NAMEl(I)
2032 FORMAT( 13X.A20 )
2031 CONTINUE
2033 DO 2034 1=1,NID
NAME(I)=NAMEl(ID(I))
2034 CONTINUE
DO 2050 1=1,N
DO 2060 J=1,NID
IF (ID(J).EQ.l) GOTO 2050
2060 CONTINUE
BELONG(1,I)=-4 
BELONG(2,I)=-4
CONTINUE2050
C====
C
C
C
C====
3001
3002
3010
3040
3030
3100
3035
C===
C
C===
5000
3036
3050
C =
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C
6000
READ NETnnn.MTA
IF(NONET.LT.10) THEN
WRITE(IFILE1,3001) NONET 
FORMAT( ’NETOO’,11,’.MAT’ )
ELSE
WRITE(IFILE1,3002) NONET 
FORMAT( ’NETO’,12,’.MAT’ )
END IF
OPEN (UNIT=10,FILE=IFILEl)
READ(10,3010) ((A(I,J),J=1,N),1=1,N) 
F0RMAT(1X,15311)
CLOSE(UNIT=10)
DO 3030 1=1,NID 
IK=ID(I)
DO 3040 J=1,N
JK=ID(J)
C (I, J) =A (IK , JK)
CONTINUE
CONTINUE 
DO 3100 1=1,NID 
DO 3100 J=1,NID
A (I, J) =C (I, J)
C(I,J)=0.
CONTINUE 
DO 3035 1=1,NID
A(I.I)=1
CONTINUE
SYMMETRICISE ORIGINAL MATRIX
N=NID
IF (NSYM.EQ.l) THEN
DO 5000 1=1,N 
DO 5000 J=I +1 ,N
IF ((A(I, J) .EQ.l) .OR.(A (J,I).EQ.1)) THEN 
A(I,J)=1 
A (J , I) =1
END IF
CONTINUE
END IF
WRITE(FMT6,3036) NID
FORMAT( ’IX,13,IX,’,13,’Al)’ )
DO 3050 1=1,NID 
DO 3050 J=1,NID
IF(A(I,J).EQ.l) THEN 
B (I, J) = ’# ’
ELSE
B(I.!)=’_’
END IF
CONTINUE
WRITE(7,FMT6) ((ID(I) , (B (I, J),J=1,NID)),1=1,NID)
CLOSE(UNIT=7)
Start calculation of Conversion index
1. 0-1 DISTANCE Matrix
2. NEGOPY
3. I.C.P.
IF (NINDEX.EQ.l) THEN 
DO 6000 1=1,N
DO 6000 J=1,N
C(I,J)=A(I,J)
CONTINUE 
GOTO 7000
END IF
IF (NINDEX.GE.2) THEN 
TYPE 2
DO 6010 1=1,N
DO 6020 J=1,N
IF (A(I.J).EQ.O) THEN 
C(I, J)=0 
GOTO 6020 
ELSE
C(I,J)=1 
DO 6030 K=1,N
IF((K.EQ.I).OR.(K.EQ.J))GOTO 6030 
C(I, J)=C(I, J)+A(I,K)*A(K,J)
6030 CONTINUE
END IF
6020 CONTINUE
6010 CONTINUE
END IF
IF (NINDEX.EQ.3) THEN 
DO 6040 1=1,N 
SUMS=0
DO 6050 J=1,N
SUMS=SUMS+A(J,I)
6050 CONTINUE
DO 6060 J=1,N
C(I,J)=C(I,J)/SUMS
6060 CONTINUE
6040 CONTINUE
END IF
C===================================================================c
C Start Iterations
C
C by: 1. NEGOPY method
C 2. RANKING method
CC===================================================================
7000 DO 7010 1=1,9
IJ(I)=0
7010 CONTINUE
0===================================================================
C
C ISOLATES IDENTIFIED
C
C===================================================================
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 8001 
TYPE 8000
8001 WRITE (6,8000)
8000 FORMAT ( / ’ ISOLATES’ / )
NIS0L=O
NSY=0
NBR=0
DO 8010 1=1,N
IACROS(I)=0 
IDOWN(I)=0 
ISOLAT(I)=0 
SUMACR(I)=0 
SUMDWN(I)=0 
DO 8020 J=1,N
IACROS(I)=IACROS(I)+A(I,J)
IDOWN(I)=IDOWN(I)+A(J,I)
SUMACR(I)=SUMACR(I)+C(I,J)
SUMDWN(I)=SUMDWN(I)+C(J,I)
8020 CONTINUE
IAD=IACROS(I)+IDOWN(I)
IF (IAD.EQ.2) THEN 
ISOLAT(I)=1 
BELONG(1,ID(I))=-1 
BELONG(2,ID(I))=-1 
NISOL=NISOL+1 
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 8031
8031
8030
TYPE 8 0 3 0 .NISOL,ID(I).NAME(I)
WRITE (6,8030) N I S O L ,ID(I).NAME(I) 
FOR M A T ( 1X.I5.5X,’ACTOR-’ .I3.2X.A20 )
END IF
IF(NEXCL.E Q .0) GOTO 8010
IF ((IAD.EQ.6 ) .AND.(NSYM.EQ.l)) THEN 
I SOLAT(I)=3 
BELONG(l,ID(I))=-3 
BELONG(2,ID(I))=-3 
NBR=NBR+1
END IF
IF ((IAD.EQ.4 ) .AND.(NSYM.EQ.l)) THEN 
ISOLAT(I)=2 
BELONG(l,ID(I))=-2 
BE L O N G (2,ID(I))=-2 
NSY=NSY+1
END IF
8010 CONTINUE
IF(NSYM.NE.l) GOTO 8999 
IF(NEXCL.EQ.O) GOTO 8999 
IJJ=0 
TYPE 8080
8080
W R I T E (6,8080)
FORMAT ( / , ’ SYCOPHANTS ’,/)
DO 8082 1=1,N
I F (ISOLAT(I).E Q .2) THEN 
IJJ=IJJ+1 
DO 80821 J=1,N
I F ((A (I, J) .NE.O).AND.(I.NE . J))THEN 
JSY=J
GOTO 80822
END IF
80821
80822
CONTINUE
IF(TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 8083
TYPE 8084,IJJ,ID(I),NAME(I),ID(JSY).NAME(JSY)
8083
8084
W R I T E (6,8084)IJJ,ID(I).NAME(I),ID(JSY).NAME(JSY) 
FORMAT(IX,15,5 X , ’A CTOR-’,I3,2X,A20,’ ( ’ , 13 , I X ,A 2 0 ,’) ’)
END IF
8082 CONTINUE 
IIJ=0 
TYPE 8050
8050
W R I T E (6,8050)
F O R M A T ( / , ’ BRIDGES’,/ )
DO 8040 1=1,N
I F (ISOLAT(I).E Q .3) THEN 
IIJ=IIJ+1 
JBR1=0 
JBR2=0
DO 80401 J=1,N
IF(J.EQ.I) GOTO 80401 
IF (A(I,J) .NE.O) THEN
I F (JBRl.EQ.O) THEN 
JBR1=J
ELSE
JBR2=J 
GOTO 80402
END IF
END IF
80401
80402
CONTINUE
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 8032
TYPE 8033,IIJ,ID(I).NAME(I).ID(JBRl).NAME(JBRl),
$
8032
$
8033
$
ID ( JBR2),NAME(JBR2)
WRITE (6,8033) I I J ,ID(I).NAME(I) ,
ID(JBRl),NAME(JBRl),ID(JBR2),NAME(JBR2) 
FO R M A T ( 1X.I5.5X,’A C TOR-’,I3,2X,A20,’ (’,13,IX,
A 2 0 ,’ fc ’,13,2 X ,A 2 0 ,’) ’ )
END IF
8040
c---- =
C
CONTINUE
c START CONVERSION ITERATIONS
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8999 BEST=10000.
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 9001
TYPE 1 
TYPE 9000
9001 WRITE (6,1)
WRITE (6,9000)
9000 FORMAT(’ TRIAL CONVERGED ICHANG IDIF CONCENTRATION INDEX’)
IF(TTYBAT.EQ.1) THEN
NTRY=20
ELSE
NTRY=100
END IF
DO 9010 ITRY=1,NTRY 
IC0NVE=O 
DO 9020 1=1,N
RANK(I)=INT(RANS(0)*N) +1 
IF(ISOLAT(I).EQ.l) RANK(I)=N+1 
IF(ISOLAT(I).EQ.2) RANK(I)=N+2 
IF(ISOLAT(I).EQ.3) RANK(I)=N+3 
IRANK (I)=RANK(I)
9020 CONTINUE
DO 9030 K=1,N
DO 9040 1=1,N
IROLD(I)=IRANK(I)
RNKOLD(I)=RANK(I)
9040 CONTINUE
DO 9050 1=1,N 
RANK(I)=0
IF(ISOLAT(I).NE.0)THEN
RANK(I)=RNKOLD(I)
GOTO 9051
END IF
JSYBR=0
DO 9060 J=1,N
IF(NSYM.EQ.1) THEN
IF(ISOLAT(J).NE.O) THEN 
RRB=0.
JSYBR=JSYBR+A(I,J)
ELSE
RRR=RNKOLD(J)
END IF
RANK (I) =RANK (I) +RRR*C(I, J)
ELSE
RRANK=RNKOLD (J) * (C (I, J) +C ( J ,1) )
RANK(I)=RANK(I)+RRANK 
END IF
9060 CONTINUE
IF(NSYM.EQ.l)THEN 
RA=RANK(I)
RANK (I) =RANK (I) / (SUMACR(I) - JSYBR) 
IF(ISOLAT(I).EQ.2) RANK(I)=N+2 
IF(ISOLAT(I).EQ.3) RANK(I)=N+3 
RB=RANK(I)
ELSE
RANK(I)=RANK(I)/(SUMACR (I)+SUMDWN(I))
END IF
9051 TEMP(I)=RANK(I)
9050 CONTINUE
C=======================================================================
c
C RANKING TEMP(I),1=1,N
C
C=========—==—=—:=—=====================================================:
DO 9070 III=1,N 
RMIN=N*2 
DO 9080 JJJ=1 ,N
IF (RMIN.GT.TEMP(JJJ)) THEN 
RMIN=TEMP(JJJ)
IJMIN=JJJ
339
END IF
9080 CONTINUE
TEMP(IJMIN)=N*3
IRANS(IJMIN)=111
9070 CONTINUE
C
C
C
CALCULATE STOP-ITERATION CRITERION
CHANGE=0
ICHANG=0
IDIF1=0
IDIF2=0
DO 9090 1=1,N
CHANGE=CHANGE+ (RNKOLD (I) -RANK (I) ) **2 
ICHANG=ICHANG+(IROLD(I)-IRANK(I))**2 
IF (IROLD(I).NE.IRANK(I)) IDIF2=IDIF2+1
9090 CONTINUE
DO 9100 1=9,2,-1
IJ(I)=IJ(I-1)
9100 CONTINUE 
IJ(1)=ICHANG
L---
c
c
c
JUDGING STOP-ITERATION
Ü---
IF (((IJ(1).EQ.IJ(2)).AND.(IJ(2).EQ.IJ(3))
$ .AND. (IJ(3).EQ.IJ(4)) .AND.(IJ(4).EQ.IJ(5))
$ .AND.(IJ(5).EQ.IJ(6)).AND.(IJ(6).EQ.IJ(7))
$ .AND.(IJ(7).EQ.IJ(8)))
$ .OR.((IJ(1) ,EQ.IJ(3)) .AND.(IJ(2).EQ.IJ(4))
$ .AND.(IJ(3).EQ.IJ(5)).AND.(IJ(4).EQ.IJ(6))
$ .AND.(IJ(5).EQ.IJ(7)).AND.(IJ(6).EQ.IJ(8)))
$ .OR.((IJ(1).EQ.IJ(4)).AND.(IJ(2).EQ.IJ(5))
$ .AND.(IJ(3).EQ.IJ(6)).AND.(IJ(4).EQ.IJ(7))
$ .AND.(IJ(5).EQ.IJ(8)).AND.(IJ(6).EQ.IJ(9))))
$ GOTO 9200
IF (ICHANG.EQ.O) THEN
IC0NVE=1 
GOTO 9200
END IF
IF (METHOD.NE.l) THEN
DO 9110 1=1,N
RANK(I)=IRANK (I)
9110 CONTINUE
END IF
9030 
C-- :
CONTINUE 
GOTO 9010
C
C CALCULATE CONCENTRATION RATE 
C
C=============================================
9200 SUMQ=0
NNN=N-NISOL-NBR 
DO 9210 1=1,NNN
IR=IRANK(I)
DO 9210 J=1,NNN
JR=IRANK (J)
IF (A(I,J).NE.O) THEN 
SUMQ=SUMQ+1 
B(IR,JR)= ’# ’
ELSE
B(IR,JR) = ’_ ’
END IF
9210 CONTINUE
SUMWID=0 
DO 9220 1=1,NNN
DO 9230 J=1,NNN
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IF (B(I,J).EQ.*#*) THEN 
JSTART=J 
GOTO 9240
END IF
9230 CONTINUE
9240 DO 9250 J=NNN,1,-1
IF (B (I,J).EQ.’# ’) THEN 
JEND=J 
GOTO 9260
END IF
9250 CONTINUE
9260 WIDE=JEND-JSTART+1
SUMWID=SUMWID+WIDE
9220 CONTINUE
CONCEN=SUMQ/SUMWID
C======================================================================
c
C PRESERVING BEST-PERFORMANCE TRIAL’S IRANK IN IRBEST(I)
C
0=======================================================================
IF (IDIF2-C0NCEN.LT.BEST) THEN 
BEST=IDIF2-C0NCEN 
IBEST=ITRY 
IDBEST=IDIF2 
CONBST=CONCEN 
DO 9300 JK=1,N
IRBEST(JK)= IRANK(JK)
9300 CONTINUE
END IF
IF (ICONVE.EQ.l) THEN 
CONVERT YES’
ELSE
CONVER= ’NO’
END IF
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 9311
TYPE 9310.ITRY,CONVER,K ,ICHANG.IDIF2.CONCEN,IDIF2-C0NCEN 
9311 WRITE(6,9310)ITRY,CONVER,K,ICHANG,IDIF2,CONCEN,IDIF2-C0NCEN
9310 FORMAT(IX,15,3X,A3,2X,14,2X,F6.2,2X,14,2X,F13.5,2X,F9.5)
9010 CONTINUE
C======================================================================
c
C PRINT-OUT THE BEST RESULT 
C
C=— ===================================================================
WRITE (6,2)
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 10001 
TYPE 10000,IBEST,IDBEST,CONBST,BEST 
10001 WRITE (6,10000) IBEST,IDBEST,CONBST,BEST 
10000 FORMAT ( ’ BEST RESULT TRIAL=’,I3,’ IDBEST=’,I5,
$ ’ CONBST=’,F10.7,’ BEST=’,F10.7 )
0=======================================================================
C
C REARRANGEMENT OF MATRIX 
C
C=======================================================================
TYPE 2 
WRITE (6,1)
DO 10010 1=1,N
IR=IRBEST(I)
TEMP(IR)=1 
DO 10020 J=1,N
JR=IRBEST(J)
IF (A (I, J) . GE. 1) THEN 
B(IR,JR) = ’# ’
ELSE
B (IR, JR) = ’_ ’
END IF
10020 CONTINUE
10010 CONTINUE
C================================— ===================================
C
n
o
n PRINT-OUT ON TTY
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 10050 
DO 10030 KK=1,3
Kl=l+(KK-l)*120 
K2=MIN(N,KK*120)
WRITE(FMTTTY,10040) K2-K1+1 
10040 FORMAT ( ’ ( IX,13,X,13,X,’,13,’Al ) ’ )
TYPE (FMT=FMTTTY), ( (I,ID(TEMP(I)),(B(I,J),J=Kl,K2)),1=1,N) 
IF(K2.EQ.N) GOTO 10050 
TYPE 2
10030 CONTINUE
0=======================================================================
C
C PRINT-OUT IN FILE (FOR06.DAT)
C
C=======================================================================
10050 DO 10060 KK=1,3
Kl=l+(KK-l)*120 
K2=MIN(N,KK*120)
WRITE(FMTFIL,10070) K2-K1+1 
10070 FORMAT ( ’ ( IX,13,X,13,X,’,13,’Al ) ’ )
WRITE(6,FMT=FMTFIL)((I,ID(TEMP(I)).(B(I,J),J=K1,K2)),I=1,N) 
IF (K2.EQ.N) GOTO 11000 
WRITE (6,1)
10060 CONTINUE
C======================================================================
C
C START CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION
C
C======================================================================
C FROM NOW ON ISOLATES.SYCOPHANTS t BRIDGES ARE EXCLUDED FROM ANALYSIS 
C=====================================================================
11000 N=N-NISOL-NBR-NSY 
DO 11010 1=1,N
IROLD(I)=0 
IRANK(I)=0 
SUMACR(I)=0 
DO 11020 J=I,N
IF ((B(I,J).EQ.’# ’) .OR.(B(J,I) .EQ. ’# ’)) THEN 
C(I,J)=l 
C(J,I)=1
ELSE
C(I,J)=0 
C(J,I)=0
END IF
11020 CONTINUE
11010 CONTINUE
DO 11025 1=1,N
SUMACR(I)=0 
DO 11025 J=1,N
SUMACR (I)=SUMACR(I)+C(I,J)
11025 CONTINUE
DO 11030 KK=1,2 
NCLiq=0 
WRITE (6,1)
IF (KK.EQ.l) THEN
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 11041 
TYPE 11040 
WRITE (6,11040)
FORMAT ( I' FORWARD CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION ’ ) 
NSTEP=1 
Nl=l 
N2=N
ELSE
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 11051 
TYPE 11050 
WRITE (6,11050)
FORMAT ( /’ BACKWARD CLIQUE IDENTIFICATION ’ ) 
NSTEP=-1
11041
11040
11051
11050
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11100
Nl=N
N2=l
END IF
DO 11060 ISTART=N1,N2.NSTEP 
MCQ=0
IF (SUMACR(ISTART).E Q .1) GOTO 11060 
DO 11080 K=0,N2-ISTART,NSTEP
DO 11090 I=ISTART,I S T A R T + K ,NSTEP 
SUMI=0
DO 11100 J=ISTART,ISTART+K.NSTEP 
SUMI=SUMI+C(I,J)
CONTINUE
SSAA=1+(SUMACR(I)-1)*CLIQUE 
IF(SUMI.G E .SSAA) GOTO 11090 
IF (MCQ.EQ.O) GOTO 11080 
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 11111 
TYPE 11110.ISTART,
$
$
$
m u
$
$
$
11110
I D (INT(TEMP(ISTART))), 
ISTART+K-NSTEP,
ID(INT(TEMP(ISTART+K-NSTEP))) 
WRITE (6,11110) ISTART,
ID(INT(TEMP(ISTART))), 
ISTART+K-NSTEP,
ID(INT(TEMP(ISTART+K-NSTEP))) 
FORMAT ( ’ CLIQUE ’ ,4(18 , ’(’,13,’) ’))
NCLIQ=NCLIQ+1 
GROUP1 (NCLIQ)=ISTART 
GROUP2 (NCLIQ)=ISTART+K-NSTEP 
ISTART=ISTART+K-NSTEP 
GOTO 11060
11090 CONTINUE
IF (MCQ.EQ.O) THEN 
MCQ=1
KMCQ=K+ISTART
END IF
11080 CONTINUE
$
11121
$
11120
IF (MCQ.EQ.l) THEN 
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 11121
TYPE 11120,ISTART,ID(INT(TEMP(ISTART))),KMCQ, 
ID(INT(TEMP(KMCQ)) ) ,N2,ID(INT(TEMP(N2)))
WRITE (6,11120) ISTART,ID(INT(TEMP(ISTART))), 
K M C Q ,ID(INT(TEMP(KMCQ)) ) ,N2,ID(INT(TEMP(N2))) 
FORMAT ( ’ CLIQUE ’,6(18,’(’,13,’) ’) )
NCLIQ=NCLIQ+1 
GR0UP1(NCLIQ)=ISTART 
GR0UP2(NCLIQ)=N2 
ISTART=N2 
END IF
O 
O 
M 
II 
t->
II 
o
II 
o
II 
o
II II II II II II II II
CONTINUE
C PRINT-OUT NAMES IN CLIQUE-GROUPS IDENTIFIED
iiiiiiiillllllllllllllll
o o
DO 11130 1=1,NCLIQ
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 11141 
TYPE 11140,1
11141
11140
WRITE (6,11140) I 
F ORMAT( / ’ CLIQUE-’,12 ) 
IGST=GR0UP1(I)
IGEN=GR0UP2(I)
DO 11160 IG=IGST,IGEN,NSTEP
$
11151
$
11150
IF (TTYBAT.EQ.2) GOTO 11151 
TYPE 11150,ABS(IG-IGST+NSTEP),ID(INT(TEMP(IG) )) , 
NAME(INT(TEMP(IG)))
WRITE (6,11150) A B S (IG-IGST+NSTEP),
ID (INT (TEMP (IG)) ) .NAME (INT (TEMP (IG)) )
FORMAT ( 9X,I3,2X,’A CTOR-’,I3,2X,A20 )
IID=ID(INT(TEMP(IG)))
BELONG(KK,IID)=I
11160 CONTINUE
CONTINUE11130 
11030 CONTINUE
DO 13000 1=1 ,NMAX
DO 13010 Kl=-4,30
DO 13020 K2=-4,30
IF((BELONG(1,1).EQ.Kl).AND.(BELONG(2,I).EQ.K2))THEN 
BELONG(3,I)=(Kl+4)*30+K2+4 
END IF
13020 CONTINUE
13010 CONTINUE
13000 CONTINUE 
IG=0
WRITE(6,1)
DO 14000 K=1,1225
IF(K.EQ.31) GOTO 14000 
IF (K.EQ.62) GOTO 14000 
IF(K . EQ.93) GOTO 14000 
ITEMP=0
DO 14010 1=1,NMAX
IF(BELONG (3,1) .EQ.K) ITEMP=ITEMP + 1
14010 CONTINUE
IF(ITEMP.NE.O) THEN 
IG=IG+1
TYPE 14020,IG.ITEMP 
WRITE(6,14020) IG.ITEMP
14020 FORMAT( ’ GROUP-’,15,110 )
ELSE
GOTO 14000
END IF
DO 14030 1=1,NMAX
IF(BELONG(3,I).EQ.K)THEN 
DO 15000 11=1,NID
IF(I.EQ.ID(II)) THEN 
NAMAE=NAME(II)
GOTO 15010
END IF
15000 CONTINUE
15010 TYPE 14040,I,NAMAE 
WRITE(6,14040) I.NAMAE
14040
END IF
FORMAT (20X,15,5X,A20)
14030 CONTINUE
14000 CONTINUE
STOP
END
344
C .6  L ist o f  M a jo r  S o c io -E co n o m ic  C h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  V illa g e r s
As the results of the discussion between the village head of Belatung and the 
au tho r ,  153 village households were initially identified according to  the landownership. 
However, some were living outside the village and did not utilise the land inside the 
village a t  all. In the process of the fieldwork, 118 village households were identifies as 
members of the village. For identifying these village households, the numbers from 1 to 
153 were used, and are used th roughout this s tudy.
Villager
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
21 
22
23
24
25
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
39
40
41
42 
44
Characteris tics
farmer from Lebuk Batang  Lama 
hired labourer for National Railway 
National Railway worker 
National Railway worker 
National Railway worker 
runs a very small grocery shop 
National Railway worker 
National Railway worker 
section head of National Railway 
primary school teacher 
grocery shop owner 
station  official
only farmer who produces enough rice for his family and sells it 
basically s tays in Kota Bumi producing coffee
sharecropper of Director of Belatung s ta tion  who lives in Lampung
native National Railway worker
National Railway worker
National Railway worker
native National Railway worker
National Railway worker
National Railway worker
National Railway worker
National Railway worker
ex-village head with innovative ideas, half retired and looked after by 
his son, teacher
village official but lives in Lekis East
Belatung primary school teacher
an elder looked after by his unm arried  daugh ter
brother of Villager 34
dukun, traditional medical healer
two brothers and their m other
a member of Sebimbing Sekundang (rubber smallholder scheme)
Villager 36’ son, newly built his house next to  his fa th e r ’s
has a relative in Dinas K ehutanan  (Forest Agency) in Palembang who
sends agricultural information to him
entrepreneur, recently built a concrete /brick  house
very successful K ota  Bumi coffee farmer
entrepreneur, son-in-law of Villager 29
very lazy, works for his father-in-law, Villager 60
46
47
49
50
51
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
64
65
66
67
68
70
71
72
73
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
100
101
102
103
104
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m echanic, bus d riv e r
K o ta  B um i coffee fa rm er
grocery shop ow ner
a household o f a w idow  and her son
K o ta  B um i coffee fa rm er
v illage  o ffic ia l
h a rd -w o rk ing  loner
usua lly  stays a t the fa rm  on the opposite  side o f the Ogan 
an elder
w ea lth ies t by re p u ta tio n , used to  have a grocery shop in the v illage ,
and bough t m any p lo ts o f land
w idow
son o f V illa g e r 64 
an elder
na tive  N a tio n a l R a ilw ay w o rke r, b u t a lm ost a lw ays a t fa rm  and does 
no t w ork fo r N a tio n a l R a ilw ay , he b u ilt  a house in  the v illage  b u t has 
no t fin ished
successful Coffee fa rm er in Lam pung  
relig ious teacher
an elder, very poor 
w idow
p rinc ip a l o f the v illage  p rim a ry  school 
carpenter
p a rt tim e  b u t inn ova tive  fa rm e r, a rm y ’s c iv il o ffic ia l in B a tu ra ja , 
appo in ted  as v illage  head o f ne ighbouring  v illage , K a rta  M u lya  in A p r il  
1983
young entrepreneur often w orks fo r V illagers  49 &  128’s shops 
very poor, has sold a lm ost a ll p lo ts  o f land 
son o f V illa g e r 29
successful K o ta  B um i coffee fa rm er 
ex-v illage  head 
b ro the r o f V illa g e r 91 
pem borong, carpenter
an old fa rm e r from  K a rta  M u ly a , w ith  no re la tives
ex-v illage  o ffic ia l fo r V illa g e r 84, a nom ina l cha irm an o f Sebim bing 
Sekundang (ru bb e r sm a llho lde r scheme) 
b ro the r o f V illa g e r 85 
active  e n tre p re n e u r/fa rm e r
na tive  N a tio n a l R a ilw ay senior w orker, b ro the r o f V illa g e r 14 
b ro the r o f V illa g e r 84
recently m arried  to  a daugh te r o f V illage r 80 and moved in to  Be la tung
fa th e r stays in  B e la tung  and son is a K o ta  B u m i coffee fa rm er
new ly re tu rned  from  K o ta  B um i
h a lf-re tire d , looked a fte r by V illa g e r 120
V illag e r 84 ’s son-in -law
w idow  o f very ac tive  e n tre p re n e u r/fa rm e r
ex-re lig ious teacher (died in J u ly  1983)
active  fa rm e r in  Lekis
106
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
120
121
122
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
132
134
135
139
140
148
149
150
151
153
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Villager 94’s son-in-law
notable t rad e r/g ro w er of c itrus siam
stays in Lekis area
grocery shop owner, formerly an itineran t m erchant
teacher, son of Villager 71, religious teacher
his son-in-law is an extension worker of Dinas Perkebunan
recently s ta r ted  moved to his rubber smallholding and rarely appeared
in the village
resident jun ior extension worker of Dinas Perkebunan
Villager 148’s son
village official, grocery shop owner
very active and  political en trep reneur/fa rm er
recently moved into a house in the middle of the village
National Railway worker
sick but National Railway worker
owns a  bus, driver himself
occasional carpenter
grocery shop owner, entrepreneur,  plans to produce banana
commercially
retired soldier
village head, pioneer of citrus siam 
lives in Talang  Kisam 
lives in T alang  Kisam, lumbering 
lives in T alang  Kisam, lumbering
lives in Lekis, very lazy, tries to run a grocery shop for villagers in 
Lekis area 
lives in Lekis
brother of Villager 100, coffee farmer in Kota Bumi, too 
active en trepreneur/fa rm er 
National Railway worker 
lives in Lekis East
widow of section head of National Railway, works as vendor for 
National Railway workers
347
A p p e n d ix  D
A p p e n d ix  to  C h a p t e r  4
D . l  A v e r a g e  N u m b e r  o f  T rees p er A d o p ter
See Figure D-l
D .2  D e r iv a t io n  o f  C o n su m er  P r ic e  In d ex
W ith M atro n i’s (n.d.) price d a ta  of numerous commodities traded a t  B a tu ra ja  
m arkets  between 1967 and 1980, and official d a ta  between 1981 and mid-1983, the 
consumer price index was calculated monthly by the Laspeyres method. Weights used in 
the calculation are shown in Table 2-2. Table D-2 shows seasonally adjusted consumer 
price index in B aturaja .
F i g u r e  D - l :  Average N um ber of Trees per A dopter
Y E A R
Source:
Fieldwork.
Figures 4-3 and 4-4.
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Figure D-2: Consumer Price Index in Baturaja
3,000-1
2,500-
2,000-
LU
Q  1,500-
500-
YEAR
Source:
Matroni (n.d.)
Expenditure compositions based on household expenditure data collected 
during the fieldwork (Table 2-2).
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A p p e n d i x  E
M a t h e m a t i c a l  A p p e n d i x  to  C h a p t e r  5
E . l  M a th e m a t i c a l  N o ta t io n s
Villager i’s certa in ty  equivalent (scalar). 
Villager i’s covariance operator.
Villager i’s expectation operator.
ci
C O V i( ) 
E>()
F:
grad(G )
I:
Substi tu te  for /  u’(Xi)/Xi dX
Function which relates scale of adoption, 1^ , or time of adoption, to 
risk-premium and socio-economic characteristics.
The first order derivative of the function f with respect of its k-th 
argument.
G radient of function G.
Villager i’s scale of adoption.
1 .
l
m
n
P i =  PR E M IU M  j
*
Villager i’s scale of adoption which correspond with P- .
Interdependence coefficient, which indicates Villager i’s 
interdependence with Villager j ( j ^ i ) .
Villager i’s interdependence coefficient with respect to himself. 
Especially called Villager i’s independence coefficient.
Number of individualistic socio-economic characteristics.
Number of villagers in the system.
Villager i’s risk-premium.
P. Villager i’s m inim um  risk-premium.
Q-^ Villager i’s interdependence expectation index with respect to Villager
k, i.e., the ra tio  of covariance between Villager i’s expected income 
distribution and Villager k ’s expected income d is tribution expected by 
Villager i to the variance of Villager i’s expected income distribution.
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Qi Villager i ’s interdependence expectation index, weighted average of Q m 
(k i), IE index.
R
» i Villager i ’s Arrow-Pratt individualistic relative risk-aversion index.
S i Subjective relative income level of Villager i.
i
0 - -u
Variance of Villager i’s expected income distribution.
i
o .. 
U
Co-variance between Villager i ’s expected income distribution and  
Villager j ’s income distribution, expected by Villager i.
r 1 A variance-covariance matrix of Villager i’s expectations of all 
villagers’ income levels.
trace(M ) Trace of matrix M , sum of diagonal elements of matrix M .
ui =  u ( x i) Villager i’s independent utility function.
u ’i =  u ’(Xj) Villager i’s independent marginal utility function.
n ” i =  u ” (Xi ) The second-order derivative of Villager i’s independent utility function.
U 1 Utility level of Villager i.
V 1 Villager i ’s utility function, which depends on his income level, Xj, as 
the first argument, and his subjective relative income level, S-, as the 
second argument.
v i
Villager i ’s marginal utility function with respect to the first argument.
v i ,
The second-order derivative of Villager i ’s utility function with respect 
to the first argument.
v 1
2
Villager i’s marginal utility function with respect to  the second 
argument.
v 122
The second-order derivative of Villager i ’s utility function with respect 
to the second argument.
v 112
The second-order derivative of Villager i ’s utility function with respect 
to the first and second arguments.
V A R i( ) Villager i ’s variance operator.
W 1 Villager i ’s interdependence utility function which depends all villagers’
w 1i
income levels, Xj (j =  l ,2 , . . . ,n ) .
Villager i ’s interdependence marginal utility function with respect to
his own income.
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w 1
J
w1.
JJ
w!.
ij
w ü
x i
x i
xl
The second-order d e riva tive  o f V illa g e r i ’s interdependence u t i l i t y  w ith  
respect to  h is own income.
V illa g e r i ’s interdependence m arg ina l u t i l i t y  fu n c tio n  w ith  respect to  
V illa g e r j .
The second-order d e riva tive  o f V illa g e r i ’s interdependence u t i l i t y  w ith  
respect to  V illa g e r j ’s income level.
The second-order d e riva tive  o f V illa g e r i ’s interdependence u t i l i t y  w ith  
respect to  V illa g e r i ’s incom e level and V illa g e r j ’s incom e level.
V illa g e r i ’s interdependence w e igh t w ith  respect to  V illa g e r j .
V illa g e r i ’s independence w e igh t w ith  respect to  V illa g e r i h im self. 
Income level o f V illag e r i. A fte r  page 212, th is  s im p ly  represents his 
present incom e level.
Present incom e level o f V illa g e r i especially before page 212.
V illa g e r i ’s sub jective  average social (v illag e ) income level.
Transpose o f vector X .
x!
xl
Y
Z1
z ik
V illa g e r i ’s expected incom e level.
V illa g e r k ’s expected incom e level, expected by V illa g e r i.
C e rta in ty  equ iva len t vector.
A m a tr ix  o f second-order p a rtia l de riva tive s  o f V illa g e r i ’s 
interdependence u t i l i t y  fu n c tio n , W ,  w ith  respect to  a ll v illa g e rs ’ 
income levels.
V illag e r i ’s k -th  in d iv id u a lis tic  socio-econom ic ch a rac te ris tic  
( k = l,2 , . . . ,m ) .
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E .2  T w o  O th er  S cen a r io s  o f  In te r d e p e n d e n c e  R isk -P r e m iu m
Suppose he receives a  windfall gain with certainty while he expects others  also 
receive the same am ount of windfalls irrespective to the expected income levels of others. 
He th inks th a t  windfalls are equally d is tr ibu ted  am ong others  including himself. Hence
Y  - (P, P, . . .  , i f .
Suppose he has a windfall gain with certain ty  while he expects others also receive 
windfalls, the am ounts  of which are proportionate  to  their expected income levels, like the 
s i tua tion  where the weather often affects all villagers’ production in proportionate  to  the 
size of land. This scenario sounds a little a rb itra ry ,  but M alinvaud’s (1971) “directional 
risk-prem ium ” assumption in a  m ulti-com modity utility function framework is equivalent 
to this scenario. M alinvaud (1971) and Kihlstrom and M irm an (1974) used the 
“directional risk-premium” assumption and derived two different risk-aversion indices. 
K ihlstrom  and M irm an’s index is not applicable to  a utility function which is not strictly 
concave. M alinvaud’s index can be applied to any type of utility function. Person i’s 
ce rta in ty  equivalent vector in this scenario is
(£ -2)
Y  =  ( 1 -  R ) (x],  X'r  . . . ,  X ' J ,
where R is called “risk-premium ra te” .
In the same vein as M alinvaud’s nam ing of this scenario, the first scenario can be 
nam ed the “uni-directional risk-premium” and the second one the “equi-directional risk- 
p rem ium ” . In the following analysis, the “uni-directional risk-prem ium ” and “directional 
risk-prem ium ” are investigated.
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A p p e n d ix  F
A p p e n d ix  t o  C h a p t e r  6
F . l  N e t w o r k  A u to c o r r e la t io n
Erbring and Young (1979) considered several types of contextual effects and 
developed two models: ( l )  the endogenous feedback model, in which the dependent 
variable is assumed to be interdependent, and (2) the network disturbance model in which 
error te rm s are assumed to be in terdependent with each other.
The network disturbance model has the following formulation, with a non-limited 
dependent variable, Y, and explanatory variables (vector), X,
Y  = X  ß  +  e
2
c — p\V( + v  v  Ps 7V(0,<t^7)
where c is a  n-dimensional column vector of error terms, a scalar p is an autocorrelation
param ete r  analogous to a correlation coefficient, and W is the interdependence coefficient
m atrix .  The elements of W are row-normalised, u is a n-dimensional column vector of
2
error term s which has a  normal distribution with its average zero and its variance a ^ I, 
where I is a n x n identity matrix. This model was used by White, Burton and Dow 
(1981) for their study of the sexual division of labour in African agriculture.
W ith this reformulation, true coefficients can be derived from the following equation 
with an appropria te  regression method.
(F.2)
(1 -  f>W)Y = (I-  p\V) Xß  + v, [/ k  :V (o T / )
Transform ing (1 — pW)Y to Y and (1 — pW )X to X , the OLS m ethod can be 
used to  es tim ate  ß  with an appropria te  value of p given. In order to estim ate  ß  and p 
s im ultaneously , a t  least a maximum likelihood method m ust be used. Dow et al. (1984)
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found two problems associated with this network autocorre la tion  model: (1) construction 
of a plausible interdependence coefficient m atrix  W and (2) es tim ation  of the 
autocorre la tion  param eter  p. The first problem has already been solved by using the 
interdependence coefficient m atrix  elicited in C h ap te r  3. Secondly, if there is no 
au tocorrelation , i.e., p =  0, this regression is identical to the first equation in Equation 
(F . l )  of the original regression model, and the OLS m ethod can be used. However, if there 
is au tocorrelation , the network disturbances model has special s tatis tica l properties th a t  
the OLS m ethod lacks. F irst,  a lthough the OLS estim ates  of regression coefficients are 
unbiased, they are more highly dispersed around the true  population param eters  than the 
ML (m axim um  likelihood) estim ates. Second, the OLS estim ates of the sampling 
variances of the regression coefficients will generally underestim ate  the true  variance. 
Hence, with respect to estim ates, underestim ating the variances of the regression 
coefficients will lead to exaggerated a t tr ibu tions  of significance to particu lar  independent 
variables.
T he appropria te  estim ation procedure has not been established for this problem, 
although several network s ta tis tic ians have developed a m axim um  likelihood method 
(M L )1, an itera tive generalised least square (1GLS)2 and an iterative residual regression 
m ethod (IRR)° for non-limited dependent variable models.
^ r d  (1975), Doreian (1980) and Cliff and Ord (1981)
2Ord (1975) and Bodson and Peeters (1975)
^Bodson and Peeters (1975)
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F .2  M o n te -C a r lo  m e th o d  to  te s t  th e  C a n c ia n  D ip
In order to  statistically tes t the following hypothesis for the existence of the 
Cancian  Dip:4
where
: coefficient for the first order polynomial
a2: coefficient for the second order polynomial
a3: coefficient for the third order polynomial
a simple statis tica l  testing m ethod available in s tatis tics  textbooks cannot be used. A
m ethod based on the Monte Carlo method and some matrix m anipula tions has been 
newly formulated  by the author.
The procedure is as follows:
1. C rea te  three standardised unit sets of random numbers.
2. T ransform  them  to non-correlated sets of random  numbers.
3. T ransform  them  again to  sets of random numbers which are correlated in the 
m anner indicated by the correlation m atrix  derived from the estimation 
procedure of the above coefficients (CV option of T obit analysis in the 
SHAZAM creates a variance-covariance m atrix  of the coefficients).
o
4. Calculate  I) from these correlated random numbers and count incidences of 
D > 0 and a., > 0, then calculate the significance level.
The procedure is now explained in detail.
4 If a dependen t variable Yj and explanatory  variable Xj are assumed to have the  following cubic 
rela tionship ,
Yi ~  a3At'3 + a2Xt'2 + a l Xi + a0
for th is  to have a Cancian Dip, the  following derivative, Y j ’ , should have two real roots.
Therefore
—  4(ci2^ — 3aja^) > 0.
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Step 1
Three sets of random  num bers  which are uniformly d is tr ibu ted  between 0 and 1 are 
calculated, and this is repeated ten times to  m ake sums of these random  num bers. By 
dividing the sums by ten , th ree sets of approxim ately  normally d is tr ibu ted  random  
num bers are secured. These are standardised to get normally d is tr ibu ted  random  
num bers with their averages being zero and their s tandard  deviations one. Then a 
correlation m a tr ix  of these random  numbers is constructed. The correlation m a tr ix  is
1 ^12 ^13
^12 1 ^23
^13 ^23 1
=  X X1
where X is a  3 x n m atrix  of three sets of random  numbers (n is the  num ber of 
observations, set arbitrarily  set, for example, a t  1000). Due to  the definition of these 
random  num bers,  the correlation m atrix  is a  real symmetric m atrix .
Step 2
Since the  correlation m atrix  is a real sym m etric  one, there exists an orthogonal 
m atrix , P , which can produce a diagonal m atrix , A, from the correlation m atrix .
A =  P- X P
X
where
Pp'  = I
rfh e  orthogonal m atrix , P, consists of eigen vectors (column vectors) of the  correlation 
m atrix ,  £  . Let a s tandardised eigen vector which corresponds with the i-th eigen value 
of the correlation m atrix , Yj. Therefore, the orthogonal m atrix , P , is
P =  ( YvYr  Y3 )
W ith this orthogonal m atr ix ,  P, a 3 x n m atrix  of completely independent random
5
num bers,  X , can be created from the original m atrix  of random numbers, X, by
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X  = F1 X
Step 3
For testing  the hypothesis which involves three random  num bers which are 
correlated to  a certain degree, these independent random numbers created above m ust be 
modified into correlated random  numbers.
Let R be a correlation m atrix  of three coefficients
1 P 12 P \ o
p \ 2 1 p 2 o
p \ 3 p 2 Z
1
and B be a m atrix , each column of which is an eigen vector of the correlation m atrix  R. 
Suppose a 3 x 3 m atrix  Q which satisfies
Z = Q  X
where Z is a  3 x n matrix of standardised vectors of three random numbers each of which 
is correlated  with others in the m anner shown in the correlation m atrix , R. Therefore, the 
correlation m atrix  can be w rit ten  as follows:
R = Z Z* =  Q X  (Q X ) 1 =  Q XX1 Q‘ = Q
for X has already been s tandard ised  ( X  X — I ).
On the o ther hand, there are the following relationship between ( l )  B, the m atrix  of 
eigen vectors of R. which is an orthogonal m atrix , and (2) A, a diagonal m atrix  of eigen 
values:
R B = B A, and B Bl = 1, 
therefore,
R = R B B ' 1 = B A B r i = B A B t
and
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Q Q l = B  A &  =  B  A 1/ 2 A 1/ 2 B l 
=  B  A 1/ 2 ( B  A 1! 2 Y
where A ^ / 2 is a  diagonal m atrix  of square roots of the eigen values. Then,
Q  =  B  A 1/ 2.
W ith th is  m atrix  Q, random  numbers which correlate with each other in the certain 
m anner indicated by the correlation matrix R can be created.
Step 4
From  these new sets of designed random  numbers, the values of — 3 a^ a ,
o
are calculated , co-occurrences of D > 0 and a^ > 0 are counted. As usual, 5 percent level 
is taken  for the criterion.
The whole procedure is conducted by the F O R T R A N  program me called 
C H E C K .F O R  created by the au thor,  and the programme is shown in the next section.
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F.3 F O R T R A N  program m e C H E C K .FOR
C—=—==——— =—————— ——===——==:==:——=——————==—=—————————————=—==——
C EXISTENCE OF CANCIAN DIP
C ------------------------
C
C STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NON LINEAR COMBINATION OF
C THREE REGRESSION-COEFFICIENTS BY A MONTE-CARLO METHOD
C
C XI: COEFFICIENT OF 1-ST ORDER
C X2: COEFFICIENT OF 2-ND ORDER
C X3: COEFFICIENT OF 3-RD ORDER
C
C HYPOTHESIS: X2*X2-3*X1*X3 > O AND X3 > O
C
C CREATED BY Y0ICHIR0 HIGUCHI
C 23 SEPTEMBER 1985
C ECONOMICS RSPacS AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
C = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
PARAMETER NMAX=1000
DOUBLE PRECISION Xl(NMAX),X2(NMAX),X3(NMAX),TEST(NMAX),U(3,3), 
$ LAMDAl,LAMDA2,LAMDA3,C0V12,C0V13,C0V23,
$ SD1,SD2,SD3,C1,C2,C3,RAVE,RSD,RMAX,RMIN,CXI,CX2,CX3,
$ SUMXl,SUMX2,SUMX3,C0R12,COR13,C0R23 
N=NMAX
C-----------------------------------------------------------------------
C INPUTSC--------------
TYPE 200
200 FORMAT( ’ REGRESSION-COEFFICIENT 1 = , $ )ACCEPT *, 
TYPE 2001
COEFFl
2001 FORMAT( ’ T-RATIO OF REGRESSION-COEFFICIENT 1 = , $ )
ACCEPT *, 
TYPE 201
Tl
201 FORMAT( ’ REGRESSION-COEFFICIENT 2 = , $ )ACCEPT *, 
TYPE 2002
C0EFF2
2002 FORMAT( ’ T-RATIO OF REGRESSION-COEFFICIENT 2 = , $ )
ACCEPT *, 
TYPE 2011
T2
2011 FORMAT( ’ REGRESSION-COEFFICIENT 3 , $ )
ACCEPT *,C0EFF3
TYPE 2003
2003 FORMAT( ’ T-RATIO OF REGRESSION-COEFFICIENT 3 = , $ )
ACCEPT *, 
TYPE 202
T3
202 FORMAT( ’ VALUE TO BE TESTED , $ )
ACCEPT *,TESTRA
TYPE 601
601 FORMAT( ’ CORRELATION BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS 1 & 2 _ » ,$ )ACCEPT *, 
TYPE 611
C0R12
611 FORMAT( ’ CORRELATION BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS 1 fc 3 _ » ,$ )
ACCEPT *, 
TYPE 62
C0R13
62 FORMAT( ’ CORRELATION BETWEEN COEFFICIENTS 2 k 3 —  * ,$ )
ACCEPT *,C0R23
c ITERATIONS 10 TIMES
C
DO 1 KK=1,10
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ISEED=NMAX*(KK-l)
TYPE 501,ISEED
501 FORMAT ( ’ RANDOM SEED (INTEGER) = ’,17)
DO 90 1=1,SEED
R=RANS(l)
90 CONTINUE
C------------------------------------------------
C CREATE NORMAL UNIT RANDOM NUMBERS N(0,l)
C------------------------------------------------
DO 100 1=1,N
X1(I)=0 
X2(I)=0 
X3(I)=0 
DO 120 J=1,10
Xl(I)=Xl(I)+RANS(O)
X2(I)=X2(I)+RANS(l)
X3(I)=X3(I)+RANS(2)
120 CONTINUE
X1(I)=X1(I)/10 
X2(I)=X2(I)/10 
X3(I)=X3(I)/10
100 CONTINUEc-----------------------------------------------------------
C CHECK CORRELATIONS AMONG RANDOM NUMBERSC------------------------------------------------
CALL STAND(Xl,X2,X3,N,C0V12,C0V13,C0V23)
C----------------------------------------------------------------------
C CONVERT THEM TO NON-CORRELATED RANDOM NUMBERS
C AND TEST NON-CORRELATIONS
C------------------------------------------------------------------
CALL EIGEN(C0V12,C0V13,C0V23,U,LAMDA1,LAMDA2,LAMDA3)
CALL TESTl(C0V12,C0V13,C0V23,U)
DO H O  1 = 1, N
Dl=Xl(I)*U(l,l)+X2(I)*U(2,l)+X3(I)*U(3,l) 
D2=X1(I)*U(1,2)+X2(I)*U(2,2)+X3(I)*U(3,2)
D3=Xl(I)*U(1,3)+X2(I)*U(2,3)+X3(I)*U(3,3)
Xl (I)=D1 
X2(I)=D2 
X3(I)=D3
llO CONTINUE
CALL STAND(Xl,X2,X3,N,C0V12,C0V13,C0V23)
TYPE *,* FINISHED MAKING NON-CORRELATED RANDOM VARIABLES’
C----------------------------------------------------------------------
C CONVERT NON-CORRELATED RANDOM NUMBERS TO CORRELATED
C RANDOM NUMBERSC----------------------------------------------------------------------
TYPE *,’CONVERT NON-CORRELATED RANDOMS TO CORRELATED RANDOMS’
CALL EIGEN(C0R12,C0R13,C0R23,U ,LAMDAl,LAMDA2,LAMDA3)
CALL TEST2(C0R12,C0R13,C0R23,U ,LAMDAl,LAMDA2,LAMDA3)
U(1,1)=U(1,1)*DSQRT(LAMDA1)
U(1,2)=U(l,2)*DSQRT(LAMDA2)
U(l,3)=U(l,3)*DSQRT(LAMDA3)
U(2,l)=U(2,l)*DSQRT(LAMDAl)
U(2,2)=U(2,2)*DSQRT(LAMDA2)
U(2,3)=U(2,3)+DSQRT(LAMDA3)
no
n
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U(3,l)=U(3,l)*DSQRT(LAMDAl)
U(3,2)=U(3,2)*DSQRT(LAMDA2)
U(3,3)=U(3,3)*DSQRT(LAMDA3)
DO 111 1=1,N
Dl=Xl(I)*U(l,l)+X2(I)*U(1,2)+X3(I)*U(1,3)
D2=X1(I)*U(2,l)+X2(I)*U(2,2)+X3(I)*U(2,3)
D3=X1(I)*U(3,1)+X2(I)*U(3,2)+X3(I)*U(3,3)
X1(I)=D1
X2(I)=D2
X3(I)=D3
111 CONTINUE
CALL STAND(XI,X2,X3,N ,C0V12,C0V13,C0V23)
TYPE FINISHED MAKING CORRELATED RANDOMS’
CALCULATE THE VALUES TO BE TESTED
TYPE *,’ START CALCULATING THE VALUES TO BE TESTED’ 
SDl^ABS(COEFFl/Tl)
SD2=ABS(COEFF2/T2)
SD3=ABS(COEFF3/T3)
Cl=0
C2=0
C3-0
RAVE=0
RSD=0
RMAX=0
RMIN=0
CXl=0
CX2=0
CX3=0
SUMXl=0
SUMX2=0
SUMX3=0
DO 215 1=1,N
X1(I)=X1(I)*SD1+C0EFF1 
X2(I)=X2(I)*SD2+COEFF2 
X3(I)=X3(I)+SD3+COEFF3 
SUMX1=SUMX1+Xl(I)
SUMX2=SUMX2+X2(I)
SUMX3=SUMX3+X3(I)
215 CONTINUE 
AVEX1=SUMX1/N 
AVEX2=SUMX2/N 
AVEX3=SUMX3/N 
V1=0
V2=0
V3=0
COV12=0
COV13=0
COV23=0
DO 216 1=1,N
Vl=Vl+(XI(I)-AVEXl)**2 
V2=V2+(X2(I)-AVEX2)**2 
V3=V3+(X3(I)-AVEX3)**2
C0V12=C0V12+(XI(I)-AVEXl)*(X2(I)-AVEX2) 
C0V13=C0V13+(XI(I)-AVEXl)*(X3(I)-AVEX3) 
COV23=COV23+(X2(I)-AVEX2)*(X3(I)-AVEX3)
216 CONTINUE 
Vl=Vl/(N-l)
V2=V2/(N-1)
V3=V3/(N-l)
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C0V12=C0V12/(N-l)
C0V13=C0V13/(N-1)
C0V23=C0V23/(N-l)
R12=C0V12/SQRT(V1*V2)
R13=C0V13/SQRT(V1*V3)
R23=C0V23/SQRT(V2+V3)
TYPE 217,V1,V2,V3,C0V12,C0V13,C0V23,R12,R13,R23
FORMAT(IX,’ VARIANCE OF BETA-1 = ’,G15.6/
$ IX, ’ VARIANCE OF BETA-2 = ’,G15.6/
$ IX, ’ VARIANCE OF BETA-3 = ’ ,G15.6/
$ IX, ’ COVARIANCE 1 & 2 = ’,G15.6/
$ IX, ’ COVARIANCE 1 k 3 = ’ , G15.6/
$ IX, ’ COVARIANCE 2 A 3 = ’ ,G15.6/
$ IX,’ CORRELATION COEFF. 1 t 2 = ’,G15.6/
$ IX, ’ CORRELATION COEFF. 1 k 3 = ’,G15.6/
$ IX, ’ CORRELATION COEFF. 2 k 3 = ’,G15.6)
DO 220 1=1,N
IF(COEFFl.GE.O) THEN
IF(XI(I).LT.O) CX1=CX1+1
ELSE
IF(Xl(I).GT.O) CX1=CX1+1
END IF
IF(C0EFF2.GE.O) THEN
IF(X2(I).LT.O) CX2=CX2+1
ELSE
IF(X2(I).GT.O) CX2=CX2+1
END IF
IF(C0EFF3.GE.O) THEN
IF(X3(I).LT.O) CX3=CX3+1
ELSE
IF(X3(I).GT.O) CX3=CX3+1
END IF
C--HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED-------------------------------
TEST(I)=X2(I)*X2(I)-3.*Xl(I)*X3(I)
IF((TEST(I).GT.TESTRA).AND.(X3(I).GT.O)) C2=C2+1
C----------------------------------------------------------
c------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF(RMAX.LT.TEST(I)) RMAX=TEST(I)
IF(RMIN.GT.TEST(I)) RMIN=TEST(I) 
RAVE=RAVE+TEST(I)
RSD=RSD+TEST(I)+TEST(I)
220 CONTINUE
TYPE 230,Tl,2*CXl/N*100,T2,2*CX2/N*100,T3,2*CX3/N*100
230 FORMAT(IX,’COEFFICIENT-1 T-RATIO = ’,G15.6,’ 7. = ’ ,G15.6/
$ IX,’COEFFICIENT-2 T-RATIO = ’,G15.6,’ 7 - ’,G15.6/
$ IX,’COEFFICIENT-3 T-RATIO = ’,G15.6,’ 7 = ’,G15.6)
5556 RAVE=RAVE/N
RSD=SQRT((RSD-N*RAVE*RAVE)/(N-l))
TYPE 400,RAVE,RSD., RMIN.RMAX
FORMAT( ’ AVERAGE VALUE = ’,G15.6/
$ ’ SD = ’,G15.6/
$ ’ MIN = ’,G15.6/
$ ’ MAX = ’,G15.6)
5557 C2=C2/N*100
TYPE 300,KK,TESTRA,C2 
WRITE (6,300)KK,TESTRA,C2
300 FORMAT(IX,’ITERATION NO.’,13,’ COMBINED PROB: (D-SQUARE >
$ F5.2,’ AND X3 > O ) =’,F10.4,'%’)C---------------------------------------------------------------
C ITERATION ENDS
C 
1 CONTINUE
n 
n 
o
999 STOP
END
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SUBROUTINE FOR STANDARDISATION OF RANDOM NUMBERS
SUBROUTINE STAND(XX1,XX2,XX3,N ,CR12,CR13,CR23)
DOUBLE PRECISION XXl(N),XX2(N),XX3(N),CR12,CR13,CR23,
$ SUMX1,SUMX2,SUMX3,SDX1,SDX2,SDX3,AVEX1,AVEX2,AVEX3
SUMX1=0 
SUMX2=0 
SUMX3=0 
SDX1=0 
SDX2=0 
SDX3=0
DO 140 1=1,N
SUMX1=SUMX1+XXl(I)
SUMX2=SUMX2+XX2(I)
SUMX3=SUMX3+XX3(I)
SDXl=SDXl+XXl(I)*XX1(I)
SDX2=SDX2+XX2(I)*XX2(I)
SDX3=SDX3+XX3(I)*XX3(I)
140 CONTINUE
AVEX1=SUMX1/N
AVEX2=SUMX2/N
AVEX3=SUMX3/N
SDX1=SDX1-N+AVEXl*AVEX1
SDX2=SDX2-N*AVEX2*AVEX2
SDX3=SDX3-N*AVEX3*AVEX3
SDX1=SQRT(SDXl/(N-l))
SDX2=SQRT(SDX2/(N-l))
SDX3=SQRT(SDX3/(N-l))
DO 180 1=1,N
XX1(I)=(XXI(I)-AVEXl)/SDXl 
XX2(I)=(XX2(I)-AVEX2)/SDX2 
XX3(I)=(XX3(I)-AVEX3)/SDX3
180 CONTINUE 
CR12=0 
CR13=0 
CR23=0
DO 181 1 = 1,N
CR12=CR12+XX1(I)*XX2(I)
CR13=CR13+XX1(I)*XX3(I)
CR23=CR23+XX2(I)*XX3(I)
181 CONTINUE 
CR12=CR12/(N-1)
CR13=CR13/(N-l)
CR23=CR23/(N-1)
TYPE 182,CR12
182 FORMAT( ’ CORRELATION BETWEEN RANDOMl k 2 = ’,F10.8)
TYPE 183,CR13
183 FORMAT( ’ CORRELATION BETWEEN RANDOMl k 3 = ’,F10.8)
TYPE 184,CR23
184 FORMAT( ’ CORRELATION BETWEEN RAND0M2 k 3 =’,F10.8)
TYPE END OF SUBROUTINE STAND(STANDARDISATION)’
5558 RETURN
END
C-------------------------------------------------------------------
C SUBROUTINE FOR CALCULATION OF EIGEN VALUES AND EIGEN VECTORS
C ---REAL SYMMETRIC MATRIXC-------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBROUTINE EIGEN(CR12,CR13,CR23,UU,L1,L2,L3)
DOUBLE PRECISION A (3,3),UU(3,3),Ll,L2,L3,
CR12,CR13,CR23,EPS,AMAX,W ,Al,A2,A3,$
11
10
20
23
24
25
40
41
42
45
53
54
55
365
$ T , Z,ZZ,C ,S ,AW, AZ,ASC2
A(l*l)-1
A(2,2)=l 
A (3,3)=1 
A (1,2)=CR12 
A (1,3)=CR13 
A (2,1)=CR12 
A (2,3)=CR23 
A (3,1)=CR13 
A(3,2)=CR23 
EPS=0.000000001 
DO 10 1=1,3
DO 11 J=1,3
UU(I,J)=0.0
CONTINUE
UU(I,I)=1.0
CONTINUE 
Nl=3-1 
K0UT=O 
AMAX=0 
DO 25 1=1,Nl
11=1+1
DO 24 J=I1,3
W=ABS(A(I,J) )
IF(AMAX-W) 23,24,24
AMAX=W
K=I
L=J
CONTINUE
CONTINUE
IF(EPS-AMAX) 40,50,50
K0UT=K0UT+1
A1=A(K,K)
A2=A(L,L)
A3=A(K,L)
W=(A1-A2)*0.5
IF(ABS(W)-AMAX) 42,41,41
W=A3/W
T=W/(SQRT(W*W+1.0)+1.0)
GOTO 45 
W=W/A3
Z=SIGN(SQRT(W+W+1.0),W)+W 
T=1.0/Z 
ZZ=T*T+1.0 
C=SQRT(1.O/ZZ)
S=T*C
DO 55 1=1,3
AW=UU(I,K)
AZ=UU(I,L)
UU(I,K)=AW*C+AZ*S 
UU(I,L)=-AW*S+AZ*C 
IF(I-K) 53,55,53 
IF(I-L) 54,55,54 
AW=A(I,K)
AZ=A(I,L)
A(I,K)=AW*C+AZ*S 
A(I,L)=-AW*S+AZ*C 
A(K,I)=A(I,K)
A(L,I)=A(I,L)
CONTINUE 
ASC2=2.0*A3*S*C 
A(K,K)=A1*C* *2+A2*S* + 2+ASC2 
A(L,L)=A1*S* *2+A2*C* +2-ASC2
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A(K,L)=0 
A (L, K)=0 
GOTO 20
50 TYPE * , ’EIGEN VALUES’
TYPE 60,(I,A(I,I),1=1,3)
60 FORMAT(1H ,6HLAMDA(,12,2H) =,F13.9)
L1=A(1,1)
L2=A(2,2)
L3=A(3,3)
TYPE *,’EIGEN VECTORS’
TYPE 61,(J,(UU(I,J),1=1,3),J=1,3)
61 FORMAT(1H ,2HX(,12,2H)=,3F13.9)
TYPE *,’NUMBER OF ITERATIONS = ’,KOUT 
TYPE *,’END OF SUBROUTINE EIGEN’
5559 RETURN 
END
C---------------------------------------------------------------
C SUBROUTINE FOR TESTING MATRIX MANIPULATION - 1
C---------------------------------------------------------------
SUBROUTINE TESTl(CR12,CR13,CR23,UU)
DOUBLE PRECISION A(3,3),UU(3,3),B(3,3),C(3,3)
A(l,l)=l 
A (2,2)=1 
A (3,3)=1 
A (1,2)=CR12 
A(l,3)=CR13 
A (2,l)=CR12 
A (2,3)=CR23 
A(3,1)=CR13 
A (3,2)=CR23 
DO 10 1=1,3 
DO 10 J=l,3 
B(I,J)=0 
DO 10 K=l,3
B(I,J)=B(I,J)+A(I,K)*UU(K,J)
10 CONTINUE
DO 20 1=1,3 
DO 20 J=1,3 
C(I,J)=0 
DO 20 K=1,3
C(I,J)=C(I,J)+UU(K,I)*B(K,J)
20 CONTINUE
TYPE 30,((C(I,J),J=l,3),1=1,3)
30 FORMAT(IX,3F10.6)
TYPE *,’END OF SUBROUTINE TESTl’
5560 RETURN 
END
C--------------------- -----------------------------------------
C SUBROUTINE FOR TESTING MATRIX MANIPULATION - 2
C---------------------------------------------------------------
SUBROUTINE TEST2(CR12,CR13,CR23,UU,Ll,L2,L3)
DOUBLE PRECISION A(3,3),UU(3,3),B(3,3),C(3,3),L1,L2,L3
A (1,l) =L1
A(2,2)=L2
A(3,3)=L3
A (1,2)=0
A (1,3)=0
A (2,l)=0
A (2,3)=0
A(3,1)=0
A (3,2)=0
DO 10 1=1,3
DO 10 J=1,3
367
B (I,J) =0 
DO 10 K=1,3
B(I,J)=B(I,J)+A(I,K)*UU( J,K)
10 CONTINUE
DO 20 1=1,3 
DO 20 J=1,3 
C(I,J)=0 
DO 20 K=1,3
C(I,J)=C(I,J)+UU(I,K)*B(K,J)
20 CONTINUE
TYPE 30,((C(I,J),J=l,3),1=1,3)
30 FORMAT(IX,3F10.6)
TYPE *,’END OF SUBROUTINE TEST2’
5561 RETURN
END
